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Preface
The conference on China and Global Climate Change was held at Lingnan University, Hong
Kong, from 18-19 June 2009. About 100 scholars from around the world participated in the
conference. They served in various capacities, including as presenters, researchers, paper
writers and/or discussants. The conference was jointly organized and sponsored by Lingnan
University's Centre for Asian Pacific Studies (CAPS) and its Environmental Studies
Programme (ESP). The objective of the conference was to examine the problem of how to
reconcile China's growing greenhouse gas emissions with the Chinese government's
unwillingness (so far) to join binding international commitments to reduce those emissions.
Since the start of international negotiations on climate change in the 1980s, the
Chinese government has refused to be bound by commitments to limit its pollution of the
atmosphere. This refusal is based on the historical responsibility of the world's wealthy
countries for past emissions and China's status as a developing country. President Hu Jintao
recently reaffirmed that China will not commit to mandatory emissions-reduction targets
before the world's wealthy countries take the lead in addressing global climate change. He
has also called on affluent countries to pay for emissions limitations in China and other
developing countries.
Alongside these Chinese concerns about justice and historical responsibility is the
new reality that China has become the largest national source of pollution causing climate
change. Without China's involvement, notably limitations in its future greenhouse gas
emissions, international efforts to mitigate global warming substantially are unlikely to
succeed. This comes against the backdrop of increasing concerns among atmospheric
scientists that global warming is happening more quickly than predicted, that climate change
will be more severe than anticipated, and that the poorest countries and people of the world
will experience monumental suffering in coming decades as a consequence.
Thus the conference aimed to assess how China's longstanding concerns about
international fairness and justice can be squared against the pressing need for an effective
international regime that limits greenhouse gas emissions – including those from China.
Conference Themes and Questions
Major themes underlying the conference included (1) practical considerations, including the
latest findings on greenhouse gas emissions and climate change impacts, including in China;
(2) ethical considerations, including questions of fairness, justice and human rights related to
climate change and China's role; and (3) political considerations, including issues related to
the domestic and international politics of climate change, the international climate change
negotiations, and the political significance in other countries of China's climate change
diplomacy and policies. The conference participants aimed to address these and other
questions related to China and global climate change:
Is there any common ground between China's concern with development and
international justice, on one hand, and growing greenhouse gas emissions and the
worsening problem of climate change, on the other?
What must the developed countries do to persuade the Chinese government to commit
to greenhouse gas limitations, and eventually reductions, in the future? How can they
facilitate those limitations?
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Does China's newfound wealth undermine the argument that it should not be required
to limit its greenhouse gas emissions? What ethical arguments bolster or bring into
question China's reluctance to restrain emissions?
How do the adverse impacts of climate change for China's poorest people, and indeed
for poor people throughout the developing world, affect China's obligations? Does
China have obligations to poorer countries just as wealthier countries have obligations
to China?
How significant is it, practically, ethically and politically, that China is going down
the same fossil-fuel development path as the West just as scientists are warning of the
severe consequences of doing so? Does it matter that China's economic emergence
has occurred against the backdrop of improving climate science, whereas the West
was historically unaware that its development path was unsustainable?
Should China's new wealthy classes be allowed to hide behind China's developingcountry status to avoid lifestyle changes increasingly demanded of most people,
including poor ones, in the world's developed countries?
How is the failure of Western governments to implement major cuts in greenhouse
gases a political issue in China? Do China's positions on climate change make it more
difficult for developed-country governments to persuade their constituents to accept
the major cuts in greenhouse gas emissions that will be required to address climate
change?
Are workable and affordable technical solutions available to allow China to take a
different development path so that its people can enjoy the fruits of modernity without
causing monumental harm to the global environment? How can the West encourage
and support those solutions?
Given that China and the United States are the largest national sources of greenhouse
gas pollution, albeit with very different capabilities and historical responsibilities,
how might they work together to protect the atmospheric commons?
Participants in the conference approached these and related questions from a variety
of epistemological, empirical and ontological perspectives. While their conclusions varied,
there was a strong consensus among delegates in attendance that it is vitally important to
understand China's role in efforts to address climate change. The papers that comprise these
proceedings make a major contribution to developing and advancing that understanding at a
crucial stage in international efforts to curb and respond to atmospheric pollution.1
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Introduction
Paul G. Harris1
In December 2009, diplomats will meet in Copenhagen to finalize what many hope will be a
strong agreement to fight global warming and climate change. They will grapple with how to
address these problems in light of new scientific findings showing that the adverse effects of
global warming are happening sooner and are more severe than scientists predicted only a
year or two ago. Some countries, notably in Europe, have started to take serious steps to limit
and in several cases reduce their emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.
However, those efforts have been very slow in coming, and any politically realistic scenarios
for action by industrialized countries in the next decade or two will be swamped by
increasing emissions from the developing world.
One reason for the world's slow and weak response to climate change is a game of
"you go first" being played between rich and poor countries, particularly between China and
the United States. Both of these latter countries now agree that much more needs to be done.
The United States no longer denies the problem, and China has come to acknowledge its
major role. At the same time, China rightly expects the United States and other wealthy
countries to do much more to reduce their pollution and provide aid to help developing
countries grow more sustainably and cope with the effects of climate change. After all,
China's average per capita emissions of greenhouse gases remain well below those in the
developed world.
However, owing to its large population and rapid economic growth, China's emissions
are ballooning. It has overtaken the United States to become the most polluting country in the
world, and within the next twenty years or so its emissions of carbon dioxide will account for
nearly one-third of the global total.
Three Dilemmas
How can the world reconcile China's new status as the largest polluter of the atmosphere with
its justifiable expectations for continued economic development? In answering this question,
we might start by thinking about three dilemmas presented by a rising China:
A Practical Dilemma
China's efforts to limit its carbon dioxide emissions, while commendable, are nowhere near
enough to actually start reducing national emissions. Pollution will increase, albeit at a
somewhat slower rate, as China's economy grows. Without much more robust action by
China in the near future, efforts in the West to prevent the worst effects of climate change
will fail. Industrialized countries are understandably not enthusiastic about doing what is
necessary, including implementing economically and politically disruptive policies at home,
if their efforts will be in vain. Thus, avoiding concrete and measurable action is no longer a
practical option for China – at least not if the world is to make substantial progress in fighting
climate change this century.
An Ethical Dilemma
China has argued for decades that developing countries should not be required to limit their
development to fix a problem caused by the industrialized world. Its argument that rich
1
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countries should substantially reduce their greenhouse pollution and provide developing
countries with aid to address climate change seems unassailable. The rich countries caused
the problem and they ought to fix it before requiring developing countries to act. But this
argument applies only if we think narrowly in terms of governments and states. If we think in
terms of people, China's argument is much weaker. After all, many millions of Chinese are
now living affluent lifestyles akin to those of people in the West. If it is wrong for Londoners
and New Yorkers to pollute the atmosphere, it must be wrong for affluent people in Hong
Kong and Shanghai to do so, too.2
A Political Dilemma
While industrialized countries are indeed responsible for most of the climate change problem
today, millions of affluent Chinese are responsible for much of the problem in the future. It
may be politically impossible for Western governments to ask their citizens to change their
lifestyles substantially, and to pay more for energy, when those people are bombarded with
television images of Chinese joining the global consumer class – something for which the
Chinese government is rightly proud, but which has profoundly negative consequences for
the global environment.
Beijing's Leadership?
How can we escape these dilemmas? The solution to the "you go first" mentality of climate
change diplomacy may be found in an acknowledgment by Beijing that not all Chinese are
the same. Some of them have a responsibility to act now to fight climate change even if
China as a state continues to reject such a responsibility. Put another way, all of China need
not wait until Americans and Australians go first. Affluent people in China can act alongside
the majority of Americans and Australians. Most Chinese people will continue to use more
energy, as is their right, but the most affluent among them will have to cut back alongside
most Westerners.
China can be a leader on climate change without limiting its development. By
formally agreeing to have some of its most well off people act in the fight against climate
change, China can break the diplomatic deadlock and remove the last excuse that Western
governments have used to avoid fulfilling their responsibilities. By doing so, Beijing would
send a powerful message around the world
Thus Beijing may hold the key to a future in which the Earth's climate is more benign
than many scientists fear – but only if affluent people in China accept that they are part of the
problem.

2
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Global Sustainability, Climate Change and China:
The Need for a New Paradigm for International Cooperation
Mukul Sanwal1
Abstract
The basic assumptions of global environmental sustainability around international
cooperation that were laid out fifty years ago no longer hold. This common understanding
was based on the fact of the historical responsibility of developed countries for causing the
pollution – developed countries would do whatever has to be done and support developing
countries through provision of financial resources and technology. Therefore, to ensure
global sustainability, we have to seriously consider whether adopting a defensive posture in
the ongoing climate negotiations is the best policy or, with the balance of economic power
shifting out of the United States and Europe to Asia, the time has come for countries like
China to design a different paradigm for sustainable development.
Achieving a global consensus to meet the challenge of climate change is an issue that
is currently being debated. The lack of progress relates to the design and implementation of
the rules that have been established to reflect the historical responsibility of industrialised
countries for global pollution. The gap between concern for the environment and the nature
and scope of the design and implementation of the actions – the way the problem has been
defined, arrangements for multilateral cooperation designed and implementation sought
through the market – has led to a situation where international cooperation is seen in terms of
burden sharing. Consequently, the basic assumptions of global environmental sustainability
that developed countries will do whatever has to be done and international cooperation will
support actions in developing countries, laid out fifty years ago, no longer hold. In fact, by
framing the issue in terms of responses to international commitments, such negotiations not
only lead to inconclusive debate but also serve to stifle innovative solutions based on national
circumstances.
This paper analyses the implications of the historical responsibility of developed
countries in causing the global problem of climate change and its adverse effects in the
context of the current impasse in finding a global consensus to deal with the challenge of
climate change. The paper is in three parts. Part I highlights the gap between the rhetoric of
developed countries in their concern for the global environment and the reality of their
actions in designing the rules, establishing institutions and implementing actions. Part II of
the paper suggests policy drivers for global sustainability, based on current emission trends
that focus on modifying consumption patterns and recognising ecological services as key
elements of global sustainability. In this framework international cooperation would be based
on designing new institutions to support technology development and transfer to respond to
the scale and speed required to meet the challenge, instead of the current focus on
international trade. In the last part of the paper a new paradigm is proposed for a global
consensus where patterns of resource use will have to be common for all countries.
I.
Climate Change in The Context of Sustainable Development
A better understanding is emerging of what sustainable development means, driven largely
by the intensive academic research, business concern and policy experience around climate
change. Current research trends on how to meet global challenges focus on societal dynamics
as both the root of environmental problems and the potential solution to them (IHDP, 2007).
1
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Environmental problems are no longer defined as discrete problems, but are increasingly
being understood as symptoms of a particular development path.
Seen from this perspective, from an effectiveness point of view, the choice is not
between preservation and exploitation of nature, and there is widespread disappointment with
the conventional approach to conservation and pollution based on command-and-control
promoted during the 1980s and 1990s. From an equity point of view, the current concern is
not so much over the sovereign right to exploit natural resources but rather on the
consequences of institutional patterns of resource use that would have to be common for all
countries. Clearly, the way the issue continues to be framed only around the environment is a
major reason why effective solutions have not emerged.
According to recently released UN data for the European Commission, emissions
from the energy sector, accounting for 80 per cent of total GHG emissions, increased by 2.2
per cent in the period 1990 and 2006 – transportation emissions increased 25.8 per cent and
emissions from energy industries by 3.7 per cent (UNFCCC, 2009), despite its emissions
trading scheme, and emissions in Japan and the United States have should double digit
growth. On the other hand, the approach adopted by China focuses on activities that generate
the pollution. Placing resource conservation, environmental protection and economic
development on equal footing is showing good progress. The 11th Five year Plan of China
(2006-2010) has set a target to reduce energy use per unit of GDP by 20 per cent by 2010
compared to 2005, China has more efficient coal fired plants than the United States and is
becoming the major world market for such plants, and also for renewable energy (IEA,
2009). On World Environment Day China issued a nationwide call for a “low carbon
lifestyle”. Against these achievements, the continuing in-action, even in those developed
countries who are championing global sustainability, means that we need to question the
assumption in the international relations literature that countries are seeking a fair outcome in
the on-going negotiations.
Actions by all countries are to be taken within the framework of the rights and
obligations established by the Climate Change Convention, negotiated in 1992, which
requires developed countries to take the lead and to provide technology and financial
resources to enable measures to be taken by developing countries. Previous negotiations on
climate change have picked the low-hanging fruit available to developed countries, and as
considerations of historical responsibility and global social justice for sustainable
development are brought to the fore by developing countries, we may well have reached the
end of the line for arriving at a global consensus under the current framework. We need to
identify why the current regime has not worked, and what might be done about it.
The time has come to rethink the current model for international cooperation that
focuses solely on national emissions rather than on the activities that generate those
emissions. Current approaches to climate change do not address the essential drivers of the
emissions - the individual citizen. The missing element can be provided by a shared vision
where patterns of resource use have to be common for all countries.
The Missing Element of Equity
A global response to meet the challenge of climate change raises questions as to how the
burden of reducing the threat should be shared among nations throughout the world, given
that they have different responsibilities for causing the problem and different vulnerabilities
to harm caused by climate change.
The tension between industrialized and developing countries over global, as distinct
from local, environmental concerns goes back to the Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment in 1972. At that time the argument was made that population growth in
developing countries would lead to environmental catastrophe. At the Rio Conference on
4

Environment and Development in 1992, when the Convention on Climate Change was
negotiated, the issue was defined as one of production patterns, with rising industrial
emissions of greenhouse gases in developing countries leading to global warming, and
catastrophe. Industrial emissions in industrialized countries have remained steady since 1990,
since they had completed development of their infrastructure and had begun shifting to
services as the engine of economic growth. Since industrialization was just getting way in
developing countries, the finger continued to point at them.
Viewing climate change and its adverse effects through the prism of justice and
human rights, rather than only through the lens of science and economics, reveals a very
different picture to the popular version of polar bears on ice floes in danger of extinction and
smokestacks clouding the sky. The dominant view in developing countries is of one billion
citizens lacking access to modern electricity, and an equal number suffering from
increasingly more prolonged drought. For example, Darfur is already experiencing the
catastrophic adverse effects of climate change.
A shared global vision of countries at different levels of development – per capita
GDP as well as emissions – must have environmentally sustainable global growth as the
central objective, with carbon management as a result and not the other way round. On a percapita basis, developed countries emit almost three times as much carbon dioxide as the
world average and about six times more than in developing countries. The global goal should
target consumption and not production patterns, with the per capita emissions of developed
countries coming below the world average within the next twenty years, as a first step.
Yet, pressure continues to mount on developing countries to take on commitments to
reduce emissions of carbon dioxide because of their strong economic growth. These
initiatives ignore the provisions of the Climate Convention, in particular, Article 4.7, which
states that “the extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their
commitments under the convention will depend on the effective implementation by
developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial
resources and transfer of technology and will fully take into account that economic and social
development and eradication of poverty are the first and overriding priorities of the
developing country parties”. That “the Parties have a right to, and should promote,
sustainable development” (Article 3.4) is one of the principles of the Convention.
While considerable progress has been made at the global level in identifying issues
that are of common concern, even after forty years of discourse, debate and discussion,
considerably less progress has been made in developing a shared conceptualisation of how to
deal with these issues in the North-South context. This topic arises in every serious
international discussion in the context of implementing multilateral environmental
agreements, and is a source of significant tension.
The Political Bias in The Way Sustainability has Been Framed
The nature and scope of the problem of global sustainability has long been recognized, but
not acted upon because of political considerations. The report ‘US Priority Interests in the
Environmental Activities of International Organizations’, prepared by the Committee on
International Environmental Affairs of the State Department, in the run-up to the first United
Conference on the Environment in 1970, noted that
“Long range policy planning to cope with global environmental problems must take account
of the total ecological burden. This burden tends to increase with population growth and with
the level of economic activity, whereas the capacity of the environment to provide essential
inputs to production and to absorb unwanted outputs from consumption is fundamentally
limited. The problem with managing total ecological burden will remain even after world
5

population is stabilized. Controlling that burden by systematic reduction in per capita
production of goods and services would be politically unacceptable. A concerted effort is
needed to orient technology towards making human demands upon the environment less
severe” (italics added) (State Department, 2005 - 1).
As the annual publication of The World Watch Institute observes, changing lifestyles
will also be necessary, “as the world’s climate cannot be saved by technology alone. The way
we live will have to change as well…..the things we may need to learn to live without –
oversized cars and houses, status based consumption, easy and cheap world travel, meat with
every meal, disposable everything – are not necessities or in most cases what makes people
happy” (State of the World, 2009) .
Despite the scientific evidence that climate change is really a problem of the
ecological burden of developed country per capita consumption and production patterns, the
issue has been framed in terms of assessments of damage and the attendant emissions targets
and timetables that pits old against new emitters. Global attention is sought to be focused on
the increasing emissions from China (and India), where three quarters of the electricity
generated goes for industrial production and any reduction in emissions will have a direct
impact on economic growth, unlike in developed countries where consumption by households
accounts for two-thirds of the electricity generated, and reductions will impact only on
(wasteful) lifestyles.
The absence of a shared global vision has hindered a global consensus. As early as 1970, the
State Department noted that
“….some African representatives may strongly challenge developed countries “doctrine” on
environmental matters at the upcoming Stockholm Conference….their views linking
environment and development will be with us for years to come…. that the documents
prepared for the Conference give far more weight to the preoccupations of industrialized
countries than to the far more serious ones of the developing countries………. the problems
to be discussed at the conference are of a political nature (italics added) (State department,
2005 - 2).
Even though three-quarters of Africa still has no access to electricity, the aspirations
of developing countries for economic growth continue to be highlighted as the problem in
dealing with climate change, while the impact of developed countries economies on the
environment is ignored. For example, the Energy Information Administration has predicted
that coal would provide 57 per cent of US electrical power production in 2030, up from 51
per cent today (EIA, 2008), but the focus in the media and in the negotiations is on the
continued reliance of China and India on their coal reserves. The additional cost of building
integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) coal fired plants in China instead of more
conventional plants has been estimated by the US National Academy of Sciences to be $190
billion (National Academy of Sciences, 2008), however, there is limited discussion of
technology transfer at the global level. According to recent estimates by the International
Energy Agency carbon capture and storage, a technology that is not yet commercial, would
double the cost of a coal fired plant (IEA, 2009), and raises the question regarding the
provision of financial resources on a grant or concessional basis. It is also not generally
pointed out that China has only 13 per cent of the number of cars in the US, with a population
that is four times larger. A shared global vision of environmentally sustainable global growth,
supported by technology transfer, will be essential for any meaningful deal on climate
change.
6

The methods adopted for arriving at a consensus also continue to have a familiar ring
to them. In the run-up to the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the
Scientific Attaché in Brazil suggested to the State Department that
“ ….as you know one of the standard department procedures, especially where international
organizations or activities such as the upcoming Stockholm Conference are concerned, when
they run into trouble is to attempt to mount a demarche by all of the ‘ friendlies’ on the poor
little fellow who happens to be ‘unenlightened’ to appreciate fully the merits of our
position….. I think we can anticipate without much difficulty that there is going to be a
continuation of the feeling among many of the underdeveloped countries that being
concerned about the environment is, in the final analysis, a rich man’s game. This feeling
may well, in fact be present at a low level even with countries which may be pragmatically
willing to go along “for what’s in it for them”. While we know this not just a rich man’s
game, we also know that it is sometimes very difficult to persuade otherwise someone whose
major goal must be development. Accordingly, my suggestion would be that you …….set in
motion now…with specific ‘friendlies’ ….. .a well thought programme of gradually
informing and hopefully converting the key policymakers wherever that seems necessary.
…..to establish long term persuasive relationships with the policymakers of specific
underdeveloped countries where they may have influence by virtue of past association or a
special relationship….” (italics added) (State Department, 2005 – 3).
A shared global vision with respect to patterns of resource use would not need tactics
that knowingly lead to outcomes detrimental to the interests of one partner in the
negotiations. The context in which sustainability has been discussed at the multilateral level
has changed, since the issue first came onto the global agenda in 1972, stressing single global
solutions and financial inducements. The challenge now is to increase resource productivity –
using fuel, water and raw materials more productively. In this framework of global
sustainability stressing demand side management, patterns of resource use will have to be
common for all countries, and primarily require national action in developed countries.
Questions Around The Legitimacy of Multilateral Environmental Agreements
The recently published ‘The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law’ raises
the important issue of legitimacy, that “international environmental law continues to struggle
with the complaint that it reflects the concerns of developed countries more than those of
developing countries…..in the ongoing debates over whether developing countries, for
example, should preserve biological resources of global concern or should reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions and, if so, how much financial support developed countries should
provide for such efforts” (Bodansky, 2007). Maurice Strong, writing in ‘Foreign Affairs’ in
1973 immediately after the Stockholm Conference, also advocated a management approach
to global environmental problems, and did not advocate multilateral environmental treaties as
an organising theme (Strong, 1973).
The current global framework was established to respond to concerns with growing
industrial pollution in the mid-twentieth century. The Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment, in 1972, made a distinction between global and local environmental problems,
and recognised the socio-economic factors behind many global environmental problems, but
both developed and developing countries were uneasy with the resulting compromise because
it implied a trade-off between environment and development. The Rio Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED), in 1992, continued to treat environment as a
separate policy issue, and focussed on the promotion of multilateral environmental
instruments as a way to make environment and development compatible.
7

International environmental law was adopted as the framework for governance in
order to reconcile the differing and competing concerns of developed and developing
countries. This framework was conceptualised in terms of mutual rights and responsibilities
of polluting and victim states. It was argued that interdependence in terms of contributions
and solutions required cooperation, and the response was to build multilateral treaty-based
regimes. The use of law to produce global collective benefits raised the important question of
burden sharing. However, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities that
emerged at the Rio Conference, in 1992, did not specify what is to be done and paid for and
by whom and for what purpose.
Principles included in treaties, for example equity, not only raise difficult questions
and leave them unanswered, but reservations have also been recorded to these Principles in
areas that deal with issues in the North-South context. The most important Principles,
Principle 7, of the Rio Declaration, referring to common but differentiated responsibilities,
and benefit sharing in the Convention on Biological Diversity have not been accepted by the
United States (UN, 1992) and the European Union (UN, 1993), respectively. At the World
Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002, the United States recorded an interpretative
statement, repeating its position that Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration highlights the “special
leadership role of developed countries……and the United States does not accept any
international obligations or liabilities, or any diminution of the responsibilities of developing
countries under international law”. The United States goes on to add that in its view
“….negotiation of an international regime to promote and safeguard the fair and equitable
sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources….would not entail the
development of a legally binding instrument” (UN, 2002). Consequently, these principles
have yet to gain legal status, and this factor accounts for the limited progress in achieving a
consensus on actions for implementation of the related agreements.
The problems with the current framework are not limited to the ‘Rio Conventions’.
The development of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes provides another example. In the 1980’s following increasingly stringent
environmental standards and rising disposal costs in industrialised countries, attempts to ship
toxic wastes to developing countries led countries in the African region to call for an outright
ban on the export of hazardous wastes. A multilateral agreement was achieved only on
regulation rather than on a ban of such exports. Experience with implementation of these
treaties shows that a very different framework than the current paradigm based on
international environmental law is needed (Sanwal, 2007).
The continued stress on achieving a negotiated and legally binding agreement as the
outcome of inter-governmental meetings has resulted in the Commission on Sustainable
Development concluding its session in May 2007 without any agreed outcome. The
unresolved issue centred around an international treaty on time bound targets for energy
efficiency (pushed by the European Union) and the provision of financial and technical
assistance (pushed by the developing countries) (ENB, 2007). In a related development, at the
Solar World Congress, in September 2007, China proposed a multilateral science and
technology co-operation agreement to establish international laboratories and research and
development centres on renewable energy to act as a platform for transfer of technology
(SciDev Net, 2007).
In fact the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) had adopted a
very different approach, and considered consumption and production patterns as an essential
element in understanding how global environmental problems can be solved locally. The
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation requires placing “more emphasis on actions that enable
implementation at all levels, including promoting and facilitating partnerships involving
Governments, international organizations and relevant stakeholders for the implementation of
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Agenda 21”(para 146, Johannesburg Programme of Implementation). The emphasis is on
three new areas. First, to “focus on the cross-sectoral aspects of specific sectoral issues and
provide a forum for better integration of policies, including through interaction among
Ministers dealing with the various dimensions and sectors of sustainable development
through the high level segments” (para 147). Second, “identify constraints on implementation
and make recommendations to overcome those constraints” (para 148). Third, “promote best
practices and lessons learned in sustainable development” (para 150).
New processes for enhanced global cooperation, directed equally towards national
governments, business and local communities, will require arrangements to rebalance the
relationship between formal and informal institutions. The focus is shifting from policy
guidance to countries, developed through an agreed document, to sharing experiences of best
practices. The new institutional framework requires coherence with new actors at multiple
levels, with human well-being as the overriding objective. Though fresh thinking has taken
place in the periodic international conferences distinguishing between global environmental
and sustainable development governance, the outcomes have yet to be developed into a new
framework.
Despite the emergence of new perspectives, developed countries continue in their
efforts to alter the agreed balance of rights and obligations in the climate treaty in order to
shift the burden onto developing countries. For example, they are not willing to accept a
climate agreement based on equal per capita emissions allocations or historical cumulative
emissions, because of the implications for them. Moreover, even those that acknowledge that
over the long term there is no real alternative to convergence on roughly equal per emissions
at very low levels (about 2 tons per capita), suggest a graduated approach that eliminates the
“simplistic” division between developed and developing countries as well as a shift to the
principle of capacity in place of responsibility. Such a view goes back to 1992, when the US
insisted on introducing capacity into the principles of the climate treaty. Differentiation was
also proposed by developed countries during the Montreal Protocol negotiation in the 1990’s,
arguing that wealthy developing countries should not get any assistance (and a formula based
on per capita emissions was agreed). These elements are currently again being raised in the
climate negotiations to divert attention from the real issue of the ecological burden of
developed country lifestyles.
A recent study of international support for adaptation to climate change concluded
that the various funds are not technically adequate for responding to developing countries’
needs, both because of the complex design of the funds and the poor implementation of the
guidance provided by the Conference of the Parties (Mohner and Klien, 2007). It is now
being recognized that “the times when it was possible to sweeten a deal for developing
countries with placebo funds and voluntary declarations have irrevocably past” (Muller,
2008). A recent publication co-authored by the OECD - Invention and Transfer of Climate
Change Mitigation Technologies on a Global Scale: A study Drawing on Patent Data –
concludes that “there is no visible effect of the Kyoto Protocol on technology transfer”
(Dechezlepretre, 2008). The European Policy Institute assessing the extent to which the EU
has lived up to existing financial commitments made for supporting implementation of the
Kyoto Protocol has concluded that there is lack of clarity in defining what is new and
additional, the information communicated to the UNFCCC is unreliable or not provided, and
the annual amount provided to multilateral funds “falls well short” of the commitment.
(Pallermaerts, 2009)
While globalization increases the rewards in coordinating policies, the interests of
major economies need to converge and domestic costs should not be high for a multilateral
agreement.
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Using Market Based Arrangements to Shift the Burden
Under the current framework developed countries consider international trade as the most
powerful form of international cooperation. Multilateral negotiations, therefore, seek
solutions through cost-benefit analysis, global market mechanisms to secure efficiency gains,
and a global price for carbon - which essentially mean reducing costs in industrialised
countries. Consequently, the focus of international negotiations is to seek outcomes that
create, national, regional and global markets, as in the case of the “flexibility mechanisms” of
the Kyoto Protocol, companies profiting through new markets for cleaner technologies, or
even shifting polluting industries overseas. This framework completely avoids the ethical
question of industrialised countries emitting greenhouse gases above their fair share of safe
global emissions, and has an immediate duty to reduce their national emissions without
regard to global cost-benefit analyses and global agreements.
For example, the leader of the US delegation to the Stockholm Conference, held in 1972,
obtained the approval of the President on the environmental goals, stating that
“The overall U.S. objective to the conference is to raise the level of national and
international awareness and understanding of environmental problems and to increase
national, regional and global capabilities to recognize and solve those problems which have
serious adverse impact on the human environment. By doing so we will maintain and improve
our international economic, competitive position as other countries adopt control measures
comparable to our domestic measures” (italics added) (State Department, 2005 – 3).
Actions by developing countries interlinked with commercial interests of developed
countries were also a decisive factor in the United States agreeing to the Montreal Protocol.
Richard Benedick, who led the United States delegation, documents the pressure “American
corporate chiefs” put on the Bush Administration.
In the current negotiations on climate change the stress on global emissions standards
in electricity generation, cement and steel sectors will impact only on developing countries,
and have the objective of opening the way for export of equipment. This is because in the
developed countries emissions from industrial emissions have been steady since 1992, and
any global standard would be based on levels they have already achieved. Calls in the WTO
for developing countries reducing tariffs on environmental goods and services, and
simultaneous demands for raising tariffs in developed countries on imports manufactured in
countries that do not have emission reduction commitments, should be seen in this context.
Just as financial wizards did not understand that their increasingly complex models
were getting further away from the real world, climate policymakers are also being lulled into
complacency by new financial products like Emissions Trading with opt outs, as well as the
project based Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Reducing Emissions from Forests
and Forest Degradation (REDD) that essentially offset emissions. Offsets allow companies
and governments in developed countries to pay developing countries to make their carbon
reductions for them. It has been pointed that so many permits may be bought that industries
will have emitted 1 per cent more in 2008 than they did in 1990 (Michael Wara, Stanford
University, USA, in ‘International Herald Tribune’ 8 May 2009).
The Stern Report is an illustration of the continuing problems with formulations based
on cost-benefit analysis for burden sharing to produce collective benefits (Stern, 2007). The
weight given to future generations has been criticised as too high (by William Nordhouse, of
Yale University) and the weight given to the consumption of the poor relative to that of the
rich has been criticised as too low (by Partha Dasgupta, of Cambridge University). Both
agree that the choices made in the report are inconsistent with each other: egalitarianism
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between the future and the past also requires egalitarianism between the rich and the poor.
The conclusions of the report lead to a redistribution from poorer to richer countries, and
raises questions regarding mitigation of climate change that are political, rather than legal or
technical in nature (Economist, 2007).
As the Nobel Prize winner, Joseph Stiglitz, recently pointed out in his address to the
International Economics Association, held in Istanbul in June 2008, the key problem is how
to allocate emission rights, currently valued at about $2 trillion annually, that is 5% of global
GDP, and the “only serious defensible principle is equal emission rights per capita, adjusted
for past emissions…. as a process of slowly easing in emission rights would increase
inequities associated with past emissions”. Even if this entails large redistribution, it is not
clear why this should be treated differently than other property rights. Stiglitz goes on to
argue that climate change will require a new economic model – changed patterns of
consumption and innovation, as “only through changes in patterns of demand will adverse
effects on developing countries be mitigated”.
For international comparison of the effects of the measures adopted by all countries it
is important to agree on, and understand, the driving forces. Such indicators are best based
on per-capita consumption and not on GDP. Market exchange rates fluctuate widely and
differences in consumption of different baskets of goods and energy prices makes
determination of purchasing power parity problematic as a tool to compare countries with one
another. The two also give different results even for countries at similar levels of economic
development. In what can be considered as a response to these methodological problems, the
Chancellor of Germany has suggested adoption of a global standard of 2 tonnes of carbon
dioxide per capita as the basis for international cooperation on climate change.
II.
The Emerging Focus on Consumption Patterns
As the International Energy Agency points out, in developed countries on the consumer side
of the economy technological and lifestyle changes combined with higher incomes have
significantly altered energy use patterns since the Climate Convention was negotiated in
1992, with over two-thirds of carbon dioxide emissions now coming from the services,
households and travel sectors. In those countries over forty per cent of the electricity
generated is used in buildings – as a result of urbanization - in cooling and heating, lighting
and appliances, and end-use energy demand continues to increase.
A recent study also highlights a shortcoming of the current international approach of
setting emissions targets on a nation-by-nation basis, and at the point of production rather
than consumption, amidst increasing globalisation of the world economy. As manufacturing
industries and their jobs shift from high-wage developed economies to low-wage developing
economies, and more and more goods and services flow the other way, national emissions
targets have less meaning. Economic researchers at Carnegie Mellon University in
Pennsylvania have come up with a fully quantified measure of China’s export-related
emissions using standard money flow models and official China emissions data. The team,
led by Christopher Weber, found that in 2005, China emitted 1.7 billion tonnes of greenhouse
gases from its export-related sectors, 33 per cent of the national total, up from an estimated
12 per cent of total emissions in 1987. It has, thus, become easier for developed countries’ to
slow the growth in their emissions and meet their targets at the expense of developing
countries - in effect, exporting their emissions. These findings bring a new perspective to the
international debate over emission targets and burden sharing as the UN struggles to strike a
new global accord to succeed the Kyoto Protocol on global warming.
The Human Development Report, 2007/8, ‘Fighting Climate Change: Human
Solidarity in a Divided World’, produced by the United Nations Development Programme,
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concluded that “carbon intensive growth is symptomatic of a deeper problem…that the
economic model which drives growth, and the profligate consumption in rich countries that
goes with it, is unsustainable”. Such a debate has not taken place, because it would focus
attention on the consumption patterns of the rich countries. The consumer is the ultimate
driver of emissions of greenhouse gases, and lifestyles need to change to meet the threat of
climate change.
So far efforts of industrialised countries to reduce carbon dioxide emissions have
mainly focussed on “production”, with higher prices of fuels and electricity as the key to
‘energy efficiency’ and reduced emissions in more energy intensive industry. However,
progressive reductions in primary energy needed to produce one unit of GDP have not
reduced emissions.
This trend is borne out by the recent analysis of consumption trends in industrialised
countries conducted by the International Energy Agency for the period 1990 - 2004:
•

•
•

•
•

Despite an improvement of 25 per cent in the energy intensity of GDP in both Europe
and the US, total emissions of carbon dioxide have decreased by only 1.5 per cent in
Europe (EU-15), and have risen by 16.3 per cent in the United States, because of its
higher growth rate fuelled by consumer demand.
Energy use in manufacturing has remained unchanged, while final energy use, and
emissions of carbon dioxide, have each increased by 14% - even though half of the
increased demand has been met through energy efficiency.
Energy use in passenger transport increased 25%, and in freight transport 24%. There
has been a 31% increase in passenger travel. Buses and trains account for only 5% of
total passenger travel, slightly lower than in 1990, while air travel has increased 61%
in this period. Cars used 88% of energy in the transport sector, with a minimum
ownership level of 0.35 cars per capita - car ownership has doubled in Greece and
Ireland.
Appliances account for more than half of the electricity used in households, with a
48% growth - half of which is in the newer small appliances, like computers.
Electricity consumption in the services sector increased 50%, and in households by
35%. Oil with a share of 47% and electricity (22%) dominate total final energy
consumption.

The patterns of energy use provide important insights into the role of governments in
influencing the demand for electricity and oil, and consequent emissions of carbon dioxide.
Buildings, including households and services, at present account for 40% of energy use in
industrialised countries, driven by growth of the services sector and higher incomes - more
households, bigger apartments and more appliances. Two-thirds of the increase in electricity
demand in the EU between 1978 and 2003 was accounted for by appliances. Small appliances
are becoming the largest source of emissions from households - personal computers, mobile
phones, personal audio equipment. Also, improvements in vehicle and engine technology
have been offset by consumer preferences for larger and heavier vehicles. Developing
countries can be expected to follow a similar path.
Measures to improve energy efficiency, without affecting the service, stand out as the
cheapest way to curb energy demand and carbon dioxide emissions growth in all countries in
the near term, and do not need any international agreement. Building standards for new
construction should include insulation of walls and windows. The use of compact florescent
lamps and light emitting diodes alone would cut down the electricity used for lighting by
more than half. High speed passenger trains and metros will also serve to reduce emissions
of carbon dioxide by shifting the balance to mass transportation. With retail distribution
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networks just being established in developing countries, this is the appropriate time to craft
policy interventions by working together with business to shape retail distribution models,
structure of supply chains, physical infrastructure and consumer behaviour to prioritise areas
where energy use can be avoided. Expanding forest cover provides a range of ecosystem
services – water, soil conservation, food and fodder – including sequestration of carbon
dioxide. End-use energy efficiency and conservation has benefits for economic growth and
for the environment - reducing demand for electricity generation and oil as well as emissions
of carbon dioxide.
The global dialogue provides an opportunity to identify sectors and activities where
energy efficiency can support both the environment and economic growth. For example, it
has been estimated, by the International Energy Agency, the United Nations Environment
Programme and by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, that 30% of the
projected increase in greenhouse gas emissions in the building sector can be avoided at no
cost. Business has also noted that technology available today can make dramatic
improvements in building energy efficiency (WBCSD 2007, UNEP 2007, IEA 2007).
Clearly, a different metric, than the current approach of focussing on global industrial
emissions, is needed in setting public policy priorities worldwide for dealing with climate
change and its adverse effects.
The Underestimated Concern of Adaptation and Ecological Services
Every published literature and assessment has concluded that developing countries, rather
than developed countries, will bear the adverse impacts of climate change with huge
economic costs. Agriculture is the sector that will be adversely impacted the most, and a
majority of the population in developing countries derives their livelihood from agriculture.
The IPCC has concluded agricultural output in developing countries is expected to decline by
10-20 per cent by 2080 (IPCC, 2007).
The International Food Policy Research Institute and the UN Food and Agriculture
Organisation point out that while early impacts can be reduced by adaptation, options for
developing countries diminish and associated costs increase with increasing climate change
impacts (Cohen, 2008). A recent paper for the Brookings Institution points out that Darfur is
an example of how climate change could leave global development in the balance, and the
question is now being raised whether because of the impacts of climate change many
developing countries will be able to grow at all! (Mendelsohn, 2008).
The Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Food Programme and the
International Fund for Agricultural Development have expressed their “deepest concern” that
climate change is a major challenge to world food security, and will increase hunger and
malnutrition amongst the poorest. They have argued that it is paramount that we address food
security concerns when discussing the challenges of climate change.
The World Health Organization, in a recent study, points out that developing
countries could spend between US$6 to $18 billion a year by 2030 to manage additional costs
to health services as a result of climate change. The WHO has found that modest global
warming since 1970 was already causing in excess of 150,000 deaths every year. Infectious
diseases are appearing in new locations where people do not have immunity and health
services do not have the experience in treating infections, hence the need for rich countries
responsible for global warming to help pay towards these additional health costs.
As the main determinant of a countries adaptive capacity is economic wealth, such
unprecedented adverse impacts of climate change will severely constrain development and
lock the poor in long term poverty traps. Meeting this challenge will require major new
investments, for example in agricultural research to develop new drought resistant crop
varieties and insurance schemes. UNDP has estimated the annual costs of adapting to climate
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change to be $86 billion in 2015, while the amount pledged to date (cumulatively, not per
year) is $300million. It is now recognised that fighting climate change and fighting poverty
have to be addressed together (CCCD, 2009).
The livelihoods of the rural poor and the conservation and sustainable use of natural
resources are also so intimately intertwined that they are best addressed through an integrated
approach, irrespective whether the primary motivation is development or environmental
conservation. It is estimated that environmental wealth accounts for 26 per cent of the total
wealth of low-income countries, versus 13 per cent of wealth in middle-income countries and
only 2 per cent of wealth in developed countries (Hamilton, 2005).
A shift is taking place from the widely held perspective that policy interventions
cannot lead to alleviation of poverty and to the conservation of natural resources – which are
two sides of the same coin. The adoption of the Millennium Development Goals by the
United Nations underlines the reality that after over 50 years of public programmes the world
still has nearly $4billion poor, who subsist on less than $2 a day and environmental
degradation continues. The ‘Bottom of the Pyramid’ provides new growth opportunities for
innovation and entrepreneurship, with new products, services and payment models to make
finance and technology affordable and accessible to the poor. The recent independent
evaluation of the International Finance Corporation also concludes that economic growth,
poverty reduction and environmentally and socially sustainable development can have
mutually reinforcing development and financial benefits (IFC, 2008). However, new
conceptual frameworks and strategies tailored to social value creation, where the objective is
for the maximum number to benefit from the effort, are yet to be developed.
The global goal to deal with climate change should be determined in terms of
sustainable development. International cooperation would then be framed in terms of
emission reduction in industrialized countries, joint programmes to support adaptation to the
adverse impacts of climate change and transfer of technology to developing countries to
enable them to modify their trajectory of growth.
International Cooperation, Technology and Global Sustainability
At the climate change negotiations in Bali, in December 2007, developing countries agreed to
take mitigation actions in the context of sustainable development. This distinction suggests
that the focus of such actions should shift from considering the environmental impact of
carbon dioxide to analysing its linkages with the provision of energy services for human well
being.
Energy services are directly related to human well being. Development of
infrastructure, urbanization, manufacturing and services are all essential for economic
growth, and for alleviation of poverty. For example, the per capita generation of electricity in
India is one-fifteenth that of the United States. Estimates suggest that currently, worldwide
1.6 billion people lack access to electricity. As developing countries still need to build their
infrastructure, the objective of international negotiations on climate change should be to
determine how their economic growth can take place in an environmentally sustainable
manner.
Sustainability, as defined in the Objective and the Principles of the Climate Change
Convention, is not limited to “industrial emissions” (that is how we currently measure
emissions), but rather requires a focus on all sectors and activities where carbon is embedded,
used and its concentration impacts adversely, for example food security. The global focus on
moving to a low carbon society is an acknowledgement that the citizen is not only the driver
of emissions but also the victim of the adverse impacts of climate change.
Growth in carbon dioxide emissions is linked to the use of fossil fuels to meet the
increasing demands for energy services. At around $3000 per capita GDP in PPP terms,
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energy demand explodes as industrialization and personal mobility take off, and beyond $
30,000 per capita GDP economic growth can continue without significant energy increases,
with the absolute level varying depending on national circumstances. According to the
government of the UK over 40% of emissions of carbon dioxide arise directly from the
decisions of citizens, for example, heating and using electricity in homes and driving
vehicles. The government funded Carbon Trust in the UK reports that leisure and recreation
accounts for most of the current emissions for the average British citizen, of which half is
from transportation (Carbon Trust, 2006). Only one country - Norway, with the highest
Human Development Index in the world, and a GDP of $46,000 per capita in PPP terms - has
pledged that it will become carbon neutral from 2050. Clearly, high levels of national wealth
are a precondition for effective carbon management; however, in the interim a lot can be
achieved.
Researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences have proposed a Carbon
Budget, defined as per capita cumulative emissions during a given period of time, to establish
a threshold level for national emissions, to reflect differential conditions between countries
and meet an agreed long term global goal through emissions trading. Since developed
countries have used up their budget, they would be able to obtain surpluses from developing
countries by providing financial support for low carbon development. This approach, based
on transfers of financial resources and technology, has been suggested as a win-win solution
to meet the challenge of climate change through international cooperation (Pan, 2008).
In a sustainable development framework, international cooperation will be based
around development and transfer of technology. In this paradigm, global sustainability will
not depend on negotiated global environmental goals and emission reduction commitments
by developing countries, but rather on mechanisms for transfer of technology to reconcile the
competing concerns. The European Parliament, in its resolution of 15 November 2007 on
climate change, recognised that Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) licensing fees in the area of
clean technologies constitute a barrier to the transfer of such technology to developing
countries, and stressed the provision of alternate means of compensation for IPR holders to
facilitate technology flows.
There is a global consensus that a technological shift, unprecedented in the scale and
speed of deployment, will be critical in determining environmentally sustainable patterns of
resource use to meet the challenge of climate change. Global policy needs to focus directly on
developing new energy technologies, rather than leave it to the market. For example, the
market failure that results from anti-competitive measures of pharmaceutical companies to
delay research, development and commercialization of drugs by firms in developing countries
is now well documented, and is also under inquiry by the European Commission.
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO, 2009) effective
transfer of technology requires public institutions to maintain an interest and a degree of
leverage over technology developed through public investment, the creation of new
enterprises as tailor-made vehicles for development of a new technology, a broad-based open
licensing structure to promote dissemination of a platform or enabling technology,
cross-licensing structures or pool arrangements that allow diverse technology players to build
on the benefits of each others’ technologies, and packaging the patented technology with
other non-patented material, such as manufacturing knowhow, other commercial information,
or regulatory approval dossiers.
Placing relevant technologies in the public domain has been discussed at the
multilateral level since 1992. Such a provision is included in Agenda 21 as well as in the
Kyoto Protocol. These elements provide a good starting point for further discussion, because
global policy needs to focus directly on the effective development and transfer of new energy
technologies (to enable developing countries to take actions, as the Bali Action Plan
15

requires), otherwise emissions cannot be reduced within the timeframe required without
affecting economic growth.
Currently a multilateral technology fund is under discussion in the climate
negotiations. Such a fund should cover incremental capital and operational costs so long as
the cost of electricity from clean coal and renewable energy technologies exceeds those
determined by current energy strategies. Only with a global approach that recognises the
central importance of energy services in human well-being can there be broad public support
in developing countries for dealing with climate change.
III
The New Paradigm
The response at the multilateral level to the seismic shift in economic power and demand
from Asia, particularly from China, has largely been of a scarcity mentality seen as a zerosum game, rather than develop a shared vision where everyone can become better off.
The on-going negotiations for moving to a low carbon future will now focus on the
gaps between the positions of developed and developing countries, and identify options. The
three key gaps relate to global equity, meeting the costs of adaptation and technology
transfer. The shared vision should modify consumption patterns in developed countries
leading to real cuts in global emissions without adding any burden on developing countries,
provide adequate and predictable resources to enable adaptation to the adverse impacts of
climate change that are already upon us, and establish mechanisms for effective development
and transfer of technology to enable global reduction of emissions. We need to move away
from ever changing assessments to a fundamental transformation of the global economy and
human activity in ways that ensures patterns of resource use are common for all countries.
By making human well-being as the central objective, a new sustainable development
paradigm is emerging that focuses on reacting to change rather than focus only on preventing
it. This approach has three key elements. First, with the growing importance of the service
sector and consumer demand in economic growth, it points to the need for developed
countries to adopt consumption rather than a production-based approach to address the
driving forces of environmental change. Second, it focuses on avoidance, rather than on
reduction, of adverse impacts on the environment through a different growth path for
developing countries that also distinguishes between management of the environment and
sustainable development. Third, to meet the concerns of the large majority of the global
population in developing a vision of environmentally sustainable global growth, it suggests
that the bio-physical limits to growth require deeper action in the industrialised countries,
including technology transfer to those who bear little responsibility for causing this problem.
While there is an increasing recognition of the consumer as the driver of global
environmental change, there is continuing divergence of opinion and experience about how to
address those concerns at the societal level.
The North-South divide can be overcome by recognizing poverty alleviation as the
key strategy for dealing with the interrelated challenges of climate change, energy security,
food security and equity. Since raising standards of living, per capita emissions and
international equity are related issues, patterns of natural resource use will have to common
for all countries. It is in this framework that mitigation measures should be identified, to
determine where modification of longer term trends is needed. Considering the full range of
natural resources, ecosystem services and activities impacted by the concentration of
greenhouse gases will also bring adaptation to the fore as a global concern. A broader
perspective is the only way to ensure that conflict over natural resources – food, water and
energy – is avoided in the coming decade.
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The increasing share of consumer demand in the GDP of major economies, sustained
economic growth of Asia and financial and technological globalization are leading to a rebalancing of the current framework of global environmental governance. The new sustainable
development paradigm should focus on alleviation of poverty, the welfare needs of citizens
and the decisions of consumers. This framework of international cooperation re-balances the
roles of the state, markets and citizens. The consumer, not the state, is the driver of
environmental change, and new knowledge needs to be developed to support the modification
of consumption patterns and develop a vision of environmentally sustainable global growth.
The challenge of sustainable development - striking a balance between environmental
imperatives, social justice and economic growth – is to create affluence that is independent of
energy intensive consumption. As developing countries still need to build their infrastructure,
the objective of international negotiations on climate change should be to determine how
their economic growth can take place in an environmentally sustainable manner. The time has
come for developing countries to design a new paradigm for sustainable development.
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Climate Change, Water, and China’s Security:
Implications for Global Cooperation on Climate Change
Scott Moore1
Abstract
This paper links the issues of climate change, water, and China’s security, arguing that the
water-related impacts of climate change post significant strategic challenges for China and
Asia, with consequent implications for China’s participation and engagement in global
climate change cooperation efforts. Specifically, water-related climate impacts will strain the
capacity of many key public institutions, and imperil the government’s strategic development
objectives. Recognizing these imperatives points the way toward a strategic dialogue with
China on climate change. This paper first discusses scientific assessments of predicted
hydrological changes in China and neighboring countries under climate change, progressing
to a security analysis of the challenges these changes pose, and finally discusses how Chinese
policymakers and commentators view climate change and water as geopolitical issues. This
paper concludes by examining implications for global climate cooperation.
Introduction: Linking Climate Change, Water, and China’s Security
As the world approaches the international climate negotiations at Copenhagen in December
2009, the two imperatives of promoting economic development and protecting the global
atmospheric commons seem increasingly to stand at odds. Even as scientific assessments of
the impacts of climate change grow more urgent, large developing nations like China and
India continue to prioritize their own economic goals. Given the difficulties in resolving this
impasse, it is helpful to think broadly about all dimensions of the climate change problem,
social, political, economic and ecological.
This paper seeks a role in this debate by examining the strategic-security implications
for China of a changing climate, with specific reference to water issues. It does so chiefly
with an eye towards evaluating the contribution that such a perspective can make to shaping
China’s participation in global cooperation on climate change. Most commentators agree that
China will play a crucial role in finalizing a post-2012 climate agreement; from this
perspective, there is clear value to seeking a security imperative in its approach to
international cooperation on climate change. As international relations scholar Katherine
Morton has pointed out, the value in “securitizing” the climate issue is that “In situations
where there is a growing international consensus that a problem exists, but limited consensus
on the most effective and fair method of dealing with it, a preventive security approach
encourages action on the basis of a pragmatic calculation that prevention is better than cure”
(Morton, 2008, p. 54).2
The argument presented here is that water-related impacts of climate change imperil
many of China’s strategic development objectives, presenting an opportunity for foreign
countries to engage the country in a strategic dialogue on climate cooperation. This paper
first presents a scientific assessment of water-related climate change impacts, both in China
and its neighboring countries. Next, it discusses strategic and security implications for
China’s foreign relations, domestic issues like food security, and also internal stability. The
final section of the paper discusses discourse on climate change, water, and security topics
within China, pursuing an understanding of how such discourse could help frame the
1
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country’s participation in an international, strategic dialogue on climate change issues. This
multifaceted approach, spanning the physical and social sciences, frames the Conclusions
section, which identifies cross-cutting issues related to water, climate change, and China’s
security and also discusses implications for global climate cooperation.
This integration of climate change, water, and Chinese security issues is timely for
several reasons. First, many of the most severe likely impacts of climate change in China and
Asia generally are water-related, such as a predicted long-term decline in water runoff from
the Himalayan region (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1997, p. 15). Second,
there is growing recognition of the linkages between water availability, conflict, and security
issues in Asia. As a recent Asia Society report notes, “more than one billion people in Asia
alone are projected to experience negative impacts on water resources as a result of climate
change…Over time, these effects will have a profound impact on security throughout the
region” (Asia Society, 2009, p. 7). Finally, climate change is becoming an important issue in
China’s relations with the rest of the world, as indicated by the recent visit of US Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton to Beijing (Landler, 2009). Despite this confluence of factors, few
commentators have focused specifically on the implications for China’s security of waterrelated climate impacts. It is thus high time to do so.
Before delving into this discussion, the linkages between climate change, water, and
security require further articulation. Recent decades have witnessed the gradual broadening
of the concept of security from its traditional political and military foundations. In an
influential 1989 article, former US government official Jessica Mathews called for a
redefinition of national security to “include resource, environmental and demographic issues”
(Mathews, 1989, p. 162). Subsequent research and scholarship has given prominence to the
field of environmental security, which in one articulation “is central to national security,
comprising the dynamics and interconnections among the natural resource base, the social
fabric of the state, and the economic engine for local and regional stability” (Institute for
Environmental Security, 2004).
Several strands of environmental security and related discourse are of relevance to
this paper. First is a growing body of scholarship that has identified clear, though contextspecific linkages between resources scarcity, environmental change, and conflict, particularly
at the sub-national level (Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict:
Evidence from cases, 1994). As a recent United Nations report concluded, “Environmental
factors are rarely if ever the sole cause of conflict, but exploitation of resources is present in
each stage of the conflict cycle” (United Nations Environment Program, 2009, p. 5). Second
is the increasing focus of many institutions with a traditional security focus on climate change
and instability. In 2007 the United Nations Security Council held its first-ever debate on
climate change, and a major US Centre for Naval Analyses report found that “Climate change
acts as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world”
(Center for Naval Analyses, 2007, p. 6).
In addition, the concept of human security is relevant to discussions of some of the
water-related impacts China is likely to face as a result of climate change. According to one
widely accepted definition, “The objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of
all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term
human fulfilment” (Alkire, 2002). Human security thus entails issues, such as an equitable
distribution of resources, that do not fall within more traditional or restrictive conceptions of
security (Morton, 2008, p. 54). Here, however, the value of a human security perspective is
that it facilitates the analysis of water-related climate impacts within the context of China’s
pervasive regional, ethnic, and economic disparities.
Applying these broadened conceptions of security to water-related climate impacts
focuses this paper on the social and political consequences of shifting water resource
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distributions within China. from this perspective, it is possible to understand more concretely
the security consequences of a changing climate in china, and to discuss how these
consequences can and should guide both Chinese and international approaches to global
climate cooperation. To begin this discussion, this paper turns now to a scientific assessment
of water-related climate impacts for China and its Asian neighbours.
Water-Related Climate Change Impacts in China and Asia: the Scientific Basis
The eastern portion of the Asian landmass, of which China is a part, faces particularly acute
changes in water availability and distribution as a result of climate change. While climate
modeling is subject to significant uncertainties, this section identifies two such changes
which are of particular relevance to non-traditional security issues (discussed in the
subsequent section). First, the incidence of extreme water-related phenomena, such as
prolonged drought and severe flooding, is likely to increase. Second, some regions, many of
them already under water stress, are likely to be heavily, and perhaps catastrophically,
impacted by changes in water availability. This section indicates that, based on existing
scientific research, whatever the precise nature and distribution of water-related climate
change impacts in China and its neighboring countries, they will be acute and pervasive.
Many Asian nations are already under water stress, and the Asian continent has the
lowest per-capita water allocation of any continent save Antarctica (Asia Society, 2009, p. 9);
(See Table 1 below).
Table 1: Water Resources and Dependency (From
Region's Water Future, p. 44)
Total
Internal
Renewable
Country
Water
Resources
(km3)
Afghanistan
55
Australia
492
Bangladesh
105
Cambodia
121
China
2,812
India
1,261
Indonesia
2,838
Iran
128
Japan
430
Kazakhstan
75
Kyrgyzstan
46
Laos
190
Malaysia
580
Mongolia
45
Myanmar
881
Nepal
198
Pakistan
55
Philippines
479
South Korea
65
Sri Lanka
50
Thailand
210
United States 2,800
Uzbekistan
16
Vietnam
366

Asia Society, Asia's Next Challenge: Securing the
Total
External
Renewable
Water
Resources
(km3)
10
0
1,106
356
17
636
0
9
0
34
-26
143
0
0
165
12
170
0
5
0
200
51
34
525
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Dependency
Ratio (%)

15
0
91
75
1
34
0
7
0
31
0
43
0
0
16
6
77
0
7
0
49
8
77
59

Moreover, as a recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report has
concluded, “Asia has a very high population that is growing at a fast rate, low development
levels and weak coping capacity. Climate change is expected to exacerbate the water scarcity
situation in Asia, together with multiple socio-economic stresses” (Bates, Kundzewicz, Wu,
& Palutikof, 2008, p. 85). In India, for example, over-exploitation of groundwater resources
and population growth is expected to reduce per capita water availability by almost 50% by
2025 (China Daily, 2007, p. 6). In north China, the water use to availability ratio was three to
four times the level in the south as of 2000 (Shalizi, 2006, p. 8). In China and its immediate
neighbourhood, climate change threatens to exacerbate this already tenuous water situation in
several ways.
The hydrology of Eastern Asia is dominated by two processes: atmospheric
circulation, principally the Asiatic monsoon and El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), as
well as a snow- and glacial-melt regime situated on the Himalayan region (Barnett, Adam, &
Lettenmaier, 2005); (Xu, Takeuchi, & Ishidaira, 2004, p. 108).
In China, for example,
changes in aridity are determined primarily by summer precipitation, mostly the East Asian
monsoon (Yang, Ding, Chen, & Liu, 2005, p. 177). Atmospheric circulation, though
relatively poorly understood, appears to be set to increase the variability of precipitation and
the risk of flooding as a result of climate change, while glacial melting will cause significant
changes in the flow of Asia’s major rivers. Both have the potential to impose large economic
costs and to disrupt agriculture.
China’s National Climate Change Program asserts that “climate change has already
caused changes [in] water resources distribution over China,” focusing particularly on an
increase in “hydrological extreme events” such as drought in the north and flooding in the
south (National Development and Reform Commission, 2007, p. 22). This assessment draws
largely from IPCC data indicating an observed increase in precipitation in north and
northeastern China, and a marked increase in the west (Chang Jiang delta region) and
southeast (Bates, Kundzewicz, Wu, & Palutikof, 2008, pp. 85-86). Yang, et al., for example,
note that as a result of climate change precipitation is decreasing in eastern China agricultural
areas, with drought-related agricultural losses increasing steadily since the mid-twentieth
century (Yang, Ding, Chen, & Liu, 2005, p. 184). Tao, et al. similarly predicted that soil
degradation under a changing climate would lead to higher probability of “disastrous drought
and floods” in central, southwestern, and northeastern China (Tao, Yokozawa, Hayashi, &
Lin, 2005, p. 169).
A tendency toward more extreme climate events is also predicted for other regions. A
major study of the Indian Himalaya found that climate change will increase the variation of
seasonal flows significantly (Singh, Arora, & Goel, 2006, p. 1991). In the Mekong,
Southeast Asia’s most important river system, maximum monthly flows are expected to
increase by 35-41% by mid-to late century over 20th century levels in the river basin, while
the minimum monthly flows are expected to decline by 17-24% (Bates, Kundzewicz, Wu, &
Palutikof, 2008, p. 87).
Such increased variation threatens to disrupt normal economic and agricultural
activity in vulnerable regions, and as the IPCC has noted, “there could be increased flooding
risks [in the Mekong region] during the wet season and an increased possibility of water
shortages in the dry season” (Bates, Kundzewicz, Wu, & Palutikof, 2008, p. 87). In the case
of the Mekong, this variability is enhanced by additional risks from sea level rise and
resulting salt water intrusion poses a profound threat to agricultural production in the river’s
delta region (Wassmann, Hien, Hoanh, & Tuong, 2004, p. 89).
Potentially even more serious, however, is a predicted long-term decline in water
availability as Himalayan glaciers melt and snow packs are reduced in size. The IPCC
estimates that a decrease in Himalayan glacier mass of about 25% is possible by 2050 as
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global temperatures rise (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1997, p. 14). This is
significant as glacial melt water accounts for some 70% of summer flow in the Ganges river
system, and 50-60% of the flow in other major Asian river systems (Barnett, Adam, &
Lettenmaier, 2005, p. 306). One major study predicted that Himalayan melt-fed water
systems would peak at 150-170% of initial flow by 2050-2070, with annual mean flow
declining thereafter by 33% and 4-18% less in the western and eastern Himalayan regions,
respectively (Rees & Collins, 2006, pp. 2167-2168). As Barnett, et al. conclude, a significant
portion of northwest China and northern India will be subject to declining water availability
by the end of the century, as seasonal water shortages arrive abruptly, “going from plenty to
want in perhaps a few decades” (Barnett, Adam, & Lettenmaier, 2005, pp. 304-306).
Nonetheless, there is likely to be substantial regional variability in these effects.
Some river basins are likely to be particularly heavily impacted; the Tarim River for instance,
Xinjiang’s most important river system, depends on glacial melt water for 40% of its mean
annual flow (Liu & Chen, 2006, p. 298). Other areas of north-western China are likely to be
severely impacted by changes in water availability. As the IPCC has reported, “The duration
of seasonal snow cover in [Chinese] alpine areas – namely the Tibet Plateau, Xinjiang and
Inner Mongolia– is expected to shorten, leading to a decline in volume and resulting in severe
spring droughts. Between 20% and 40% reductions in runoff per capita in Ningxia, Xinjiang
and Qinghai Provinces are likely by the end of the 21st century” italics original (Bates,
Kundzewicz, Wu, & Palutikof, 2008, p. 87).
Changes of similar magnitude are predicted for major river systems elsewhere in
China and Asia. A major study by Manabe, et al., which attempted to model the effects of a
quadrupling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations above pre-industrial levels,
concluded that most major Asian rivers, including the Chang Jiang (Yangtze) and Huang He
(Yellow River) in China, and the Ganga/Brahmaputra in the Indian Subcontinent, were likely
to experience large increases in flow on a one-hundred year timescale, but that the Mekong
was expected to experience a 6% decrease (S. Manabe, Milly, Delworth, & Stouffer, 2004, p.
65); (see Table 2 below).
Table 2: Changes in flow of major East Asian rivers under climate change (Adapted from S. Manabe,
Milly, Delworth, & Stouffer, 2004, p. 65)
River system
%
change
in
annual mean rates
of
simulated
discharge (D, 103
m3 s−1)

Chang Jiang

Huang He

Ganga/Brahmaputra

Mekong

+28

+18

+49

-6

Uncertainty and variability are also dominant themes in projections of changes
regarding precipitation patterns. For instance, in a wide-ranging simulation of climactic and
soil conditions, Tao et al. predicted that areas of central, western, and south-western China
would face large soil-moisture deficits as a result of climate change, which in turn reduces
precipitation (Tao, Yokozawa, Hayashi, & Lin, 2005, p. 193). The IPPC, however, notes that
2/3 of modelling studies on the same area predicts an increase in precipitation (Bates,
Kundzewicz, Wu, & Palutikof, 2008, p. 88).
While some studies suggest that in north China only 70% of irrigation needs can be
met under climate change scenarios, a major study of Chinese agricultural production under
climate change indicates that the country will be able to meet its food requirements under any
of the IPCC climate warming scenarios, assuming a carbon-dioxide fertilization effect
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(Xiong, Lin, Ju, & Xu, 2007, p. 208).3 Other research has broadly supported this conclusion,
predicting increased production of staple food crops in China (Lobell, Burke, Tebaldi,
Mastrandrea, Falcon, & Naylor, 2008, p. 609) and an increase in global food production
generally under various climate change scenarios (Parry, Rosenzweig, Iglesias, Livermore, &
Fischer, 2004, p. 63).
The best summary of these potential water-related climate impacts appears to be that
water distribution patterns will become much more variable. Another characterization might
be that many areas of China are likely to have too much water when they don’t need it (i.e.,
flooding during the rainy season) and too little when they do (the dry summer months).
Certain areas, such as northern and north-western China and the Mekong river system, will be
more impacted, and by a greater combination of factors, than others. This conclusion has
important implications for both China’s national and regional security.
Strategic-Security Analysis of Water-Related Climate Impacts in China and
Surrounding Countries
The scientific assessment presented above predicts that water-related climate impacts will be
acute not only in China, but in surrounding nations as well. As a result, this strategic-security
analysis first considers implications for China’s regional security and foreign relations, before
turning inward, to examine threats posed to food production, disaster management capacities,
and internal stability within China. This section argues that water-related climate impacts
will stress the disaster response and emergency management capacities of key institutions,
such as the armed forces, and imperil many of the government’s key strategic development
objectives, such as the Western Development Strategy.
It is clear that water-related climate impacts spill over China’s borders, which will
increase the importance of water issues in China’s foreign and regional security policies.
Indeed, regional actors are already expressing growing concern over such water issues. At the
2008 World Economic Forum, 81% of business leaders ranked climate change and water
issues as being those of greatest concern to Asia (Info-Prod Research, 2008). The Filipino
Defense Secretary made a similar pronouncement with his recent statement that climate
change is a greater long-term threat to his country’s security than religious or social conflict,
in large part due to water supply concerns (Antiporda, 2009).
This concern is reflected in the attitudes of China’s neighbours. In Pakistan, for
instance, officials have suggested that changes in Himalayan melt water could devastate
agriculture in this already fragile country (Das, 2008). A recent study from the Earth Policy
Institute makes clear the heavy dependence of vast numbers of people on glacial melt waterfed agriculture (Brown, 2008); (see Table 3 below). Given such dependence, transboundary
water issues are certain to become an issue of growing importance for China. As the Asia
Society’s report on water and security has concluded, hydropolitics will be an increasingly
potent force in Asian security (Asia Society, 2009, p. 13).

3

A carbon-dioxide fertilization effect asserts that increased fixation of carbon dioxide, resulting in increased
crop growth and yield. However, the extent of CO2 fertilization effects is contentious. See, for example, L.
Hartwall Allen, Jeff Baker and Ken Boote, “The CO2 fertilization effect: higher carbohydrate production and
retention
as
biomass
and
seed
yield,”
Food
and
Agriculture
Organization,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/W5183E/w5183e06.htm, accessed May 26, 2009.
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Table 3: Vulnerability of major Asian river systems to changes in glacial melt water (Adapted from Earth
Policy Institute and U.N. Environment Programme, Global Outlook for Ice and Snow (Nairobi, Kenya:
2007), p. 131)

River system

Population
(million)

Tarim
Indus
Ganges
Brahmaputra
Chang Jiang
Yellow
Mekong

8
178
407
118
368
147
57

Basin
area
(thousand square
kilometres)
1152
1082
1016
651
1722
945
806

Cropland (%)

Dependence
on
glacial melt water

2
30
72
29
48
30
38

Very high
Very high
High
High
High
High
Moderate

In particular, certain Asian river systems seem to be more contentious than others.
Based on their study of conflict and cooperation over water, Yoffee, et al. developed a
“Basins at Risk” indicator, which ranks the Ganges, Indus, and Mekong as at risk for conflict
(Yoffe, Wolf, & Giordano, 2003, p. 1123). Among these, the Mekong River System presents
particular challenges for China’s security. Relations between China and its downstream
neighbours in the Mekong basin have long been fragile (Morton, 2008, p. 8). This situation is
likely to be exacerbated by the construction of several dams in Chinese territory, which
restrict flow to downstream nations. If, as climate models suggest, water flow to the Mekong
becomes more variable under climate change, China’s “asymmetric” control of the river’s
headwaters will become an issue of even greater concern to Southeast Asian nations (Asia
Society, 2009, p. 17).
This particular power asymmetry is of special significance, since Yoffee, et al.’s
research suggests that a high density of dams is associated with conflictive behaviour, unless
freshwater treaties are involved (Yoffe, Wolf, & Giordano, 2003, p. 1116). China has
steadfastly refused to join such “hard law” regimes in the Mekong region (Nielsen, 2007, p.
217). Thus, it seems reasonable to assert that China will have to improve its cooperative
frameworks if it is to avoid significant diplomatic tension with Mekong nations as the flow of
the river changes along with the climate. Simply put, Beijing will almost certainly have to
devote more diplomatic attention to the Mekong and other potential Asian “water hotspots”
as climate change impacts accelerate.
In mainland China, specific regional impacts also appear to represent the most
pressing security challenges. Several of China’s most strategically important regions are
predicted to suffer significant water resource shortages as a result of climate change. As
Barnett, et al. have observed, some 23% of China’s population lives in western regions where
glacial melt water provides the principal dry season water source (Barnett, Adam, &
Lettenmaier, 2005, p. 306), and as glaciers melt, water will become increasingly scarce
during the dry season. One study, describing the disappearance of an oasis in north-western
Gansu province, attributes climate change for causing a decrease in stream flow during the
summer months. This decrease in water availability is inducing desertification, which
exacerbated by population growth has imposed serious socioeconomic costs on an already
poor area (Kang, Su, Tong, Zhang, Zhang, & Davies, 2008, p. 444). Such impacts are
particularly significant since these western regions are not only impoverished, but also the
most restive in China, being home to ethnic minorities who have long mounted challenges to
Beijing’s rule (Davis, 2008).
These Changes in water availability in China’s restive northwest can pose security
challenges in two primary ways. First, competition over scarce resources can exacerbate
existing tensions between China’s majority Han ethnic group and minority groups such as the
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Tibetans and Uyghur (Bhattacharji, 2008). As the Asia Society report has concluded, “One
could certainly foresee the potential for conflict as urbanization and industry begin to deplete
already scarce water supplies, particularly if certain Han-run businesses are perceived to be
receiving favourable treatment in water resource allotment” (Asia Society, 2009, p. 19). One
Chinese scholar has similarly noted the danger environmental change poses for the success of
the country’s much-touted Western Development Strategy (Xibu da kaifa), saying “The
environment of the West itself is the foundation of the Western Development Strategy” (Lu,
2008).
Second, water scarcity could increase the numbers of “environmental refugees” from
China’s northwest, potentially inflaming ethnic tensions and increasing socioeconomic
burdens (round out this sentence) as they seek opportunity elsewhere in China. A study by
Kang, et al. found that increasing numbers of farmers in Gansu province are abandoning their
lands as a result of “the rapid deterioration of [their] water environment” (Kang, Su, Tong,
Zhang, Zhang, & Davies, 2008, p. 446). Similar phenomena have been described in Tibet,
where a variety of challenges are inducing higher rates of out-migration of ethnic Tibetans
(Morton, Climate Change on the Tibetan Pleateau: a new human security challenge, 2009).
In the high Himalaya, minorities may be affected less by water shortages and more by
increasing exposure to geologic hazards, such as the threat of flooding from glacial melt
waters and landslides as permafrost melts (Hewitt, 2009). Nonetheless, the potential for
environmental refugee outflows to increase exists in both regions.
The danger posed by such environmental refugees4 is that they may be deprived of the
means to sustain livelihoods in their new homes. Research has indicated that gradual
environmental deterioration, as may be expected under climate change, affects the very poor
disproportionately; already bereft of resources, they have little capacity to re-establish
themselves elsewhere (Bates D. , 2002, p. 469). As Yan and Qian have described, arable
land is scare in China, and environmental refugees, pulled away from their livelihoods and
kinship networks, often have great difficulties in setting up livelihoods when forced to
resettle (Yan & Qian, 2004, pp. 631-632). Research by environmental security scholars has
further indicated that this dislocation can cause significant social stability issues. In
particular, as a result of environmental scarcity “people migrate in large numbers to regions
where resources seem more plentiful, only to fight with the people already there. Or they
migrate to urban slums, where unemployed young men can be primed to join criminal gangs
or radical political groups” (Homer-Dixon, Terror in the weather forecast, 2007).
Additionally, climate-related water shortages pose threats to China’s food security.
The north China winter drought of 2008-2009, which China’s National Meteorology Centre
classified as an “extreme weather event” (Jiduan qihou shijian) attributable to climate change
(Liu Y. , 2009), illustrates these security implications. This drought, which occurred during
the winter of 2008-2009, was the worst in 30 years, and affected China’s principal wheatgrowing areas, damaging 2.7 million mu of farmland 5 (Zhang & Wang, 2009). News
reported indicated that about 40% of China’s winter wheat crop would be affected (Li, 2009),
and that the drought was expected to decrease the wheat harvest, one of China’s most
important, by 5% nationally, and by 20% in some areas, such as Henan province (Xinhua
News Agency, 2009).
The scale of such effects has led many commentators to warn that climate-related
drought in north China could threaten the country’s food security (Liu S. , 2009). Political
factors dictate that food security is an especially sensitive issue in China, as the government
4

There is a technical though important distinction between “refugee” and “migrant.” Refugees, according to the
United Nations, are persons who are compelled to migrate by external factors, while migrants are those who
choose to do so for other, typically economic reasons.
5
This figure is equivalent to approximately 180,000 hectares (1 mu= 0.0667 hectares).
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is anxious to insulate the large population of rural poor from food price shocks (Brown,
2008). While it is unclear whether, as Xiong, et al. have indicated, climate change will
actually threaten China’s total domestic food supply, it is clear that the government cannot
afford to ignore extreme weather events, placing increasing pressure on the country’s military
and paramilitary institutions to develop disaster management and assistance capabilities.
Indeed, the drought provides an illustration of the increased need for such operations.
The paramilitary People’s Armed Police (Renmin wuzhuang jingcha) mobilized some 2400
troops over eight provinces, with commanders pledging to “make all-out efforts to fight the
drought and prevent disaster,” while also joining a “battle to snatch a bumper harvest.”
Additionally, assets from the People’s Liberation Army, including seven Air Force aircraft
and engineers from the country’s strategic nuclear forces, were called into service. The Jinan
Military District accompanied its mobilization with the exhortation to “call upon the
[Sichuan] earthquake relief spirit” (Fachang kangdi jiuzai jingshen) (Wang, et al., 2009).
With climate models predicting increasing incidence of extreme weather events, China’s
military will be compelled to incorporate these domestic disaster response and assistance
capabilities more closely into its operational planning strategies.
In addition to posing challenges to the country’s military, it is clear that adaptation to
water-related climate impacts will impose serious economic costs upon China. Xinjiang
Province, for example, is building 59 reservoirs to collect melt water from the Himalaya’s
shrinking glaciers in attempt to address concerns about long-term water availability. The tenyear project is expected to cost 200 million RMB per year for at least the next three years
(Watts, 2009), a considerable sum for one of China’s poorer areas. A large-scale study by
Kirshen, et al. also sheds light on the costs of adaptation to water distribution changes in
China. After compiling water storage costs and modelling changing flow under various
climate change scenarios, the study indicated that water storage costs vary widely by region;
the cost of capturing 120 billion cubic meters of water are USD$4.5 billion in the southern Xi
Jiang river area, and less than USD$2 billion in the central Chang Jiang, for example. Most
noticeably, it will become increasingly difficult and expensive to enhance water storage
capacity (reservoirs, catchments, etc) in water-stressed areas like north China (Kirshen,
McCluskey, Voegl, & Strzepek, 2005, p. 327).
The security implications of water-related climate impacts can be fundamentally
characterized by the uncertainty they introduce with respect to overall water availability, food
security, and social stability. As one commentator has noted, climate change is an “engine of
destabilization” (Stuhltrager, 2008, p. 38).
This characterization seems particularly
appropriate with respect to China. Water-related climate impacts will be severe in several
regions, both within China and in its border regions. In addition, these impacts have the
potential to foster general instability. However, it is difficult to identify any of these security
implications as direct. What appears more certain, however, is that China’s military,
governmental institutions, and national resources will be increasingly burdened by climate
change and water issues. As a result, the government has been compelled to devote more
attention to these issues, a trend which is only likely to accelerate. With this conclusion in
mind, the next section investigates Chinese political and strategic discourse on climate
change and water issues.
The Geopolitics of Water and Climate in China
It is clear that the distribution and availability of water resources in China and neighbouring
countries will be severely impacted by climate change, a prospect which in turn entails
significant security implications. What remains is to assess how China perceives this
situation, and how it is responding. This final section thus discusses Chinese governmental?
Too broad reactions and discourse on climate change, water, and security. It first describes
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changing Chinese perspectives on security, before more focusing more specifically on steps
that China has taken to address water-related climate impacts, both within and outside the
country’s borders. This section argues that the Chinese government is particularly concerned
about the consequences, both traditional security and otherwise, of water-related climate
change impacts, presenting opportunities to open a strategic, security-focused international
dialogue on climate change (addressed in the Conclusions section).
In recent years, Chinese analysts, have, mirroring their Western colleagues, have
articulated a broader conception of security. China’s “New Security Concept” (Xin anquan
guan), promulgated since the late 1990s, addresses environmental and social issues, and also
emphasizes cooperation and dialogue as a means of conducting foreign relations (Liu G. ,
2006). As a subset of this trend, China’s strategic studies and international relations
community has also devoted increasing attention to the potentially destabilizing impacts of
climate change. Citing the broadening definition of security in the West, Liu et al., for
example, advocate creating a special policy research group that focuses on the political and
security dimensions of environmental change (Liu, Ge, Fang, & Zhang, 2006, p. 350).
Chinese security commentators have been even more prolific in citing American
analyses of the security threats posed by climate. A series of such reports, including a
widely-read 2004 Department of Defense study, prompted commentary within China over the
possibility that climate-related resource shortages could lead to conflict or even war (Lin,
2005). Some non-official commentators have gone so far as to extrapolate upon such
analyses to suggest that the threat of water-related conflict may increase between China and
neighbouring countries (Guoji Xuanqu Daobao, 2004). Several more official Chinese
commentators have similarly but more soberly cited American national security analyses to
focus on the potential for water-related conflict to increase in politically unstable regions of
the world, such as the Middle East (Tong, 2007).
The Chinese government, in contrast, does not appear to view climate change, or any
of its attendant impacts, as a security issue. For most officials, climate change simply does
not rise to the level of national security (Zha, 2009). Moreover, Beijing has strongly opposed
United Nations efforts to link climate change and security through debating climate change
issues in the Security Council. China Daily, the country’s official English-language
newspaper, editorialized that “The call for the international community to address climate
change is sensible, but sensationalizing it as an issue of security is conspiratorial” (China
Daily Editorial Board, 2007). A separate China Daily report quoted China’s deputy
representative to the United Nations as saying, "Discussing climate change at the Security
Council will not help countries in their efforts to mitigate its effects” (Le, 2007).
Moreover, the Chinese government has proven to be visibly reticent on some major
transboundary water issues. It has consistently refused to participate in the Mekong Basin
Commission (Morton, 2008, p. 58), despite the fact the Mekong system’s headwaters are all
in China, making it impossible to fashion a comprehensive water management system
without Beijing. China has also been hesitant to support the creation of an International
Biosphere Reserve in the Tumen River Delta area, since most of the environmental threats to
the area come from China (Nam, 2005).
The picture becomes a bit more complicated when this analysis is expanded to nongovernmental sources. Among Chinese security and international relations analysts, climaterelated security issues are not taken very seriously (Zha, 2009). Nonetheless, several
prominent Chinese analysts are increasingly outspoken in their advocacy for greater USChina climate cooperation. Zhang Haibin, a professor at Peking University, has written that
“from a high-level strategic perspective actively promoting US-China climate cooperation
will advance the mutual interests of all of humanity” (Zhang H. , 2009). Meanwhile, Chinese
government media gave favourable coverage to the US Deputy National Security Adviser’s
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April 2009 message to China that the United States wished to enhance clean and renewable
energy technology cooperation (Wang, 2009).
In addition, water issues have become more prominent in China’s relations with some
neighbouring countries. China has in recent years concluded a number of agreements with
countries like Russia and Kazakhstan regarding the demarcation and protection of
transboundary rivers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003). Furthermore, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), which Beijing initially promoted largely as a body for
expanding security cooperation and countering Western influence, has begun working on
water issues. The SCO’s 2004 meeting was devoted to water, and in 2005 the organization
signed a compact with the Association of Southeast Asian nations to broaden cooperation on
water resources (Asia Society, 2009, p. 38).
At the domestic level, Chinese officials appear to take very seriously the
consequences of water-related climate change impacts. Premier Wen Jiabao, for instance,
was quoted in 1998 as saying, “"The survival of the Chinese nation is threatened by the
country's shortage of water” (Plafker, 2005). Lin Erda, a prominent member of China’s
Agricultural Sciences Institute, has similarly called attention to the threat posed by retreating
glaciers, saying that these and other effects of climate change “directly threaten China’s food
security” (Lin, 2005). The recent winter drought of 2008-2009 also indicated the
government’s concern for water issues, with state media reporting in its wake that
“Agriculture is a top government priority… [In early 2009 the] State Council and the Central
Committee of the Communist Party issued their first joint document of the year, which
reiterated that the development of agriculture and rural areas in 2009 was of special
significance” (Xinhua News Agency, 2009).
Indeed, the government’s response to the winter drought is indicative of the
seriousness with which it takes water issues. Beijing declared a state of emergency as a result
of the winter drought, and has earmarked some 400 million RMB for drought relief (Xinhua
News Agency, 2009). State media coverage also highlighted government investment in water
management, including an investment of some 62 billion RMB in rural water conservation
from 2000-2008 (Xinhua News Agency, 2009). Government water officials further reiterated
their intention to “strengthen control” of water resources, and to implement conservation
practices (Xinhua News Agency, 2009).
Much of this effort seems to be specifically motivated by concerns for food and water
security. In statements to the press, China’s Minister for Water Resources stressed the need
to redress inequities in the distribution of water resources to urban and rural residents
(Beijing Qingnian Bao, 2009). Premier Wen Jiabao similarly emphasized the need to provide
peasants with economic security and stability in a time of drought, saying "It's of vital
significance to the overall economy to boost steady growth of grain production and farmers'
income" (Xinhua News Agency, 2009). State media further repeated the theme of uneven
access, including one report illustrating a peasant who pays five times the urban price of
water just a few kilometres away (Hun, 2009).
Paralleling this focus on water security is an even more long-standing preoccupation
with the fear that water shortages will impair food security. In mid-2008, state media
reported that “With food and water security becoming great concerns around the world,
China will take measures to ensure agricultural water use and promote its plan to increase
food production,” including raising the price of water (Wang W. , 2008). China further
appears to take the issue of water availability in the Himalaya seriously, flying several cloudseeing sorties a month to increase rainfall and water availability on the Tibet-Qinghai Plateau
(Zha, 2009). Perhaps the clearest statement of the government’s linkage of water and
security issues, however, is the National Framework for Medium to Long-Term Food
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Security, released in 2008, which emphasizes water-saving agriculture and conversation
(Xinhua News Agency, 2009).
Chinese discourse on climate, water, and security is clouded. As this section has
indicated, there remains a high-level reticence to link climate change issues and security.
However, some commentators have instead emphasized these linkages. Moreover, at the
domestic level, official voices have expressed particular concern over inequities in water
resource distribution, as well as potential implications for food security. The net result is that
it is reasonable to assume China’s foreign and security policy framework has not been
broadened to include climate-related impacts. Given the manifold strategic challenges these
impacts will pose for China, as outlined in the last section, this is of some concern. With this
in mind, this paper turns to its conclusions, which include implications for global climate
change cooperation and negotiations.
Conclusions: A Way Forward for Climate, Water, and Security in China and Asia
This paper has attempted to probe the intersection of climate, water, and security. In the
process, it has examined the physical science basis of water-related climate change impacts,
their security implications, and Chinese political and security discourse. In many ways, this
is uncharted academic terrain. Scientific assessments of climate change and its impact on
hydrological systems are subject to large uncertainties, while the security and political
dimensions of the climate issue exist in a fluid context of popular and elite opinion.
Nonetheless, this paper has advanced a consistent theme, namely that water-related climate
change impacts will increasingly bear on China’s security, foreign relations, and political
discourse.
Beneath this over-arching conclusion, this analysis has uncovered several crosscutting issues at the intersection of climate, water, and security. First among them is
uncertainty. The climate system is incredibly complex, making precise scientific assessment
of climate change impacts, particularly on water, extremely difficult. Indeed, one of the most
confident predictions that can be made is that climate change will increase the variability in
precipitation patterns. As a result of this fundamental uncertainty, the security implications
of such change center on grave but general threats to stability, including large-scale
migration, decreasing agricultural water availability, and increased risk of catastrophic
flooding. Such uncertainty makes tinges climate security studies with a generic air. But this
does not detract from their gravity: as security analyst James Stuhltrager has noted, climate
change fundamentally represents uncertainty and risk, both of which are integral to security
assessment and planning (Stuhltrager, 2008).
A second inter-related issue deals with acute regional impacts. It is clear that specific
regions, such as the Mekong River, parts of the Indian Himalaya and northwest China, will be
more severely impacted by changes in hydrology under climate change. In most such cases,
these ecological impacts will be exacerbated by social, economic, and political factors; in the
Mekong, water management is hampered by transboundary political disputes, while in
northwest China ethnic tensions and poverty enhance the threat of climate-hydrological
changes. Thus, the political-security implications of such changes are likely to be centered
on several specific “hot spot” regions.
The third and final major cross-cutting issue identified in this analysis is that waterrelated climate change impacts will strain the capacity of Chinese institutions and policy
frameworks. This is particularly evident with respect to the military’s natural disaster
response capabilities and transboundary water management policy, as well as with domestic
agricultural, emergency management, and water management policies. The Chinese
government, perhaps with the increased aid of international and civil society actors, will be
pressed to improve its conceptual, planning and implementation capacities in each of these
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policy areas. While Chinese discourse provides evidence of a foundation for developing such
capacities, they are unlikely to be sufficient to deal with the full scale of the climate change
challenge. Finally, China will be forced to devote large economic resources to adaptation,
including the construction of flood defenses, reservoirs, and water distribution systems, if it is
to escape the worst water-related climate change impacts. At a time when China’s
development priorities demand investment in so many areas, this investment is almost certain
to increase political tensions.
With these observations more fully articulated, this paper can at last approach the
issue of implications for global cooperation on climate change. Before doing so, a caveat is
appropriate. It is evident that, from the perspective of China and most other developing
countries, the climate issue is defined primarily by political and economic issues. China’s
stated goals for the Copenhagen climate change conference, for example, emphasize
adaptation and technology transfer, with funding responsibilities borne entirely by developed
nations (National Development and Reform Commission, 2009).
These points of contention, rather than security or strategic dialogue, will define
upcoming global climate negotiations. Indeed, Chinese leaders may continue to resist linking
climate change and its national security, since as scholars have long noted there is little risk
that climate change will foster interstate violence, the traditional focus of security (Deudney,
1990, p. 461). There is thus a limit to the benefit to be gained by “securitizing” the issue of
climate change. However, this paper’s conclusion that water-related security issues will be of
increasing importance under climate change carries at least three significant implications for
global climate cooperation.
First, water-related security issues present a particularly good opportunity to broaden
and deepen bilateral and regional cooperation on climate change. Fundamentally, it presents
an opportunity for strategic dialogue on the long-term impacts of climate change, rather than
shorter-term disagreements over technology transfer or verifiable emissions reductions.
Acute institutional vulnerabilities, such increased strain on emergency management and
disaster response capabilities in China, present opportunities for international technical
assistance and cooperation. A recent Council on Foreign Relations paper, for example,
recommends that the US military integrate climate-related extreme weather response into its
regional command structure (Busby, 2007, p. 21); building dialogue between such
commands, their Chinese and other Asian counterparts could dramatically improve the
efficacy of international disaster response efforts.
This kind of cooperation could be further strengthened by focusing developed-country
climate adaptation funding to address acute strategic issues. For example, the US Agency for
International Development has launched a program in cooperation with the Gates Foundation
to develop new rice varieties capable of surviving various climate change-related stresses,
thereby enhancing food security throughout South Asia. The USD$35 million project will
focus on enabling farmers in the region to obtain higher rice yields even in the face of climate
change, and with fewer inputs of fertilizer and irrigated water (US Federal News Service,
2009). Similar models could be explored, possibly with a greater degree of co-financing, in
China.
Additionally, a recent cooperative venture between the Chinese Academy of Sciences
and the US Department of Agriculture illustrates how bilateral technical assistance can focus
on ameliorating water-related climate change impacts. The program, founded in 2005, is
focused on preventing erosion in China’s Loess Plateau, which is expected to experience
severe flooding under climate change. Cooperative modeling between the two agencies
identified no-till farming practices that can reduce soil loss by 85% under climate change,
helping protect farmers from economic and ecological destruction (Zhang & Liu, 2008, p.
22A). Replicating similar programs can help target adaptation funding to averting the worst
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hydrological impacts of climate change (and attendant security effects), while also expanding
bilateral climate cooperation.
The third and final implication of this analysis for global climate cooperation is to
view such cooperation not only as an ecological imperative, but also as a strategic one. As a
Council on Foreign Relations report has noted, international climate negotiations have a clear
national security dimension, inasmuch as the international community has an interest in
integrating nations like China and India into a “rules-based global order” through
participation in climate negotiations (Busby, 2007, p. 19). This interest is heightened when
the security ramifications of climate change, such as have been detailed in this paper, are
considered. Fundamentally, these ramifications serve to highlight the fact that climate
change impacts, both water and other, will reverberate across borders and traditional
disciplinary distinctions between science, politics, and security. High-level security dialogue
between China, the United States, and other countries can serve as a focal point for such
discussions, and can be a component of existing initiatives, such as the US-sponsored Major
Economies Process on Energy and Climate.
Climate change and its consequences will cast a growing shadow over international
politics and relations in the coming years. Much about the issue is uncertain, but it seems
safe to assert that policymakers and analysts in a wide variety of fields will be compelled to
pay more attention to climate issues. This analysis is intended as a first step towards probing
the issues involved for such actors at the intersection of climate change, water, and security,
especially with respect to China and Asia. It will almost certainly, however, not be the last.
Scientific assessments of climate change impacts are likely to improve in accuracy and detail,
as is the analysis of the political, social, and strategic issues entailed in climate change. Such
work is essential for sharpening the focus of this paper- to think broadly and critical about the
manifold consequences of climate change, for China, Asia, and the world at large.
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Getting Hotter:
How Could China’s Climate Change Policy Trajectory Impact a Post-Kyoto Accord?
Gloria Jean Gong1

Abstract
China’s unprecedented economic growth has given rise to equally rapid increases in
greenhouse gas emissions. China has already ratified the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols, yet
as the international community looks beyond Kyoto, China’s willingness to adhere to binding
emissions standards remains a critical question. This study describes and analyzes the factors
that influence China’s possible participation in a binding greenhouse gas emissions treaty.
Existing international treaty compliance models often overlook China’s own official policies
and stances toward such treaties. This study examines China’s current climate change policy,
historical adjustments of that policy, and potential future trajectory to determine the factors
that would most impact China’s willingness to sign a post-Kyoto climate change. This study
utilizes both English and Chinese-language documents to analyze current Chinese climate
change policies. It describes the historical trajectory of Chinese environmental policy since
1972, tracing the evolution of the “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle and
of the demand for technology transfers and access to international funds. This study also
examines reports from the World Bank, China Council for International Cooperation on
Environment and Development (CCICED) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), explicating how recommendations from influential organizations
may impact China’s future policy trajectory. Most surprisingly, the conclusion of this study is
that China, while retaining much of its former stance on climate change, is also increasingly
warming to taking bold actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

I. Introduction
China’s recent economic growth and industrial development have been breathtakingly
rapid. These increases in manufacturing and industrial production coupled with growing
consumption and an increased standard of living are inseparably connected to persistent
environmental degradation and rising pollution.
The 2007 Synthesis Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warns
that “warming of the climate system is unequivocal.”2 The report also estimates that global
greenhouse gas emissions rose 70% since 1970, and that this steep increase in greenhouse
gasses is very likely a major factor in global warming. 3 Climate change threatens to
destabilize ecosystems, weaken food security and precipitate severe water shortages.
International consensus on the threat climate change presents to the global community has
solidified consistently since the early 1990s.
The international community responded with the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, an international treaty designed to
combat global warming with a system of measuring, emissions caps, and credit trading. By
2008, of Kyoto Protocol signatories, only the United States of America had not and did not
intend to ratify the treaty. Under the Kyoto system, China was classified as a non-Annex I
developing nation and, like other non-Annex I nations, was not required to set emissions caps
on any greenhouse gasses. Rather, developing nations agreed to conduct emissions
1
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measurements and submit regular reports to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change while developed nations committed to reduce key greenhouse gas emissions
and to provide technology and funding to lesser developed countries (LDCs).4
To China, the lack of binding emissions caps was a vital factor in ratifying the treaty.
Since the 1970s, China has maintained that the right to industrial and economic development
takes precedent over environmental protection, pointing out that developed countries only
reached their current economic levels after passing through an industrial revolution. In
addition, China and other LDCs argue that current levels of greenhouse gasses are
overwhelmingly due to emissions by developed countries, and that forcing LDCs to truncate
their growth to pay for the emissions of the first world is unfair. When criticized for its
skyrocketing carbon emissions rates, China is quick to counter that in terms of emissions per
capita, it still ranks far below the developed world. Table 1 shows China, the US, the largest
emitter, smallest emitter, mean, and median countries on total carbon dioxide emission, per
capita emission, and per US$ GDP emission.
Total CO2

kilotons

Per capita

tons

Per $GDP

kg/$ PPP

~China†

6,251,235

Qatar

62.97

Uzbekistan

2.96

US

5,788,181

US

19.904

China

0.65

China

4,143,494

Mean*

5.7

US

0.56

Mean*

128,214

China

3.216

Mean*

0.5

Median**

7,971

Median**

2.7

Median**

0.33

Kiribati

29

Chad

0.013

Chad

0.01

US, 1st of 195
China, 2nd
*Argentina, 31st
**Mongolia, 97th

US, 7th of 191
China, 85th
*Iran, 62nd
**Syria, 96th

US, 38th of 170
China, 34th
*Mauritania, 45th
**Morocco, 85th

Table 1: Comparison of Total, Per Capita, and Per $GDP CO2 Emissions
† 2006 estimate from the Netherlands Environment Assessment Agency, 8% greater than US
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2004

Because of the large carbon intensity gap between developed and developing nations,
China draws extensively on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” to
explain its reluctance to reduce emissions. The principle of “common but differentiated
responsibility” outlined in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
refers to assigning to developed countries the responsibility to “take the lead in combating
climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”5
Despite low per capita carbon emissions, China’s burgeoning total emissions attract
ever more international attention and concern. Studies made headlines when they reported
that sometime in 2006, China surpassed the US as the largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the
world, almost 15 years earlier than most research had predicted.6 China’s unfettered CO2
4
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emissions have political as well as environmental implications, and played a major factor in
the US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. China defends some of its growth by
pointing out that 26% of its carbon emissions are caused by manufacturing goods for the west,
and argues that the west should take responsibility for these “exported emissions.”7
As the effects of climate change grow ever clearer, China itself has begun to
recognize the dire need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The National Eleventh FiveYear Plan for Environmental Protection released by the Ministry of Environmental Protection
admits with disarming frankness that, “China is facing grim situation [sic] in addressing
climate change with hard tasks.”8 Addressing climate change is an integral part of China’s
sustainable development goals, which are based largely on the United Nation’s Agenda 21
framework. The international community has matched China’s increased environmental
activity with access to funding and technical support. This potential aid combined with
China’s ambition to lead the bloc of emerging economies makes China susceptible to
pressure from the international community over issues of environmental protection.
Yet the debate about emissions cuts remains troubled. A lack of consensus on a postKyoto climate change protocol arises largely from uncertainty about China’s willingness to
participate in a treaty that includes binding emissions caps for LDCs. This study defines five
major factors impacting China’s potential compliance with a future climate change treaty:
economic development, domestic goals, United Nations framework, allocation of
responsibility and international cooperation. It examines these factors in light of China’s
current climate change policy, historical adjustments of that policy, and potential future
trajectory.
II. Background and Literature Review
Deng Xiaoping's 1978 ascension to power after the death of Mao Zedong not only ended the
Cultural Revolution but heralded renewed exchange between China and the world. In sharp
contrast to Mao’s strict isolation from the Western world, China participated more actively in
international economic, cultural, and environmental systems. Under Deng’s liberalizing
influence, China broke from earlier policies of environmental exploitation and initiated its
domestic environmental protection program. The year of Deng's rise to power saw a change
in the constitution recognizing the importance of the environment. In the following year, the
National People's Congress approved China’s first draft law on environmental protection.9
In 1984 China held its second national conference on environmental protection,
established an environmental protection commission and elevated the Environmental
Protection Bureau to the National Environmental Protection Bureau (a status just below
ministerial).10 In the same year, Vaclav Smil’s book The Bad Earth was published, giving the
first comprehensive western overview of China's environmental condition.
When Lester Ross's Environmental Policy in China was published in 1988, Ross
examined influences on China’s interchange with the west over environmental policy
questions, pointing out, among other factors, the continued influence of Soviet policy,
guidance, and ideology. Yet China’s approach to environmental protection began diverging
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7
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from the Soviet model. In 1989 China formally promulgated its first Environmental
Protection Law and granted the National Environmental Protection Bureau independent status
from the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction.
While rapid industrial growth gave rise to climbing pollution rates, China’s
participation in the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio
Convention) marked a new era of environmental participation from the central government.
The inclusion of authors Dasheng Yang and Weiyu Yang in the 1993 international forum on
global warming is representative of China’s advance in environmental expertise.11
1993 also saw the publication of Vaclav Smil’s China's Environmental Crisis, the
follow-up to 1984’s The Bad Earth. During the intervening nine years China had undergone a
massive change. In China’s Environmental Crisis, Smil noted the impact of rapid industrial
development on China’s environment and also wrote at length on the contemporary energy
use trajectory and its implications. Interestingly, Smil presciently predicted China's
impending challenges, writing that:
The worst-case scenario would see an unmistakable onset of relatively rapid warming
during the 1990s translating into substantial CO2 generation cuts in rich countries,
with China becoming the leading producer of the gas before the year 2010, and
finding itself under a mounting international pressure to start cutting its emissions.12
Smil criticized contemporary literature on the Chinese environment, writing that too
much emphasis had been put on language ability resulting in “embarrassingly ignorant
writings on the physical nature of China.”13
The Rio Conference and the 1993 Climate Change Convention opened the door to a
flood of publications addressing China’s participation in international environmental treaties
generally, and the global climate change regime specifically. Barbara Sinkule and Leonard
Ortolano’s book Implementing Environmental Policy in China presents an insightful analysis
of the process of environmental policy formation within China. Using a wealth of Chinese
sources, Sinkule and Ortolano address at length the “san ge fabao” (“three magic weapons”)
of environmental impact assessment, pollutant discharge fees, and the three synchronizations.
Using the metaphor of “implementation games” as a framework for analysis, they also
analyze individual industrial facilities and local environmental protection bureaus.14 Sinkule
and Ortolano’s book is one of a handful that draw heavily on the language and logic of the
Chinese environmental policy apparatus, and their attention yields profound insights into the
process of policy making unique to China.
Council on Foreign Relations member Elizabeth Economy’s The River Runs Black:
The Environmental Challenge of China's Future (2004) also benefits from a deep familiarity
with Chinese sources. Economy draws exhaustively on official documents, statistics and
personal interviews to paint a compelling picture of the founding of the Ministry of
Environmental Protection and China’s environmental regime.
As the field of climate change and sustainable development studies explodes, more
and more scholars with little specific knowledge of China apply their expertise to addressing
China’s environmental policy. In the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, the widespread popularity
11
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of sustainable development and environmental studies resulted in a plethora of comparative
studies that included China.15 Others examined the process of international environmental
treaty-making from a political science standpoint.16 Political science research in this area
often uses game theory models to examine the incentive structures of international treaties or
regimes and is largely based on realist theories of international relations.17 Other studies use
economic tools to assess the impact and efficacy of such incentive structures.18 Scientific
studies assess the environmental impact of existing treaties and policies and predict future
impact. 19 As the complexity of the problem become apparent, many researchers moved
toward an interdisciplinary approach, combining analytical tools from political science,
economics and environmental sciences.20
The intricate models created and utilized by these scholars are valuable resources for
understanding China’s willingness to participate in international environmental treaties and
for predicting its future compliance. While this method of broad comparison greatly increases
our ability to compare China’s actions in relation to other developing countries and in the
context of international models, it invites further China-specific research.
The models are often applied to a wide range of countries and tend not to treat at any
great length the impact of China’s domestic policy on its compliance with international
treaties. One potential reason for this lacuna is a linguistic and cultural barrier. A majority of
the studies published in the West that include China, and even of studies focused primarily on
China, are written by researchers with no apparent background in Chinese. While not an
insurmountable handicap, the inability to directly access the wealth of environmental
information available in Chinese or to understand the cultural context of public statements by
Chinese officials might limit researchers to a superficial understanding of China’s policy
trajectory.
This study analyzes both English and Chinese-language documents in order to
describe current Chinese climate change policies, including the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, the
National Climate Change Plan, and the 2007 Report on the State of the Environment. It also
15
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describes the historical trajectory of Chinese environmental policy since 1972, tracing the
evolution of the “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle and of the demand for
technology transfers and access to international funds. Finally, by inspecting reports from the
World Bank, China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development
(CCICED), and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), this
study examines how recommendations from influential organizations could impact China’s
future policy trajectory.
III. Analysis
This study identified the following five elements as currently impacting China’s policy on
climate change: economic development, domestic goals, UN framework, allocation of
responsibility, and international cooperation. The following section describes the current
policy and official stance China takes on each element as well as the historical policy
trajectory since 1972. After describing the historical trajectory and current status of China’s
climate change policy, this study will examine possible future paths by exploring
recommendations made to China by influential policy bodies.
A. Economic Development
Since its modern debut in international diplomacy, China has consistently insisted on a right
to economic development that takes precedence over environmental protection. When China
sent delegates to the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, one of the central
points upon which the delegates insisted was that the international community “assure the
rights of developing countries to develop first and address their environmental challenges one
by one."21 China has reiterated this priority throughout its increased activity in international
environmental exchanges. In a 2008 statement to the United Nations, Bai Yongjie, Counselor
of the Chinese Mission to the UN, said that China would “strive for” a reduction in energy
consumption and pollutant emissions, while maintaining that China’s primary goal was to
double the per capita GDP of the year 2000 by 2010.22
Yet China has gradually shifted its position in regards to the constant primacy of
economic development over environmental protection. In 1990, the chairman of the then
State Environmental Protection Commission, Song Jian, suggested a balance between
environmental protection and economic development, though it would take many years
before Chinese policy gave more than cursory lip-service to the idea of an equal balance.23 At
the Rio Convention, China’s delegation officially stated that “environmental protection can
only be effective when development has been attained.”24
In its section on “Philosophy, Basic Principles and Plan Objectives,” the Eleventh
Five-year Plan for Environmental Protection reiterates the “three transformations” that have
recently become the guiding principles of China’s environmental program. The three
transformations most clearly encapsulate China’s growing commitment to balance
environmental protection with economic growth. The first and second transformations
emphasize a shift away from the current prioritization of economic growth over
environmental protection toward a new standard of equal emphasis. The third transformation
emphasizes a shift from government administration of environmental protection toward a
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“comprehensive application of legal, economic, technical and necessary administrative
methods to address environmental problems.”25
While China is unlikely to relinquish its claims to a right to economic development at
the cost of the environment, it seems increasingly open to recognizing environmental
protection as a top priority. Though this new doctrine signals a substantive shift in
philosophy, there remains a tendency toward internecine conflict between the ministries over
development and environmental protection.
B. Domestic Climate Change Goals
China domestic climate change policy has evolved in response to international programs.
Until the creation of the National Climate Change Program in 2007, China’s domestic climate
change policy was scattered between several policies. This section examines China’s Local
Agenda 21 (1993), National Eleventh Five-year Plan (2007), and National Climate Change
Plan (2007) to illustrate the changes in approach to climate change mitigation and adaptation
since the 1992 Rio Convention.
An aversion to binding carbon emissions caps consistently underlies China’s approach
to climate change policy. China’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals are rarely stated
in terms of reduction in total emissions. Rather, in keeping with the continued emphasis on
environmental protection paired with economic growth, goals are most often framed in terms
of China’s carbon intensity (carbon emissions per unit GDP) or of carbon emissions per
capita rather than gross emissions.
China has focused its domestic policy on two key instruments to combat climate
change while promoting development:
1. Research and development that will strengthen basic measurement and
analysis capabilities, developing renewable energy technologies, exploring
carbon capture and sequestration and exploiting alternative energy sources.
2. Increasing efficiency of existing technologies, for example, upgrading current
coal-burning power plants.
In the Initial National Communication on Climate Change to the UNFCCC, China pointed
out that its observation infrastructure is underdeveloped, crippling its ability to accurately
measure key emissions indicators.26 China’s insistence on increased efficiency as a way to
reduce carbon emissions is in line with its determination to continue growth, but also
accurately reflects the fact that upgrading outmoded technology is China’s most accessible
and efficient pathway to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. China’s coal-fired plants often
function with only a fraction of the efficiency of counterparts in the developed world.
According to World Bank estimates, replacing obsolete technology with cleaner-burning,
more efficient technology could reduce China’s carbon dioxide emissions by as much as 40%
by 2030.27
Local Agenda 21: China was the first country to formulate a Local Agenda 21 (LA21)
in response to the United Nations’ Agenda 21 (a framework for international sustainable
development). One of the 19 areas of focus in China’s Agenda 21 is “Protection of the
Atmosphere,” which includes prevention of stratospheric ozone depletion, controlling
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greenhouse gas emissions, and construction of climate change monitoring, forecasting and
service systems.28
LA21 states that “China wishes to bring the emission of greenhouse gases under
control, reduce the growth rate of carbon dioxide emissions, study measures for reducing
emissions of methane and nitrous oxide, maintain and strengthen greenhouse gas sinks.” The
Agenda lays out a framework for combating climate change that includes research,
strengthening the emissions measurement infrastructure and increasing efficiency in energy
production and consumption. Its objectives for reduction of ozone depleting substances (ODS)
focus on research and development activities that will improve the production of ODS
substitutes. LA21 also prioritizes setting “targets for emission levels, in accordance with the
international convention for the control of greenhouse gases” though the Agenda itself gives
little indication of what those emissions levels would be.29
National Eleventh Five-Year Plan: Revealing vestiges of Soviet influence, China’s
central government periodically publishes a five-year plan to outline policy direction. In
2007, in response to the central government’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan, the Ministry of
Environmental Protection (MEP) published the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for Environmental
Protection. The Plan lays out an ambitious list of policies intended to control the emissions of
greenhouse gasses (GHGs), including accelerating development of energy saving
technologies, developing renewable energy, controlling GHG emissions in industrial
production processes and creating carbon sinks through reforestation projects.
In addition, MEP’s Five-Year Plan sets binding targets that are “fragmented [sic] to
each province, autonomous region, and municipality directly under the State Council.” 30
Important to note, these binding targets are imposed on provincial governments by the central
government and in no way indicate that China would agree to binding emissions reductions
targets being placed on it by other, powers such as the United Nations, rather, these standards
merely indicate that China is now prioritizing emissions reduction more so than in the past.
National Climate Change Plan: Signaling a growing commitment to address climate
change, the central government called for the formation of a national climate change
framework. Published in 2007, the 62-page document details China’s plan to mitigate and
adapt to global warming. Key features of China’s National Climate Change Plan (CNCCP)
include its admission of climate change as a “major global issue,” its placement of climate
change within a sustainable development framework, its emphasis on equal treatment of
adaptation and mitigation, and its lack of binding emissions standards.
The CNCCP reaffirms China’s commitment to achieving environmental protection
within a larger framework of economic and social development. In the section on “China’s
Efforts and Achievement in Mitigating Climate Change” the CNCCP outlines the direction of
China’s Climate Change mitigation program including “restructuring the economy,
promoting technology advancement and improving energy efficiency, optimizing energy mix
by developing low-carbon and renewable energy, strengthening laws and regulations, and
policies and measures relevant to addressing climate change.”31 In addition to goals to raise
conservation awareness, encourage climate change research and restructure legal and
economic mechanisms and reduce emissions through technology upgrades, the CNCCP
outlines specific standards on greenhouse gas emissions.
The key standards outlined in the CNCCP include:
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•
•
•
•

increase the proportion of renewable energy (including hydropower) to 10 percent
of the primary energy supply by 2010;
increase extraction of coal bed methane to 10 billion cubic meters;
stabilize nitrous oxide emissions at 2005 levels by 2010;
reduce CO2 emissions through a 20 percent reduction of energy consumption per
unit GDP by 2010.32

Counselor of the Chinese Mission to the UN, Bai Yongjie, in her 2008 address to the
Roundtable on “Environmental Sustainability” of the UN High-level Event on Millennium
Development Goals, said that in addition to doubling the 2005 GDP by 2010, China would
“strive for, as compared with the 2005 level, a 20% reduction in China's per unit GDP energy
consumption, a 10% reduction in main pollutant discharge and a 20% increase in forest
coverage.”33 Ms. Bai’s statement not only clearly defines several of China’s environmental
goals, but also illustrates why China’s domestic treatment of climate change has increasingly
become the subject of international scrutiny.
C. United Nations Framework
China created its domestic climate change policy in response to and reflects the underlying
structure of the UNFCCC. China has repeatedly criticized attempts to circumvent the
UNFCCC, arguing that it should be the main vehicle for addressing climate change. China
has also stressed the importance of delaying binding emissions caps on LDCs until developed
countries have first reduced their carbon emissions.
Since 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has
remained the international community’s key organ for mitigation of climate change. China’s
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol was greatly influenced by its inclusion as a non-Annex I
country. Under the Kyoto Protocol, China was required to observe and report emissions data
but was not required to reduce emissions of greenhouse gasses.
China has actively participated in UNFCCC activities and has resisted the creation of
alternative treaties by nations dissatisfied with the Kyoto Protocol. At the release of the
National Climate Change Plan, Ma Kai, minister of the Chinese National Development and
Reform Commission, dismissed US President Bush’s formation of the APEC Leader’s
Declaration on Climate Change, Energy Security and Clean Development (the Sydney
Declaration), an alternative declaration to the Kyoto Protocol that contained no emissions
reductions standards for developed countries and reiterated China’s commitment to working
within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.34 After meeting with Australian
Prime Minister John Howard to discuss the Sydney Declaration, Hu Jintao announced at a
press conference that he hoped the Sydney Declaration would recognize the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change as the “main channel” through which the international
community would address climate change.35
Ma Kai also pointed to China’s low greenhouse gas emissions per capita and its status
as a developing nation, arguing that it was "too early, too abrupt and too blunt" for the
international community to impose emissions caps on China. China has also roundly rejected
calls for emissions caps on high-emitting sectors, such as steel-making, labeling them as
specifically antagonist to the interests of developing countries.36
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D. Allocation of Responsibility
The principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” laid out in the UNFCCC is now
a ubiquitous tenet in Chinese environmental policy. The “common but differentiated
responsibilities” principle holds that all members of the international community have a
common responsibility to address the impact of climate change, but that developed nations
are responsible for initiating cuts on GHG emissions. The questions of assignment of
responsibility for environmental degradation arose in China’s interactions with the
international community even under Mao.
Even before Mao's death, China sent delegates to the 1972 United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm, Sweden. At the UNCHE, Chinese
delegates emphasized ten principles that would be echoed in subsequent documents. One of
the principles was that the international community ought to "assign responsibility to the
superpowers for the destruction of the human environment through their "imperialist"
policies of plunder, aggression, and war” and to “sanction countries that plundered and
destroyed the environment of developing countries."37 Such openly antagonistic language was
rapidly replaced by more diplomatic approaches, though China has not swayed from the
central claim that responsibility for environmental degradation should primarily be assigned
to developed countries. At the Rio Conference in 1992, China’s position stated that "the
developed countries are responsible for global environmental degradation" and that “China
should not talk about its responsibility for global environmental pollution and degradation."38
As the issue of global warming grew in importance, China applied the same policy
stance toward differentiated responsibilities in mitigating climate change. But China, while
remaining firm in the policy that the developed countries should bear the burden of
responsibility for climate change and should be first to cut emissions, has softened its rhetoric
and become more willing to engage. There are no further calls for sanctions on “imperialist”
powers for their “acts of plunder.” Instead, the Eleventh Five-Year Plan assures that in
addition to “adhering to the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’” China
will:
actively participate in international environmental conventions and WTO environment
and trade negotiations, and safeguard environmental rights & interests of China as
well as developing countries. China will perform its obligations, vigorously promote
the domestic implementation work, accelerate the phasing out of substances that
deplete ozone layer and try its best to control the emissions of greenhouse gases
[sic].39
China’s willingness to engage in cooperative efforts to mitigate climate change does
not mean it has relinquished its stance on assignment of responsibility. In 2008, China and
India became ringleaders of a surprising upset at the G8+5 summit, refusing to support the
G8’s goal to halve carbon emissions by 2050. Instead, the five leading emerging economies
issued a joint statement calling on developed countries to “slash carbon emission levels by
80-95 per cent from 1990 levels.”40
When articulating China's demands of a post-Kyoto climate change treaty, China’s
special representative to the climate change talks, Yu Qingtai said “any final deal must reflect
rich countries' responsibility for gases emitted during production of the many Chinese-made
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goods they consume.” 41 The question of exported emissions rises to the front of the
confrontation between China and other developed countries, with China pointing out that
about 25% of its emissions are for the manufacture of goods exported to the west. China
argues that forcing it to reduce its economic growth because the west has essentially exported
the high-emissions industries to its nation is unfair and that developed nations must also
shoulder responsibility for the emissions of the products they purchase from China.42
The National Climate Change Plan holds “common but differentiated responsibilities”
as one of its guiding principles. In line with this principle, the CNCCP states that “the Parties
included in Annex I to the Convention should take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.” It also argues that the first priority for developing countries “with less historical
emission and current low per capita emission [sic]…is to achieve sustainable development.”
The CNCCP firmly declares that “as a developing country, China will stick to its sustainable
development strategy,” essentially signaling an unwillingness to accept emissions caps unit it
reaches its “first and overriding priorities of … sustainable development and poverty
eradication.” Though it makes no mention of a specific emissions reduction standard
developed countries must meet before China will subject itself to emissions cuts, it echoes the
UNFCCC in warning that “ the extent to which developing countries will effectively
implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective
implementation by developed [countries] of their basic commitments.”43
E. International Cooperation
China’s fervent participation in bilateral or multilateral cooperative climate change projects
under the umbrella of UNFCCC structure highlights the powerful role international funding
and technology transfers play in winning China’s compliance. While demands for
international funds and technology transfers to support the transition to environmental
preservation were present since the 1970s, such whole-hearted enthusiasm illustrates China’s
gradual thaw towards submitting itself to external standards in exchange for international
funds.
In 1988 Lester Ross noted the diminishing number of references to Soviet ideology in
Chinese environmental policy and an increased willingness to participate in international
environmental regimes. He wrote, "in contrast to the early 1970s when official spokesmen
trumpeted China's inherent superiority, the tone nowadays is one of serious concern over the
state of the environment, coupled with a search for effective policy."44 In 1989, China signed
and ratified the Montreal Protocol, an amendment to the Vienna Convention that set as its
main goal the depletion of ozone depleting substances (ODS). China’s active participation in
reducing its ODS is an excellent example of effective binding emissions standards.45
In exchange for agreeing to phase out its production and consumption of designated
ODSs, China gained access to the Multilateral Fund, a multi-billion dollar international fund
established to assist developing countries in replacing outdated technologies, measuring and
reporting ODS presence, and otherwise move toward the phase-out goal.
As of 2007, China had received the highest amount of funding of any country drawing
on MLF resources. According to the Multilateral Fund’s Country Programme and
Compliance Summary Sheets, China has been approved to receive $779,788,815 in funds and
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has already received $614,032,859. This puts the price per ton at $3,593 approved funds or
$2,829 disbursed funds.

ODP
ODP
US$
US$
US$ approved US$ disbursed
tonnes
phased
Approved
disbursed
ODP phased
ODP phased
233,100 217,023.6 $779,788,815 $614,032,859
$3,593.11
$2,829.34
Table 2: Funding, Outcomes of China’s Collaboration with the Multilateral Fund

With support from the MLF, China was very successful in reducing its consumption
and production of almost every designated ODS. The goals for emissions reduction of CO2
and other greenhouse gas are noticeably vague in China’s domestic policy documents, but
there are specific goals detailing the goals to completely phase out the use and production of
certain ODSs.46

Figure 1: Comparison of 10th FYP goals with outcomes reported in 11th FYP

A comparison between the Tenth Five-Year Plan goals and achievements with those
under the Montreal Protocol reveals a marked difference. Of the 13 goals listed in the Tenth
Five-Year Plan, China reported meeting only two. Yet it has consistently met the standard
and consumption reduction goals set under the Montreal Protocol (see graph below). Access
to Multilateral Funds, expertise, and technology ensured China’s willingness to comply with
the binding reductions.
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Figure 2: CFC Consumption and Production in tons
Thus two important aspects of international cooperation demanding consideration are
international funds and technology transfer.
International funds: China claims that it is walking the path of development that other
countries did during the Western Industrial Revolution. China insists that it is unfair for
developed nations to expect it to curtail its economic and industrial development because of
their emissions. In response, developed nations have pointed out that by leveraging existing
technologies China can leapfrog the most harmful stages and avoid wreaking the same
environmental havoc. The question of how to pay for the expensive leap in technology has
plagued discussions of development since modern China’s engagement with the west. The
1972 delegation to the UN Conference on the Human Environment put forward the principle
that there be compensation for “any country polluted by another" and asked that the
resolution include plans to "develop an international fund by the industrial countries to
support environmental protection elsewhere."47
At the Rio Convention in 1992, the Chinese delegation stated more directly that "the
developed countries should compensate developing countries for the efforts they undertake to
meet international environmental agreements and should provide environmental technology
and intellectual property at below-market prices." 48 In 1994, NEPA chairman Song Jian
estimated that the international community would need to provide 30-40% of the $4 billion
cost of China’s Local Agenda 21 projects.49
China’s Local Agenda 21 reflects the same sentiment, stating that China will “actively
seek investment from the international community for projects which assist in the slowing of
climate changes,” including coal-fired power plants and other coal-gas projects, hydroelectric
stations, coal methane utilization and reforestation projects.50
China not only exerted pressure on the international community to provide financial
support to developing countries’ environmental protection efforts; once funds were available
to China, the positions switched and the donors were able to leverage their position to
influence China’s environmental protection policy. Ross observed the role economic
considerations played in China’s environmental decisions, noting in 1988 that donor
organizations or governments “insisted on the incorporation of environmental assessments
47
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into project evaluations, and, more importantly, included environmental improvement
projects in their aid programs ... thus making such projects much more viable." 51 Even
projects with primarily economic purpose incorporated requirements for certain
environmental actions, using the hunger for development assistance to convince China to
establish basic monitoring and conservation programs.
One clear example of the impact of funds lies in China’s 2002 ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol. As a non-Annex I signatory, China agreed to measure and submit regular
communications on emissions in China. Under the Kyoto Protocol, China had access to the
Clean Development Mechanism, which offered funds for new carbon reduction technology
development. To date, China has received 52% of the funding from the MLF, more than any
other developing nation.52
Under the umbrella of the UN programs or bilaterally, China has actively engaged
with other nations or bodies on climate change collaborations. In 2008 China launched the
UN-China Climate Change Partnership Framework, a partnership aimed at “supporting
development of post-2012 strategies, strengthening global knowledge sharing and best
practices … and designing adaptation policy frameworks to climate-proof future investments
in less developed areas of China.”53 In 2008 Bai Yongjie also stated to the UN that China
believes environmental difficulties facing the international community “need to be resolved
through enhanced global, regional and bilateral cooperation.”54
Technology transfer from developed nations: An issue closely related to access to
international funds, technology transfer lies at the heart of environmental interactions
between developed nations and China.
As early as 1972 China lobbied for international community to “support the free
transfer of scientific and technical knowledge.”55 The Eleventh Five-Year Plan’s “Priority
Areas for Environmental Science & Technology Innovations “outlines China’s plan to
participate “extensively” in international cooperation. According to the Plan, China hopes to
“consolidate and deepen its environmental cooperation” with key nations, the European
Union and traditional allies, and to find opportunities for environmental collaboration with
neighboring countries. 56 The Plan also states that “the introduction of foreign capitals,
technologies and management experience will help China improve the environmental
protection technology and management level...China will enhance its capacity in self
innovation and actively promote international cooperation and technological transfer that
reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases.” 57 The “Science and Technology Innovations”
section also outlines technology focus areas, including climate change adaptation and
mitigation, population control, biodiversity conservation and biosafety.
China’s special representative for climate change talks told a news agency he was
“gloomy” about discussions on post-Kyoto treaties and cited the perceived failure of western
governments to successfully fulfill their Kyoto obligations of technology transfers. Western
governments point to their inability to mandate the transfer of patented technology, an excuse
Yu and other Chinese officials dismiss. 58 Despite continued debate in the international
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political sphere, international cooperation between China and other nations blossomed after
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.
In 2005, the European Union and China announced a climate change partnership. The
partnership pledged to work together on collective research projects on climate change
adaptation technologies, agricultural substitutes, and other related topics. The EU- China
Climate Change Partnership also established a new collaboration on clean coal technology.
As part of the collaboration, the United Kingdom has pledged $6.1 million over three years
towards clean coal technology research with China.59 The research focuses on developing
low-carbon emissions power stations and carbon capture and sequestration technologies.
China and Australia have also signed a deal as part of a plan to cut power stations’ CO2
emissions to test a post-combustion capture (PCC) pilot plant in Beijing.60
China has actively sought funding and technology transfers on a variety of projects,
ranging from carbon trading to adaptation. Using United Nations funds provided under the
Millennium Development Goals, China launched two carbon-trading programs in 2007, and a
carbon trading exchange in Beijing, the first outside of Europe and the US.61 A further $1.7
million of funding will go to 12 western Chinese regions to help facilitate carbon trading.
Norway and the UN also provided $2.4 million of funds and technology for climate change
adaptation and mitigation programs in some of China’s most vulnerable ecosystems. The
project will target both delicate and high-emissions areas, including Ningxia, Qinghai, Tibet,
Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Liaoning and Shanxi.62 Under the World Bank's Umbrella Carbon
Facility and the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism, Asian and European
companies are paying US$1 billion to help cut Chinese greenhouse gas emissions.63
Such collaborative projects lay the groundwork for China’s future climate change
policy trajectory.
IV. Future Trajectory
The previous section addressed the historical trajectory and current status of China’s climate
change policy. Together they give good indication of where China’s policy stands and why.
Another way of predicting possible future paths China may take is to look at the
recommendations made by highly influential bodies. This section examines recommendations
made to China’s central government by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, the World Bank and the China Council for International Cooperation on
Environment and Development. In general, the organizations promote increased participation
in international environmental protection cooperation, especially encouraging access to
international funding. They also emphasize the importance of technology innovation and
modernization.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) continued its
decade-long work with SEPA with the first Environmental Performance Review of China in
2007. In the resulting report, the OECD outlined recommendations, including methods to
address China’s international cooperation. The recommendations all emphasize strengthening
China’s participation in international environmental co-operation, and include continuing
China’s “active engagement”, strengthening infrastructure capabilities “in support of the
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implementation of international commitments,” developing partnerships with foreign
enterprises and improving efficacy and use of “international support mechanisms” such as the
Multilateral Fund, the World Bank’s Clean Development Fund, and other similar funding
mechanisms.
The core of the OECD’s recommendation is active engagement in international
environmental co-operation. As part of this engagement, the OECD has urged China to meet
all the requirements of the Montreal Protocol for reduction of ODSs within the appointed
timeframe. Although the OECD does not ultimately determine China’s climate change
policy, inasmuch as the OECD does wield influence, its recommendations can still indicate
possible future climate change policy for China. If China engaged as fully as the OECD
suggests, the international community’s influence in China’s domestic policy could be
expected to grow significantly. Even the recommendation that China develop partnerships
with foreign enterprises to receive “training, technical support and cleaner technology”
implies a willingness to conform to the environmental requirements of foreign firms. If
China implemented all the recommendations of the OECD, it would proactively adjust
internal standards and processes to ensure international compatibility and would, in turn,
benefit greatly from the resulting access to funds.
Recommendations from the World Bank follow a similar vein of thought, with a
predictable emphasis on market forces. The World Bank Report China: Air, Land, Water
points to structural changes and technology innovations emerging from “successful economic
reforms” as the key to future reductions of greenhouse gasses.64 China’s accession to the
World Trade Organization, the report posits, will speed these economic reforms. The report
also calls for relying on pricing and regulatory measures to improve the quality of coal,
countering greater demand for automobiles with increased fuel efficiency, and improving
building energy efficiency. Additionally, the report recommends that China “explore new
ways to tap into international capital, knowledge, and technology” to address environmental
challenges. The report specifically urges that these gains in capital, knowledge and
technology should be applied toward an aggressive alternative energy development program.
Reducing China’s coal dependence is so vital, the report claims, that China may not be able
to rely solely on market forces, but may require additional government support.65
Established in 1992, the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment
and Development (CCICED) is an advisory body made up of international experts and highlevel Chinese officials, many of whom are ministers or vice-ministers of the main
departments. The CCICED submits its reports directly to the highest levels of Chinese
government. Current Premier Wen Jiabao was former chairperson of the CCICED; the
current chairperson is the Vice Premier of the State Council, Li Keqiang. Among the
CCICED’s stated objectives are providing “advice, policy recommendations and early policy
warnings to the Chinese Government” and acting in an advisory capacity to the Chinese
Government on important environmental and developmental decisions.66 Recommendations
from the CCICED range from short-term pragmatic solutions to long-term policy principles.
The 2005 CCICED Annual General Meeting on “Sustainable Urbanization” suggested
that climate change mitigation and adaptation be addressed at the planning stages of
development in order to address predicted changes in rainfall, temperature and sea level.
Suggestions also focused on the modernization of coal utilization as part of a national
strategy to form a sustainable energy system. Interestingly, the report noted both the cost of
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delaying reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the fact that planned investments into
electricity would further solidify China’s commitment to coal use.67
In 2003 the CCICED wrote, “China can build for its future, not simply retrofit the
past—the very expensive route of already-industrialized countries.”68 This ambitious ideal is
tempered by the acknowledgment that “the challenge of creating a sustainable national
economy on the scale of China’s is unprecedented. There is no existing model to draw
upon…”69 To face this challenge, the committee members wrote, “will require a singularly
strong will, more financial resources, and great ingenuity.”
The CCICED, like the World Bank and the OECD, envisions China expanding its role
in the international community. This vision took more concrete form during the 2008 Annual
General Meeting on “Innovation for a Harmonious Development” in which the members
discussed the possibility for China to become a world leader in green technologies.
Referencing the challenge of climate change, CCICED Chairperson Li Keqiang declared that
“even with a slowing economy, no country can relent in the struggle.”70 To meet China's
GHG emission reduction standards and long-term sustainable development goals, the
committee recommended that future policy, including the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, focus in
part on developing a Low Carbon Economy. 71 The Task Force on Energy Efficiency and
Urban Development noted that “China is well positioned to play a lead role in the new clean
technologies sector ... including clean transport, solar power, wind power, geothermal
systems nuclear power systems, carbon capture and sequestration, clean coal etc.” Though
currently reflected only in a few levels of government, this viewpoint envisions shifting
China's position from a recipient of technology transfers to a world leader in clean
technology.72 In order to realize this vision, the CCICED focuses heavily on the support of
technology research and innovation, suggesting the creation of several national-level
information networks and organizations to encourage innovation.
The Task Force on Innovation and Environmentally-Friendly Society linked China's
ability to lead the world in clean technology with an ability to reduce emissions. The Task
Force unexpectedly suggests that, while China's current goals of reduction in emissions
intensity are worthwhile, “it is time to look at absolute pollution reduction, not just intensity
reduction…”73 During General Debate some members cited the Innovations Task Force in
recommending the creation energy-intensity based mechanisms to complement the CDM and
suggested that China "could play a role in championing this view as we move towards a new
global climate."74 While the recommendations put forward by the CCICED do not guarantee
the direction of future policy, they do indicate broad topics in which the central government
is most invested. According to the CCICED reports, China's policy future is one that
supports a Low Carbon Economy, highly encourages innovation and leadership in clean
technologies, and is open to considering absolute emissions cuts in addition to reductions in
emissions intensity.
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V. Conclusion
In their monograph “Overcoming Obstacles to U.S.-China Cooperation on Climate Change,”
Kenneth Lieberthal and David Sandalow make nine recommendations to senior leadership on
ways to facilitate post-Kyoto negotiations. The first recommendation is for both parties to
acknowledge the legitimacy of each other’s perspective. Lieberthal and Sandalow write that
fundamental divisions between the US and China perspective remain significant, arguing that
if the United States and China, as the world’s major industrialized country and largest
developing country, can start by recognizing and accepting different perspectives, and
proceeding from there to constructive action, it could reduce obstacles to developing
more widespread multilateral agreements. Including such an approach on U.S.-China
bilateral agreements on climate change and clean energy could contribute to shaping
post-Kyoto agreements to control greenhouse gas emissions globally.75
The importance of acknowledging the legitimacy of each party’s viewpoint can be
extended to the international community as well. This study, by describing the historical
context and current status of China’s climate change policy, facilitates understanding by
framing China’s perspective on climate change. As China jockeys into position to play a
leading role in the international community throughout the next century, an understanding of
the historical trajectory, current stance and possible future paths of China’s climate change
policy grants important insight into its approach to a post-Kyoto climate change protocol.
At an APEC meeting in 2007, Chinese President Hu Jintao succinctly summarized the
following four principles of China's climate change stance: address climate change through
cooperation, pursue sustainable development, uphold the UNFCCC as the main channel for
addressing climate change, and “adhere to scientific and technological innovation.” 76 The
following points examine President Hu's statement in the light of the historical trajectory of
China's climate change policy to predict what China is willing and is not willing to sign and
enact in a post-Kyoto accord.
1. Address climate change through cooperation. This includes the responsibility of
developed countries to “continue taking the lead in reducing emissions after 2012.”
Consistent since 1972, China has and does insist that developed countries reduce their
emissions first. The National Climate Change Plan and other policies uphold China's
commitment to the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.”77 A numerical
standard of emissions reductions expected of developed countries is rarely named, though
some statements have insisted that developed countries reduce emissions down to 40-95% of
1990 levels. As for addressing climate change through cooperation, China's commitment to
working within the established international framework has strengthened considerably since
the 1970s. This stronger commitment should play a factor in any post-Kyoto treaties, since
China will be more eager than ever to take a major role as a leader in the developing world.
2. Pursue sustainable development. For a long time, China insisted on the right of
LDCs to economic development at the cost of the environment. This stance has shifted
dramatically, with China now giving equal weight to environmental protection, at least in
theory. While actual practice appears to lag behind this ideal, China is clearly making
sustainable development a priority. It is important to note, however, that while China may be
willing to impose restrictive domestic standards if it sees fit, it will be less likely to accept
external caps on emissions that would severely retard economic growth. Thus, a post-Kyoto
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treaty that defines caps and cuts in terms of carbon intensity or per capita emissions for nonAnnex I nations would be much more palatable to China than one that defined them in terms
of total emissions. For example, a treaty that required a 4% annual decrease in energy
intensity per GDP unit would be in line with China’s current domestic goals.
3. Uphold the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol as the “core mechanism and
main channel for addressing climate change.” Repeatedly rejecting treaties proposed
outside of the UN framework, China has demonstrated its determination to work within the
UNFCCC structure. The funding and technology transfer organs of the Kyoto Protocol have
proved beneficial to China and lower the cost of making the transfer to more efficient
technologies. The example of China’s success in reducing ozone depleting substances under
the Montreal Protocol raises an intriguing example of the efficacy of international funds in
providing a powerful incentive to change production and consumption patterns. To merit
China’s support, a post-Kyoto protocol almost inevitably must be built upon the foundation
of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, including a continuation of existing international
funds (e.g., the Clean Development Mechanism).
4. Science and technology innovation. China has turned to science and technology
innovations as the key solution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and increasing energy
efficiency, continuing its request of technology transfers from the developed world. While the
smooth transfer of technology has been interrupted by concerns over intellectual property
rights, patent violation, potential military use and economic competition, China has already
actively engaged in many bilateral and multilateral technology development projects. As such,
China will likely require commitments by developed countries to provide services, funds and
technology transfers to developed countries as a fundamental part of any post-Kyoto accord.
It is important to note that negotiation and ratification of any post-Kyoto treaty will be
the beginning rather than the end of China’s post-2012 climate change policy. Even after
successful ratification, China will still face significant implementation challenges; lack of
coordination between ministries, a growing sector of small to medium size enterprises and
strong local protectionism present serious threats to China’s ability to implement effective
environmental policy. Jared Diamond and Jingguo Liu reported in their article “China’s
Environment in a Globalizing World” that township and village enterprises (TVEs) account
for a third of Chinese production and half of its exports. TVEs, which average six workers,
account for a disproportionate percentage of China’s pollution. TVEs may often use highpolluting outdated technologies or unsafe chemical disposal practices, yet the small size of
TVEs make them relatively difficult to regulate.78 (1180)
Though policy-makers form increasingly sophisticated statutes, Chinese regulatory
laws are famously vague in their stipulations. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan for
Environmental Protection, for example, determines the direction of relevant policies and
announces certain goals and central programs, yet leaves specific standards and
implementation policies up to local governments. Unfortunately, the vagueness of the
national laws leaves room for manipulation or even for contradictory local laws that create a
legal space for industry to continue high-emitting practices.
Implementation at regional levels often runs headlong into local protectionism, one of
the most daunting challenges facing environmental protection in China. Under pressure to
grow their GDPs local governments often privilege industrial development over
environmental protection, despite national or even local regulations. Government structure
also inhibits effective environmental protection. Distribution of authority, incentive structures
and the limits of the central government’s power limit the power of the Ministry of
Environmental Protection and of local environmental protection bureaus in pursuing effective
78
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regulation. For example, Lieberthal notes that, “given the line of authority and incentives in
China, the entrepreneurs (local territorial officials) typically control the regulators (local
environmental officials).” 79 This study recommends further investigation of the impact of
these challenges on China’s ability to implement a post-Kyoto climate change treaty.
China’s willingness to agree to mitigation and adaptation policy stipulations will most
likely be affected by its ability to carry out the commitments it makes. China has ambitions to
become the recognized leader of the developing world and to increase its influence in the
international political sphere. One of the recurring phrases China uses to describe itself is a
负责任的发展中国家 (fuzeren de fazhanzhong guojia)—a responsible developing country,
In negotiations on a climate change treaty, China will push for the inclusion of attainable
standards that allow it to build its credibility as a responsible developing country. What
standards are “attainable” for China? Answering that question is well beyond the scope of
this study, but China’s determination to seek attainable standards explain in part its eagerness
for technology transfers and funding. Funding and technology provided by the international
community lowers the cost of implementation to China, making successful regulation more
possible. Thus, the level of control to which China is willing to submit may be closely related
to the amount of funding made available and the level of commitment from developed
countries to transfer technology.
As the global community responds to increasingly urgent calls to action on climate
change, mutual understanding will be critical in achieving consensus. China will play a key
role in negotiating a successful post-Kyoto climate change accord, and a historically
grounded description of China’s policy trajectory provides the perspective necessary to
predict China’s stance on any number of post-Kyoto accord iterations.
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Two Logics of Climate Change Games:
Environmental Governance and Know-How Competition
Hongyuan Yu1
Abstract
Global warming and the resulting climate change present the world with major and
potentially devastating challenges. They lead to environmental degradation/scarcity and a
radical reform of the energy mix among industrial countries, in addition to other nontraditional security concerns.2 From the 1992 Rio Summit through the Kyoto Conference and
the Bali Roadmap, a generation has passed since the world's governments began to seriously
consider the problems of global warming and the resulting climate change. It is now patently
clear that the world should get together to combat the climate disaster. However, we are
always confused with two questions: why has global climate governance been so difficult,
and what factors hamper the effectiveness of international cooperation. This article will give
an explanation to two logics of climate change games by linking environmental governance
and know-how competition.
For those concerned about climate change, collective actions and regimes designed to
limit carbon emissions are at the core of global warming concerns. However, preventing
catastrophic climate change is actually an energy challenge that leads to dramatic know-how
competition in both new and alternative energy. In the international collective action against
global warming, on the one hand, the pursuit of rational common goods leads to cooperation;
on the other hand, the pursuit of rational self-interest or preference (in carbon emissions and
energy know-how) among different states often frustrates international cooperation. Thus
there are two logics of the climate change games: the logic of collective action in
international environmental cooperation; and the logic of power competition in energy
innovation, which is the foundation of power transition in this century. The energy revolution
induced by global warming includes the discovery and exclusive possession of new energy
sources, along with revolutionary progress in the promotion and application of new energy
technology, improved social and economic efficiency, and government control over energy
use. Not surprisingly, the transition of power and hegemony in the future will most likely be
connected to energy.
In the fight against global warming, Western countries not only need to deal with the
failure of collective action among Annex I countries (developed countries),3 but also resolve
interest conflicts between themselves. They also have to encourage developing countries to
share concrete responsibilities in global governance on global climate change. Particularly,
the rich countries—the European Union, Japan and the United States—have and will
continue to achieve domination in the process of climate change politics, and they will
1
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compete for leadership in new and alternative energy, which is at the core of a low-carbon
economy.
China, which is the world's largest economic powerhouse and polluter, is central to
both regional and global efforts against global warming, particularly in the post-Kyoto
climate negotiations. The two-layer games in global climate change politics will pose double
challenges on the country’s domestic political economy and diplomacy. China’s current
development route is still a growth-oriented, unsustainable and resource-constrained
economic model, and the country faces the crucial need to promote development while
joining the global struggle against global warming and contributing to global economic
growth. The government in Beijing seeks to act as a “responsible stakeholder in the
international system,” while pursuing a “scientific outlook on development” in its national
economic development. On the one hand, given the growing absolute carbon emissions,
China has turned into an “environmental superpower;”4on the other hand, its energy-intensive
economy is not only pushing up growth rates in the United States, Japan, the EU and other
economies, but also strengthening the capacity building for low-carbon and new energy. With
these considerations in mind, in this paper, I look at some of the consequences and
characteristics of the two-layer games in global climate change politics. Then I describe
international and domestic implications for China.
1. Two Logics of Climate Change Games
In this analysis of the two logics of the international struggle against climate change, the first
focus is on how to limit carbon emissions in different countries on the basis of the global
collective action theory.5 The other focus is on the competitive advantage of nations resulting
from energy know-how.6
1.1. The Logic of Collective Action in International Environmental Cooperation
The future of the international struggle against global warming depends on collective action
and shared responsibilities.7 The international regime for averting climate change has sought
to overcome this problem since the early 1990s. But the international effort against global
warming has produced mixed results. The explanations of both liberals and constructivists
look powerful in articulating an ideal condition or performance for collective action, but
somewhat thin in explaining the effectiveness of the collective action which has been
undertaken. The effectiveness of collective action involves two overlapping ideas: first,
which members of the regime abide by its norms and rules, and second whether the regime
achieves its objectives or fulfills certain purposes. 8 Apparently, the effectiveness of the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol is very low. These divergences affect the effectiveness of
the UNFCCC so much that a new theoretical analysis beyond constructivism or neoliberalism
should be built.
Under Mancur Olson’s collective action theory, three variables—selective
inducement, optimal group structure or institution building, and major power—will determine
the effectiveness of collective action. Major power interaction determines the rules and
legitimacy of collective action. Selective inducements shape the pay-off structure of
4
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collective action. Institution building will help maintain structure stability in collective
action. Among these three variables, major power plays a significant role. First, selective
inducements depend on the preference structure and group scale. Second, the flexibility and
payoff structure of the Kyoto Protocol affect the effectiveness of collective action against
climate change. Third, when an established power abandons global collective action in some
areas, some emerging powers will replace its role and push the collective action agenda
forward.
A reduction of carbon emissions is at the core of collective action against climate
change, and it has an impact on the material and physical foundations needed for the survival
of a state. Since no country, by itself, would be able to substantially influence the climate
system, according to the principle of summation,9 all states in the world should make efforts
to limit carbon emissions. The key concern is the payoff structure for carbon emission
reductions among different signatory countries. Currently, most scholars have introduced
market mechanisms to resolve the collective action problems. These models are designed and
forwarded to the carbon credit market. Examples include CDM, IET and JI.
Homer-Dixon argued that climate change problems may soon increase the level of
conflict between poor and rich countries. 10 Some Western scholars termed developing
countries’ climate policy the “maxi-mini principle”—one based on the maximization of rights
and minimization of responsibilities. Under this view, some developing states are only
interested in “free rides” and in gaining access to technical expertise, foreign aid, and
information in order to further their goal of economic development.11 Christopher D. Stone
used the “free-rider” behaviors among poor countries in climate change as strong evidence to
support carbon emission limitations in poor countries.12
1.2. International Competition for New Energy
Energy is fundamental to the prosperity and security of nations. The next-generation energy
will determine not only the future of the international economic system but also the transition
of power. Competition in the energy chain will determine the result of the power struggle
based on innovation and influence power transition in the international system. The new
energy is not only an important constituent of the next-generation energy system, but also
will change the scenario of the future international power configuration. As Daniel Yergin13
of the “American oil hegemony” and Paul Kennedy 14 of the “British coal hegemony”
indicate, the prerequisite condition of significant structural changes in the international
system is an energy power revolution based on the emergence of next-generation energy-led
countries. Technological innovation is of key importance in the energy power structure.
Modelski's long-cycle theory,15 Kondratev’s long-wave theory, and Schumpeter’s economiccycle theory16 have all confirmed the historical contribution of the technological revolution
and institutional innovation to the rise and fall of great powers. They all emphasized the
effect of a “great technological breakthrough” on the world economic cycle, indicating that
9
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the cycle should owe its rise to the technological breakthrough, which mainly happened in
energy areas such as the electricity steam engine and the internal-combustion engine. Michael
E. Porter, in his book The Competitive Advantage of Nations explained why nations should
make an innovation-based model of comparative advantages a priority in developing their
competitive advantage.17
With the heated debate on collective action against climate change, Western countries
have monopolized the future energy system based on new and alternative energy. Peter Evens
once pointed out that every major power that dominated the international system had some
know-how advantages.18 For now, it seems that a low-carbon economy and clean energy will
ultimately determine the future of energy power transition. Jonathan and other scholars
recognized that the EU’s environmental policy geared toward boosting the bloc’s
competitiveness and promoting climate negotiations could also boost its creativity and
competitive advantage. 19 In 2007, the Stern Review Report on the Economics of Climate
Change20 and the Low Carbon Economy Report by the Royal Institute of International Affairs
both confirmed that the EU promoted climate negotiations not just because it was a
forerunner in a low-carbon economy, but also wanted to achieve dominance in global
governance and lay foundations for the future economy. U.S. senior officers Paula
Dobriansky, Richard Lee Armitage and Joseph Nye once proposed that U.S. involvement in
climate negotiations could enhance the nation’s “smart power” and the competitiveness of its
industry.21
Western countries always use the fast growing carbon emissions in new emerging
economies as a strong explanation for global warming. National competitive advantages are
associated with carbon emission reductions. For those who advocate climate diplomacy,
environmental capacity is one important part of a state's comprehensive national power.
Thomas Homer-Dixon supports limitations in developing countries’ environmental capacity
and economic growth. 22 James N. Rosenau uses the concept of a “balance of payments”
instead of a “balance of power” in global environmental governance, and argues that
developing countries should share the costs and responsibilities for global environmental
protection.23
2. The Logic of Collective Action in Climate Change
2.1. The Different Responses of the EU and the U.S.
The EU’s climate diplomacy aims to serve the bloc’s leadership in global governance. The
EU has been closely involved in the international debate on global warming and climate
change. EU countries have always been “at the forefront of efforts to strengthen the
international commitments on climate change.” 24 The bloc plays the role of a leader and
17
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advocate of international action against global warming and climate change. The EU has used
its dual status as the biggest economic bloc and its growing role as a major advocate of
international commitments on climate change. The EU is one of the largest donors of
environmental aid and the strongest supporters of the Kyoto Protocol during COP
conferences. The EU’s leadership on climate change has international legitimacy.25
The EU spends “more resources on initiating more awareness of climate impacts in
developing countries.” 26 Moreover, European countries try their best to persuade other
countries to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. At the EU Council Meeting on May 31, 2001, the EU
decided to strengthen the capacity building of developing countries against global warming.
The EU supported Kyoto mechanisms such as joint implementation among Annex I
countries, but was concerned that the U.S. would avoid a reduction in domestic carbon
emissions by trading environmental emissions with developing countries. A carbon tax is also
a good experience for EU climate change policy implementation. 27 The policy has been
introduced by many signatories to the UNFCCC. In 2004, the EU’s willingness to trade
support for Russia’s accession to the WTO for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol gave an
unprecedented impetus to the international struggle against climate change. In 2007, the EU’s
endeavors saved the Bali Roadmap, preventing sharp conflicts between rich and poor
countries.
The United States, which is the largest emitter, is central to the global collective
action. Since 1997, the U.S. State Department has published its annual Environmental
Diplomacy Report,28 which evaluates global climate change diplomacy. “The United States
was a global leader in the early development of policies and regulatory programs to protect
environmental quality.”29 Under the Clinton administration, the U.S. announced a $1 billion
five-year effort to help developing countries cut emissions and meet the goals of the climate
change treaty. However, after 2001, the Bush administration put climate change on the back
burner. The U.S. government argued that the Kyoto Protocol was unfair to the United States,
and the Bush administration withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. Under the Bush
administration, the U.S. has shifted more responsibility to private industry to guide pollutioncutting efforts in the Third World.30 In 2001, the Bush administration declared that it would
reduce the amount of money set aside in the U.S. budget for programs intended to help
countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Mexico, Poland, and Russia, in
order to increase their industrial development with only minimal contributions to global
warming. 31 In 2005, Hurricane Katrina battered the U.S. Gulf Coast and caused great
economic costs. Hurricane Katrina forced the Bush administration to place an emphasis on
global environmental protection. The United States is working with other countries through a
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series of bilateral or multilateral forums launched by top government leaders on global
warming. These include Major Economies Meetings, G8, and AP6.
Common goods mean joint supply and the impossibility of excluding others from
consumption once these goods are supplied to some members of the community. 32 This
means that any country, including India, China, Japan and the U.S., should contribute to
mitigating global warming, and that they cannot seek to withhold goods from other
countries.33 Thus, Western countries are working hard to avoid “free-rider” behaviors and are
trying to persuade China to join the campaign. The U.S., EU and other developed countries
are urging China, India and other developing countries to assume responsibility for reducing
carbon emissions as soon as possible. Otherwise a rapid increase of carbon emissions in the
developing world may counterbalance the endeavors of the rich countries. The Bush
administration argues that the Kyoto Protocol is unfair to the United States and other
industrialized nations because it exempts 80 percent of the world, particularly China, from
compliance.34
Figure 1: The Common Goods
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Interestingly, in some carefully selected areas, developing countries have discretely
cooperated with the U.S. in UNFCCC negotiations. For instance, China agreed with the U.S.
that employing adaptation measures—such as transferring funds and technologies from
developed to developing countries to help the latter minimize the impact of climate change—
was the preferable way of addressing the problem. Among developed countries, the EU
places more emphasis on mitigation than on adaptation in climate change negotiations. But
the United States, China, India and members of the OPEC believe that adaptation should be a
priority. By shifting the focus of climate talks to adaptation, both the U.S. and China could
actually avoid hurting their economies and refused immediate commitment to fixed emission
cuts. Moreover, both the U.S. and China are skeptical about a global carbon tax supported by
the EU as a mitigation measure from which revenue could be spent to finance technological
transfers. They believe that both producers in China and consumers in America would be
overburdened.
2.2. Developed against Developing: Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and
Equity in Collective Action against Global Warming
While the U.S. and other developed countries enjoy a relatively plentiful, wasteful and
competitive use of energy, most developing countries struggle for the very basic needs of
industrialization, urbanization and life’s physical necessities. The developing world considers
it an inalienable right to advance its economy and enjoy the same standard of living as people
in developed countries. It’s an inalienable right of the developing world to further develop its
economy, improve living standards, and enjoy the same living standards as people in the
developed countries. Of the world's six billion people, one-third enjoys electricity. And one
third—two billion people—simply lack access to modern energy services and live on less
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than $2 per day. For the poor countries, ensuring economic growth and lifting people out of
poverty are necessarily important priorities. Greater energy use by these countries and greater
emissions from them are therefore inevitable.35 For China, the largest developing country,
global warming issues have been intimately linked with efforts to modernize the economy
and the energy strategy employed to fuel that modernization. If China decreases its emissions
of greenhouse gas (GHG) by 10-20%, its GDP will decrease by 2%. When per capita income
grows by 5.1%, GHG emissions increase by 1.29%. 36 Mukund Govind Rajan argues that
“India’s sustained increase in energy production and use was to play a central role in fueling
economic development. There is a very low per capita consumption of greenhouse gases as
compared to the world average.”37 According to Mukund Govind Rajan, “It is the developed
countries which have created and continue to add to the threats of climate change, and it is
primarily their responsibility to reverse the situation by setting limits on their emissions of
greenhouse gases. Developing countries contribute little to the problem, though their share is
increasing. Their resources are scarce and they do not have ready access to the required
technologies. They need technical and financial assistance to adopt environmentally benign
technologies. Even given adequate resources their socioeconomic backwardness may prevent
them from fully attaining the desired results.”38
Figure 2: The Payoff Structure in Climate Change
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The figure below shows that different states can have different payoffs and utility in
the international campaign against global warming. Some states’ payoff is very high, while
for others it is very low. Some states have no payoff at all, but they can also enjoy the utility
from the cooperation. Even those who do nothing to limit their carbon emissions can share
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the benefits of reduced carbon emissions, in disregard of the moral hazard, ill reputation or
punishment involved. 39 Such “free-riding” behaviors frustrate the endeavors of other
countries. Any country, including China, can try to enjoy the technology transfer,
environmental loans and other utilities without trying to reduce carbon emissions. On the
other hand, different countries will have different utilities from international cooperation
against global warming. Poor countries pay more attention to technology improvement and
economic development than environmental gains. On the contrary, most developed countries
prefer a better natural environment and put more emphasis on environmental security. From
this point of view, developing countries should contribute more to reducing carbon emissions.
The game theory is the study of people’s behavior in strategic situations, so it can be
used to analyze the two logics of the climate change games when people make different
choices on cooperation in climate change. Developing countries have two choices: A) refrain
from reducing greenhouse gas emissions unless developed countries provide the technology
and funds; B) reduce carbon emissions unconditionally. If developing countries choose
strategy B, as they have promised to share global responsibility for global warming,
developed countries will be confronted with two choices: C) decide against providing
technology and funds to developing countries; D) decide to provide technology and funds to
developing countries. If developed countries choose C, developing countries may consider
slowing down the increase in their carbon emissions because they lack advanced technology
and funds. So the gains will be –1 and –3. If developed countries choose D, developing
countries will be able to afford to reduce carbon emissions by building a low-carbon society.
So they both gain +5.
Figure 3: The game between developing and developed countries
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Developed countries are the principal emitters of pollutants and should therefore bear
the primary responsibilities in addressing the climate change problem. The principle of
“common but differentiated responsibilities” is a global consensus in the UNFCCC and other
international environmental laws. This principle means that the industrialized, wealthy
countries of the world bear responsibility for global warming because of their historic
emissions of greenhouse gases for more than 300 years. Furthermore, developed countries’
per capita emissions remain far above those of developing countries, meaning that their
responsibility continues. According to the UNFCCC, “The largest share of the historical and
current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, [while]
per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and the share of global
emissions originating in developing countries is growing to meet their social and
development needs.”40 However, developing countries are deeply dissatisfied with developed
countries in this respect because the latter refuse to pay sufficient attention to the
technological backwardness of developing countries as far as energy is concerned. Developed
countries tend to play down the role of technology transfer while maintaining high prices for
intellectual property rights linked with these technologies.
Since its inception, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) has promoted technology
transfer, grants and loans from the developed world for reducing carbon emissions through a
39
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series of projects in developing countries. However, since its launch in 1991, the GEF has
only allocated about $4 billion in grants.41 Through CDM, industrialized countries could also
meet part of their obligations for reducing their emissions under the Kyoto Protocol by
receiving credits for investing in projects that reduce carbon emissions in developing
countries.
2.3. International Norms and Climate Change Cooperation in Poor Countries
The UNFCCC reads, “Acknowledging that change in the Earth's climate and its adverse
effects are a common concern of humankind; acknowledging that the global nature of climate
change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an
effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic
conditions; determined to protect the climate system for present and future generations...”
Katzenstein argues that the concepts of international norms refer to collective expectations
for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. Norms thus either define (or
constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behaviors, or they do both.42 This means that
international norms in collective action influence the behavior of individual states.
Considering the question of what is the most important international factor motivating China
to improve its climate change coordination work, it is necessary to analyze the influence of
various interest-based factors on the global climate change action from 2003 to 2007.43

Figure 4: What is the most important international factor affecting coordination work in China? 2003
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Figure 5: What is the most important international factor affecting coordination work in China? 2007
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3. The Logic of International Competition for New Energy
Generally speaking, climate change is a major issue that has brought a lot of pressure to
global energy and environmental conservation efforts. Although most countries have
recognized the seriousness of the crisis and the need for emission reductions, the United
States and the EU are still thinking of ways to curb carbon emissions and reduce demand for
energy in developing countries. The conclusion is clear: on the surface, climate change is just
a problem of collective action on how to handle the crisis and stabilize carbon emissions, but
on the deep level it is a problem of energy sources and development potential that could
affect the transition of power in the international system in the long term.
3.1. Transition in the Traditional Energy System
The contemporary world is based on oil, and global energy security is crucial to economic
growth and people's livelihood in all countries. Energy is also fundamental to the prosperity
and security of nations. The advent of globalization, the growing gap between the rich and
poor, and the need to fight global warming are all intertwined with energy concerns. There is
a pressing need for strategic thinking about the international energy system. Supply and
demand on the international energy market are imbalanced. Areas rich in oil resources are
still at the center of geopolitical, political and military conflicts. Energy exporting nations use
energy weapons to implement their political and economic goals. Major energy suppliers—
from Russia to Iran to Venezuela—have been increasingly able and willing to use their
energy resources to pursue their strategic and political objectives.44 It is also important to take
a long-term perspective, deepen energy cooperation, increase energy efficiency, and facilitate
the development and use of new energy resources.
Climate change will bring dramatic changes in the international economic system, and
national competition advantages will be built on the basis of clean and alternative energy.
The advent of global warming and energy security pose a great challenge to humankind.
Competition in the energy chain will determine power struggles based on innovation and
influence power transition in the international system. New energy is not only an important
constituent of the next-generation energy system, but will also change the scenario of the
future international power arrangement. Preventing an environmental disaster like climate
change is, at its core, an energy challenge. Different economies struggle and compete for this
historical opportunity to increase energy efficiency, and facilitate the development and use of
new energy resources.
3.2. Power Transition and the New Energy Chain
There is a correlation between energy competition driven by climate change and the
international political economic environment, know-how, ability and possession of resources.
The interaction of these factors constitutes a complete energy chain. The energy chain
comprises the institutions and activities related to the search for, development, and utilization
of energy resources. The discovery of new energy sources, revolutionary changes in the
energy chain, and the corresponding changes in the political economy and the innovation
system, have combined to lay the groundwork for a more effective use of energy, which is
fundamental to the rise of big powers. Historically, the emergence of great powers has been
accompanied by a rise of a new generation of energy. Since the establishment of the modern
international system, the energy chain has undergone two major changes. The first change
was the first industrial revolution of the 1860s ushered in by the United Kingdom and marked
by a transition from “the fuel-wood or bio-fuel times” to the “coal era.” The second change
44
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was the second industrial revolution of the 1920s started by the United States and marked by
a transition from the “coal era” to the “oil age.” Today a third revolution is taking place based
on clean and low-carbon energy. Under the long-cycle theory, possession and use of new
energy is closely related with national technological and institutional advances. Countries
with a dominant position in new energy must have an institutional and technical advantage
stemming from their possession and use of new energy. They have to break through
constraints imposed by previous economic, political structures and ideology, which leads to
major changes in the global industrial chain, allocation of resources and national
competitiveness. Therefore we have every reason to believe that those new energy
powerhouses will ultimately change the global arrangement of power through international
competition in the future. As history shows, every significant structural change in the
international system has been due to the revolution in the energy chain. The country or nonstate entity that seized a new energy chain or a part of it attempted to challenge the
international status quo.
3.3. The Domination of Rich Countries in New Energy Competition
As the scarcity of traditional energy and climate change emerged as serious problems,
economic growth patterns in various countries gradually evolved in a direction that suited
new energy. The EU and the United States as global superpowers aspire to corner future
energy markets through negotiations on reducing carbon emissions coupled with a desire to
dominate the drive toward clean energy and energy efficiency and innovation throughout
building a climate change regime. In December 2007, the United States passed a new energy
bill that aims to boost the development of clean and alternative energy. President Bush said,
“Energy dependence harms the U.S. economically through high and volatile prices at the gas
pump, creates pollution and contributes to greenhouse gas emissions. It threatens our national
security by making us vulnerable to hostile regimes in unstable regions of the world.”45Under
the new energy bill, production of renewable fuels is expected to exceed 136 billion liters
annually by 2022. More than half of all ethanol must come from sources other than corn, such
as wood chips or switchgrass. The law also sets tougher efficiency standards for the
construction of new commercial properties and improvements in federal buildings.
The EU has taken many measures to reduce carbon emissions among member states
in line with the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. There are four major objectives of the
EU’s climate policy: “1) a regulatory approach, 2) fiscal measures, 3) burden sharing among
member states, and 4) the scope for complementary action at the national level.”46Since the
sixth Environmental Action Program, the climate change issue has caused great concerns.47
According to the EU National Communications to the UNFCCC, “The European
Commission has proposed in particular: (1) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions beyond the
Kyoto commitments, by 1% of their 1990 levels every year until 2020; (2) To set more
ambitious environmental targets for energy taxation, such as automatically indexing taxes at
least to the level of inflation; to phase out all subsidies for fossil fuel production and
consumption by 2010, undertaking steps to develop alternative sources of employment for the
sectors concerned. The European Union also needs to think about the specific situation of
coal in some candidate countries, within the framework of the accession negotiations; (4) that
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by 2010, alternative fuels, including biofuels, should account for at least 7% of the fuel
consumed by cars and trucks.”48
The EU is struggling to agree on the details of its plan to reduce the 27-nation bloc's
greenhouse-gas pollution by 20 percent by 2020 compared with the benchmark year 1990.
They promised to deepen this to 30 percent if another industrialized power followed suit.
They also pledged to boost the share of renewables in the EU energy mix to 20 percent,
including a 10-percent share for bio-fuels.49
Most developing countries follow a growth-oriented, unsustainable and resourceconstrained economic model. These countries face the crucial need to promote development
while joining the global struggle against global warming and contributing to global economic
growth. As countries undergo industrial development, they move through a period of
intensive, and often inefficient, use of fossil fuel. Efficiencies improve along this
development trajectory, but eventually tend to level off. Industrialized countries such as EU
member states, Japan and the United States are at a knowledge-intensity and energy levelingoff stage, while developing countries such as China are at the energy-intensive development
stage. Both factors are decreasing the global efficiency of fossil fuel use and increasing
energy consumption. But a high growth of energy consumption is required for the capitalintensive industrialization period in today’s China and other developing economies, and will
be reduced at post-industrialization stages sooner or later. However, developed countries
have not displayed enough enthusiasm transferring advanced clean energy technologies to the
developing world.
In facing the continuing economic rise of the emerging countries, the United States, or
even the European countries and Japan, would not give these countries the core
technologies.50 They would, on the one hand, prevent the other countries from acquiring the
core technology, thus to weaken their competitiveness; on the other hand, they are worried
that the emerging countries would not protect the intellectual property rights of the advanced
technologies. Moreover, the United States is unwilling to see China and other emerging
countries improve their structure of energy production and use. From the viewpoint of the
United States, if China successfully transformed itself to the way of sustainable development,
the Chinese model of development would threaten the soft power of the U.S.
On December 2007, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) said in one of
its reports that in addressing climate change issues developed countries “did not take the
responsibility to help developing countries.” In 2007, at the United Nations Climate Change
Conference in Bali, Oxfam Hong Kong, an independent development and relief agency based
in Hong Kong, said that the international community needs some $1-2 billion to make the
least developed countries adapt to the most urgent requirements of climate change; however,
developed countries have donated no more than $67 million for this purpose.51 In December
2007, the Bali Roadmap was adopted whereby developed countries undertook to assist
developing countries in clean energy development; however, no clear commitments have
been made in this process so far.52
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4. The Implications of the Two Logics of Climate Change Games for China
4.1. The Influence of the Two Logics of Climate Change Games
The two logics of the climate change games influence China on three counts. First, developed
countries continue to dominate international climate change negotiations. The fight against
global warming can be described in terms of common goods. Even though there are many
internal contradictions among rich countries, they share a common interest in trying to keep
and widen the development gap and in staving off the rise of emerging powers. As a result,
wealthy countries maintain their leading position in the post-Kyoto climate regime building
process. Developed countries initially communicated with and consulted big greenhouse gas
emitters in a bid to establish a rational and efficient post-Kyoto system that would safeguard
and coordinate balanced development between energy consumption, the Earth's climate, and
economic growth. At the same time, developed countries tried to persuade developing
countries to accept soft and hard environmental constraints. Western countries argue that the
Kyoto Protocol placed little responsibility on developing countries, and that the December
2009 Kyoto meeting in Copenhagen will impose carbon emission limits on China and India.
Second, due to the early-development advantage of developed countries and the latedevelopment advantage of developing countries, any major energy innovation would bring
about a new industrial revolution and the reallocation of global industry. Developed countries
have even launched a climate or carbon tax to put limitations on the economic growth of the
developing world, particularly China. Developing countries are gradually assuming the
obligations of stabilizing GHG. But because they lack new energy sources and advanced
technology, developing countries only become emerging markets for Western multinational
companies, while developed countries are making full use of climate change opportunities to
strengthen their technical and competitive edge. As a result, they continue to dominate the
international system. Obviously, the situation is the same for the environmental trade regime,
which would let developing countries bear the programmed baseline costs, while developed
countries bear incremental costs. Developed countries are doing that to increase the
environmental constraint for developing countries and eventually restrict the development of
developing countries with a hard law.
Third, efforts to establish a benign two-logics-of-climate-change-games regime for
global warming, though indispensable to solve the problem of climate change, have run into
many problems. These include restrictions imposed by both hard and soft laws, international
competition in innovation, and non-commercial technical assistance. The distribution of
environmental capacity and energy innovation require a healthy competitive environment and
mechanisms that will not only promote common progress in energy technologies and
economic restructuring but will also help the world embark on a low-carbon economy and
sustainable development.
China as the new developing industrial power and India are trying to meet their
growing demand for energy, and are also ironing out tensions as countries compete to secure
direct access to stable supply sources. Because of globalization, urbanization and
industrialization, energy consumption in developing countries has been growing rapidly. In
its World Energy Outlook 2006, the International Energy Agency pointed out that the
economies and populations of developing countries were growing faster than those of the
wealthier nations, “shifting the center of gravity of global energy demand.” It estimated that
more than 70 percent of the increase in global primary energy demand between now and
2030 will come from developing countries.53The IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report estimates
that carbon dioxide emissions from energy use could rise by 45 percent to 110 percent
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between 2000 and 2030. The report indicates that two-thirds to three-quarters of the increased
emissions would come from developing countries. The report also makes it clear that the
greater the efforts to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, the less severe would be the
impact of climate change.54
4.2. Internal Responses to the Two Logics of Climate Change Games
China’s current per capita energy consumption is well below that of the developed world
(although above that of many poor countries), but by 2020 China will match the current
global average—meaning that China alone will account for almost one-third of the world's
total carbon emissions between 1990 and 2020. 55 To be sure, China's current per capita
emissions are low compared with industrialized countries, but with its almost 1.3 billion
population, China’s aggregate contribution to global warming is huge and growing. This
prospect becomes clear when one considers the burgeoning middle class in China, whose
lifestyle choices will lead to dramatic increases in per-capita energy use. China’s overall
carbon emissions by 2030 could reach 11 billion tons, well above those in the United States
(8 billion tons), Europe (4.5 billion tons), and India (nearly 2 billion tons). 56 China has
undertaken a number of policies and national development strategies, and created related
domestic institutions, specifically those related to climate change.57
Under its 11th five-year plan, the Chinese government expects to “accelerate the pace
of building a resource-efficient and environment-friendly society, and promote the
harmonization of economic development with the population, resources, and the
environment, reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by some 20 percent.”58 China
issued its National Action Plan on Climate Change in June 2007, and the government
selected a number of goals to reach by 2010: a 20-percent cut in energy intensity; increasing
renewable energy to 10 percent of the primary supply of energy, a substantial increase in
coal-bed methane production, and promotion of nuclear power.59
4.3. External Responses to the Two Logics of Climate Change Games
China has been intimately involved in the international debate on climate change. Like other
participants in the climate change negotiations, China wants to protect its interests and
promote development while also joining international efforts to address this problem.
However, it has consistently opposed efforts to require GHG limits by developing
countries—even those calling for voluntary commitments to restrict future emissions
increases. Instead, China has joined other developing countries in demanding that developed
countries reduce their carbon emissions first and provide assistance to developing countries to
help them cope with climate change and to implement sustainable development. It has usually
resisted any links between financial and technical assistance from developed countries in the
context of the climate change regime. Instead, it has demanded transfers of funds on
noncommercial and preferential terms, and has rejected many of the market-based
54
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international mechanisms for emissions reductions advocated by developed countries and
their industries.60
China has made some noteworthy contributions to climate-related international
negotiations, notably when doing so would help codify requirements that developed countries
help developing countries in the context of climate change. It proposed a resolution on
technology transfer, which was adopted by the first conference of the parties (COP) held in
Berlin in 1995. During COP2, China proposed that developed countries list in their national
communications measures they were undertaking to implement technology transfer to
developing countries. China has sometimes used a form of passive resistance during climate
change negotiations, articulating a policy of “no response” to some international events, such
as the Bush administration's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. In 2000, China put forward a
“no regrets” policy for the FCCC negotiations, meaning that it would share some concrete
responsibilities to reduce carbon emissions provided they do not adversely affect its
economic development.
Despite pressure from the United States, Europe and some other countries to reduce
its carbon emissions, China has to date refused to take on concrete commitments toward this
end. It expects the developed, wealthy countries of the world to substantially reduce their
emissions before China and other developing countries are expected to do so, in accordance
with the principle of common but differentiated responsibility adopted at the 1995 Berlin
conference of the parties. However, a significant shift in China’s energy policy and attitudes
toward the Kyoto Protocol arguably occurred when it endorsed the Bali Roadmap in 2007,
notably its paragraph on developing-country commitments: “Nationally appropriate
mitigation actions by developing country parties in the context of sustainable development,
supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity building, in a measurable,
reportable and verifiable manner” (Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change 2007: 3). 61 While this is hardly an embrace by the government of
limitations on China’s carbon emissions, it may be a harbinger of future acceptance of them.
At the 2007 APEC Summit, China’s President Hu Jintao put forward four proposals
for tackling climate change. These proposals have been regarded as China’s updated response
to international climate change negotiations: “First, cooperation is indispensable to global
efforts to tackle climate change. Second, efforts are needed to pursue sustainable
development, as climate change is ultimately a development issue and it can only be
addressed in the course of sustainable development. Third, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change should be upheld as the core mechanism for addressing
climate change. The Convention and its Kyoto Protocol constitute the legal basis of
international cooperation on climate change and are the most authoritative, universal and
comprehensive international framework for the issue. Fourth, efforts should be made to
promote scientific and technological innovation, as science and technology are important
means for tackling climate change.”62
Conclusion
The new century is an important milestone in the history of human development as half of the
world's population is about to enter into resource-intensive industrialized societies that may
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seriously affect traditional North-South relationships and international environmental
systems. Obviously, the climate crisis and energy resource difficulties would be the direct
consequences, while fierce competition among major powers in the distribution of
responsibilities, rights and interests of future development would be one of the potential
implications affecting power transition in the international system. Nowadays, as the U.S. and
EU economies recover and developing countries muster sustained economic growth, energy
supply is out of step with demand. The environmental pressure is growing, and the
geopolitical situation of the main oil-producing areas is unstable. Energy competition among
countries is concerned not only with the success of collective action, but also with the
transition of energy power in the international system.
This article endeavors to explain the two logics of the climate change games by
linking international competition for energy know-how and carbon emission negotiations.
There is a pressing need for rethinking the two-layer games in global climate change politics:
environmental governance and energy innovation competition between different countries.
On the one hand, it is now universally acknowledged that international cooperation and
collective action are necessary to mitigate global warming. On the other hand, the need to
secure access to new energy and know-how has increased and encouraged a growing number
of states to join the fray.
The need for access to energy resources has increased and more countries are making
greater demands for them. The loss of balance between human energy activities and the
preservation of nature in many parts of the world is attributed to environmental degradation,
in particular global warming. According to Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The global energy strategy
must satisfy three objectives: low cost, diverse supply, and drastically reduced carbon dioxide
emissions.”63
The world could benefit from the growth of developing countries, particularly China,
if a workable model could be devised that would truly manage the balance of energy and the
environment. A concerted transition to a low- or zero-carbon economy is the road that China
must choose, especially with financial and technical aid from the developed world. However,
such aid from the developed world is not enough. It is essential that climate change be fully
integrated into development policy, and rich countries should help developing countries build
the equity-based, sustainable, clean and low-carbon growth model. Otherwise collective
action against global warming is hopeless.
Western countries are uneasy about new rising countries such as China that would
probably confront the environmental status quo or the future allocation mechanism of
resources and try to seek ways, including hard and soft laws, to contain them. Under such
conditions, China’s strategy should be to be involved in these negotiations, on one hand by
actively coordinating the conflicts and competition triggered by the allocation of
environmental resources between different parties; and, on the other hand, by promoting the
global sharing of the achievements in technological innovation, while following the
“common development” approach to solve international environmental and political
problems.
China could, and we argue should, show moral leadership on climate change,
something that has been lacking among the developed countries. Alas, bearing in mind what
we have said, it seems unlikely that China would undertake such a pro-environment
leadership role in the Asian Pacific region or among developing countries more broadly.
There are clearly many Chinese scientists and concerned officials who would like China to do
much more. But there are also vested economic interests, exacerbated by China's infatuation
with rapid economic growth and wealth creation, which overwhelm the environmentalists.
63
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There is a burgeoning car culture—the same mistake as that made in the West—with a
rapacious appetite for petroleum. More broadly, there is an effort to emulate the West's
development and Western people's lifestyles, but with this comes an emulation of their
terrible history of pollution. This is unfortunate because a concerted transition to an economy
that produces fewer carbon emissions is possible, especially with financial and technical aid
from the developed world. However, such aid would have to come with clear restrictions that
the Chinese government has shown an unwillingness to accept. The upshot is that in the
future there will be some improvements that will limit the increases in China's carbon
emissions compared with what they might be otherwise. For the most part, however, at least
in the near term, it will be business as usual particularly in the long term.

77

Differentiating (Historic) Responsibilities for Climate Change:
Exploring The Case of China
Christian Ellermann1and Niklas Höhne2

Abstract
Following the conclusion of the official work of the Ad hoc group for the modelling and
assessment of contributions of climate change (MATCH), this paper takes a look on the
politically more sensitive aspect of the Brazilian Proposal, namely the issue of differentiating
(historic) responsibility for, and not merely (causal) contribution to climate change. Its aim is
(i) to highlight the fact that, while related, the two issues (‘contribution to’ and ‘responsibility
for’) are fundamentally different and should not be confused, (ii) to propose a methodology
of calculating shares of responsibilities as opposed to the shares in causal contribution arrived
at in the MATCH results, and (iii) apply these conceptions in depth in the case of China. Two
conceptions of responsibility (‘strict’ or ‘limited’) are applied to operationalise the notion of
‘respective capabilities’ given in Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC. The key message resulting
from the calculations is that causal contribution – while an important indicator of
(environmental) relevance to the problem – must not be confused with moral responsibility
for it. The rather large difference between the responsibilities at the two extremes of the scale
under both conceptions does give pause for thought as to what sorts of burdens can justly be
demanded in any application of the UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities, whether in the context of the Brazilian proposal or beyond.
We apply these conceptions of responsibility to the case of China and discuss how
they can inform the discussions over future commitments under a Copenhagen agreement.
1. Introduction
Climate change is increasingly acknowledged to have strong ethical dimensions, and global
solutions are unlikely to be crafted, or stable, without some broad conception of what would
be fair (IPCC 1996, Stern 2006). There is a burgeoning literature on these dimensions
(Gardiner 2004, Brown et al. 2006, Klinsky & Dowlatabadi 2009). Some recent work has
focussed on a particular dimension, namely that of historical responsibility. Early on, the
work of the ad-hoc group for the modelling and assessment of contributions of climate
change (MATCH) that was motivated by the Brazilian proposal (UNFCCC 1997)
concentrated on the causal attribution of historical greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to
countries (Höhne & Ullrich 2003, den Elzen et al. 2005a).
It had been criticised that the past work on historical contributions for climate change,
by focussing on the technical, natural science aspects, neglected the ethical and
interpretational aspects. While the MATCH work avoids the ethical dimensions of historical
responsibilities, some new publications carefully approach the challenge to distinguish causal
contribution to climate change from historical responsibility for climate change (Botzen et al.
2008). Discussions of the earlier work showed a clear demand for a deeper analysis of these
normative and moral aspects (Botzen et al. 2008). In an earlier paper (Müller et al. 2009) we
respond to this demand. The present paper is based largely on this previous work, but gives
particular attention to the role of China.
Following the Brazilian proposal, the notion of historical responsibility for climate
change of Annex I parties has been regularly evoked by many developing country parties. It
is one of the main lines of arguments underlying the principle of common, but differentiated
1
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responsibilities in the UNFCCC or the polluter pays principle more generally. The discussion
on equity – i.e. a political economic approach to historical responsibility (Friman 2007) – has
been widely present in the Chinese debate on climate change. It is indeed one of the main
discursive elements in China (Ellermann & Mayer 2009), thus framing the understanding of
the country’s ethical position vis-à-vis developed countries and the rest of the world. This
paper therefore turns the issue from a scientific into a moral question concerning the
interpretation of the results of the MATCH group, and focuses on the position of China.
2. The Conceptual Framework
2.1. Contribution Versus Responsibility
Climate impacts – be they anthropogenic, due to natural variability or anything else – will
inevitably have a large multitude of causes, each causally contributing to the impacts in
question. The (moral) responsibility for climate impacts will also typically be shared by a
number of actors. The key difference between being morally (partly) responsible for, and
(causally) contributing to is that the former is a blameable matter which only makes sense if
the impacts are anthropogenic, while the latter is not. The 1628BC eruption on the Aegean
island of Thera (Santorini), it has been argued, led to an average global cooling of 1.5°C over
the following one hundred years, and consequently to the downfall of the Minoan
civilization, but it would be considered odd to hold the mountain morally responsible.
The problem is that in the case of anthropogenic impacts, the difference, while
remaining, is sometimes not quite as self-evident. There is a link between a moral agent
causally contributing to an impact and being morally (partly) responsible for it, but that does
not mean that the two are the same. Their difference becomes clear when considering that
they generally imply different shares.
The MATCH project modelling has focussed on determining the causal contribution
of time series of greenhouse gases covered under the UNFCCC to certain climatic impacts, in
particular to changes in mean global temperature. The lesson has been that one really cannot
speak of causal contributions to climate change per se, at least not if one is intent on
specifying numerical shares thereof.
The advantage of focussing on the effects of emission time series on certain climate
parameters was the purely scientific nature of the exercise, which was meant to safeguard the
discussions from being dragged into normative or even moral debates. Even in the context of
establishing shares in causal contribution, normative issues could not be completely avoided.
One of the key normative decisions was the way in which emission time series were
associated with particular countries. It is one thing to say that this and that series of emissions
has contributed a certain percentage to the increase in global mean temperature over the 20th
Century, and quite another to say that the United States of America have done so. The former
is purely scientific; the latter involves a normative decision of how to identify ‘the emissions
of the US’ (at a given time). The implicit assumption of the MATCH team was that (a) the
(anthropogenic) emissions associated with a country for a given period are those emitted over
its sovereign territory, and (b) the sovereign territory is changing over time.
There are a number of problems with this traditional conception, not least that it does
not lend itself easily to accommodate ‘bunker fuel’ emissions from international travel and
transport. Another, lesser known problem with this sort of traditional sovereignty based
definition is that it does not lend itself to take account of joint contributions and
responsibilities, short of pooling the sovereignty of the territories in question. This
shortcoming shall be discussed briefly in the context of Article 4 of the UNFCCC, which can
be interpreted as implying joint North-South responsibility over the (increments in) emissions
in developing countries since the Convention was signed in 1992. For the rest of the article,
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the traditional sovereign territory definition of countries’ ‘anthropogenic’ emissions shall be
followed however, both for determining their relevant causal contributions and moral
responsibilities.

Figure 1. China's emissions of greenhouse gasses during different historical periods.

The normative issue of identifying the sovereign emissions of China is not completely
straightforward. During the observation period from 1890 to 2005 several changes occurred
in what is now the sovereign territory of the People’s Republic of China. We have to rely on
the decisions regarding the attribution of the emissions made by the MATCH team that
included Chinese scientists and reflect these here. The data recorded for China during this
period is largely dominated by emissions from fossil fuel combustion as recorded in Marland
et al. (2005) and thus follows their definition of “mainland China”.
Figure 1 displays the shares of emission contributions made to total emissions during
different historical periods. Until 1911 China was under the rule of the Qing Dynasty and
during parts of this time period, small parts of the country were occupied by foreign powers.
There was however no major colonial rule over China that would warrant a deeper discussion
of the attribution of emissions during that time, which amount to 6% of total emissions
between 1890 and 2005. 1912 to 1937 saw major domestic conflict with warlords fighting
over regional rule in the Republic of China, but there should be little question over the
attribution of emissions during this time, which amount to 10%. Contrary to this, major parts
of China were occupied by Japan between 1937 and 1945. Marland attributes these emissions
to China, mirroring similar decisions like the attribution of pre-independence emissions over
Indian territory to India and not to Great Britain. In spite of the regionally rapid
industrialisation and deforestation during this time, the share of these 9 years amounts to only
4% of total Chinese emissions. From 1946 on, sovereign rule over mainland China became
again clearly Chinese, and this historical period contributed 80% of the emissions from 1890
to 2005. Emissions in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao are not included in the China dataset.
While the question of Chinese sovereign emissions is not absolutely straightforward,
the contribution shares during historical periods that could be contentious (1890 to 1911 and
1937 to 1945) make up merely 10% of total Chinese emissions. In practice, the relevance of
the normative decisions surrounding this issue is therefore limited.3

3

They nevertheless certainly have to be noted in an ethical paper on Chinese historical emissions.
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Act-based

2.2. Types of Responsibility: a Loosely Aristotelian Framework
To be responsible for something harmful is to be worthy of blame for it.4 Aristotle contends
that blame and praise are bestowed on voluntary actions, while involuntary ones are
pardoned. The key to responsibility for actions is thus their voluntary status, for which he
gives two necessary conditions:
“First, there is a control condition: the action or trait must have its origin in the agent.
That is, it must be up to the agent whether to perform that action or possess the trait —
it cannot be compelled externally.
Second, Aristotle proposes an epistemic condition: the agent must be aware of what it
is she is doing or bringing about”5
However, ignorance per se seems to be slightly too easy for pardoning, which is why the
condition is usually strengthened insofar as the agent could have reasonably been expected to
know.
Aristotle’s conception of ‘responsibility’ is based in his theory of virtue, which
concerns ‘passions and actions.’ But there are other theories which see the concept rather in
the context of duties, in particular in derelictions of duty, which are not (necessarily) actions
but equally liable to give rise to blame. Figure 1 is an attempt at representing the interplay
between the distinctions of voluntary/involuntary, harmful/harmless, agency-/duty-based, and
the type/level of blameworthiness (responsibility) attached to their combinations.
Aristotle’s conditions on assigning blame to actions (and, eo ipso agents) are about whether
they are carried out voluntarily or involuntarily. However, as illustrated in Figure 1, blame
can also be assigned or withheld regardless of this distinction. If, for example, the effects of
an action are harmless (category I), then clearly no blame should be attached to it, even if it
was voluntary. Moreover, there are situations where, contrary to Aristotle conditions, ‘strict’
blame (responsibility) is handed out simply on the ground that the effects are harmful,
regardless of whether the harm was done voluntarily or involuntarily (category III.b).
I
In‐/voluntary,
harmless:
no blame

II
Involuntary,
harmful:
no/limited blame

III.a
Voluntary,
harmful:
(unlimited)
blame

III.b
In‐/voluntary,
harmful:
‘strict’ blame

f

e

d

c
h

Figure 2.

Duty-based

g
Categories of blame/responsibility.

Act-based blame. In the context of climate change, blame/responsibility is usually
seen as applying to certain acts, namely the emission of greenhouse gases – i.e. it is actbased. For example, if someone drives a car, and if the emissions resulting from this act are
deemed to be harmful, then they may be judged to deserve unreserved blame just because the
emissions are harmful (strict blame, c in Fig. 1), or because they drove voluntarily, in the
4

Strictly speaking it is either blame- or praiseworthy, but in the present context the former suffices.
Eshleman A (2004) Moral Responsibility. In: Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Stanford University. See
also Aristotle (1908) Nicomachean Ethics, Vol. Clarendon Press, Oxford: III.1-5, 1110a-1111b4.
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full knowledge of the harmfulness of the emission and without coercion (unlimited blame,
d). If, however, they can plead reasonable ignorance or coercion, then they may get a
(limited) pardon (no/limited blame, e). Finally, if the emissions in question are classified as
harmless, then no-one can justly be blamed (no blame, f).
Duty-based blame. What is not usual is to consider blaming someone for certain harmful
emissions not because they were actively engaged in emitting, but because they had duty to
prevent them. Thus if two individuals, say Jane and John, enter a contract that Jane is to
reduce her emissions and that John is to bear her additional costs, then it can be argued they
both have a joint-duty to reduce Jane’s emissions, and that if the reduction does not occur,
that they could be jointly blamed. The blame may, of course, not lie equally. Jane may have
wished to reduce but did not receive the money to do so, or John may have wished to pay for
Jane’s emission reduction, but Jane having no inclination to do so. The point being that John
might have to take responsibility for a certain amount of emissions, even though they were
not actually emitted by himself (g), while Jane may not have to take responsibility for the
whole of the emission increment she failed to reduce, because there was a joint dereliction of
duty (h).
3. Differentiating Contributions and Responsibilities
3.1.

Methodologies

3.1.1. Causal Contribution Shares: The MATCH Methodology
The methodology of the MATCH project was designed to establish the relative causal
contributions by countries to changes in global average temperature. The MATCH percentage
figures for countries’ shares in contributing to these changes are determined by the
anthropogenic emissions that have historically been emitted from their sovereign territory.
These percentage shares are themselves relative to the type of impact chosen, and they
depend on the sequential order of the emission series in question. However, to simplify the
calculations, it is possible to use the sum of the historic emissions – or rather their relative
size – as a reasonable approximation for the purpose of this paper for their relative causal
contributions (den Elzen et al. 2005b, Hope 2008). Instead of using the MATCH project
modelling techniques, the aggregate historic country emissions – using the 1995 Global
Warming Potentials (GWPs) for different gases as used under the Kyoto Protocol – emitted
between 1890 and the present (2005) are simply used here as determinants of the contribution
as well as responsibility shares in question. The proportion between countries’ historic
emissions since 1890 is used as a proxy measure of the relative size of their contribution to
climate change impacts.6
3.1.2. Responsibility Shares: The Allowance-Based Methodology
The issue of how to measure and compare responsibilities has been controversial for some
time, not least with respect to comparisons between the ‘large emitters,’ such as the US and
China. In a recent newspaper article, the IEA chief economist was reported to predict that
6

We would like to emphasise, however, that our methodologies could easily be adapted to be used with the full
MATCH modelling techniques. We need to note that using GWP factors can only be considered an
approximation, as over the long time spans considered here, static factors ignore the feedbacks and long term
changes in global warming potentials. While the radiative impact of additional emissions declines with
increasing concentration in the atmosphere, the damaging impacts of climate change increase non-linearly. This
leads Hope (2008) to the conclusion that marginal damages of a unit of emission are to a reasonable
approximation independent of concentration, which allows us to use aggregate contributions to GHG emissions
to form causal contribution shares.
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“China may overtake the United States as the world's biggest source of greenhouse gases
within months”, however, he also “accepted that on a per capita basis, people in rich
countries still emit far more than individual people in China. […] Historically, China has also
contributed little to the present build-up of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere.”
(Vidal 2007)
The problem with either aggregate (i.e. country-wide) or per capita emissions
measures is that, while they may capture some facet of the relevant notion of ‘responsibility,’
they both fail in capturing others. The percentage shares derived from the aggregate figures
clearly capture the causal contribution aspect of responsibilities, but they cannot, by
definition, reflect other potentially relevant country aspects, such as population size. Per
capita emission figures, on the other hand, do reflect population size, but they are unable to
reflect causal contributions, with the effect of assigning the same responsibility to both China
and Latvia with 0.8tC/cap, but a 500-fold difference in aggregate emissions. (WRI 2009)
There is no general answer to whether responsibility should be measured in absolute (single
parameter) or in relative (multi parameter) terms. There are cases of emission-based
responsibilities, which should be quantified in absolute terms, i.e. in terms involving only one
parameter, namely physical emissions. In other cases, it may be necessary to relativise these
figures in terms of other relevant parameters, such as population sizes – when talking about
group/country responsibilities – or wealth/economic production. Traditionally, these
relativisations have been operationalised by simple parameter divisions such as the wellknown per capita and per unit of economic output (GDP) measures. 7
Aggregate – i.e. country or regional – responsibility for climate change (impacts), is
argued in this paper, does need to be relativised in the sense that it has to be measured in
multi parameter terms, including – apart from emissions – the size of (certain) populations.
However, the traditional operationalisation in per capita terms over-simplifies the situation.
Instead a (bottom-up) allowance-based methodology is proposed, which generalises both the
traditional absolute and per capita measures.
The idea is that allowances may be allocated to emitters, which they can use against
their emissions in calculating their level of responsibility. It is, in general terms, analogous to
the system of tax allowances used in most countries in differentiating the tax burden. There
can be different kinds of such ‘climate change responsibility allowances’, depending on the
(moral) justification for why they should be allocated. For example, if a certain level of
(greenhouse gas) emissions is deemed to be harmless, then one would have to allocate what
we call ‘basic allowances’ to cover these harmless emissions, on grounds of the fact that noone should be held responsible (blamed) for a harmless activity.
Other allowances could be allocated on the basis of basic needs, in turn justified by
way of the Aristotelian ‘control condition’ that one cannot be held responsible for what is not
in ones control. This kind of allowance has been implemented by looking at ‘subsistence
allowances,’ based on the assumption that poverty eradication is an over-riding moral aim,
and that in present circumstances it can only be achieved through activities which generate a
certain amount of emissions. There may, of course, be other (basic) needs-based allowances,
which might have to be considered, such as the need to keep the ambient temperatures within
certain boundaries in order to survive. The Aristotelian epistemic condition that one should
not be held responsible for actions which one could not have reasonably been expected to
7

Baer et al. (2007) for example name “cumulative per capita CO2 emissions from fossil fuel consumption since
1990” as a “reasonable” definition of responsibility. Ultimately however they use country-wide emission
contributions adjusted by measures of income distribution in the population to calculate global responsibility
shares because it is impossible to express the percentage responsibility of a per capita share (Baer P, Athanasiou
T, Karthao S, Christian Aid, Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, EcoEquity (2007) The right to development in a climate
constrained world. The Greenhouse Development Rights framework., San Francisco)..
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know were harmful – mere ignorance is not sufficient – could also be used to justify the
introduction of what might be called ‘epistemic allowances.’ The main difference between
these Aristotle-based allowances and the above-mentioned basic kind is that while the latter
can be seen as ‘certificates of harmlessness’, the former are merely ‘responsibility wavers’
applied to emissions which would otherwise have been counted as harmful and blameworthy.
The main consequences of this is that while basic emissions should be transferable, these
‘responsibility wavers’ should not, and that the latter ought to be used only as ‘back-up’ to
the former, should both be issued, and not as complement.
Apart from the question of what sort of allowances should be admitted to be counted
against one’s responsibility (for climate change), the key issue with this sort of methodology
is, how to allocate those that have been admitted. We believe that in the case of basic and
subsistence allowances, a ‘bottom-up’ approach to country allocations – i.e. a definition of
country allocations in terms of personal ones – is the most appropriate one. Note that this
does not imply that country emissions have to be defined in the same way. In particular, this
bottom up approach to allocating basic and subsistence allowances is perfectly compatible
with the traditional definition of country emissions as the emissions originating from their
sovereign territories.
In the case of epistemic allowances – meant to operationalise Aristotle’s epistemic
condition – there is no need to take recourse to such a bottom-up approach to country
allocations, particularly if one adheres to the traditional definition of country emissions. All
that is necessary, on either the personal or the country level, is to ensure that all the emissions
which happened in justifiable ignorance of their harmfulness be covered by allowances.
As concerns personal basic allocations, it can be argued that they should be allocated on an
egalitarian principle for the same reasons that support the per capita allocation of global
emission permits. 8 The bottom-up methodology then implies that countries can disregard
b × pi of their emissions in responsibility calculations, where b is the global per capita figure
of harmless emissions, and p is the population of country/region i . This illustrates how
population figure enters the allocation-based country responsibility measures, and that they
are quite different from the traditional per capita measures.9
The difference becomes even more marked if some of the other population-related
allowances are considered. While there are arguments for a differentiated allocation (in
accordance to particular needs) in the case of subsistence allowances, it is clear that if they
are equally allocated they would normally not be allocated to the whole population of a
country, but only to those who are eligible by living below some poverty line. In other words,
it is possible that the allocation of subsistence allowances to a country is dependent on
population size, thus generating a (population-) relative responsibility measure. But – unlike
in the traditional per capita methodology – the populations in questions are not all
inhabitants, but only special needs groups, namely the country’s poor. The proposed
allowance-based methodology thus manages to reflect certain population sizes in establishing
country/regional climate change responsibilities without the danger of unjustifiably
diminishing in-country responsibility differences – by letting the responsible (carbon) rich

8

Note, however, that the two are not the same: to be allocated an emission permit, per se, is not tantamount to
being given a responsibility allowance for the specified amount of emissions, in the same way in which being
given the legal licence to produce tobacco does not give one immunity with respect to the consequences of
tobacco use!
9
For example, if it is agreed that all the emissions in question are harmful, then the basic global per capita
allocation b = 0 implying that the resulting basic country allocations are equally 0 for all countries regardless of
their population size, and thus that the allocation-based responsibility measures are independent of population
figures. Per capita measures, by contrast, reflect population size by definition.
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hide behind their (carbon) poor compatriots – as can happen in the case of the traditional per
capita methodology.
3.2. Data
The calculations made in this article are based on data coming from a variety of sources. The
same emissions dataset as in the latest modelling effort of the ad hoc group for the modelling
and assessment of contributions of climate change is used. It includes 192 countries for three
sectors: energy and industry (CO2, CH4, N2O), agriculture/waste (non-CO2) and land use
change and forestry (CO2) from 1750 to 2100. It is derived with an algorithm that combines
emission estimates from various sources in the following hierarchy: National submissions to
the UNFCCC published in the GHG emission database (UNFCCC 2007); CO2 emissions
from fuel combustion as published by the International Energy Agency (IEA 2006); 10
emissions from CH4 and N2O as estimated by the US Environmental Protection Agency
(USEPA 2006); CO2 emissions from fuel combustion and cement production as published by
Marland et al. 2003 as retrieved in 2006 and regional past data of Edgar/Hyde (Klein
Goldewijk & Battjes 1995). The emissions of different greenhouse gasses are multiplied by
their global warming potential and added up, leading to a single amount of carbon dioxide
equivalent emissions.11
Future emissions data (i.e. beyond 2005) as used in section 5.4 are derived by
multiplying 2005 actual emissions by the average growth rate of six IPCC SRES scenarios
for 17 world regions (IPCC 2000).
The source data takes into account changing geographical borders, but only for energy
and industrial CO2. Other gases and sectors are based on current sovereign territory. If a
currently existing country did not exist over the whole period, emissions were backward
extrapolated based on the country’s current sovereign territory.
Historical population data are taken from the HYDE database (Klein Goldewijk 2007)
and Penn World Tables (PWT 2006) and, where not available, the World Development
Indicators (World Bank 2006).12 Poverty headcount ratio (as % of population) at $1 and $2 a
day and GDP data (PPP current international $) are obtained from the same source for
calculating the size of poor populations.13
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This dataset was supplemented by process emissions from cement production from Marland G, Boden TA,
Andres RJ (2003) Global, Regional, and National Fossil Fuel CO2 Emissions. In: Carbon Dioxide Information
Analysis Center ORNL, U.S. Department of Energy (ed) Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change,
Oak Ridge, Tennesse., U.S.A. Available online at: http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/trends/emis/meth_reg.htm. to cover
all industrial CO2 emissions.
11
See Höhne N, Blum H, Matthews B, Fuglestvedt J, Skeie RB, Kurosawa A, Hu G, Lowe J, Gohar L, Salles
ACNd, Ellermann C (forthcoming) Contributions of individual countries’ emissions to climate change and their
uncertainty , section 2.1 for a detailed description of the emission dataset including issues of completeness and
uncertainty.
12
Because population data for the years 1890 to 1959 are not obtainable for 29 small countries (making up 11
million inhabitants of approximately 3 billion worldwide in 1960), their emission allowances of these 70 years
are not counted towards their total share. This leads to very slight increase in the share of LDC+AOSIS in the
calculation of responsibility with emissions allowances 1890-2005.
13
Poverty data of 24 least developed countries was unobtainable. For these countries, the poverty headcount
ratios at $1 and $2 a day have been set to a level comparable to that of other LDCs (50% and 75% respectively).
The time series of poverty data is not complete for all countries. Poverty shares have therefore been extrapolated
for the missing years using existing data.
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4. The View From China
4.1 Views From the Literature
Historic responsibility for climate change has been discussed in Chinese publications, but the
authors concentrate mainly on direct historic contribution of countries to the main greenhouse
gas – that is CO2 emitted through the use of energy – and unfortunately do not provide
information on the source of data (He et al. 2000, Zhao 2007, Xu & Yu 2008). According to
these authors, developed countries bear responsibility for climate change as they have emitted
77% of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use between 1950 and 2000.14 He et al. (2000) argue
to actively use the notion of developed country historical responsibility to “protect China’s
interests”. To corroborate their point and “refute arguments of ‘common responsibility’ and
the like”, they calculate that developing country annual emissions will only surpass Annex I
emissions in 2037 and cumulative emissions in 2147.15
An analysis that goes beyond directly equating contribution shares to historic
responsibility is lacking, and the level of depth largely stops at the Annex I – non-Annex I
divide. Chen et al. (1999) however analyse the topic starting with the Brazilian Proposal of
1997, its underlying concepts and calculations of contribution to climate change. Comparing
current (1990-2010) with historic contribution shares, they conclude that China’s interests
would not be served if it was singled out from the group of developing countries in analysing
historic responsibility for the approach of the Brazilian Proposal.16
4.2. Official View
As China has put forward a coherent climate policy since 2007, the government’s views on
the application of historical responsibility and China’s position in it have become manifest in
various official documents.
“Both developed and developing countries are obligated to adopt measures to
decelerate and adapt to climate change. But the level of their historical responsibilities,
level and stage of development, and capabilities and ways of contribution vary.
Developed countries should be responsible for their accumulative emissions and current
high per-capita emissions, and take the lead in reducing emissions…” (China NDRC
2008)
“According to the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ of the
UNFCCC, the Parties included in Annex I to the Convention should take the lead in
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. For developing countries with less historical
emission and current low per capita emission, their priority is to achieve sustainable
development. As a developing country, China will stick to its sustainable development
strategy […] and make further contribution to the protection of global climate system.
(China NDRC 2007)
“Developed countries shall take responsibility for their historical cumulative emissions
and current high per capita emissions to change their unsustainable way of life and to
substantially reduce their emissions and, at the same time, to provide financial support
and transfer technology to developing countries. […] Given their historical
responsibility and development level and based on the principle of equality, developed
14

This number is in the same range of the MATCH results for the same type of emissions and time period
(72.3%). Taking all Kyoto gases into account, the Annex I share for this time period drops to 54%.
15
According to the MATCH calculations, non-Annex I annual emissions (all gases) have surpassed non-Annex I
emissions in 1992 and developing country cumulative emissions (all gases) will have surpassed developed
countries by 2024.
16
“中国一旦脱离广大发展中国家的支持，必将陷于孤军奋战的不利境地。”(Chen et al., 1999).
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countries shall reduce their GHG emissions in aggregate by at least 40% below their
1990 levels by 2020 and take corresponding policies, measures and actions.” (China
NDRC 2009)
“Climate change is primarily caused by developed countries’ historical emissions over
many years”. (China MOFA 2008)
Similar to the Chinese academic views reviewed above, the official line is that firstly,
China is a developing country, and secondly, developing countries have little responsibility
for climate change. While low per capita emissions are discussed directly for the case of
China, in the case of historic responsibility, China is not mentioned individually, but as a
member of the group of developing countries with little responsibility overall.
The Chinese position on historic responsibility has become more clearly defined over
time. On the outset, China subscribed to a version of the Brazilian position that does not
allow for global reduction commitments, but differentiates reduction targets for Annex I
countries by historic responsibility only. More recently, China has started to formulate their
own position, a cumulative per capita emissions convergence approach. This „hard ball“
position (Hallding et al. 2009) requires equality of cumulative country emissions divided by
the population at the time of the target year – 2100 in the Chinese proposal.17

Figure 3.

Cumulative per capita (2100) emissions by 2100 according to MATCH data.

5. Results
5.1. Context
Causal contributions were calculated for all countries, but for expository reasons we have
chosen to focus on three countries – USA, China and India – and three groups – the group of
industrialised countries listed in Annex I of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (Annex I), the European Union after the 2004 enlargement (EU25) and the Alliance
of Small Island States combined with the Group of Least Developed Countries
(AOSIS+LDC, 76 countries). In order to understand the contribution and responsibility
figures to be discussed in the following two sections, it is important to appreciate certain
17

Chinese presentation at the AWG-LCA Shared Vision workshop at COP14 in Poznan, 2008. This simplified
metric circumvents the problem that there is no logically meaningful expression of average per capita and per
year emissions. Figure 3 shows this calculation based on MATCH data.
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basic economic and demographic facts about these entities, concerning their relative wealth
and population sizes.
Figure 4 depicts three non-emission parameters for the year 2005 that are of interest in
the subsequent analyses of contribution to and responsibility for climate change by these
countries and country groupings, namely their share in global wealth (defined in terms of
current GDP (PPP)), in global population, and in global poverty, measured in terms of the
number of people living on $1 per day, or below. Not surprisingly, the developed and
developing world (Annex I/non-Annex I; North/South) are not the same with respect to these
three dimensions: While the 20% of the world population that lives in Annex I countries
produces 56% of global wealth, the non-Annex I countries are home to 99.2% of the global
very poor. These proportions will have some impact in our responsibility calculations, which
is why it is important to keep in mind that they can change considerable depending on the
level of poverty one considers. This issue will be re-visited below in the sensitivity analysis
section, but just to give an example, and to give an idea of what these shares stand for in
absolute terms, consider the fact that China’s global share in abject poverty of 12% translates
into 129m people, and India’s 35% into 377m, while the population of those living below $2
(PPP)/day is 454m in China and a staggering 881m in India.

Figure 4.

Economic and demographic context (2005).

5.2. Differentiating Causal Contributions
According to the simplified methodology chosen for the purpose of this paper, the share of a
country’s – or group of countries’ – contribution to climate change is given by their share in
global historic GWP-weighted greenhouse gas emissions. However, to be able to calculate
these shares, some further parameters need to be specified, such as the time frame, the types
of emissions, and the countries or group of countries to be considered. For the purposes of
this paper, the chosen time horizon is 1890,18 and the emissions are those considered under
the Kyoto Protocol.

18

Data before 1890 is less complete. Roughly 10% of the effect of total aggregated emissions is left out, when
starting in 1890 instead of 1750, the start of industrialisation, see Höhne N, Blok K (2005) Calculating
Historical Contributions To Climate Change - Discussing The 'Brazilian Proposal'. Climatic Change 71:141173.
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5.2.1. Reference Case (RC) Contributions
Historically, industrialised countries (as listed in Annex I) have contributed the majority of
greenhouse gases, namely 54.5% – a figure which in the present simplified methodology
represents their share in the causal contribution to the climate change problem. The causal
contribution shares in detail, as represented in Figure 5, are (in descending order of
magnitude) as follows: USA (19.7%), EU25 (17.8%), China (10.8%), AOSIS+LDC (5.7%)
and India (3.9%).
These proportions can vary significantly depending on the sorts of gases and
sources/sinks that are taken into consideration. For example, if emissions from land use, land
use change and forestry (LULUCF), which are relatively uncertain, are excluded, Annex I
contributions increase by almost a fifth (+10.2 percentage points), most of it absorbed by the
US (+5.2%pts) and the EU (+4.3%pts), with chief beneficiaries Brazil (–2.3%pts, not shown
here), Indonesia (-2.9%pts, not shown here) and AOSIS+LDC (–2.3%pts). The Chinese
contribution does not change drastically (-0.4%pts), meaning that its share of emissions from
LULUCF in total emissions is not very far from global average.

Figure 5.

Causal contribution to climate change.

However, if one is talking of ‘causal contributions to climate change’ tout court, all
(officially) recognised sources and sinks – including those from LULUCF – should be taken
into account, which is why the Reference case is chosen for determining causal contribution
shares.
5.2.2. Joint Contributions
As mentioned earlier, there are reasons to think that certain emissions, even though emitted
over the sovereign territory of one country, should be given joint responsibility between
different countries. The example put forward above was the case of emission increments in
developing countries since 1992, when the world adopted the UNFCCC, and in particular its
Article 4.
There may be other reasons as to why one might wish to introduce a joint responsibility
for certain parts of ‘sovereign’ emissions, such as the ones embedded in exports, accounting
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for one third of total emissions in 2005 in China for example (Peters & Hertwich 2008,
Weber et al. 2008). Indeed, a recent study contends that:
“… the extent of ‘exported carbon’ from China should lead to some rethinking by
government negotiators as they work towards a new climate change agreement. It
suggests that a focus on emissions within national borders may miss the point. Whilst
the nation state is at the heart of most international negotiations and treaties, global
trade means that a country’s carbon footprint is international. Should countries be
concerned with emissions within their borders (as is currently the case), or should they
also be responsible for emissions due to the production of goods and services they
consume?” (Wang & Watson 2007a)

Figure 6.

China's joint contribution.

The method of determining shared responsibilities used in this paper is able to
accommodate this sort of joint responsibilities by introducing ‘joint contributions.’ And while
the actual calculations of responsibility shares below will all be based on the more traditional
sovereign-contributions-only approach embodied in the Reference Case (incl. LULUCF), it is
useful to just give an illustration of how the inclusion of such joint contributions might
change the picture. The exemplary implementation of joint-contributions (illustrated in
Figure 6 for China) which is meant to reflect the duties under Article 4 simply assumes that
the increment in emissions since and above the 1992 level are to be shared 50:50 by the
countries in question and the rich industrialised (Annex II) countries19 – divided among them
in proportion to their GDP.
In order to have any significant variance from the sovereign country measures at all,
the time horizon has also been limited to start in 1990. For the industrialised world, the
switch to this sort of 50:50-joint contribution would mean in increase of 3 percentage points
since 1990, most of it going in roughly equal to the US and the EU (+1%pt each), and
benefiting mostly China (-1.3%pts). Given these differences would practically disappear if
one were to use the Reference Case (beginning in 1890) it was decided not to proceed along
these lines for the moment.

19

As it happens, in 2004, the share of Chinese CO2 (energy) emissions allocated to Annex II in this fashion is
precisely the share of its embedded export emissions as calculate by Wang T, Watson J (2007b) Who owns
China's carbon emissions. Report No. 23, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Norwich.
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5.3.

Differentiating Moral Responsibilities

5.3.1. Strict Responsibility
Strict responsibilities, according to the adopted allowance-based approach, are determined by
the level of aggregate historic emissions – representing causal contributions – and a per capita
allocation of the global total of harmless emissions. There has been some debate in the
literature as to how much could be globally emitted without imposing harm, particularly in
the context of defining what has become known as ‘ecological space.’ MacGregor (2006), for
example, explains his choice of 4GtCeq (14.7GtCO2eq) as follows:
“The earth’s natural ecosystems (both land and sea) currently absorb roughly half of the
anthropogenic emissions of CO2, thus buffering us from the full climate impacts of our
emissions. However, this is a ‘moving target’ since future changes in climate will affect
this rate of natural absorption. This in turn influences the future rate of change of
atmospheric CO2 since the warmer climate accelerates decay of carbon in soils and
leads to large release of CO2, which causes further warming. Moreover, the population
is projected to increase. The current size of the global natural carbon sink is estimated
to be 3-5 billion tonnes of carbon (GtCeq) – approximately 2 GtCeq by ocean and 1-3
GtCeq by land, depending on differing rates of deforestation. A global level of 4 GtCeq
is often used (Monbiot 2007; Retallack 2005).” (MacGregor 2006)

Figure 7.

Moral responsibilities for climate change.

Agarwal, Narain and Sharma (1999) in turn contend that “terrestrial sinks are national
property, but oceanic sinks, which absorb to the order of 2GtC [7.3GtCO2] per year, belong
to human kind and are common global property.” (Agarwal et al. 1999) 7GtCO2 as the global
total of basic allowances has been adopted here, for the present purposes to be allocated – in
accordance with their global commons status – on a per capita basis.20
As can be seen in Figure 7, numerically, this choice implies an overall industrialised
country (historic) climate change responsibility of 64%. The largest single country share is
that of the US with 25.6%, followed by the EU (19.1%), China (6.4%) and finally a number
of countries with low if not negligible responsibility: AOSIS+LDC (4.1%) and India (0.3%).
20

Strictly speaking, we should also have allocated basic allowances according to the sinks capacity of the
respective sovereign territory, but given the uncertainties on how much these are, we decided to err on the side
of caution and just consider oceanic sinks.
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While it will not be surprising that individual SIDS and LDCs have really no historic
responsibility for the climate change problem (on average 0.05%), what may be less expected
is to find India at the very end of our responsibility spectrum. The reasons for the extremely
low Indian responsibility share are its relatively modest causal contribution share of around
4%, and its rather large share in global population share (16.9%).21
5.3.2. Limited Responsibility I: Epistemic Constraints (EC)
There has been a robust difference of opinion – more often than not along the
developed/developing country divide – whether it is fair to use this sort of strict historic
responsibility, or whether countries should be granted mitigating circumstances, such as
ignorance of the effect of one’s actions. For the present purposes this sort of Aristotelian
epistemic constraint of full responsibility has been implemented here by excluding emissions
before 1990 from the calculations, on the grounds that after that year, which saw the
beginning of the UNFCCC negotiations and the publication of the first IPCC reports, no
government could reasonably plead ignorance of the problem.22
This plea for ignorance as mitigating circumstance does shift the burden of
responsibility significantly from industrialised to developing countries, with Annex I as a
whole losing 10 percentage points. The US (20.1%) and the EU (12.3%) both lose over a fifth
of their responsibility relative to their historic strict responsibility shares, while China (12%)
picks up about the same number of percentage points, but in this case this means almost a
doubling of responsibility relative to the strict measure. In relative terms, by far the worst off
is India (1%), which more than triples its responsibility under such a switch to ignoring most
of the historic contributions. And yet it remains at the bottom of our responsibility scale, due
to the extremely low base line. However, the developed/developing country picture is not
quite as homogeneous as might be expected (“industrialised countries lose responsibility,
developing countries gain”). Japan (3.7%, not shown here), for one, gains a third in
responsibility, while Brazil (5%, not shown here), and AOSIS+LDC (4%) would actually be
slightly better off. But, on the whole, the fact remains that in general a limitation of
responsibility by considering only post-1990 contributions benefits industrialised countries.
5.3.3. Limited Responsibility II: EC With Subsistence Allowances
As mentioned earlier, Aristotle’s conditions on limiting full responsibility lend themselves
not only to justify these epistemic dispensations, but also a certain dispensation for
subsistence emissions, or rather emissions needed to overcome (abject levels of) poverty. For
the purposes of this paper, these needs based dispensations have been implemented as an
additional constraint on the above-mentioned epistemic dispensation case. In other words,
pre-1990 contributions continue to be disregarded in this context. This leaves two parameters
to be determined: who should be eligible for the subsistence allowances, and how much
should they be. The most readily available data are listed in the World Bank Development
Indicators, which contains figures for people living on less than $1 and 2$ per day. As to the
question of how much should poor people be allowed to emit without incurring
responsibilities, per capita subsistence allocations of less than the relevant global per capita

21

The position of Japan in this strict responsibility scale (2.8%) also suggests that burden sharing according to
responsibility alone may not really be tenable, and that it would have to be complemented with some ‘respective
capacity’ component, as referred to in Article 3.1 on the UNFCCC.
22
This is, of course, not quite the same as saying that they could not have reasonably been expected to know
even before this – as referred to above – but for the sake of argument, we shall use 1990 in accordance with the
principle of the presumption of innocence (“Giving the defendant the benefit of the doubt”).
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basic allowance will not register. 23 Given that the per capita emissions of the developing
world are currently estimated to be 3.7 and 2 tCO2eq with and without LULUCF, respectively
our decision was to allocate 2tCO2 per poor inhabitant per annum, to be subtracted from the
aggregate historic emissions (instead of the basic allowance)
In this case of 1$/day as ‘poverty threshold’ – referred to simply as ‘Limited
Responsibility’ – the annual subsistence allowance of 2tCO2eq. (which is larger than basic
allowance per capita level) is used instead of the basic one for each inhabitant with an income
of less than 1$ per day. The results benefit developing countries more than developed ones,
and yet the shift of half a percentage point in responsibility towards Annex I (53.8%) is
clearly not compensating for the shift in the other direction due to the introduction of the
epistemic constraint. The US gains 0.2 percentage points relative to the epistemologically
constrained case, while India and China jointly loose nearly one. And the situation does not
differ significantly if one moves the poverty threshold to 2$/day: The US gains another 0.6
percentage points, while China and India jointly loose 1.2 percentage points. In other words,
the choice of poverty threshold – at the assumed level of 2tCO2eq. for the subsistence
allowance – is not a particularly sensitive one, certainly not in comparison to the effects of
the chosen epistemic constraint, or the overall level of basic allowances.24
5.4. Mitigation Through Population Control?
Since the end of the 1970s, China has taken extraordinary measures to curb the growth of its
population. Based on the undoubted achievements of the policies that were implemented,
Chinese politicians have repeatedly argued that population control is one of the most
successful strategies to curb emissions and coin it as one of the key mitigation efforts of
China. The underlying assumption is that the increase in emissions would have been faster
with higher population growth.25
Estimates vary on the size of the current population in absence of the policies that
were implemented, and there is not any single number that is more correct than any other
when looking at this hypothetical case. To simplify, we extrapolate 1978 population figures
to 2005 at the growth rate of the population from the founding of the People’s Republic in
1949 to 1978, leading to a hypothetical population of 1.62 billion instead of 1.3 billion in
2005. We then calculate the hypothetical emissions for the years 1978 to 2005 by multiplying
actual emission with the factor of actual to hypothetical population of each year, which
results in hypothetical Chinese emissions of 8.7GtCO2eq. instead of 7GtCO2eq. in 2005.

23

16 (1990-2005) times the annual basic allowance budget of 7GtCO2eq, divided by the sum of global annual
population figures over the period = 1.2tCO2eq.
24
See Müller et al. (2009) for a full sensitivity analysis for varying choices of Basic and Subsistence
allowances.
25
It can be questioned if the difference in hypothetical to actual emissions growth would have been the same as
the difference in hypothetical to actual population growth. Economic growth, industrialisation and
modernisation since the end of the 1970s may have rather been hampered by overpopulation, leading to an
elasticity lower than 1.
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Figure 8.

Hypothetical responsibility with faster Chinese population growth.

Figure 8 shows the new responsibility shares for a higher Chinese population and
emissions growth. Note that the increase in the allocated share of basic allowances for its
hypothetical population offsets part of the increase in responsibility for China.
Shares in strict responsibility and epistemically constrained responsibility for Annex I
countries (-0.5/-1.1%pts.), USA (-0.2/-0.4%pts.) and EU25 (-0.2/-0.3%pts.) are lower in this
hypothetical case and the shares of LDCs and AOSIS remain virtually unchanged.
Interestingly the responsibility shares of India increase by 10%/8% (but still less than
0.1%pt.) because in relation to its low emissions the country profits most from the allocation
of basic allowances, part of which are diverted to China due to a higher share in world
population. The share of China’s strict responsibility increases to 7.1% from 6.4% and for
epistemically constrained responsibility to 13.6% from 12%. With all the caveats noted
regarding the assumptions underlying this hypothetical calculation, China has reduced its
responsibility for climate change by 10% and 13.5%26 respectively by means of population
control.
5.5. What is The Future of Historical Responsibility?
China has undoubtedly started to implement numerous policies that have a climate change
mitigating effect (Ellermann et al. 2009 forthcoming). In the deliberations of the coming 12th
Five-Year-Plan for China’s development strategy, a general consensus exists for a more
sustainable development path. However, proponents of a low-carbon future for China face
opposition by others who suggest that China should focus on unrestrained business-as-usual
development until 2030 before worrying about (unilateral domestic) climate change
mitigation.
The 12th Five-Year-Plan plan covers the years 2011 to 2015 and will among other
things provide guidance for economic restructuring and major investments in infrastructure
and capital with long turnover rates like energy generation and heavy industry facilities.
Decisions made this year therefore predetermine to a large degree China’s general emissions
trajectory over half a century or so to come. A careful look into the future (up to the often26

Note: percent, not percentage points.
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cited year 2030) and its potential responsibilities including historical (pre-2005) and new
emissions therefore seems to be warranted. Figure 9 and Figure 10 corroborate this point, as
emissions between 2006 and 2030 make up the largest part of total emissions since 1890,
with an average annual contribution of over 1.6% after 2005.
We are mindful of the difficulty of predicting future emissions and rely directly on the
MATCH calculations. The MATCH group used latest available emissions data (2005) and
extrapolated country emissions using an average of the six basic IPCC SRES scenarios for 17
world regions, avoiding a judgement on the probability of any single scenario to be more
“correct” than others. The point of this paper here is not to come up with a reliable number of
future emissions, but to illustrate the potential future direction of historical responsibility. In
contrast to the previous sections, this paper cannot provide a clear ethical argument for the
metric used (and as a consequence the use of the results), as it builds the sum of actual
historic emissions and potential future emissions, complicating the interpretation of the
results. The numbers provided are therefore simple results of a calculation based on the
scientific consensus of the IPCC over future emissions, but lack the power of an ethical
analysis of future historical responsibility. 27

Figure 9.

Total contribution during different
time periods.

Figure 10.

Annual contribution
different time periods.

during

The look into the future reveals potentially significant shifts in the shares of
responsibilities of countries and regions (Figure 11, lighter colour shows actual historical
responsibility, darker colour shows “potential future historical responsibility”). Strict
responsibility of Annex I countries would be 53.8% (-10.1%pts), epistemically constrained
responsibility would be 45.2% (-8.1%pts.). The shares of the USA would decline by 5%pts.
to 20.6% and 3.9%pts. to 16.2%, and EU25 to 15.8% and 12.6% respectively (-3.3/2.1%pts.). China’s share of strict responsibility would rise sharply to 12.1% (plus 5.7%pts. or
88.3%) and epistemically constrained responsibility would increase by 4.8%pts. (or 40.4%)
to 16.8%, overtaking the potential shares of the USA and the EU25 and potentially
amounting to more than a third of Annex I total by 2030. India’s potential responsibility
shares rise to 2.6% and 4% respectively (2.3%pts./3%pts. and a drastic relative increase),
while LDC/AOSIS potential shares drop slightly. The Rest of World responsibility shares
27

The question of the use of future emissions – modelled in emission scenarios – to calculate the historic
responsibility at an end year that lies in the future should be an interesting research topic in this field. An
argumentation could perhaps start in this direction: In the case one considered pre-2030 emissions completely
predetermined by today’s decisions on energy strategy, etc. and considered the modelled emission scenario an
accurate description of future development, these future emissions could already be assumed to be historic
today. Then they could be summed up with actual historic emissions.
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change moderately from 25.3% to potentially 27.8% and 29.7% to 30.5%, meaning that its
emissions would grow around world average, especially after 1990.

Figure 11.

A scenario for future (historical) responsibility for climate change.

The direction of these numbers – which as noted before should not be interpreted as
an ethical analysis of future historic responsibility but merely as a calculation based on
commonly agreed emission scenarios – could potentially have great implications for the
ethical debate surrounding climate change and point to the use of future emissions scenarios
as an important research topic when looking at historical responsibility.28 So far there is no
ethical concept for combining actual historic responsibilities and potential future
responsibilities, and the calculations here cannot be used for their absolute numerical results.
Their direction however suggests that by 2030 historical responsibility shares could be
distributed quite differently from today, changing the force of the principle of “common but
differentiated responsibility” for some major players. China could potentially become
similarly responsible for climate change as the USA or the EU25, and India’s responsibility
could surpass that of Germany or Japan. Undoubtedly – and this is important – this still
leaves intact low per capita emissions as the other major argument for “common but
differentiated responsibility”, and it does not affect the argument of limiting capabilities of
now developing countries to combat climate change.
6. Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper was to put forward and discuss a methodology for the numerical
differentiations of responsibilities for climate change as opposed to calculating causal
contributions to climate change. For expository purposes, this was done on the basis of
aggregate GWP-weighted historic emissions as a proxy. Moving to fully fledged climate
modelling techniques as used in MATCH could be done in the future, but would change the
relative contributions and resulting responsibilities by at most 10%29 for most countries.
This paper is not aimed to engage in a debate which of the two conceptions of
responsibility (‘strict’ or ‘limited’) with the chosen parameter values is more appropriate, or
whether the causality of developing country emissions should be partially attributed to Annex
28

Chen et al. (1999) early on pointed out the changing trend of contribution shares, comparing pre-1990
historical contribution with estimated contribution over the period of 1990-2010.
29
Percent, not percentage points.
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II countries, not least because the answer may well depend on what one wishes to do with the
results. However, the order of magnitude difference in the responsibility of the two extremes
of the scale under both conceptions does give pause for thought as to what sorts of burdens
can justly be imposed, particularly given the discrepancy between the affluence and wealth of
the exponents at either end of the spectrum of responsibilities we considered in this paper.30
While the ethical argumentation for these two conceptions of responsibility are pretty
developed and less contentious, it is still not very clear how future potential emissions can be
incorporated into a (historic) responsibility concept to include the most likely emission
scenarios for the coming one to two decades. We can predict with some certainty that the
historic responsibility of countries in 2030 will look quite different from today. Our ability to
see this today points to the need for increased research on this matter – on the future of
historic responsibility.
It stands to reason that burden sharing on the basis of historic responsibility alone – as
proposed in the original Brazilian proposal – without taking into account the second and
lesser quoted element mentioned in Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC, namely ‘respective
capabilities’, would not be appropriate. In other words, fair burden sharing would have to be
based on a mixture between the responsibility shares discussed here and some differentiated
index of capability.
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The Chinese [Climate] Box:
A Scalar Approach to Evaluating Ethical Obligations in Climate Strategies for China
Erich W. Schienke, Ph.D.1
Abstract
Assuming that all nations have the ethical obligation to reduce emissions to their global fair
share, this paper investigates how distributive and procedural justice obligations, under the
broader rubric of Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change program, play out across various
political and ecological scales in China. As China is such a large and necessary player in any
global strategies for addressing climate change, it is imperative that the nation receive closer
ethical investigation across scales and sectors, and that other nations and multi-national
corporations do their fair share in helping China's various regions and sectors reach its
obligations in a post-Kyoto regime. To address the challenges to distributive and procedural
justice that emerge at global, regional, national, intra-regional, provincial, urban, and small
town & village levels, this paper proposes a multi-scalar ethical framework for evaluating
China's climate strategies as the nation formalizes its obligations to the principle of "Common
but Differentiated Responsibility," (CDR) and to a framework of Contraction and
Convergence (C&C). Part of the difficulty in addressing China's mitigation obligations is in
the ongoing articulation of the problem as primarily an obligation of national level
governance, a structural result of UNFCCC requirements. However, due to China's
complexity in both size and population, both CDR and C&C require a more nuanced and
complex articulation of ethical and practical problems across political and ecological scales.
As such, implementing China's National Climate Change Programme (CNCCP) will require
mitigation management targeting not just political, but ecosystem scales as well. In addition,
the Central Government will need to allow or provide for a "lateral" political agency for
ecosystem management efforts, so that institutions at similar scales can plan and co-ordinate
more readily.
1. Introduction
Assuming that all nations have the ethical obligation to reduce emissions to their global fair
share, this paper investigates how obligations to ethics and justice, under the broader
approach developed through the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change Program, play out
across various political and ecological scales in China. As China is such a large and necessary
player in any global strategies for addressing climate change, it is imperative that the nation
receive closer ethical investigation across scales and sectors, and that other nations and multinational corporations do their fair share in helping China’s various regions and sectors reach
its obligations in a post-Kyoto regime.
This paper will perform an analysis across eight ethical issues, first developed in the
whitepaper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change (Brown, et al 2006), which can
inform us of China's national obligations to meeting its fair share of global emissions. The
eight ethical concerns map onto the following issues: responsibility for damages; atmospheric
targets; allocation of global emissions among nations; use of scientific uncertainty in policy
making; cost to national economics; independent responsibility to act; potential for new
technologies; and procedural fairness. This normative analysis will provide an ethical
baseline for national obligations; however, in producing a normative analysis considering
national obligations, it becomes readily apparent that what may be coherent at the national
1
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level (of governance) becomes difficult to interpret into clear ethical directives at other scales
of governance and/or ecological system. Thus, ethical issues and policy obligations require a
more nuanced analysis which is introduced here as the “climate box”. (See Table 1.)
To address the challenges to distributive and procedural justice that emerge at global,
regional, national, intra-regional, provincial, urban, firms, and small town & village
enterprise levels (TVE), this paper proposes a multi-scalar ethical framework for evaluating
China’s climate strategies as the nation formalizes its obligations to the principle of
“Common but Differentiated Responsibility,” (CDR) and to a framework of Contraction and
Convergence (C&C). Part of the difficulty in addressing China’s mitigation obligations is in
the ongoing articulation of the problem as primarily an obligation of national level
governance, a structural result of UNFCCC and other international regime requirements.
However, due to China’s complexity in both size and population, both CDR and C&C require
a more nuanced and complex articulation of ethical and practical problems across political
and ecological scales than has been thus far fully articulated. As such, implementing China’s
National Climate Change Programme (CNCCP) will require mitigation management
targeting not just political, but ecosystem scales as well. In addition, the Central Government
will need to allow or provide for a “lateral” political agency for ecosystem management
efforts, so that institutions at similar scales of governance (such as mayoral and provincial
governments) can plan and co-ordinate mitigation efforts more readily and effectively.
2. Analysis of China's Ethical Obligations to Address Climate Change according to
Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change Program (EDCC)
Issue One: Responsibility for Damages. Who is ethically responsible for the consequences
of climate change, that is, who is liable for the burdens of: a. preparing for and then
responding to climate change (i.e. adaptation) or b. paying for unavoided damages?2
Arguably, China has contributed far less to historical emissions than most OECD
countries with higher Human Development Index (HDI) profiles, particularly in relation to
the US (HID of .951).3 Therefore, China's obligation to addressing such costs is rather low in
relation to past emissions output and state of development in relation to the US. Further,
various regions across China are subject to experiencing higher frequency and severity of
climate impacts. Sichuan and regions east moving towards the Gobi desert will most likely
experience more frequent and more severe droughts in addition to more severe flooding
events in the region. Mountainous regions in Tibet, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Xinjiang are
already subject to increased flooding (even under the threat, in some regions, of glacial lake
outburst floods) and the eventual decrease of snow and ice pack during winter months. With
decrease in glacial run-off, both fresh water and hydropower in the regions along the
Mekong, Yangtze, and Yellow Rivers (as well as the Ganges to the west) will experience a
long-term decline in water resources. Continued damming along these rivers will also
exacerbate this process. The coastal regions, where China's populations are most dense, are
also subject to increased risk due to rising sea levels, and in some regions, will be vulnerable
to a projected increase in frequency and intensity of storm activity. These risks, however, also
extend to other countries in the region. Moving forward, however, these risks to China’s
interior and coastline alone justify the need to take immediate and appropriate mitigation
2

These eight ethical questions are taken directly from the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change whitepaper,
which can be downloaded at: http://rockethics.psu.edu/climate
3
This paper will mainly compare China to the US in terms of obligations towards reduction. While China’s
population is significantly larger than the US, their emissions outputs are both each approximately 20% of all
global emissions. (Together, the US and China comprise over 40% of global emissions. Their collaboration is
both essential and an ethical imperative.)
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efforts. China will incur a debt towards future generations of its own vulnerable populations
if it does not bring emissions down to its global fair and ethical share, regardless of past
emissions. Further, China is quickly closing the historical emissions gap.
As the world's largest emitter nation, by most accounts, China is responsible for
preparing for and responding to climate change within its capacity to do so. With an HDI of
.77, China is not amongst the least developed countries in the world, and is developing a
significant affluent population in urban regions such as Beijing and Shanghai. As such, the
nation will inevitably be required to tap its growing affluence, particularly in the coastal
regions, to adequately adapt to coming climate impacts. Further, in addressing the
distributions of harms and benefits resulting from climate change, the country (central,
provincial, and urban governments) will need to continue developing means to address the
disparities between the wealthier regions along the coast and the poorer interior, particularly
as the increase of drought and flood impact the interior. In addition, as China becomes a more
affluent nation in the region, it also becomes more attractive for migration for populations in
other countries bordering it. North Korea, regardless of the dire political-economic situation
the country faces, could provide a massive influx of refugees if severe famine were to occur
due to climate change or severe flooding.
The question of China’s responsibility for climate impacts based on past emissions is
up for debate, but consideration of future responsibility of climate impacts indicates clear and
present ethical obligations towards immediate action.
Issue Two: Atmospheric Targets — What ethical principles should guide the choice of
specific climate change policy objectives, including but not limited to, maximum humaninduced warming and atmospheric greenhouse gas targets?
Arriving at an ethically satisfactory level of global emissions is to be determined by
the degree of warming and ensuing damages that would not cause exceptional harm or
endangerment to particularly vulnerable populations, especially those poorer populations that
will both cannot afford adaptation costs. A relatively "safe" level of warming would be at 2°C
or under, projected at roughly 450ppm. The level of global emissions is already expected to
surpass this, even if all significant emissions were immediately reduced. To meet this goal,
total output needs to be reduced to about 70-80% of current levels.4
Climate change and the obligations to adhere to a global obligation towards reduction
are supported by a theory of global ethics. Global ethics are primarily argued under the
ethical theory referred to as cosmopolitanism, i.e. a universal ethics applying to everything
within the cosmos. (Dower 2002) There are multiple critiques that call into question the
legitimacy of a global ethics, namely communitarianism and relativism.
"Advocates of global ethical responsibilities respond to relativism and communitarianism by
making several arguments including the following:
•
Although it may be true that not all people agree with global ethical principles, they
ought to as a matter of ethics accept global obligations;
•
Those that believe in relativism have no principled way of condemning atrocities of
one group on another such as the conquistador's treatment of the Aztecs.
•
Even though moral obligations may arise from social relations with others, there is no
reason why ethical principles developed at a local scale should not be extended to a global
scale;
•
Because people are often members of more than one cultural group to which they

4

China will likely argue for a 550ppm global cap in the coming Copenhagen negotiations.
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acknowledge duties, there is no reason why they should not acknowledge obligations to the
global community." (Brown 2009, Dower 2002)
In terms of reducing GHG output, China considers its primary obligation, like any
nation, to its own population and economy first, then to those nations that support its
interests. However, when we begin to consider the interconnected nature of and the actions
China takes in the areas of economy & trade, security, disease, sporting events, technology,
and others, the nation cannot make the argument (within cosmopolitan ethics) that on one
hand there is a need to participate in and even lead the global economic community, while on
the other, it does not need take a leading role in the case of global climate mitigation. That is,
China cannot argue for global participation in the case of economy and not also play a
supporting role in the case of climate change. Further, China needs to participate in global
emissions limits to prevent "leakage" of emissions, i.e. displacement of emissions from
moving manufacturing from countries with heavier regulations to those with far more lax
standards.
Issue Three: Allocating Global Emissions Among Nations — What ethical principles
should govern the allocation of responsibility among people, organizations, and governments
at all levels to prevent ethically intolerable impacts from climate change?
The main issue at stake here is the determination of an ethically appropriate and
relevant GHG output for China. As is articulated in Ott et. al. (2004), various ethical systems
converge on the conclusion that overall atmospheric levels of GHGs ought to be stabilized at
the lowest possible levels of concentrations. Determining precisely what this level ought to be
for China is, politically, a highly contentious issue. As a nation, the per capita emissions are
relatively low. From 1990 the per capita emissions grew from 2.1 tons to about 3.84 tons in
2004 (source: CDIAC 2005), still at levels about one quarter to one sixth of that in the US,
depending on lifestyles. Nevertheless, in 2004 China was the world's second highest emitter
nation, just behind the U.S., and has recently surpassed those levels. Further, as China
continues to develop infrastructure, increases the use of personal automobiles, and expands
the housing footprint in a sprawling megablock approach to urban development, the country,
particularly urban areas, will continue to expand its per capita GHG footprint in the coming
decades. As well, there is a growing disparity between per capita emissions for those living in
the city versus those living in the rural and agricultural regions.
Based on principles of an egalitarian distributive justice across the globe, some
account of per capita emissions needs to be considered when determining China's fair share
of global emissions. However, this obligation must internally extend to how emissions ought
to be determined at a per capita level within the country. That is, based on both egalitarian
and welfare (Rawlsian) approaches to distributive justice, China is ethically obligated to
ensure that per capita emissions are not unfairly distributed across its population. In other
words, China cannot make the argument that a per capita emissions approach to determining
its national fair share at a global level, which at the same time allowing per capita emissions
allocations to range from 0.6 tons/yr in rural regions (which contains over 70% of the nation's
population) only to allow citizens living in wealthier urban regions to continue growing per
capita outputs to levels that are equivalent to those in highly developed regions of the world,
at per capita levels of around 25 tons/yr. Ethically, China cannot reasonably allow its poorer
populations to displace the emissions of the wealthier populations of the country, and would
further be obligated to ensure a per capita cap for the wealthier regions as the poorer regions
continue to develop.
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Issue Four: The Use of Scientific Uncertainty in Policy Making — What is the ethical
significance of the need to make climate change decisions in the face of scientific
uncertainty?
Some countries and political communities have deliberated some aspect of the
certainty of the severity or actuality of climate change, and have argued against taking actions
based on claims of scientific uncertainty. For years in the U.S., claims about scientific
uncertainty underpinned many of the reasons for either not taking action, as the costs of
action would far outweigh any possible costs of impacts. Since the IPCC 2007 report, the
reality of climate change and the tremendous costs of coming impacts was stated to be
unequivocal. By 2009, most national governments acknowledge the reality of climate change;
yet continue to hesitate on adopting strict caps and developing comprehensive mitigation
plans moving forward to bring down global levels.
For the most part, China has tended to adopt some of the more optimistic of
projections about climate change impacts while choosing to take less seriously the higher risk
scenarios. China is all too familiar with the problems of severe flooding along its major
rivers, so ignoring such warning signs seems socially, economically, and politically unwise.
On the one hand, using claims of scientific uncertainty to argue against confronting wicked
political-economic problems, such as what to do about the nation's massive dependence upon
coal, only belay and intensify the severity of a decision that will need to be made down the
line. On the other hand, scientific uncertainty cannot be ignored when proposing mitigation
solutions, such as the risk and effectiveness of carbon capture and storage from the burning of
fossil fuels.
China needs to continue increasing its scientific capacity in studying the global and
regional carbon cycle, particularly in relation to its industrial output. Further rationalizing
process such as urban development would also go a long way towards improving efficiency
in infrastructure. Increasing the capacity of research networks, such as China FLUX (at CAS
Institute for Geography and Natural Resource Research), will allow the nation to better
monitor its overall terrestrial carbon flux. Improving and enforcing industrial monitoring
standards, particularly in the capacity of the local and regional offices of the Ministry of
Environmental Protection (MEP) will significantly reduce uncertainty and margins of error in
carbon accounting.
Even with significant scientific certainty about the location, severity, and costs of
climate impacts, scientific results alone will not provide policy makers with an appropriate
framework for action. Scientific results and accounting of carbon flows will play a significant
role in improving planning and policy making and reducing overall uncertainty in the system.
However, ultimately, when and what China ought to do about climate change requires
making ethical decisions about both about its own population and about its impact on the
global commons.
Issue Five: Cost to National Economies — Is the commonly used justification of cost to a
national economy for delaying or minimizing actions to reduce the threat of climate change
ethically justified?
Many nations have resisted calls to reduce their GHG emissions based first on the
costs to national economies across various sectors, and second, because most cost-benefit
analysis used to determine or justify such actions will not conclude the reduction of GHG
emissions as a worthwhile investment now as opposed to in the future. (Brown 2002,
Nordhaus 2007) Both the U.S. and China have put forth the argument through various drafts
of the UNFCCC (Kyoto protocol) and became a primary reason argued by the US for pulling
out of the accord in 1997.
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China has argued, as a non-Annex I nation, that its number one priority is to its
continued economic development, which has been roughly 8-10% per year for roughly the
past 30 years, and is currently mandating a sustained 8% (“protect 8”) growth rate moving
forward. China's rapid and peaceful rise as one of the world's leading economic superpowers
has not come without significant costs in emissions. The U.S. has been the world's leading
historical emitter nation since 1850, but this is a gap China is also quickly narrowing. 5
Further, the very broad category of non-Annex I countries provides very little granularity in
definition or degree of development and, according to development indices such as the
Human Development Index (HDI), China is certain not amongst the least developed nations
and cannot continue to leverage the argument and its position in international accords as
though it is. (Hu 2009) Further, costs of emissions reductions will likely adversely impact the
economies of some regions while not impacting others. Shanxi, a major coal-producing
province (one-third of all of China's coal deposits), is under the national average per capita
GDP. Dislocating coal jobs in these regions will have a greater economic impact than on the
wealthier coastal and urban regions where the energy from coal is primarily used. However,
as Hu (2009) argues, it is the wealthier regions that need to make the reductions first,
allowing interior and western regions to continue developing while wealthier regions take on
the burden of beginning the process of contraction and convergence across sectors.
China can no longer reasonably argue the cost of not taking action on its economic
growth while simply arguing the benefits of not taking action. Implementing a Green GDP
would already bring the high growth rates down to five to six percent. Further including
overall pollution costs on human and ecological health, in some particularly polluted areas,
can even put the growth rate into the negative column, from zero to minus two percent.
Continuing development with a business as usual approach in China will only likely
exacerbate the medium and long-term bottom line costs on development and do little to
improve overall efficiency across various sectors. Further, the use of Cost-Benefit Analyses
(CBA) to determine whether, how much, what kind and when to begin mitigation actions are
typically employed without the full tally of costs a full inclusion of critical climate system
thresholds, such as the shutdown of the Meridional Overturning Circulation (MOC)
(McInerney and Keller 2007), the loss of the Greenland ice sheet, or the loss of snow pack in
the Himalayas.
Any nation, but particularly the leading emitter nations, cannot ethically argue costs to
national interests alone when the impacts affect populations through the world. Because, "no
person or nation has a right either to harm others as a means to achieve their economic health
or to endanger others' life, health, or security." (Brown et al 2006)
Issue Six: Independent Responsibility to Act — Is the commonly used justification for
delaying or minimizing climate change action that any government need not act until all
others agree on action ethically justified?
In a similar vein as arguments about costs to national economies, some nations
(particularly the U.S. and China) have put forth the argument that they have no responsibility
to lower their emissions until other nations do. China has strongly argued throughout its
engagement with the UNFCCC, that it certainly is not obliged to reduce its emissions before
the US, particularly because of the potential setbacks this would have on development. This
is a significantly more reasonable argument, at the face of it, than the US position that it will
not reduce emissions until China is fully on board in the Kyoto/post-Kyoto process.
5

The US leads the world in historical emissions from 1850-2002 at a total of 29.3%, while China only
contributed 7.9% of historical emissions. However, as revealed in a study forecasting China’s emissions, the
emissions growth rate from 2000-2010 is projected at an annual rate of 11.05–11.88 percent, increasing China’s
annual emissions output from 1000 MMTCE in 2002 to 2600 MMTCE in 2010. (Auffhammer 2008: 245)
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However, even if in this case the US was to begin significant reductions and China was not,
this would likely result in emissions leakage in the further displacement of manufacturing in
the US to China, such as the case of consumable goods, steel, aluminum, and other energy
intensive manufacturing. (That is, labor is not the cheaper commodity as much as lax
emissions regulations would be.)
Some nations within the East Asian region, such as Bhutan, are already experiencing
heavy impacts and are under the threat of severe flooding and loss of cultural artifacts
(Schienke and Nidup 2008), yet have contributed next to nothing to global emissions levels.
Developed nations, such as the US, have contributed most to this problem. Yet, as mentioned
earlier, China is quickly closing this historical emissions gap and cannot justly make the
argument that it has a right to continue business as usual practices.
Under the UNFCCC, developed (Annex I) nations such as the US agreed they would
reduce GHG emissions first based on issues of equity to prevent dangerous changes to the
climate system based on human activity. From this agreement, and as has been heavily
argued by China, nations acknowledged a "common but differentiated responsibility" (CDR)
to take action on emissions reduction. However, in practice, no significant responsibility or
action has been taken this far on the part of either the US or China. Further, such a standstill
has actually proven mutually beneficial to the political-economic elements that are
proponents of business as usual practices.
There is a tolerable limit to global emission where nations can emit without adversely
affecting the global climate system. As such, nations such as the US and China who refuse to
reduce their emissions have the burden of demonstrating that emissions are below the nation's
just share of global emissions. While determinations of what precisely is a just or fair share of
global emissions continues to be a contentious issue among nations, and a CDR approach
seems just and reasonable, worldwide emissions need to reduce to about 20% of 2004 levels.
For the US, this would require somewhere in the neighborhood of a 90% reduction of current
levels. China alone, according to a recent Global Carbon Project report (GCP 2008, Gregg et
al 2008), accounts for at least 18% of 2004 global emissions, and has very probably increased
this amount somewhat significantly in the buildup to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.
Much attention in this buildup has been put on China's increased energy consumption
in the form of coal, but cement is likely a significant factor as well, as one ton of cement
equals one ton of CO2 emissions. That is, if China were only to hold steady at current
emissions levels and the rest of the entire world were to cease any emissions, China would
still continue to increase global emissions at a much slower but still unsafe rate. As such,
China in particular can make no ethically justifiable argument at this point for not taking
immediate action towards reduction, let alone put forth an argument for the continued growth
of emissions levels as the country develops.
China has an immediate duty to cease activities that are both harming other
populations and its own population, regardless of the actions of any other nation. Further,
actions such as excessive emissions or pollution may be considered as wrongful under
international law, "even in the absence of a violation of a specific agreement such as the
UNFCCC." (Brown et. al. 2006) China has an ethical obligation to begin reducing emissions
immediately, regardless of the actions taken by other nations. Even more so, all developed
nations have a duty to reduce emissions immediately, regardless of China's actions.
Issue Seven: Potential New Technologies — Is the commonly used justification for delaying
or minimizing climate change action until less costly technologies are invented ethically
justified?
The question of new technologies is perhaps one of the most interesting in terms of
ethics, international obligations, and in the practicality of holding promise in the future. Some
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nations argue that reduction of emissions should be delayed until newer, more appropriate
and less costly measures are developed and become available on the market. The reasons
given for waiting tend to be premised on at least four main assumptions: 1) existing
technologies are too costly and will hurt the economy; 2) new technologies that can help to
reduce emissions now will be less costly in the future; 3) waiting for new or less costly
innovations will not cause harms; and 4) that there are no unintended consequences or high
risks that come with the new technologies. (Brown et. al. 2006) Further, it is assumed that
market pressures and demands will catalyze the development of newer technologies.
However, considering current financial markets, it is not likely wise to wait for market
incentives to drive the demand for such innovation, and will likely only come at the level of
governmental directives/initiatives for guiding innovation in energy efficiency and emissions
reductions.
There exists a wide variety of technologies that China needs to consider carefully
when adopting an innovation strategy and for purposes of mitigation and efficiency
improvements. I will quickly address two technology paths that, on the face of it, seem quite
appealing but can quickly bring a variety of ethical problems in their adoption, namely,
carbon capture and storage and biofuels. Other technologies requiring further ethical analysis
would include transportation (all sectors), other forms of “clean energy,” buildings and urban
layout plans, nuclear energy, land-use strategies, sanitation, and food.
Carbon Capture and Storage: The first technology path considered here is that of carbon
capture and storage (CCS), 6 a process that captures CO2 from coal-fired and natural gas
based power plants and stores it in underground geological formations, such as saline
aquifers, spent oil fields, and others. The primary problem is that coal provides China with
approximately 75% of its energy, yet coal releases more GHGs per unit of energy than any
other form of fossil fuel combustion. The general principle of capturing carbon from either
burnt coal or natural gas seems quite appealing at the outset, particularly because it can be
used in the retrofitting of some existing power plants. Because of its appeal and the
opportunities it presents to continue burning one of the cheapest and most abundant sources
of energy throughout the world, i.e. coal, many governments have lauded the possibility of
CCS strategies and have counted them as amongst their nations' most accessible strategies for
GHG sequestration from the energy production.
The technology of geologic carbon storage remains unproven and can pose significant
risks to human and ecosystem health. For example, the geologic sequestration of CO2 is
limited in space and time, in that it is highly unlikely that there will be enough ideal space for
storing necessary CO2 over the long-term as many saline aquifers could be saturated/filled in
a matter of a few decades if the burning of coal were to continue at current projected rates.
The issue of suitability of a site poses significant uncertainty in determining, whether under
great pressure, if a cap rock would prove sufficient and that there would be no other pathways
for CO2 to leak from. Long-term studies about the suitability of sties have not been
conducted, and the technology is primarily based on models and maps of possible locations,
not so much on long-term empirical testing.
6

Please note, CCS is a different technology than “clean coal”. There are two generations of clean coal
technology. The first generation of clean coal technology is based on a process where the coal is heated
underpressure at 2000 F, thus allowing for heavier impurities such as sulfur and mercury to be removed,
allowing for a mixture of hydrogen and carbon monoxide (http://www.governing.com/articles/4coal.htm) to
remain. This mixture can then be either burned as directly as a gas or liquefied into a variety of other fuels.
However, these first generation processes do not remove the primary greenhouse gas, namely CO2. While the
process is helpful in reducing SO2 and M, first generation clean coal is not a viable option for addressing the
mitigation of greenhouse gasses, and therefore should not be considered a viable solution to increasing any
nation's energy portfolio moving forward.

107

The primary problem and biggest risk posed by CCS is not necessarily the long-term
suitability and plausibility of the technology, but of basing business-as-usual practices of
burning coal at ever increasing rates on the less-then-certain promise of how much and how
safely CCS can deliver in terms of CO2 mitigation. For a nation like China, which depends
on coal mainly from its own supply for 75% of its energy, CCS will likely seem very
appealing as a way forward in terms of mitigation. However, the Chinese government and
industries would be unjust if they began counting the potentials of CCS already in the plus
column of mitigation strategies.
Biofuels: The second technology path concerns the use of biofuels for use in automotives,
heating, and other forms of power generation. Biofuels are combustible fuels extracted from
feedstocks through a variety of fermentation and extraction processes. Ethanol, methanol,
biodiesel, and methane are the most common forms of biofuels readily available today, and
many are in wide use around the world. Common feedstocks include corn, soybean, palm oil,
sugarcane, pulpy wood fibers, grasses, and discarded foodstuffs.
Biofuels are not all equal in efficiency and output. A recent study conducted by Adler
et al (2007), produced a lifecycle assessment of various crops for use in biofuels production.
The findings suggested that, "compared with the lifecycle of gasoline and diesel, ethanol and
biodiesel from corn rotations reduced GHG emissions by ~40%, reed canarygrass by ~85%,
and switchgrass and hybrid poplar by ~115%." (Adler et. al. 2007) With relatively modest
reductions of GHGs of ~40%, corn again does not seem like the best option, particularly
when compared with the GHG emissions savings of reed canarygrass, switchgrass, or hybrid
poplar. (Schienke 2007)
Beyond obvious choices about energy efficiency, many biofuel feedstocks are coming
under increasing demand, a demand that is directly competing with food prices. Corn is an
excellent example in this case. In North America, corn prices are being driven up by demand
for use in ethanol production in the U.S., a demand that is directly influencing the prices of
corn used for tortillas in Mexico. Poorer populations are being required to pay more for a
basic food staple because U.S. policy is requiring the increased use of ethanol. This could
very easily be the case in China if corn or soybean begins being used as a major feedstock for
ethanol or biodiesel. In addition to competing with food prices, biofuels also present
extensive challenges to land-use policies. This may be a slightly less pressing issue in a
country such as the U.S., but presents tremendous challenges for a country like China with a
vast and dense population. In China, the land use tradeoffs alone for producing biofuel crops
make it a prohibitive option, all except for a few possibilities with cellulosic methanol.
To briefly summarize the ethical issues at stake in considering biofuels production,
principles of distributive justice require that the benefits and burdens of biomass production
be distributed fairly across stakeholders. Distributional consequences of environmental
change are likely to arise in the consideration of how planting of biofuels stock can affect
livelihood changes such as changing access to environmental and ecosystem services, the
disruption of clean water, hunting and fishing grounds, and/or natural scenery. In addition,
consideration will be given to possible impacts on human health brought on by resulting
environmental changes from farming biomass feedstocks, from the location of biomass
processing sites, and from the disposal of wastes generated by biomass processing facilities.
Whereas, principles of procedural justice require the economically and demographically fair
and representative selection of citizens in decision-making processes. For China, the most
ethical and energy efficient approaches to the use of biofuels appear to be in the use of hybrid
poplars and switchgrasses for cellulosic methanol and ethanol, particularly in regions that
require reforestation and planting of grasslands in assisting desert reclamation projects, such
as in Ningxia and in the Gobi. In addition, further development and use of biogas digesters in
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rural areas also seems efficient and just, and should receive further investment from the
government and NGOs.
Issue Eight: Procedural Fairness — What Principles of Procedural Justice Should be
Followed to Assure Fair Representation in Climate Change Decision Making
Both within the nation and in relation to China's engagement on the world stage,
adhering to the principles of procedural justice in climate policy development will require
vigilance. Procedural justice demands the participation of stakeholders, in this case those
stakeholders who will be subject to climate impacts, to have a representative voice in the
decision making process. At the international level, this would likely take multiple forms.
First, China needs to assure the global community that it is fully participating in the IPCC
and post-Kyoto climate regimes. Second, China needs to continue being a leading voice for
the robust participation of developing nations, while at the same time assuring that its size
and scale do not entirely dominate the discourse and procedure for other developing
countries, particularly within the East Asian region, and as China continues to move forward
with investments in Africa. At the national level and below, the nation will need to ensure
that the voices of those being impacted the most will be part of the decision-making process.
However, the current political arrangements does not well support this kind of input from
communities and this will not likely change without further pressure from both the outside
and from the bottom up.
Currently, local participation in China tends to mean participation by men, and men in
positions of authority. This form of participation is not thorough, nor is it representative. The
problem is that it is often assumed that those already in positions of authority, such as local
politicians and administrators, are in a better position to represent the needs of the people, as
opposed to “ordinary” citizens. Decision-making capacity at the local level would likely
improve significantly on the side of implementation, for example if the community
infrastructure of local “Ju Wei Hui” (居委会) was used to gather, observe, and report on key
issues concerning carbon and environmental compliance more generally. In this regard, at
least observational data would be gathered and compiled for further review over the long
term. The retired community would also be useful in gathering data and observing, in that
they would be able to oversee data collection and federation, producing simple environmental
reports that could be compiled over districts, counties, and provinces. Direct action in local
politics may not be the answer for China’s current political structure, but some form of
observation and reporting would be helpful and could easily be based on public participation
and local community involvement.
3. A Multi-Scalar Approach to China's Ethical Obligations to Act on Climate Change.
While directives implemented and followed through at the national level are a necessary and
crucial dimension to fulfilling climate change obligations, the scale of problems in China
presents the situation that an analysis of national directives alone does not get at the deep
complexity and conflict facing the country across multiple scales of governance. Further,
engaging China only at the level of the national government does not ensure the robust
participation of the many levels of governance below it. As briefly described below,
collaborating with China on engaging climate change can and will need to happen across
multiple scales and proper funding and support will need to follow in kind.
As Table 1 attempts to illustrate, the directives and problems for proper climate
mitigation policies are different for different levels of administrative authority, i.e.
governance. In some cases, both ethical directives and policy directives can be in conflict
with directives at other levels of governance and would require ensuring that emissions
“leakage” would not occur through tightening regulation at one level, such as the national or
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provincial level, while leaving bureaucratic gaps at the urban/local level or, especially, at the
small town and village enterprise (TVE) level. For example, it would make much sense that
energy policy at the national level be directed towards the overall reduction of coal fired
power plants with a move towards renewable energy sources, while at the urban/local level
energy the gains are lost through lack of regulation and enforcement of building codes
concerning something as simple as proper and sufficient insulation for heating and cooling of
residential structures.
Each one of the levels of governance in Table 1 represents a place for further
intervention/participation from both the Chinese government and from outside influences.
Of particular import will be the compliance with regulations at the TVE levels, where the
greatest pressure to increase GDP is countered with the strongest expectations to comply with
and adopt cleaner and more efficient solutions. Following closely behind this trend, firms and
industrial facilities are pushing hard to develop a profit in an ever more competitive global
economic setting. The first thing to be sacrificed in such situations is going to be cleaner
production methods and investments into newer facilities. Outside firms operating or
cooperating with local Chinese firms are going to need to be vigilant in demanding that less
carbon intensive production is demonstrated thoroughly and robustly, and that local Chinese
firms are not shifting production to other, less-clean facilities within the country.
Moving forward, dimensions of Chinese carbon governance will need to work
coherently together across scales if contraction and convergence towards a national cap is to
be implemented properly and cohesively, without further exacerbating problems around the
distribution of harms and benefits, particularly to poorer regions.
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Table 1. Ethical issues across scales of governance in China in moving
towards Contraction and Convergence
Scale

Ethical Obligation for China

Policy Goals

Global

Global safe levels met

Ensure participation in and support of global
climate regime and that safe levels of CO2 are
met.

Regional

Assuring fair share with regional
partners, in this case East Asia.

Responsibility to manage regional carbon flux
and industrial outputs between cooperating
nations

National

Ensure nation’s just/fair share of
global
emissions.
Addressing
independent responsibility to act and
bring emissions to fair share.

Ensure compliance at all scales below.
Determining directives for energy sector,
infrastructure, innovation, and technology
transfer.

Intra-regional

Cooperative and procedurally fair
planning across provinces and
ecosystems.
Ensuring
emissions
spillover does not occur.

Emissions balance across regions within China
on
economic
and
ecosystem
based
collaborations,
and
encouragement
of
collaboration between urban regions.

Provincial

Determination of fair share amongst
provinces and ensuring fair share even
if growth is sacrificed.

Ensuring fair
Implementing
Increasing
representation
of authority.

Urban/Regional

Ensuring cost-effective reduction
method and active planning goals
around CO2 reduction.

Planning goals for urban development, antisprawl measures, coherent transportation
networks, inter-urban collaborations.

Urban/Local

Ensuring
on
the
ground
implementation of larger scale
development and fighting unregulated
development. Improvement of local
participation in procedural process.

Strict implementation of planning codes. CO2
reduction in project choice. Support for
choosing
green
buildings.
Controlling
developers. Improving insulation in buildings.

Firms/business

Ensuring firm or business is
complying with CO2 regulation and
that emissions leakage is not
happening internally.

Increasing
CO2
reduction
compliance.
Installing cleaner more energy efficient
technologies. Demanding proof of compliance
with other partner firms. Engaging in robust
technology transfers for efficiency gains.

TVEs

Enforcing cleaner production and
adoption of cleaner technologies.
Ensuring compliance on the ground.

Implementing
clean
development
and
production strategies on the ground. Most
difficult regulatory issues here, and impetus for
business as usual is strongest.

Individual

Reducing personal GHG footprint as
much as possible.

Conscious effort of consumption habits.
Changing personal preferences and habits.
Understanding carbon footprint in every
dimension.
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share even at cost of growth.
provincial level emissions caps.
procedural
capacity
and
of participation of various levels

4. Conclusions
There are multiple conclusions that can be drawn from this brief analysis of ethical issues
facing climate change governance in China. Based on an analysis of the eight main issues
developed in the EDCC whitepaper, the most challenging issues will likely be questions
concerning: 1) China’s responsibility to other nations for damages due to climate change; 2)
the potential for new technologies, investments into cleaner technologies and technological
innovation paths; and 3) ensuring procedural fairness both on the international stage, but also
at the level local of public participation.
Many questions remain. How much should China be funding adaptation and
mitigation costs for other, lesser-developed nations? This is a question that will require
greater investigation and deliberation on the international stage. How much should China
invest in new technologies now versus investing in innovations or in waiting for technology
costs to lower in cost? In terms of procedural fairness and justice, China faces significant
challenges in improving accountability from below and ensuring participation of local
administrators as well as the general public, in some form or another.
Chinese climate governance, in moving towards a contraction and convergence
approach, is going to require a scalar methodology of oversight, resembling something
similar to the approach presented in section three. Ensuring this “climate box” is tightly
sealed will be a necessary and wicked problem for the government, otherwise emissions
leakage will most certainly occur at multiple scales. Further, achieving ethical compliance at
all scales is also going to be necessary to ensure that the distribution of harms and benefits is
not occurring in an unfair or unjust manner. Further, constructive and helpful interventions
from the outside into China ought not be focused only on interfacing with the national level
of governance. Each of these levels (scale) of governance represents an opportunity for
intervention by foreign governments, NGOs, firms, and other significant parties that have an
interest in seeing China contract and converge its emissions to the nation’s fair share of
global emissions. Again, the primary challenge for China itself will be “on the ground”
compliance and accountability of climate strategies and in developing a more robust form of
public participation in ensuring this is the case.
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The Right to Equal Aspirations and The Obligation to be Different, as a Basis for a
Common Future
Olivia Bina1

Abstract
By virtue of its sheer size and growth trajectory, China knows it cannot be ignored. The
question is whether it can offer leadership in terms of greater responsibility, both towards its
own people and the rest of the world. The climate change crisis is the ultimate expression of
unsustainable patterns of growth. Based on this perspective of the climate change debate, I
explore the theme of responsibility as traditionally focused around the need to limit
emissions, but also in terms of the obligation to pursue development aspirations through a
different path. I consider the argument that China’s leadership has an opportunity to embark
on a path that is consistent with the need to secure a ‘common future’, and highlight both the
promise and contradictions of current policy. I conclude by challenging the idea that there is a
significant difference between the position of China’s Government and that of most
developed nations, and suggest that the promise of a new path for development might still be
met if contradictions are finally acknowledged, and experimentation is adopted to pursue
bold alternatives, rather than efficient growth models.

‘All this is happening before our eyes, and yet we act as if we had all the time we want,
and all the solutions…
If you don’t know how to fix it, please stop breaking it…
I am only a child and yet I know we are all part of a family, 5 billion strong, in fact 30 million
species strong and borders and governments will never change that….
we are all in this together and should act as one single world, towards one single goal…
even when we have more than enough we are afraid to share,
we are afraid to let go of some of our wealth…
Severn Suzuki speaking at UN Earth Summit 1992

In 1992, as representatives of state met in Rio de Janeiro for the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, the world had enough evidence to know that
growth was taking its toll on the planet, and that its benefits were very unevenly distributed.
It also knew that dependence on fossil fuels to deliver most of those unevenly distributed
benefits (registered as annual GDP growth) was resulting in dangerous concentrations of
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Even children knew it (Suzuki 1992: xvii).
Fast-forward almost two decades and little has changed. A staggering amount of
information, reports, renewed commitments and a regularly rediscovered urgency with which
the ‘crises’ ought to be addressed, characterised the 1990s and the first decade of this
millennium like a relentless, yet muffled, beat. Climate change is emblematic of the extent of
our impact, the urgency for a response and the seemingly endless postponement of action.
Although it is but the final symptom of a long chain of effects (MEA 2005) caused by
humanity’s ‘continuing transformation of the earth’ (Schellnhuber et al. 2005: 13) in its
1
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pursuit of prosperity, climate change stands out as the issue that best illustrates our
interdependence, not just between nations but with all species and habitats on whose services
we ‘fundamentally depend’ (MEA 2005: v). It is not the quintessentially global dimension of
this crisis that has focused the minds of heads of state over the last few years, but rather, its
implications given our interdependence: a characteristic of the earth system that globalisation
has exacerbated into an economic and social dimension, as well as an ecological reality.
Against this backdrop, China has rapidly taken centre stage, at once as ‘victim’ of
historical transformation and pollution of the biosphere by developed nations, and
‘perpetrator’ – as it steals the title of ‘first polluter’ from the richest country in the world
(Bina and Soromenho-Marques 2008). By virtue of its sheer size and growth trajectory,
China appears to have focused the minds of leaders across the world on the physical limits of
our planet and the challenge of having to share its common resources with a growing
population, in ways that Limits to Growth, Our Common Future, Agenda 21 and the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment have frustratingly failed to do (Meadows et al. 1972 ;
WCED 1987 ; UNCED 1992 ; MEA 2005). Economic growth and the environment have
never looked quite so in conflict as in the case of China. The contribution of this growth to
climate change is raising alarm inside and beyond the country’s borders, precisely as a result
of the ecological interdependence so strenuously ignored thanks to the successful separation
of the world of economics from the biosphere.
The climate change crisis is the ultimate expression of unsustainable patterns of
growth. The tension surrounding climate change negotiations is therefore inextricably linked
to the fundamental unresolved question of how to reconcile an increasingly widespread
pursuit of growth with the finite nature of our planet. 2 Based on this perspective of the
climate change debate, I explore the theme of responsibility as traditionally focused around
the need to limit emissions, but also in terms of the obligation to pursue development
aspirations through a different path. I consider the argument that China’s leadership has an
opportunity to embark on a path that is consistent with the need to secure a ‘common future’,
and highlight both the promise and contradictions of current policy. On balance, evidence
suggests that this opportunity is still to be taken, while there is a risk of falling into
undifferentiated irresponsibility for all parties. I conclude by challenging the idea that there is
a significant difference between the position of China’s Government and that of most
developed nations, and suggest that the promise of a new path for development might still be
met if contradictions are finally acknowledged, and experimentation is adopted to pursue
bold alternatives, rather than efficient growth models.
Framing The Issue of Responsibility
The Chinese Government does not deny the science or the importance of the climate change
crisis (NDRC 2007b). Ambassador Yu Qingtai (2008), China's Special Representative for
Climate Change Talks, acknowledges that climate change ‘affects not only the development
of the global economy and prosperity, but also the very existence of mankind’, and confirms
that his Government actively supports ‘the leadership role played by the United Nations in
responding to climate change’. Within this international framework of negotiations three
points seem crucial (Yu Qingtai 2008): 1) the centrality of UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) ‘fundamental principle of Common But Differentiated
Responsibilities’ as the ‘very foundation for international cooperation’; 2) ‘the concerns by
the developing countries over adaptation, technology transfer and financial resources should
2

The use of energy is illustrative. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA 2007) China accounted
for four fifths of the growth of industrial production and carbon dioxide emissions during the past 25 years. It
predicts that between 2004-2030 China and India will account for approximately 75 percent of global coal
demand and 35 percent of oil demand, and for 35 percent of global power generation capacity.
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be addressed in real earnest’; and 3) ‘the effectiveness of participation by the developing
countries [to the international effort] will, to a significant extent, depend on whether the
developed countries will take substantive actions on financial and technological assistance…
and capacity building, to facilitate their achievement of sustainable development’ (emphasis
added). Together, these three points define the strengths as well as the contradictions in the
approach of China’s leadership to responsibility.
The first reference to common but differentiated responsibilities refers to the need to
limit emissions and is central to the debate and impasse in the negotiations. While this is not
the interpretation of responsibility used in this paper, it is the starting point for the argument
whereby responsibility ought to relate to how development is conceived rather than to how to
responsibly clean up after development, or at least after a certain level has been achieved.3
Amongst the arguments used by the Chinese Government to resist adopting emission targets
is an appeal to the concept of historical responsibility. Quite apart from the intrinsic
weaknesses of the concept (Miller 2008), reference to the presumed irresponsibility of
England, Germany and the USA (followed by the rest of the developed nations), seems
hardly a justification for the Government’s insistence it can focus on improving efficiency
rather than limiting total emissions. The richest 20 percent of the world uses over 75 percent
of global resources and emits 51 percent of carbon dioxide to maintain its way of life: 4
undoubtedly, developed nations contributed to a significant part of current concentrations of
greenhouse gases in their quest for development, and while the benefits (development and
lifestyle) are confined to political borders, the price of those benefits is being shared by
humanity as a whole. Developing countries see the current crisis as the price for the
development path chosen by rich countries to reach current levels of wealth. The price in
terms of impacts affects all forms of life (but especially those in developing countries: UNDP
2007), the benefits have instead remained carefully contained within political boundaries.
The perceived injustice explains the appeal to notions of responsibility: responsibility in
relation to choices of development paths, which however cannot be raised against past
choices without implying that current and future development paths ought to avoid
irresponsible choices. This has important implications for the choice of China’s leaders.
The pressure on China’s Government is rising as it attained the dubious honour of
‘first polluter’ for energy-related carbon dioxide emissions in 2006 (Levine and Aden 2008).
Its response has been to counter charges of environmental irresponsibility by reframing the
climate debate as a problem of ‘development’, essentially appealing to the right to develop
(NDRC 2007b). 5 In the words of President Hu Jintao: ‘climate change is ultimately a
development issue and it can only be addressed in the course of sustainable development’
(cited in Feng Qinghu 2007). Accordingly, China’s leaders take every opportunity to remind
the rest of the world that they must still battle with poverty reduction and that in per capita
terms, the country’s energy, emissions and overall resource consumption levels are well
below the average for developed nations (see for example: CCICED and WWF 2008). They
also point out that the ‘ownership’ of those emissions, and related responsibility, is a matter
3

In the case of China, as I go on to show, this level is likely to be the moderately prosperous society of
approximately USD 4000 per capita.
4
This figure represents million metric tons of CO2 emitted by all ‘high income countries’ in 2003; the figure for
all ‘developed countries’ is 61 percent (data source: IEA in EarthTrends (http://earthtrends.wri.org) Searchable
Database Results, accessed: 9/6/09).
5
The right is rooted in the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations (United Nations 1945: preamble)
promoting ‘social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom’. During the last 75 years the number of
commitments to this right have multiplied, and its articulations have explored the link with nature (United
Nations Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm 1972) and subsequently found expression in the notion
of human development by Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen, popularised by the United Nations Human
Development Reports (UNDP 2007).
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for discussion, since approximately 33 percent of China’s domestic carbon dioxide emissions
were due to production for export in 2005 (Weber et al. 2008).
The link between the risk of climate change and development is indeed at the heart of
the problem, and the binding factor is energy. The use of energy plays a major part in shaping
the interaction between the various parts of human society and the rest of the ecosystem.
Societies grow in size and complexity thanks to ever increasing use of energy, and to date 80
percent of the world’s primary sources are fossil fuels (Evans 2007). Development depends
on energy, all the more so in a country that has grown at an average of 9-9.5 percent over five
decades, primarily thanks to industrialisation and, since 2002, heavy and energy intensive
industries. Even if all the efforts to promote a clean(er) and more efficient use of energy were
to bear their fruits (NDRC 2007b ; NDRC 2007a), the main source of energy will remain coal
for decades to come (IEA 2007). This, combined with the growth projections for China, is
bound to wipe out most benefits. By linking its right to develop with the need to remain free
of any binding commitments (emission reduction targets), the Government is effectively
expecting to take its turn on the irresponsible path. The same path tread by Euro/American
societies. Is the appeal to historical responsibility combined with the right to pursue
development the equivalent of wanting to extend a right to irresponsibility for all nations,
albeit at different times in history? The Government aims for persistently high rates of growth
until it reaches a moderately prosperous society is not only justified on grounds of poverty
reduction, but also as a way of legitimizing the ruling Party and maintaining social stability:
‘[t]aking economic development as the central task is vital to invigorating our nation and
is the fundamental requirement for the robust growth and lasting stability of the Party and
the nation’ (Hu Jintao 2007).
Since the reform era began, China’s remarkable growth has meant an equally
remarkable – though less admirable – increase of its ecological deficit. Since the mid-1970s it
has been demanding more capacity than its own ecosystems could provide, and is now
requiring ‘the equivalent of two Chinas' worth of biocapacity (CCICED and WWF 2008: 13).
Given the record of environmental pollution linked to its development, which is affecting the
lives of its people as well as contributing to the climate change crisis (Liu Jianguo and
Diamond 2005 ; Pan Yue and Zhou Jigang 2006), the leadership’s appeal to notions of
historical responsibility could result in denial of the whole concept of responsibility, both
within and beyond its country’s borders.
Ambassador Yu Qingtai’s (2008) message contained two further points that complete
the link between (ir)responsibility, pollution and development. There is a lot that developed
nations ought to do, and offer – funds and technology – to enable developing countries to
catch up in the general rush to ‘develop’ before the latter is willing to engage in greater levels
of responsibility. This is even more true about engaging with undifferentiated levels of
responsibility, which would result from calls to reduce the responsibility gap between
‘developed’ and ‘developing’ nations that achieved high levels of growth since the categories
were adopted in the Kyoto Protocol.6 The general failure to comply with commitments and
promises by rich nations within the context of the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent
negotiations has been noted: ‘It is a pity that developed countries have shown insufficient
sincerity and made inadequate efforts to fulfil… obligations’ in terms of financial resources

6

China’s representatives reveal an uncompromising stance on this issue, as it allows them to maintain
differentiated, low, levels of responsibility, but also to claim a higher moral ground by depicting their efforts as
significant: ‘China is making huge efforts to combat climate change despite the fact that it remains a lowincome developing county’ (Xie Zhenhua 2009). For an interesting discussion see (Hu Angang 2009).
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and transfer of technology (Feng Qinghu 2007), and implicitly used by developing nations to
support their claims.
The weakness of developed nations’ commitments and implementation record reveals
a failure to grasp the significance of the challenge posed by their development model. This is
not surprising: climate change is but the final symptom of a long chain of effects whose
science was far less controversial, but which still await the political will needed to address
them effectively (Jordan and Lenschow 2008 ; MEA 2005). Nevertheless, neither
controversial definitions of ‘developing country’, nor failure to deliver by developed ones can
justify the pursuit of undifferentiated irresponsibility. Such path would contradict the Chinese
Government’s message to the world (NDRC 2007b), exemplified by the recent article in The
Guardian signed by Xie Zhenhua, ٛ Hu Jintao’s special representative on climate change:
‘With a deep sense of responsibility for its own people and the entire human race, China
will continue to implement proactive policies and measures to address climate change and
make unremitting efforts to protect Earth’ (Xie Zhenhua 2009).
Opportunity and Expectation: A Promised New Path
How can one reconcile a claim to differentiated, essentially limited, responsibility with the
proclaimed objective to achieve ‘sustainable development’ and ‘protect Earth’? The Chinese
Government claims it wants to pursue a new development path that would make it
responsible to its people by improving the state of the environment at home, and to humanity
as a whole by improving the efficiency with which it uses energy and other resources
(Xinhua 2006). It is this promise, encapsulated in the political programme of ‘scientific
outlook on development’ (kexue fazhan guan) and ‘ecological civilization’ (shengtai
wenming) that suggests China’s rise might be an opportunity for its people and for a common
future. The pursuit of a new path acknowledges that economic growth is being ‘realized at an
excessively high cost of resources and the environment’ (Hu Jintao 2007). The cost,
depending on whose calculation is considered, varies between two and twenty percent of
China’s GDP (China Daily 2006 ; Liu Jianguo and Diamond 2005). As a result, the Economic
Work Conference of the Communist Party Leadership of 2006 marked a departure from the
uncompromising pursuit of rapid growth that has characterised the last five decades,
concluding that the country must ‘re-engineer the economy’ and search for ‘a new growth
pattern that is energy-saving, environmentally friendly and sustainable’ (Xinhua 2006). A
year later, the change was enshrined in Hu Jintao’s Report to the Seventeenth National
Congress of the Communist Party of China, as ‘scientific outlook on development’ (Hu Jintao
2007).
The program for a scientific outlook on development encompasses a range of ideas on
and around the sustainability of development. It emphasizes the pursuit of ‘a better life and
sound ecological and environmental conditions’ and embraces principles of efficiency,
resource (primarily energy) saving and decoupling – all of which occupy a special place in
driving the modernization of the State (Yao Runming et al. 2005). It is also seen as a driver
for the new, people-oriented, more compassionate, direction of China’s development that
responds to increasing social disparity (Liu Guoli 2007). However, to date this new path is
primarily one based on technological fixes: improved efficiency as the principal delivery
mechanism of ‘a resource-conserving and environment-friendly society’ (Hu Jintao 2007),
which has found expression in concepts of circular economy (reduce, reuse, recycle) (Jin
Yong 2008 ; NDRC 2007a). It is efficiency and the pursuit of a circular economy that will
enable a quadrupling of GDP by 2020 while ensuring ‘sound ecological and environmental
conditions’ (Hu Jintao 2007). And the current stimulus package of 400 trillion RMB is
testament to this focus. Several investments within the 10 Point Plan include an energy
efficiency element; 210 billion RMB are specifically earmarked for energy and the
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environment, for example for upgrading refineries (World Bank 2009).7 In a country with
twenty percent of the world population, and seven percent of the world’s land and water,
efficiency in the use of resources makes eminent sense, and the significant role of heavy and
energy intensive industry over the last decade has meant that a reduction of energy intensity
by 20 percent per unit of GDP by 2010 (against 2005 levels) is now a national priority
(NDRC 2007a). Similarly, great effort and resources are being devoted to the more efficient
use of scarce land, especially agricultural land, and water. Beyond the generic statements of
intention there is a very significant body of practical and administrative measures that,
especially since the approval of the 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010), have been attempting to
balance the pursuit of economic growth with greater attention for the needs of the
environment and of the less fortunate sections of China’s rural society more closely in contact
with the devastating effects of the former (NDRC 2007a ; Pan Yue and Zhou Jigang 2006 ;
Song Guojun et al. 2008).
Ecological civilisation was officially introduced together with scientific development
at the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Although official
discourse refers to both the scientific outlook on development and ecological civilisation,
often with no clear distinction,8 it is suggested here that the scientific outlook and ecological
civilisation are not two dimensions of the Government’s promised new path, but rather the
former might be usefully considered as the means to the latter. The means focuses on
efficiency, the end questions the development paradigm and aspires to a new era for humanity.
Ecological civilisation represents a wider mission statement in response to the ecological
crisis that is affecting the country. An acknowledgement of the need to rethink traditional
models of growth in a country with limited biocapacity and limited options to export waste
and pollution beyond its borders. The idea is to provide a cultural basis from which to
transcend industrial civilisation and capitalism, advocating the pursuit of material and
spiritual wealth through an ecological harmony rooted in traditional Chinese cultural ethics
that recognises value in both man and nature (Beijing Review 2006). In the words of Pan Yue
(2004? : 47-56) it represents a ‘historical mission’ for China to promote an ‘advanced culture’
that recognises Man as ‘inseparable from other forms of life in nature’ and which can only
coexist through mutual restraint:
‘all advanced cultures exist in nature… Man has the right… to enjoy material lives and
seek freedom and happiness. However, such rights must be limited by the scale and
environmental capacity’.
This interpretation is in line with the idea of interdependence and necessary limits introduced
in the late 1960s and rediscovered with renewed urgency ever since. It reflects the
leadership’s concern with ‘the future of global civilization’ given global constraints as well as
global ecological problems epitomised by dangerous climate change (Ma Jun 2007).
Ecological civilisation subscribes to the idea proposed here, that the right to human
development aspirations must be accompanied with the obligation to pursue a different
development path. This is of course true for China as it is for the rest of the world, since
limits and restraint can only make sense when national perspectives are transcended and
consideration is given to the Earth system (I return to this in the conclusions).
Chinese official discourse on the need for a new development path has thus witnessed
7

It is worth noting that the updated version of the plan (from November 2008 to March 2009) has witnessed a
significant contraction of the amount devoted to ‘sustainable environment’ in favour of ‘technology and
industry’ and ‘housing’ (The Economist 2009).
8
Government representatives like Jia Zhibang (2009), director of the State Forestry Administration, links the
scientific outlook of development with ecological civilisation and the need to ‘protect[…] global ecological
security and sustain[…] human culture’ acknowledging climate change as ‘a prominent threat to the progress of
civilization’.
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interesting developments since the Sixteenth National Congress of the Party. It suggests the
Government intends to take a responsible approach both towards its people and towards the
rest of the planet, which represents an opportunity to avoid dangerous climate change.
Whether such opportunity materialises will depend on the further articulation of both the
means (scientific outlook on development) and the end (ecological civilisation), as well as the
capacity of Government to deliver on its promises. It is worth noting that the promise has
been matched by expectations across the world. Internationally renowned scholars –
including Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph Stiglitz, and commentators – including Sir Crispin Tickell,
Lester Brown and Jonathon Porritt, have in recent years expressed the hope that China might
lead the world to a new era of sustainable development. China as ‘a relatively late comer to
the industrial world… has the opportunity to leapfrog over the mistakes of others’ (Tickell
2007), technology will play a crucial part in delivering more sustainable development (Brown
2006; Sachs 2007a), and there is ‘no reason why China shouldn’t become the world’s number
one nation in terms of eco-efficiency’, according to Porritt – who defines the situation in
China as ‘an ecological apocalypse’ (Green Futures 2006:3).
It seems there is almost ‘a desire for hope’ that makes most commentators tread the
uneasy path between hope and despair, as if afraid to contemplate the wider consequences of
China’s possible demise (Bina 2007). A substantial part of this hope is supported by faith in
technology and efficiency gains as the foundations of a sustainable future. This faith is shared
by the developing discourse of scientific outlook on development, and related circular
economy. However, based on the Chinese Government’s current policies and funding
priorities, a number of contradictions can be identified, which suggest that the solutions
devised by the scientific development programme (the means) may not lead to the radical
changes needed to shift to the new development paradigm of ecological civilization (the end).
The result could be a failure to address the underlying causes of China’s environmental crisis,
and to contribute to avert dangerous climate change.
The Contradiction in The Promise
Considering the most recent policies, economic plans and funding priorities from the angle of
the promise of greater harmony seems to have been left behind, and the opportunity for
containing the risk of dangerous climate change that might have come from a new path may
be significantly weaker than expected.
The primary contradiction is perhaps the simplest and one which remains unresolved
in many parts of the world, not only in China: that between environmental protection and
development. Sustainable development has only contributed to muffle rather than solve this
tension, and it seems that the Chinese concepts of scientific outlook on development and
ecological civilisation might be heading in the same direction, judging from the content of the
more recent public plans explicitly designed under the auspices of such concepts. While Hu
Jintao's speech delivered at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia annual
conference (Boao, Hainan, 12 April 2008) suggests there is still a desire to ‘explore and
improve our development path and model in keeping with China's national conditions’, he
also confirms a ‘commit[ment] to promoting the sustained and steady growth of the world
economy’ (Hu Jintao 2008). The contradiction between improving the quality of development
and the need for rapid growth persists. The Government advocates ‘sound and rapid
economic growth’ though the quadrupling of per capita GDP of the year 2000 by 2020, and
expects this growth to deliver ‘balanced development’ by ‘reducing consumption of resources
and protecting the environment’ (Hu Jintao 2007). China’s 11th Five Year Plan is meant to
promote this balanced outcome, yet a mid-term evaluation suggests it has failed to live up to
the promise: ‘insufficient progress on macroeconomic rebalancing and changing the
economic and industrial structure has [meant] limited progress on energy and water intensity,
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and environmental quality’ (World Bank 2008: 11).9 The development path remains inspired
by a traditional model of industrial growth and a market economy that depends on global
exports. The plans for the forthcoming 12th Five Year Plan suggest little change is to be
expected until well into 2020. The environmental chapter of the national plan is being drafted
not in order to address the ecological crisis, but rather to support the imperatives of economic
growth and social stability through the achievement of a moderately prosperous society by
2020. 10 Initial proposals suggest that ‘the pre-ordained economic development model
determines environmental progress’ and that until 2020 China can expect the relationship
between economy and the environment to be in ‘contradiction’ and only ‘preliminarily
harmonious’ by 2030 (China Environmental Law 2009). Once again, the model seems
unlikely to change in any significant way. The implementation of the much-praised ‘green’
stimulus package of 400 trillion RMB is also revealing its contradictions as environment and
social concerns are sidelined in favour of economic priorities, mainly expressed in terms of
infrastructure investment (The Economist 2009 ; Tan Yingzi 2009). In the words of Zhou
Shengxian, Environment Minister: ‘environmental protection [is] not being highlighted in the
overall plan’ and recent reviews show a relaxation of the already bland implementation of
pollution controls, and new environmental problems arising from many of the industrial plans
in the Centre and West regions (Li Jing 2009).
The overall approach that transpires from the last decade of planned economic growth
suggests that China’s leaders are waiting for the environmental Kuznets Curve to reach the
theoretical point of industrialisation and per capita income after which pollution levels begin
to drop. Quite apart from the critiques of the curve’s assumptions (Caviglia-Harris et al.
2009), this mode offers nothing that can be defined as a new, more responsible, path of
development. Instead, the brief overview of high profile plans suggests business as usual for
at least a few decades to come.
Given the efforts by the Government to redefine China’s path to development, these
results might seem surprising, were it not for a deeper contradiction within the overall
promise: a contradiction between the ultimate need for restraint, intrinsic to ecological
civilization (the end) and the unquestioned pursuit of growth, albeit efficient growth, central
to the programme for a scientific outlook on development (the means). The latter is arguably
aimed at ‘putting people first’ (Hu Jintao 2007), but its foundations in greater efficiency of
resource use, primarily energy resources, seem to have sidelined the social dimension and the
need to work within the country’s biocapacity limits. It is because of the efficiency
credentials that the scientific outlook is being considered a contribution towards climate
change policies (NDRC 2007b). This appeal, almost fascination, with the potential of
efficiency to deliver sustainable development can be linked to a desire to rationalise, control
and shape nature (uprooting forests, redirecting rivers) which has characterised China’s

9

The analysis explains how the country’s capital-intensive, industry-led pattern of growth continues to be a key
driver of economic and social imbalances: ‘First, the capital-intensive, industry-led growth had been particularly
intensive in energy, natural resources, and environmental degradation, thus accentuating the associated
imbalances noted above. While energy and natural resource intensity was declining in several sectors, the
relatively rapid growth of industry increased the weight in GDP of the most energy and resource intensive
sectors. Second, capital-intensive growth created fewer jobs than a services-led growth pattern, limiting the
absorption of surplus agricultural labor and contributing to the rising rural-urban income inequality and rural
poverty’ (World Bank 2008: 3).
10
The four key stages of economic growth were summarised thus by Wu Shunze, Deputy Director General of
the China Academy of Environmental Planning: 1) industrialisation to be completed by 2030, 2) peak in the use
of resources and energy between 2020-2030, 3) modernisation, including growth of the service industries and a
reduction of pressure on the environment, to be attained between 2030-2050, and 4) mature urbanisation, highincome status and largest world economy by 2050 (China Environmental Law 2009).
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leaders for millennia (Elvin 2004).11 However, it seems to ignore a fundamental weakness:
the inefficiency of China’s industry is well known and certainly will benefit from greater
efficiencies, but historical evidence shows that higher efficiency of energy conversion leads
eventually to higher, rather than lower, energy use, ultimately negating the initial benefits
(Smil 2005). 12 This is especially true for a country that is planning rapid and sustained
economic growth, as well as unprecedented urbanisation by 2050. There is therefore a second
contradiction in the promise of China’s leaders: it can be expressed as faith in efficient
growth.
In spite of the rhetoric invoking a different – responsible – development path, there is
enough evidence to suggest that the leadership is pursuing the same path and committing the
same mistakes that today’s richest countries experienced. Both sides seek to mediate their
responsibilities towards emission reductions through the seemingly unquestionable right to
growth and to the pursuit of ever-higher standards of living. The result is likely to be one
more step towards undifferentiated irresponsibilities. Efficiency per se ensures no harmony
between man and nature. It acknowledges their interdependence, but without reference to
limits and the need for restraint, it cannot lead to lasting harmony. This is of course the
problem with the ‘limited’ responsibility at the heart of the Government’s position in the
climate change negotiations. Many of the arguments explored above will support limited
responsibility on the grounds of equity. In practice however, the Chinese Government is
confronted with the simple fact that by virtue of having the largest population in the world,
and being one of its largest economies, it is also one of the largest and fastest growing
pressures on the planet. Being a responsible player both at home and abroad will take more
than efficient growth, and the shortcomings of recent plans confirm this.
Embracing Contradictions: The Obligation To Be Different
The analysis of the contradictions and limitations of current proposals echoes with that of
O’Riordan (1983) who reminds us that contradictions lie at the heart of modern
environmentalism. Environmentalism has its origin in divergent ideological modes of
interpreting the environmental question: the ecocentric mode that assumes a natural order that
man has the power to disturb, potentially leading to the destruction of the biosphere, and the
technocentric mode that focuses on rational, value-free scientific managerial techniques to
shape the natural environment and man’s destiny (O'Riordan 1983). The first mode is
concerned with ‘ends’, and the moral and spiritual dimension of choices, while the latter is
primarily interested in the potential of science to develop the necessary ‘means’ of human
progress. In many ways, technocentrism has succeeded in defining both the problem (be it
climate change or development) and the solution (efficient growth, green economy).
Ecocentrism instead struggled to translate generic consensual objectives into concrete
policies and actions. The nature of the divide between ecocentrism and technocentrism
echoes that between the idea of ecological civilisation and scientific outlook on development
(although the former is not to be equated to econcentrism). If the Chinese leadership is to live
up to its promise, and to the hope and growing expectations that it has contributed to create
around the world, it will have to address the contradictions of its scientific outlook on
11

The relationship with nature is also characterised by contradiction, as successive governments sought to
control key resources for political and military reasons, all the while demonstrating a remarkable sensitivity and
respect for nature’s beauty and spiritual dimension: ‘classical Chinese culture was as hostile to forests as it was
fond of individual trees’ (Elvin 2004: xvii; see also: Beijing Review 2006).
12
The emphasis on energy efficiency so as to “produce more with less”, has well known limits and even risks,
as well as obvious immediate and short term benefits. The Jevons Paradox and the Khazzoom-Brookes postulate
warn of rebound effects whereby savings accruing from more efficient use of energy lead to lower prices and
eventually lead to increased consumption (see for example: HoL 2005 ; York 2006 ; Smil 2005).
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development and invest greater energy in defining more clearly the nature of an ecological
civilisation – its end, before choosing the means to achieve it. Taking responsible action to
avert dangerous climate change will require much more bold proposals than those tabled to
date, which subscribe more to a responsibility for cleaning up after development, than for
redefining development in ways that openly addresses the limits we face.
As Harvey (1996) notes, globalisation is characterized by a time-space compression,
and the turn of the century has been marked by a renewed awareness of the Earth as a closed
system, with clear limits in terms of capacity and resources. These limits are made more
tangible thanks to the projected population growth in China, India and Africa, and the sheer
impossibility of extending the current lifestyle of rich countries to the ‘newcomers’ (for a
detailed discussion, see: Brown 2006). The Chinese leadership seems fully aware of this:
‘I cannot accept the argument that I, as a Chinese, am only entitled legally to one quarter
of what you are entitled to…But… being equal to an American when it comes to per
capita emissions would be a nightmare for the Chinese’ (Ambassador Yu Qingtai cited in:
Heilprin 2008).
Responsibility must therefore include limits and mutual restraint for the benefit of the
commons and thus, our common future. This is true for China’s representatives as for those
of all countries. Indeed, a question inevitably arises from this analysis: can any country be
reasonably expected to define a new development path in an interdependent and globalised
world? Given the current state of the global commons and the implications for dangerous
climate change, the time for limited responsibility, whether by developed or developing
countries – no matter how poor, seems to be over, and a new development path may have to
be a global obligation.
The acknowledgement and analysis of contradiction is a distinctive characteristic of
Chinese political thought, as much as experimentation is a unique trait derived from its
revolutionary past (Dirlik forthcoming). Perhaps the greatest contribution from China
towards finding a solution to the multiple crises the world is facing could be to place on the
global agenda the contradiction between environment and development that is the legacy of
Euro/American capitalism, forcing heads of state across the world to acknowledge what they
must surely already know: that ‘win-win’ situations are rare and their pursuit is encouraged
only thanks to the vagueness of sustainable development concepts. The climate change crisis
is the ultimate expression of such contradiction. Chinese leaders have an opportunity to show
a different path, living up to the promise of an ecological civilisation that is not simply a
rehearsal of technocentric beliefs and efficiency-driven solutions. There is a need for
radically different ways of thinking about the medium term – for long-term is now a luxury of
the past if the conclusions of the IPCC are to be taken at face value, and a need to experiment
now with models that will have to be in place in a matter of decades, not centuries. Only if
world leaders are prepared to see the contradiction inherent in simple numbers, such as the
energy figures from the International Energy Agency, will they take steps towards addressing
– rather than discussing – the dangers linked to climate change. Only then will they show the
long awaited responsibility and leadership they owe to our common future, averting the
decline and fall into a pattern of undifferentiated irresponsibility.
In the words of a twelve year-old:
‘do not forget why you are attending these conferences, who you are doing this for.
We are your own children, you are deciding what kind of world we are growing up in…
I challenge you, please make your actions reflect your words’.
Severn Suzuki speaking at UN Earth Summit 1992
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Climate Duties, Human Rights and Historic Emissions
Derek Bell1
Abstract
The problem of global climate change cannot be resolved without the cooperation of both
China and the USA. However, neither government appears close to signing up to mandatory
emissions reductions. Both nations defend their climate policies by appealing to ideas of
fairness, equity and justice. This paper outlines the arguments offered by Chinese opponents
of mandatory emissions reductions, highlighting three central claims about historical
responsibility, ability to pay and the right to development. The first part of the paper
examines these claims, the arguments supporting them, the relationships among them and
their implications for a just global climate regime. Two different interpretations are
suggested – the ‘overlapping consensus’ account and the ‘hybrid’ account. It is argued that
only the hybrid account offers a coherent ethical position. The second part of the paper
critically examines the hybrid account of global climate justice. On this account, the
historical responsibility claim appears central to the Chinese argument that the West should
pay the costs of tackling climate change. Several arguments against the historical
responsibility claim are considered and detailed attention is paid to the argument from
excusable ignorance, which suggests that the West should not be held responsible for those
emissions generated before the risks of anthropogenic climate change were widely
recognised. It is argued that many of the common replies to the argument from excusable
ignorance are not convincing. However, a new (but limited) reply, which draws on the link
between basic human rights and energy use, is proposed. The final part of the paper shows
how the new reply requires a re-formulation of the hybrid account. The paper concludes by
considering the implications of this new account for a just global climate regime and, in
particular, China’s duties to contribute to it.

In 2007 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) declared that:
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of
increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow
and ice and rising global average sea level (IPCC 2007: 30).
Global climate change has already happened. The IPCC has also become increasingly
confident about the causes of climate change:
Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th
century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG [greenhouse
gas] concentrations (IPCC 2007: 39; original emphasis).
The IPCC defines an outcome that is ‘very likely’ as one that has an ‘assessed
probability of occurrence’ of more than 90% (IPCC 2007: 27). There is greater than 90%
probability that humans have caused global warming. The IPCC predict that:
Continued GHG emissions at or above current rates would cause further warming and
induce many changes in the global climate system during the 21st century that would
very likely be larger than those observed during the 20th century (IPCC 2007: 45).
1
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If we continue with a business-as-usual emissions policy, we are ‘likely’ (=more than
66% probability of occurrence) to see global average temperature rises in the range of 1.7 –
6.4°C by the end of the 21st century (IPCC 2007: 45). The IPCC project that this will have
significant impacts on ecosystems and on humans. It is, for example, ‘likely’ that the
‘resilience of many ecosystems … [will] be exceeded this century’ (IPCC 2007: 48).
Similarly, there is ‘high confidence’ (= 8 out of 10 chance) that:
The health status of millions of people is projected to be affected through, for
example, increases in malnutrition; increased deaths, diseases and injury due to
extreme weather events; increased burden of diarrhoeal diseases; … and the altered
spatial distribution of some infectious diseases (IPCC 2007: 48).
We can expect that climate change will cause many people to die from malnutrition,
extreme weather events (including flooding, heat waves, wildfires and hurricanes), diarrhoeal
diseases, infectious diseases and lack of water. We can expect that the lives of billions of
other people will be seriously negatively affected by climate change. In short, human
emissions of GHGs will cause (and have already caused2) harm to other humans.
This has led some activists and philosophers to argue that we should conceive of
climate change as a human rights issue: we violate human rights by emitting greenhouse
gases. This contrasts sharply with the dominant cost-benefit analysis approach to assessing
how we should respond to climate change, which is used by economists. On the human
rights approach, we do not try to calculate the economic costs of death, injury, malnutrition,
water-stress or illness and then weigh them against the opportunity costs of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions.3 Instead, we recognise human rights to life, physical security,
subsistence and health that should be protected from violation by human action. If
anthropogenic climate change threatens to violate these basic rights, each one of us has (at
least) a duty to pay his or her fair share of the costs of preventing anthropogenic climate
change.
The major problem for any theory of climate justice is to determine how the costs of
preventing anthropogenic climate change should be shared. What is a fair allocation of the
costs of preventing the harms of anthropogenic climate change? The Chinese Government,
like many others in the global South, has consistently argued that the global North should pay
the costs of climate change because they have caused the problem. It is the global North’s
historic greenhouse gas emissions that have caused anthropogenic climate change, therefore,
the global North should pay the costs of protecting people from the harmful effects of
anthropogenic climate change. The aim of this paper is to consider the role that historic
emissions should have in a theory of global climate justice. More specifically, I aim to
outline a distinctive approach to global climate justice – which is grounded in basic human
rights – and to consider the role that historic emissions should have in the proposed theory.
In section one, I offer a brief defence of the claim that anthropogenic climate change
violates basic human rights. In section two, I consider Onora O’Neill’s well-known objection
to rights-based theories of justice, namely, that they do not tell us how to allocate the
correlative duties. I consider a response to this objection and I distinguish three kinds of duty
that should be included in a full theory of climate duties. In the remaining sections of the
paper, I consider these three kinds of duty in more detail and in relation to historic emissions.
In section three, I consider (what I call) the ‘general climate duty’, namely, the duty to
promote effective institutions for the fair specification and allocation of particular climate
2
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duties. More specifically, I consider when this duty might have been first acquired by
citizens and states in the global North. In section four, I consider principles for specifying
and allocating climate duties under just (fair and effective) institutions. In particular, I
consider the claim that the global North should be held responsible for historic emissions
because its citizens have exceeded their equal per capita share of emission rights. In section
five, I outline an account of the duties of rectification that anyone who fails (or has failed) to
comply with the general climate duty should incur and I suggest that this has important
implications for how we think about arguments from historic responsibility. Section six
summarises the arguments of the paper.
1. Basic Human Rights
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has highlighted the
impact of climate change on human rights:
Global warming could result in hundreds of millions of people suffering from hunger,
malnutrition, water shortages, floods, droughts, heat stress, diseases triggered by
extreme weather events, loss of livelihood, and permanent displacement. Indeed,
climate change poses a direct threat to a wide range of universally recognized
fundamental rights, such as the rights to life, food, adequate housing, health and water
(United Nations 2007).
The suggestion is that climate change is a ‘direct threat’ to some of the most basic
human rights.
Similar arguments have been made by political philosophers writing on climate
change. For example, Henry Shue has argued that there is a human right to ‘physical
security’ and that this right is threatened by anthropogenic climate change (1999, p. 39).
Simon Caney has identified several human rights that are threatened by climate change,
including the right to life, the right to health, and the right to subsistence (Caney 2009).4
Caney has also argued, in other papers, that there is a human right ‘not to be exposed to
dangerous climate change’ (Caney 2008, p. 539; Caney 2006, p. 263). A similar climatespecific human right has been defended by Steve Vanderheiden, who suggests that:
Since rights exist in order to protect interests, a strong case can be made from the
critical importance to human welfare of climatic stability for a right to an adequate
environment with the corollary that the right includes a claim to climatic stability
(Vanderheiden 2008, p. 252).
Vanderheiden builds on Tim Hayward’s argument for a human ‘right to an
environment adequate for (human) health and well-being’ (Hayward 2005, p. 29).
Some of these accounts have appealed to widely recognized human rights, including
the rights to life, physical security, health and subsistence. Other accounts have defended
‘new’ climate-specific human rights. In this paper, I will focus on arguments that
anthropogenic climate change violates widely recognized – or basic – human rights. If
anthropogenic climate change violates basic human rights, we may not need to defend more

4
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2009, p. 12).
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controversial – or more ambitious – human rights claims to justify urgent action on climate
change.5
The most straightforward way of defending any particular human right is to show that
it has already been included in international human rights conventions. One attraction of this
approach is that rights that have been widely recognized in international law may be less
controversial than rights that have not been recognized in international law. Moreover, if we
begin from legally recognized human rights, we may be able to avoid offering moral
arguments to support our fundamental rights commitments. Basic human rights to life,
physical security, health and subsistence can be readily defended in this way by appealing to
major human rights documents, such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.6
However, the ‘legal’ approach to defending human rights is only a shortcut for most
moral and political philosophers. The legal recognition of a human right is ultimately
justified by a moral argument for that human right. Many different kinds of moral arguments
have been offered for particular human rights.7 However, basic human rights – including the
rights to life, physical security, subsistence and health – are often defended by appealing to
the interests that they protect:
Virtually any argument in favor of a right will depend at bottom on emphasizing that
the interest to which the right is asserted is genuinely important, fundamental, vital,
indispensable, etc. (Shue 1980, p. 8).
Basic human interests provide the grounds for basic human rights. We have seen that
human rights provide the strongest (moral) protection that we can offer, therefore, they must
be connected to our most important interests. As Griffin argues, in defence of his own
account of human rights:
I choose those features [autonomy and liberty among others] precisely because they
are important human interests. It is only because they are especially important
interests that rights can be derived from them; rights are strong protections, and so
require something especially valuable to attract protection (Griffin 2008, p. 35).
Similarly, ‘especially important’ human interests in life, physical security, subsistence
and health might reasonably be taken as grounds for basic human rights to life, physical
security, subsistence and health.8
The ‘important human interests’ argument provides a relatively straightforward way
of defending particular human rights. If we accept the argument for human rights to life,
5
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(Shue 1980, p. 18).
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change’ (2006, pp. 259-64). See also Vanderheiden’s defence of the human rights to an adequate environment
and climatic stability (2008, p. 241).
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physical security, subsistence and health, it also seems a relatively straightforward step to the
claim that anthropogenic climate change violates – or threatens to violate – these human
rights. Caney has claimed that ‘it is clear that anthropogenic climate change violates [the
right to life]’ by, for example, increasing the frequency of extreme weather events, including
storm surges, which can be expected – based on previous experience – to cause ‘very high
mortality’ among the coastal population of Bangladesh (Caney 2009, p. 7). 9 As we saw
earlier, there is ample evidence in the latest IPCC reports to show that anthropogenic climate
change is likely to kill, injure, starve and cause illness to many millions of people. In short,
anthropogenic climate change will violate their human rights.
2. The General Duty and Particular Duties
Onora O’Neill has argued that the problem with rights-based theories is that they do not tell
us who has the duty to protect rights.10 O’Neill’s particular target is positive rights, such as
rights to welfare or education, because she assumes that we can specify the duties that are
correlative to negative rights, such as the right not to be killed or injured. However,
O’Neill’s concern about unspecified duties extends to negative rights when those rights can
be violated by the cumulative actions and collective practices – working through complex
causal chains – of many millions of people.11 In the context of anthropogenic climate change,
a human rights-based theory does not seem to tell us what we most need to know: Who has a
duty to do what? When do a person’s greenhouse gas emissions – or other actions – violate
the human rights of victims of anthropogenic climate change?
In reply to O’Neill’s concerns, Elizabeth Ashford has suggested that we can identify a
duty that is correlative to basic human rights – namely, the duty to promote and maintain
effective institutions that will fairly ‘specify and allocate’ the particular duties needed to
ensure the protection of basic human rights (Ashford 2007, p. 217). If we take human rights
seriously and we do not have clear and widely acknowledged criteria for specifying and
allocating correlative duties, then we should recognise a duty to promote and maintain
effective institutions that will fairly specify and allocate the duties needed to ensure the
protection of human rights. Let us call this the ‘general duty’. In the context of climate
change, we might recognise a ‘general climate duty’ – namely, the duty to promote and
maintain effective institutions that will fairly specify and allocate the particular duties needed
to ensure the protection of basic human rights from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate
change. The general climate duty is implicit in the broader general duty once we recognise
anthropogenic climate change as a ‘standard threat’ to basic human rights (Shue 1980, p.
13).12
The main problem with both the general duty and the general climate duty is that they
still do not specify or allocate particular duties to individuals. Instead, they attempt to defer
the problem by requiring us to promote institutions that will solve the problem for us by fairly
specifying and allocating particular duties to individuals. However, the problem cannot be so
easily deferred for two reasons.
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Caney quotes from – and bases his claims about the effects of storm surges on – McLean and Tysban (2001,
pp. 366-7).
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See, for example, O’Neill (1986, pp. 101-3; 1996, pp. 129-35).
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Hayward has argued that the problem of unspecified duties extends to all negative rights, including, for
example, the right not to be tortured: ‘the circumstances under which a right not to be tortured is violated are not
brought about simply by numbers of individuals failing to recognize their negative duty, but rather are a result of
a systematic organization of power within which specific responsibilities are murkily dispersed’ (Hayward
2005, p. 53).
12
For a fuller discussion of the role of ‘standard threats’ in an account of human rights and correlative duties see
Bell (2009b).
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First, the duty to promote institutions that will fairly specify and allocate particular
duties to individuals might plausibly be re-described as a duty to promote just institutions.
The justice of institutions might be understood in two broad ways: substantively or
procedurally. If the justice of institutions is understood substantively, I can only fulfil my
duty to promote just institutions by promoting a particular substantive conception of justice.
However, a particular substantive conception of justice will be (or will entail) an account of
how particular rights and duties should be specified and allocated to individuals. In other
words, we can only fulfil our duty to promote (substantively) just institutions if we already
have an account of how particular duties should be specified and allocated to individuals. On
this understanding of justice, the general (climate) duty cannot be fulfilled unless we have a
prior account of (or principles for) the fair specification and allocation of particular duties.
We might be able to avoid this problem by adopting a procedural theory of just
institutions. If the justice of institutions is understood procedurally, I can fulfil my duty to
promote just institutions without promoting a substantive conception of justice. Instead, I
need only promote institutions that use just procedures to decide on substantive principles of
justice that will determine (or guide) the specification and allocation of particular duties to
individuals. So, for example, if I subscribe to a conception of procedural justice as
aggregative democracy, I need only promote the institutions of an aggregative democracy and
then ‘leave it to the people’ (or their representatives) to decide how particular duties should
be specified and allocated to individuals. On this account, the specification and allocation of
duties will be just if and only if the procedure is just.
However, there are two problems with adopting a purely procedural theory of justice
in this context. First, the most popular accounts of procedural justice in contemporary
political philosophy are deliberative rather than aggregative. So, I might be able to promote
the procedurally just institutions of deliberative democracy without promoting a substantive
conception of justice but I will not be able to be a good citizen in a deliberative democracy
without taking an active part in the debates about how particular duties should be specified
and allocated. In other words, even if we were to adopt a procedural theory of just
institutions, we would have a duty to try to work out how the particular duties that are
correlative to human rights should be specified and allocated by fair and effective institutions.
Second, our starting point was a commitment to (substantive) basic human rights. It seems
odd to adopt a purely procedural theory of justice for the specification and allocation of
particular duties to protect basic human rights, which have been specified (and allocated to all
humans) on substantive rather than procedural grounds. If we believe that substantive justice
is relevant to the specification and allocation of rights, why would we ignore it for the
allocation of the correlative duties?
I have suggested that the first reason that introducing the general (climate) duty does
not solve our initial problem is that it does not alleviate the need for a substantive theory that
specifies and allocates particular duties to individuals under fair and effective institutions.
The second problem with the general (climate) duty is that it produces an additional problem
of specification and allocation – namely, the problem of specifying and allocating the general
(climate) duty itself. If the promotion of fair and effective (or just) institutions is a collective
endeavour, we will need to work out what the duty to promote just institutions requires from
particular individuals at particular times and places. It is, for example, plausible that the
general duty requires different actions from President Obama than it does from the average
US citizen. Similarly, it might require different actions from the average UK citizen than it
does from a person living on less than a $1 per day in a developing nation. In other words, a
full account of the general (climate) duty will include an account of the fair specification and
allocation of the duty to promote just institutions. Moreover, the specification and allocation

133

of the general (climate) duty cannot be purely procedural because it is logically prior to the
realisation of just institutions.
These important objections to the general (climate) duty might lead us to the
conclusion that we should look for an alternative response to O’Neill’s criticism of rightsbased theories. However, I think that would be premature. We have seen that the general
(climate) duty cannot offer a complete solution to the problem of identifying the duties that
are correlative to basic human rights. However, I want to suggest that it does offer us a
useful way of approaching the problem. The general (climate) duty suggests a particular
structure for an account of our particular duties.
We have seen that the general (climate) duty points us toward two sets of particular
duties that a complete theory of human rights-based duties will need to specify and allocate.
First, we need principles for the allocation of the duty to promote just institutions (i.e., fair
and effective institutions for the specification and allocation of duties). These principles will
tell us how to determine who should do what to promote just institutions. Second, we need
principles for the specification and allocation of particular duties (to protect basic human
rights) under fair and effective institutions. These principles will tell us who should do what
when we have just institutions to protect basic human rights.
In addition, a complete theory of human rights-based duties may need to specify
duties of rectification if our duty to promote just institutions is not fulfilled.13 So, the third
part of an account of human rights-based duties should include principles for the specification
and allocation of duties that arise from the failure of some people to comply with their
particular duties to promote just institutions. For example, if the failure of some of us to
comply with our duty to promote just institutions prevents or delays the development and
implementation of just institutions, we need to work out how (if at all) this affects the future
duties of both the compliers and the non-compliers.
In the remainder of this paper, I will consider how we might begin to develop these
three parts of an account of human rights-based duties in the particular context of climate
change. More specifically, I will consider the role and relevance of historic emissions in the
proposed account of climate duties. In section 3, I consider when we might first have
acquired the general climate duty. I relate this discussion to the claim that the global North
should pay the costs of anthropogenic climate change because it is morally culpable for its
historic emissions. In section 4, I consider one account of how climate duties should be
allocated under just institutions. I argue that we should reject the idea of a universal right to
equal emissions (or ‘equal emissions over time’) and, therefore, I suggest that all historic
emissions should not be counted equally. In section 5, I consider duties of rectification. I
outline some important duties of rectification and I suggest that it is the recent (historic)
emissions of the global North that are likely to generate the most significant duties.
3. Climate Duties 1: The Duty to Promote Fair and Effective Institutions.
On this account, the general duty to promote fair and effective institutions for the protection
of basic human rights is a duty that has existed for as long as human rights have existed.
However, the general climate duty to promote fair and effective institutions for the protection
of basic human rights from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate change may be better
understood as a newer duty. The basic human rights that are threatened by anthropogenic
climate change are not new human rights that have only come into existence with climate
13

We might also need principles to specify and allocate duties when some people do not comply with just (or
fair and effective) institutions. However, for institutions to qualify as ‘effective’, and therefore as ‘just’, they
must prevent large scale non-compliance. I will not address the problem of non-compliance under just
institutions in this paper. Instead, I make the simplifying assumption that we can make fair institutions effective
by designing appropriate penalties and punishments for non-compliance.
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change. They are basic human rights that can be violated in many different ways.
Anthropogenic climate change is a new threat – or a new way of violating – those rights.
Therefore, the original formulation of the basic human rights could not plausibly have
identified climate-related duties. This is a case where changes in ‘circumstances which were
not predicted … give rise to a new duty which was not predicted in advance’ (Raz 1986, p.
185). The duties that are correlative to basic human rights will change over time because the
‘typical major threats’ will change over time (Shue 1980, p. 33). Anthropogenic climate
change is a new way of violating basic human rights, which gives rise to new duties,
including a new general climate duty to promote fair and effective institutions for the
protection of basic human rights from the new threat posed by anthropogenic climate change.
This is a normal result of the ‘dynamic character’ of basic human rights (Raz 1986, p. 185).
I have suggested that the general climate duty is a relatively new duty but when did it
come into existence? More generally, we might ask: what factors are relevant to determining
when the general climate duty came into existence? I want to suggest that two factors are
important here.
First, we have seen that the general climate duty is a response to the new ‘standard
threat’ posed by anthropogenic climate change to basic human rights. Therefore, the general
climate duty cannot have come into existence before anthropogenic climate change posed a
‘standard threat’ to basic human rights. Two points of clarification are in order here. First,
we should distinguish between the time at which anthropogenic climate change became a
‘standard threat’ to basic human rights and the time at which humans could reasonably have
recognised anthropogenic climate change as a ‘standard threat’ to basic human rights. It is, at
least, possible that anthropogenic climate change posed a serious threat to basic human rights
before humans knew or could reasonably have been expected to know about it. Second, any
judgement about when anthropogenic climate change became a ‘standard threat’ to basic
human rights is likely to be contestable. However, it is clear from the evidence that
anthropogenic climate change should now be recognised a ‘standard threat’ to basic human
rights. We know that the effects of anthropogenic climate change have already violated the
basic human rights of some people and are likely to violate the basic human rights of many
millions of people in the near (and far) future.
It is less clear when anthropogenic climate change first posed a ‘standard threat’ to
basic human rights. Was it at the very beginning of the Industrial Revolution when humans
developed the capacity to emit large quantities of greenhouse gases? Was it early in the
twentieth century when the mass production of motor vehicles began? Was it shortly after
the Second World War when the global population exceeded 2.5 billion? Perhaps, the most
plausible way of approaching this question is to consider when the probability of
anthropogenic climate change causing widespread violations of basic human rights (and,
thereby, posing a ‘standard threat’) exceeded some threshold. So, for example, we might
imagine that the probability that humanity would take the route that it has taken since the
Industrial Revolution (e.g., the technological change, the population increases, and the social
and economic changes) may have been quite low so that the likelihood of anthropogenic
climate change violating basic human rights might also have been quite low. We might,
therefore, conclude that anthropogenic climate change did not pose a ‘standard threat’ to
basic human rights until more recently.
I have suggested that the first condition on the existence of the general climate duty is
that it cannot have come into existence until anthropogenic climate change posed a ‘standard
threat’ to basic human rights. The second condition is that the general climate duty – like all
duties – should not be unreasonably demanding. We might distinguish two ways in which
the general climate duty might be too demanding. First, the general climate duty might
require us to promote fair and effective institutions for tackling anthropogenic climate change
135

before we could reasonably be expected to know about anthropogenic climate change and its
effects. If at time t we are excusably ignorant of the effects of our use of fossil fuels, it seems
unreasonable either: at t to claim that we have the general climate duty; or at t+1 to claim that
we should be held morally responsible for our ‘non-compliance’ at t with the general climate
duty. So, the general climate duty can only be imputed to an agent that is either
knowledgeable or inexcusably ignorant about the link between fossil fuel use and the rightsviolating effects of anthropogenic climate change. Judgements about excusable ignorance
will, of course, be contestable. However, I think we might plausibly argue that most ordinary
citizens in the global North were excusably ignorant of the effects of fossil fuel use until (at
least) the mid 1980s. It might be possible to argue that Northern states had a much greater
responsibility to consider and conduct research into the effects of their actions (and the
actions of their citizens) and, therefore, that their ignorance became inexcusable much earlier.
The second way in which the general climate duty might be too demanding is that it
might ask people to sacrifice too much. The general climate duty asks us to make two kinds
of sacrifice. First, it asks us to pay the opportunity costs of devoting time to promoting just
institutions. In some circumstances, this might be too much to ask of an agent. For example,
a person living on less than a $1 a day has more urgent demands on their time, energy and
resources and the general climate duty should not be imputed to them. Second, the general
climate duty asks us to pay the opportunity costs of living under and complying with just
institutions (after they have been successfully promoted and implemented). If institutions are
genuinely just, they should not ask too much of individuals. Therefore, agents should be
willing to pay the opportunity costs of complying with just institutions. However, we should
note that the general climate duty focuses only on the promotion of fair and effective
institutions for the protection of basic human rights from the threat posed by anthropogenic
climate change. There is a risk that if we try to develop ‘climate-specific’ institutions, we
may develop institutions that are not fair or just in a broader sense. It is, therefore, important
to locate any theory of climate justice – and especially climate duties – in a broader theory of
justice. We should not endorse institutions that specify and allocate duties in a way that
protects basic human rights from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate change but fails
to protect basic human rights from other threats (or causes any other kind of injustice).
In this section, I have discussed the general climate duty to promote fair and effective
institutions for the specification and allocation of particular duties to protect basic human
rights from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate change. In particular, I have
considered when the general climate duty should be understood to have come into existence –
or, when an agent might be said to acquire the general climate duty. I have argued that the
general climate duty could not have come into existence until the probability of
anthropogenic climate change violating basic human rights became significant. I have also
suggested that the general climate duty should only be imputed to an agent when: (a) that
agent has knowledge of or is inexcusably ignorant of the link between fossil fuel use and
rights-violating anthropogenic climate change; and (b) complying with the general climate
duty (and complying with the proposed just institutions) does not make unreasonable
demands on the agent.
This understanding of the ‘birth’ of the general climate duty is significant because it
poses an important obstacle to historic responsibility arguments. On one understanding of the
historic responsibility argument, Northern states and their citizens should pay the costs of
tackling anthropogenic climate change because they are morally responsible for the problem.
However, the proposed theory of human rights and duties suggests that only the current
generation of ordinary citizens in Northern states might be considered guilty of any climaterelated moral failure. The general climate duty cannot reasonably be imputed to ordinary
citizens before the mid-1980s. It might be possible to make an argument that Northern states
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acquired the general climate duty earlier but it seems unlikely that they acquired it before the
beginning of the twentieth century. Therefore, the most ambitious arguments for historic
responsibility – grounded in moral responsibility or moral failure and extending back to the
beginning of the Industrial Revolution – should be rejected.
4. Climate Duties 2: The Specification and Allocation of Particular Duties Under Fair
and Effective Institutions.
I have argued that the general climate duty is a relatively new duty for ordinary citizens of the
global North. In this section, I want to consider how fair and effective institutions should
specify and allocate particular duties (to protect basic human rights from the threat posed by
anthropogenic climate change). In other words, what principles for the specification and
allocation of climate duties should people who comply with the general climate duty be
trying to promote? In particular, I want to consider the possibility that fair principles will
allocate climate duties based on historic emissions. We have already seen that there are good
reasons for thinking that the North’s moral failure with respect to climate change is relatively
recent. Therefore, if we want to allocate climate duties based on historic emissions (over a
longer period of history), we will need a different kind of argument to support that claim. In
this section, I will consider one important argument that has been offered to support the claim
that the allocation of particular climate duties should be proportionate to historic emissions.
The central claim of this argument is that there is a universal right to equal
greenhouse gas emissions irrespective of the time and place that a person lives. We might
call this ‘equal emissions’. Let us assume that we are seeking to promote fair and effective
institutions for the specification and allocation of climate duties at time t. If we accept equal
emissions, we will take into account the historic emissions of each person in allocating their
future emissions (to ensure that over their lifetime they do not exceed their ‘equal emissions’
allowance). Moreover, if we find that some persons have already emitted more than their
‘equal emissions’ allowance, we may reasonably require them to compensate others
(assuming that there is some commensurability between emissions permits and other ‘goods’)
by, for example, paying for adaptation.
There are several problems with ‘equal emissions’. 14 I want to highlight two
important problems. First, it is not at all clear why there should be a universal right to equal
emissions. We do not normally distribute particular resources – even newly discovered
resources – in an egalitarian manner (Beckerman and Pasek 1995). Indeed, there are very
few resources that are distributed equally in the contemporary world. Of course, we need not
endorse the distributive principles that appear to operate in (or between) contemporary (‘real
world’) societies (even so-called ‘liberal democratic’ societies). Instead, we might (and
probably should) adopt a more egalitarian theory of global justice.
However, the second problem with equal emissions is that there are good reasons for
advocates of egalitarian theories of global justice to support an unequal distribution of
emissions. I will suggest two reasons. First, different persons may need different resources
to achieve the same levels of welfare or realise the same capabilities. Emission permits are a
resource just like the fossil fuels that produce them. Some persons may need to use more
energy (and emit more greenhouse gases) than other persons to achieve the same level of
capabilities. If we are concerned about equality of (or, at least, sufficiency of) capabilities,
we may reasonably reject equal emissions. Second, circumstances may vary between
different times and places such that the marginal opportunity costs of not emitting greenhouse
gases vary considerably. This variation may be due to a range of factors, including, the
availability and cost of non-fossil fuel energy and the energy required to achieve a sufficient
14

I have discussed some of these problems in Bell (2008).

137

level of capabilities given the social, economic and technological structure of one’s society.
For example, it may be reasonable to suggest that current generations should not be entitled
to emit as much as previous generations because we have non-fossil fuel energy technology
available (or potentially available) to us at an affordable cost, which is consistent with
maintaining a sufficient level of capabilities. If the marginal opportunity cost for many
citizens in the global North of reducing our greenhouse gas emissions is lower than it is for
both previous generations in the North and for current generations in the global South, equal
emissions is not the most plausible interpretation of fairness (even for an egalitarian).
I have argued that we should reject equal emissions. If we reject equal emissions, we
cannot treat all emissions at all times and places equally. Therefore, we will need to be rather
more careful about how we take historic emissions into account in determining future
responsibilities to reduce emissions and pay the other costs of protecting basic human rights
from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate change. In particular, I have suggested that
one unit of emissions from the global North at the beginning of the twenty-first century
should not count equally with one unit of emissions from the global South at the same time or
with one unit of emissions from the global North at the beginning of the twentieth century.
The marginal opportunity cost – measured in an appropriate metric, such as impact on basic
capabilities – of reducing greenhouse gas emissions should be considered as well as the level
of historic emissions when we try to develop principles for the fair specification and
allocation of climate duties. In other words, historic emissions may be relevant in
determining the fair allocation of climate duties under just institutions but historic
‘subsistence emissions’ (with a high opportunity cost) should not be treated in the same way
as historic ‘luxury emissions’ (with a low opportunity cost) (Shue 1993).
5. Climate Duties 3: Duties of Rectification.
So far, I have discussed the general climate duty to promote just institutions and the
specification and allocation of climate duties under just institutions. In this section, I will
briefly discuss duties of rectification. The general climate duty assumes that the specification
and allocation of more specific duties must be done by effective institutions that aim to
protect basic human rights from the effects of anthropogenic climate change. This suggests
that we have no specific duties – for example, to limit our individual greenhouse gas
emissions – until there is ‘an actual [and “authoritative”] allocative scheme, operative and in
force’ (Feinberg 1984, p. 30). This is morally problematic because it suggests that we can
continue with ‘business-as-usual’ greenhouse gas emissions until there are fair effective
institutional regulations in place that specify the level at which we are required to limit our
emissions. This creates a perverse incentive for continuing non-compliance with the general
climate duty: if we don’t comply with the general climate duty and just institutions are not
created, we do not violate any human rights-based duties by continuing to emit high levels of
greenhouse gases.15 If we want to avoid this problem, we need to go beyond the general
climate duty.
I want to suggest two further duties that take us beyond the general climate duty. I
will argue that both duties follow from the general climate duty. First, we have a duty to
rectify the wrong that we have done if we fail to comply with the general climate duty. On
our account, if a person does not comply with the general climate duty, he violates the
correlative human rights. We generally recognise that if a person violates another person’s
human rights, they have a duty to rectify the wrong that they have done. 16 What does
rectification require in the context of the general climate duty? Let us assume that
15

We are, of course, violating human rights by not complying with the general duty to promote just institutions
for the protection of basic human rights from the threat posed by climate change.
16
There may also be reason to punish them for the wrong that they have done.
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rectification cannot take place until just institutions are in place and duties are specified and
allocated. I would suggest that rectification requires that those who have not complied with
the general climate duty should be allocated more burdensome duties, including, for example,
lower limits on their future greenhouse gas emissions and a greater share of the monetary
costs of adaptation measures. The minimum requirement should be that they are not
advantaged over the course of their lifetime by their failure to comply with the general
climate duty. Moreover, non-compliers might legitimately be required to accept a worse
outcome if rectification (or compensation) of the situation of the victims of human rights
violations caused by anthropogenic climate change (who might have been protected but for
non-compliance with the general climate duty) requires it. In sum, the general climate duty
implies a duty of rectification: under effective institutions, previous non-compliers must
accept more burdensome duties that may make them worse off than they would have been if
they had always complied with the general climate duty.
The second duty that follows from the general climate duty is the duty not to accept
benefits that result from actions that violate someone’s human right. If there were full
compliance with the general climate duty, we might plausibly assume that effective
institutions for specifying and allocating duties to protect basic human rights from
anthropogenic climate change would quickly be implemented. Let us assume that some
people comply with the general climate duty but others do not and as a result just institutions
are not implemented. Some of the compliers may benefit from the delayed implementation
of just institutions if, for example, they have been enjoying a lifestyle dependent upon a
higher level of emissions than they would have been permitted under just institutions. We
might reasonably say that they are benefiting from the actions of the non-compliers. In other
words, they are benefiting from actions that violate human rights. It is, however, surely
wrong for someone who takes human rights seriously to accept benefits that result from
human rights violations. Therefore, I would suggest that the general climate duty also
implies a duty not to accept benefits that result from the failure of other people to comply
with the general duty.
What does this additional duty require? I would suggest that it requires each person:
(1) to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to a level that they can reasonably believe would
be consistent with the specification and allocation of duties by just institutions; and (2) to
accept that just institutions can legitimately take into account the historic emissions (and
other relevant actions) of those who have complied with the general climate duty (as well as
those who have not complied) during the period that just institutions were delayed by noncompliance. In other words, the duty not to accept benefits requires both individual action
now in advance of just institutions and compliance with institutions that (fairly and
effectively) specify and allocate duties ‘retrospectively’.
If this account of duties of rectification is plausible, the failure of Northern states and
Northern citizens to comply with the general climate duty over (at least) the last twenty or
thirty years has significant implications for their duties now and in the future. The North is
guilty of a moral failure in recent times and should seek to rectify that failure. Northern
citizens are not only required to comply with the general climate duty (and ‘do their bit’ to
promote just institutions) but are also required to limit their own current and future emissions
to a level that they can reasonably believe would be consistent with the specification and
allocation of duties by just institutions. Moreover, Northern citizens should be seeking to
promote just institutions that will demand a lot from them, including, compensation for the
excessive (unjust) emissions that they have emitted since they acquired the duty to promote
just institutions (to protect basic human rights from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate
change) in the late twentieth century. The demands on Northern states – and, therefore,
indirectly on their citizens – might be even greater if it can be successfully argued that
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Northern states were culpably ignorant of the threat posed by climate change to human rights
much earlier in the twentieth century.
6. Conclusion
I have discussed three kinds of climate duty. First, we have a general climate duty to
promote just institutions that will protect basic human rights from the threat posed by
anthropogenic climate change. I have suggested that a reasonable account of this duty
undermines one important argument – the argument from ‘moral failure’ – for taking all
historic emissions into account when we allocate climate duties. We cannot justifiably claim
that Northern citizens or Northern states should be held morally responsible for their historic
emissions prior to the time when they can reasonably be said to have acquired the general
climate duty. However, they can be held morally responsible for their failure to comply with
that duty since they acquired it. If we assume that Northern citizens only (directly) acquired
the general climate duty in the 1990s, we should regard their pre-1990s emissions very
differently from their emissions since the 1990s.
Second, we have a duty to comply with effective institutions that fairly specify and
allocate duties to protect human rights from the threat posed by climate change. I suggested
that one common argument for taking historic emissions into account when allocating climate
duties was based on the idea of a universal right to equal emissions. I offered two criticisms
of this argument. First, it is unclear why we should be egalitarians about greenhouse gas
emissions when we are not generally egalitarians about other resources. Second, I suggested
that egalitarianism about emissions ignores the difference between luxury and subsistence
emissions and, more generally, does not take into account the variation between the marginal
costs of emissions reductions (measured in a relevant metric, such as capabilities) for
different people in different places and at different times. Therefore, I have suggested that a
fair allocation of emissions (or emission permits) is not likely to be an equal allocation.
Instead, a fair allocation of emission permits should reflect the (marginal) opportunity costs
(measured in reduced capabilities) of not emitting greenhouse gases for particular individuals
in particular places at particular times.17
It is important to be clear about the limits of this argument. First, the criticisms of
‘equal emissions’ are not intended to show that historic emissions, including pre-1990
emissions, are irrelevant when we are designing just institutions for the specification and
allocation of climate duties. Instead, they suggest that most historic emissions should not be
counted equally with current and future emissions. So, a fair allocation of emission permits –
i.e., duties to limit emissions – and other particular climate duties under just institutions
should not be based on a principle of equal emissions over time. Second, ‘equal emissions’ is
not the only possible argument for taking historic emissions into account. For example, it is
commonly argued that Northern citizens should pay the costs of anthropogenic climate
change because they are benefiting from historic emissions. I have not addressed this (or
other) arguments for taking historic emissions into account in determining a fair allocation of
climate duties under just institutions. Therefore, there is much more work to be done to offer
a fully worked out account of the relevance and role of pre-1990s historic emissions in
principles for the fair allocation of climate duties.
The third kind of climate duty that we have identified is duties of rectification. I have
suggested that most Northern citizens do have duties to rectify their failure to comply with
the general climate duty (since they acquired it in the 1990s). These duties include a duty to
reduce their own emissions now to a level that they can reasonably believe is consistent with
the allocation of climate duties under just institutions. In addition, Northern citizens should –
17

If we are capabilities egalitarians, we should seek to equalise the marginal costs of emissions reductions.
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to comply with the general climate duty and the duties of rectification – be seeking to
promote a global climate regime and effective institutions that will make severe demands on
them. In particular, most Northern citizens should expect to be required under just
institutions to pay compensation for their unjust post-1990s emissions.
Climate change poses a very serious threat to basic human rights in the twenty-first
century and beyond. We have a duty to protect basic human rights from the threat posed by
anthropogenic climate change. In this paper, I have offered the outline of a distinctive
account of how we should understand our (correlative) climate duties. In particular, I have
explored the relevance and the role of historic emissions in the allocation of climate duties.
The Chinese Government, like many in the global South, has argued consistently that the
global North should be held responsible for the costs of climate change because it is their
historic emissions that have caused the problem. I have suggested that this claim should not
be accepted without further consideration and some refinement. Specifically, I have
suggested that the citizens of the global North do have a duty to pay compensation for our
excessive (unjust) emissions during the last twenty or thirty years. However, I have also
suggested that earlier emissions should not be treated in the same way. Earlier emissions
may be relevant for the allocation of climate duties under just institutions but they are not
relevant in the straightforward way that often seems to be assumed in climate justice debates.
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Mitigation of Short-Lived Greenhouse Gases as The Foundation for a Fair and Effective
Climate Compromise Between China and The West
Frances C. Moore1 and Michael C. MacCracken2
Abstract
Short-lived greenhouse gases that also contribute to air pollution are playing a major role in
global warming. Black carbon alone is likely the second or third most important climate
forcing agent. The short atmospheric lifetime of these pollutants means that, unlike CO2,
reducing emissions produces a decrease in atmospheric concentration and a reduction of the
radiative forcing that drives climate change. Black carbon and tropospheric ozone also have
large negative effects at the regional and local level contributing substantially to indoor and
urban air pollution and the formation of Atmospheric Brown Clouds that disrupt regional
climate. Moreover, technologies to reduce emissions are available, cost-effective, and have
already been widely deployed in developed countries.
Reducing these short-lived greenhouse gases is therefore a mitigation pathway for
industrializing countries that is both appropriate to their level of development and highly
climatically effective. It is also consistent with both responsibility and capability fairness
principles, both of which play important roles in the international climate regime. As such, it
offers a way out of the current deadlock between developed and developing countries in
which each group asks for more substantial emissions reduction commitments from the other
before taking action. China, as the world’s largest black carbon emitter, should push for
substantial CO2 mitigation commitments from the developed countries in return for
aggressive action to reduce its own soot emissions. This action is consistent with China’s
own development strategy and would contribute substantially to the mitigation of climate
change.
Introduction
The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), signed at the Rio Earth
Summit in 1992, sets as its objective the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations at a
level that would avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate” (Article 2).
Although ‘dangerous’ is a perhaps deliberately subjective terminology, a limit of no more
than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial temperatures has been widely discussed and was
proposed by the European Union as the policy target for global mitigative action (European
Commission, 2009). In order to have a reasonable chance of meeting this target, total global
emissions need to peak and begin declining no later than 2020 (Meinshausen, 2006).
Despite the urgency of the climate change problem, the current international regime
has been relatively ineffective. The Kyoto Protocol that came into force in 2004 limits the
emissions of relatively few states and sets a goal of only 5 percent emission reductions below
1990 levels in the 2008-2012 compliance period. Moreover, a number of states including
Canada, New Zealand and Japan are unlikely to meet even the limited commitments they
have undertaken through the Kyoto Protocol (Barrett, 2008).
Governments are currently negotiating a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, due to be
agreed in Copenhagen this December. The likely compliance period (2013-2017) means that
this treaty will be critical in determining whether or not global warming is constrained to
below the two degrees threshold. A key element of the negotiations has revolved around how
to engage major industrializing countries in mitigation activities. Developing countries
currently account for only 25 percent of global radiative forcing but this will grow to over 70
1
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percent by 2100 (Moore & MacCracken, 2009).3, 4 Developing countries have nevertheless
refused to accept caps on emissions, pointing to the substantially larger per-capita emissions
in the developed North as well as the historical association between use of fossil fuels and
economic development (for example, Singh, 2008). On the other hand, developed nations
have pointed to the rapid growth in emissions from industrializing countries as a reason why
a future climate agreement should have full participation from major emitters (for example,
Connaughton, 2007).
China plays a critical role in this part of the negotiations. In 2006 it surpassed the
United States to become the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter. Moreover, its rapid
economic growth means emissions grew a remarkable 80 percent between 2000 and 2006
alone (Boden, Marland, & Andres, 2009). Nevertheless, its per-capita emissions are only just
above the global average (1.27 tons of carbon in 2006 as compared to an average of 1.25), its
per-capita GDP is less than half the global average, and more than a quarter of its population
lives on less than $2 a day (WRI, 2008). China will therefore be a critical player in solving
the climate change problem but, along with other developing countries, is wary of any
proposal that would require it to cap its carbon dioxide emissions. Overcoming the current
deadlock between developed and developing countries will require finding ways around the
major standoff over who should reduce CO2 emissions in order to identify energy sources and
mitigation options that are at once consistent with national development strategies in
industrializing countries and have the potential to substantially mitigate global warming.
This paper will outline one such strategy, namely the mitigation of short-lived
greenhouse gases that are also air pollutants, and will evaluate it with respect to principles of
fairness embodied in the international climate regime, particularly the principles of
responsibility and capability. The following section will summarize the role played by shortlived greenhouse gases that are also air pollutants and will outline the key elements of the
‘lifetime-leveraging’ proposal. Then the burden sharing of the mitigation effort that would
result from such an agreement will be assessed relative to fairness principles based on both
responsibility and capability metrics.
Short-Lived Greenhouse Gases and the Lifetime Leveraging Proposals
Climate change has for a long time been considered the quintessential long-term
environmental problem with the most serious impacts affecting the grandchildren and greatgrandchildren of current decision-makers. While it is true that much of the carbon dioxide
released now will remain in the atmosphere for tens of thousands of years, it is also the case
that some pollutants are short-lived (i.e., have an atmospheric lifetime of weeks to decades)
and have a substantial impact on climate over policy-relevant decadal timescales (Archer,
2005). For example, the atmosphere already contains enough long-lived greenhouse gases to
raise global temperature by over 2°C (assuming a climate sensitivity of approximately 3°C).
Of that, 0.8°C of warming has already been realized, 0.6°C will be realized as the climate
system comes to equilibrium, and the remainder is being offset by the cooling effect of (very
short-lived) sulfate aerosols (IPCC, 2007b, p. 204).

3

Radiative forcing is a useful measure for directly comparing diverse factors that affect the Earth’s climate.
Measured in Watts per meter squared (Wm-2) , the value describes the equivalent change in net solar irradiance
at the tropopause (top of the troposphere) caused by a given climate driver (for example, an increase in
greenhouse gas concentration or a change in albedo).
4
Based on the IPCC B2 scenario (IPCC, 2000).

144

Agent Emitted

Atmospheric
Lifetime

Primary Sources

Fossil fuel burning, deforestation and
land use change, cement production.
Landfills, natural gas leakage,
agriculture.
Fertilizer use, livestock sector, fossil
fuel combustion.
Aerosols, cleaning products and
refrigerants.
CO – incomplete fossil fuel
combustion; VOCs – petroleum
production
and
consumption,
solvents.
Fossil fuel combustion, biomass
burning.

CO2

Net
Change
in
Radiative Forcing in
2005 due to Emissions
1750-2005 (Wm-2)
1.56

CH4

0.86

CenturiesMillennia
12 years

N2 O

0.14

114 years

CFC / HCFC

0.28

100-1000 years

CO / VOC
(O3 precursors)

0.27

CO – months
VOC – hours
(O3 – days)

Black Carbon

0.44-0.9

1 week

Table 1. Change in radiative forcing from 1750 to 2005 due to emission of various agents
Source: IPCC (2007b, p. 33, 207) and new results for black carbon from Ramanathan and Carmichael
(2008).

Table 1 summarizes the major warming agents, their relative importance, atmospheric
lifetime and principal sources. 5 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
estimates forcing from black carbon at 0.44 Wm-2, making it the third most important
anthropogenic warming agent after carbon dioxide and methane (IPCC, 2007b, p. 207). New
results from Ramanathan and Carmichael (2008) that include observational evidence suggest
that warming from black carbon may be as high as 0.9 Wm-2, making it the second most
significant warming agent. Black carbon, moreover, has a disproportionate warming effect in
vulnerable regions: it is scavenged out of the atmosphere by ice and snow particles, so
changing the albedo in sensitive areas such as the Arctic and alpine regions (Hansen &
Nazarenko, 2004; Jacobsen, 2004). In addition, black carbon emissions in South Asia have a
particular impact on China because many remain in the region and contribute to the formation
of Atmospheric Brown Clouds (ABCs), the largest of which sits over the Himalayas where it
contributes to the retreat of glaciers on the Tibetan Plateau that form the headwaters of the
Yangtze and the Huang He rivers and disrupts the Asian monsoon cycle (Menon, Hansen,
Nazarenko, & Luo, 2002; Ramanathan, et al., 2008; Ramanathan, et al., 2007). Tropospheric
ozone is not included in Table 1 because it is not emitted directly but the IPCC estimates that
it is responsible for 0.39 Wm-2 of warming (IPCC, 2007b, p. 207).
Apart from their role in global climate change, black carbon and tropospheric ozone
both contribute to air pollution. Approximately 20 percent of black carbon emissions come
from the burning of traditional biomass fuels (IGSD, 2008). These emissions are a major
component of indoor air pollution, globally the 8th most important health risk factor
responsible for 2.7 percent of the global burden of disease (WHO, 2005). In China alone,
indoor air pollution is responsible for over 380 thousand deaths a year, or 16 percent of the
annual total (WHO, 2007). In addition, both pollutants contribute to urban air pollution,
which causes an additional 275 thousand premature deaths in China each year (WHO, 2007).
5

Although tropospheric ozone and black carbon are collectively referred to in this paper as ‘short-lived
greenhouse gases’ for convenience, it should be noted that black carbon is strictly speaking not a gas but a
particle aerosol.[Just a grammatical note—“particulate” is an adjective—as in particulate matter, so one needs to
use both words, or shorten it to “particle”]
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Radiative Forcing (W per m2)

Finally, ozone pollution causes cellular damage in plants and has a substantial effect on
primary productivity both in natural and agricultural ecosystems. Ozone-associated
agricultural losses in Asia are expected to reach $8 billion by 2020 (Wang & Mauzerall,
2004).6
The multiple order of magnitude differences in atmospheric lifetime shown in Table 1
have significant policy implications. The long-lived greenhouse gases regulated by the Kyoto
Protocol are ‘stock’ pollutants in that a reduction in emissions will reduce the rate of increase
of atmospheric concentration but cannot reduce the total amount of gas in the atmosphere.7 In
contrast, black carbon and tropospheric ozone are ‘flow’ pollutants, meaning that a reduction
in emissions will decrease the atmospheric concentration and the corresponding radiative
forcing. Figure 1 shows the implications of this difference for climate policy. Because of its
long lifetime, halting emissions of CO2 today would result in a decrease in associated
radiative forcing of only 38% by 2050. In contrast, halting emissions of black carbon,
methane and ozone precursors would eliminate the radiative forcing from these pollutants.
With the world already flirting dangerously with the two degree warming threshold,
mitigation of short-lived greenhouse gases offers one of the only opportunities to actually
reduce radiative forcing in the near term, so ‘buying time’ to control and begin reducing
emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases.
3
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2050
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Figure 1. Radiative forcing from CO2 from fossil fuels, CO2 from land use change, methane, nitrous
oxide, soot (black carbon) and tropospheric ozone in 2000 and 2050. Yellow represents warming from
emissions that have already occurred. Green represents warming from emissions taking place between
2000 and 2049 which can therefore be controlled through emissions policies put in place today. Adapted
from Moore and MacCracken (2009).

In a 2009 paper, Moore and MacCracken outlined a ‘lifetime leveraging’ proposal for
a post-Kyoto agreement that would use mitigation of short-lived greenhouse gases to achieve
early reductions in radiative forcing that would offset continued growth in CO2 emissions
6

Ozone is also an important part of what may become a significant carbon-cycle feedback. Warmer
temperatures due to global warming accelerate the rate of ozone production which in turn harms forest
ecosystems, weakening the land carbon sink and accelerating the build up of CO2. Modeling studies indicate
that the indirect radiative forcing from this feedback effect in 2100 will be comparable to the direct forcing from
elevated O3 concentrations (Sitch, Cox, Collins, & Huntingford, 2007). Ozone abatement policies can thus
directly mitigate global warming while also protecting the land carbon sink.
7
Methane, the only one of the bundle of six greenhouse gases regulated by the Kyoto Protocol with an
atmospheric lifetime less than a century, is the exception. With a 12 year residence time, methane might be
considered a stock pollutant for the purposes of the (5 year) Kyoto commitment period but is a flow pollutant for
the purposes of long-term (multi-decadal) policy-making.[good point]
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from industrializing countries (Moore & MacCracken, 2009). In the ‘lifetime leveraging’
architecture, developed nations (those with a per-capita GDP greater than $10,000) would
commit to ambitious reductions in all greenhouse gas emissions, middle-income nations (percapita GDP $3,000 to $10,000) would commit to similar reductions of black carbon,
tropospheric ozone and methane, as well as improvements in energy efficiency and carbon
intensity. Countries would graduate between groups and take on additional mitigation
commitments as they developed, with graduation based on both per-capita and emissions and
per-capita GDP indicators. Preliminary modeling shows that for realistic but ambitious
emissions cuts by developed countries, on the order of 80 percent by 2050 and 90 percent by
2100, this proposal would result in an equilibrium temperature increase of between 2 and 2.5
degrees Celsius (MacCracken & Moore, 2009).8
In order to be effective, a post-Kyoto treaty must be both climatically rigorous, with a
reasonable chance of limiting warming to less than two degrees above pre-industrial
temperatures, and within the ‘political-contract zone’ of major emitters if it has any chance of
being agreed to and enforced. Climatically, in addition to the sharp emission cutbacks in the
developed nations, the key to the ‘lifetime leveraging’ proposal is the early abatement of
short-lived greenhouse gases in middle income countries. This action produces a reduction in
radiative forcing that offsets continued growth in CO2 emissions in industrializing nations,
which remain uncapped for several decades.9 Politically, the question is whether the central
trade-off in which middle-income countries begin working on short-lived greenhouse gas
mitigation in return for uncapped CO2 emissions in the near term will be considered fair and
politically acceptable to those governments and constituencies. The following sections will
consider the fairness question by evaluating the ‘lifetime-leveraging’ framework with respect
to the fairness principles of common but differentiated responsibility and respective
capabilities embodied in the UNFCCC under Article 3.
Responsibility
Perhaps because it is a principle that can mean many things to many people, the common but
differentiated responsibility (CBDR) principle has become near-universal in mitigation
burden sharing proposals. CBDR is usually understood to mean that while all nations have an
interest in the protection of the Earth’s climate, their duty to protect it is linked to the degree
of responsibility they bear for the problem. Nevertheless, its interpretation has not been
uncontested since the signing of the UNFCCC in 1992. While developing countries argue that
CBDR means they have should have no binding emission reduction commitments until
developed countries have made substantial progress on cutting emissions, developed nations,
particularly the United States, have focused on the ‘common’ nature of the responsibility to
argue for universal participation in the mitigative effort (Harris, 1999).
Even if the CBDR principle is accepted in theory, implementing it in practice by
assigning mitigation commitments according to some responsibility metric is not a purely
objective exercise. Instead, the flexibility of CBDR interacts with national political-economic
circumstances to produce a multitude of proposed responsibility criteria, usually not unrelated
8

This would not be the warming in 2100 because the Earth’s temperature takes some time to equilibrate to
changes in radiative forcing. Instead this equilibrium temperature rise would be realized over the course of one
to two centuries.
9
To the extent that the industrializing nations can begin reducing the growth in their CO2 emissions and prepare
for later beginning to cut emissions back, there would be a further reduction in the warming influence. [One of
the interesting results from the EMF-22 study was that the overall costs for mitigation are lower if the
industrializing countries early on the set the date that they will join in starting to reduce CO2 emissions—this
has the effect that those in the industrializing nations plan ahead and do not keep constructing coal plants right
up to the time of the changeover, etc.—so there is a push to get those countries to set a date certain to join in
cutting emissions—and this would require looking ahead more than 5 years.]
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to the self-interest of those proposing them (Ringius, Torvanger, & Underdal, 2002). A
principal question is whether responsibility should be differentiated according to current
emissions or, given the long atmospheric lifetime of CO2, whether historic emissions should
be taken into account? With a long industrial history, the United States has repeatedly
rejected taking past emissions into account (Grubb, 1995).10
Basing responsibility purely on absolute emissions is also unsatisfactory because it
fails to take into account variations in national circumstances between countries. For
example, China and the United States produce roughly the same amount of greenhouse gas
emissions but China has four times as many people and so many would agree it should be
considered less responsible than the US. The principle of per-capita emissions as a metric for
assigning responsibility, stemming from the idea that all should have equal access to the
atmospheric commons, is perhaps the most widely-accepted responsibility metric (for
example, Baer, Athanasiou, Kartha, & Kemp-Benedict, 2008). Nevertheless, other
normalizing criteria have been suggested. The Bush administration evaluated progress on
combating climate change based on carbon intensity (emissions per unit GDP), reflecting an
assumption that economic growth and production are socially-beneficial and should not be
sacrificed to protect the climate (White House, 2002). Similarly, Russia, the largest country
in the world, proposed that responsibility should be based on greenhouse gas density
(emissions per unit land area; Ringius, et al., 2002). This analysis will look at both per-capita,
absolute emissions and intensity metrics (since the greenhouse gas density proposal has
received little support in the international negotiations), though recognizing that the percapita principle is better established as a responsibility metric and that significant controversy
remains around the use of carbon intensity. The analysis will also focus on black carbon and
fossil fuel CO2 emissions, for which good emissions data are available, as representative
examples of short- and long-lived greenhouse gases respectively.
Figure 2 shows emissions of fossil fuel CO2 and black carbon in major regions, as
well as emissions normalized by population and GDP. The per-capita emissions graph is
particularly interesting, showing an almost perfect inverse relationship between per-capita
CO2 emissions and per-capita black carbon emissions. North America, with by far the highest
level of per-capita CO2 emissions nevertheless has the lowest per-capita black carbon
emissions. Similarly, Asia, South America and sub-Saharan Africa have very low per-capita
CO2 emissions but high black carbon emissions. This difference is a combined result of the
deployment of black carbon abatement technologies that has reduced industrial emissions in
the US and Europe, inefficient and polluting coal combustion technologies in use in
industrializing economies, and the widespread burning of traditional biofuels in Africa and
Asia.

10

Note that the question of historic emissions is less relevant for short-lived greenhouse gases because they are
rapidly removed from the atmosphere. Nevertheless, because of a lag in the equilibration time between radiative
forcing and global temperature, a long history of short-lived greenhouse gas emissions adds energy to the Earth
system that has an impact even after emissions have ceased and the gasses have been removed from the
atmosphere.
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Figure 2. A: per-capita CO2 and black carbon emissions. B: absolute emissions. C: CO2 and black carbon
intensity (normalized by GDP). (World Bank, 2008; Bond, et al., 2007; UNPOP, 2009; WRI, 2008).

Assigning responsibility solely on the basis of absolute emissions would again result
in North America and Europe having high responsibility for CO2 emissions but far lower
responsibility for black carbon. Asia is responsible for high-levels of both while South
America and sub-Saharan African release minimal levels of both. In the context of this paper
it is interesting to note the relative responsibilities for CO2 and black carbon emissions. So
while North America, Europe and Asia are responsible for roughly equal proportions of total
CO2 emissions (30-40 percent), Asia is responsible for a far greater proportion of the black
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carbon emissions (66 percent) than either Europe (12 percent) or North America (2 percent).
Similarly, Africa is responsible for less than one percent of CO2 emissions but over 10
percent of black carbon emissions.
Using the carbon intensity metric shows low responsibility in the service-based
economies of North America and Europe but high responsibility in both Asia and Africa. As
noted above, the intensity metric is of dubious use as an indicator of responsibility because it
obscures the historical increase in greenhouse gas emissions associated with GDP growth,
which is a key structural fact of the climate change problem. Nevertheless, comparing the
most efficient with the least efficient gives an impression of the scope for improvement. So a
unit of wealth produced in Asia is associated with 3.5 times more CO2 emissions but with
over 75 times more black carbon emissions than an equivalent unit produced in North
America. At first glance, this suggests there may be significant scope for improvement,
though this conclusion is questioned by some researchers that point to an offshoring of
environmentally-damaging production by rich countries to poorer countries, resulting in
artificially low carbon intensities in wealthy nations (Heil & Selden, 2001; Roberts & Parks,
2006, pp. 163-169).
Fairness principles based on responsibility are more difficult to apply than it would
first appear because widely varying political and economic national circumstances lead to
conflicting claims over fair ways of evaluating responsibility. In a complex and morallyambiguous world in which understandings of fairness are contextual and socially-constructed,
it is counter-productive to arbitrarily select any one definition of responsibility. Instead, a
useful way forward is to evaluate multiple metrics and develop policy based on findings that
are robust under multiple assumptions. The analysis above shows that under all measures of
fairness Asia is responsible for a high proportion of the black carbon problem whereas North
America and, to a lesser extent, Europe have a low level of responsibility. In contrast, the two
commonly used measures of responsibility (per-capita and absolute emissions) show the
developed world as having a large responsibility to mitigate CO2 emissions. Moreover, all
responsibility metrics show the developing world as relatively more responsible for black
carbon than for the CO2 problem. In the face of mitigation resource constraints, this finding
suggests that it is fair for mitigation actions to be differentiated according to the ‘lifetimeleveraging’ proposal so that industrializing nations such as China work on reducing longlived greenhouse gas emissions and industrializing nations work on short-lived emissions and
particularly black carbon.
Capability
Although less frequently cited as a principle of mitigation burden sharing than CBDR,
differentiating responsibilities based on ‘respective capabilities’ (Article 3, UNFCCC) is also
an important principle of the Convention. The principle finds its roots in a long-standing and
fundamental tradition of international environmental policy – that developing nations should
not have to sacrifice scarce resources to environmental improvement in the face of more
pressing basic development needs (Bernstein, 2002). Implementation of this principle has
seen many international environmental treaties include temporary exemptions for developing
countries or financial transfers from the North to the South to aid compliance with
commitments.
In terms of climate change specifically, implementation of the capability principle has
been developed through research into the determinants of mitigative capacity. Originally
proposed by Yohe (2001), mitigative capacity has been defined by the IPCC as “a country’s
ability to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gases or enhance natural sinks” (IPCC, 2007a, p.
696). The determinants originally proposed by Yohe include the range of viable technological
options available to a country or community, the range of viable policy instruments,
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institutional structure and the stocks of human and social capital (Yohe, 2001). In developing
the concept further, Winkler et al (2006) explicitly link mitigative capacity with development
pathway and use two indicators of capability, the Human Development Index and per-capita
GDP. Similarly, indicators proposed by the World Resources Institute include life
expectancy, literacy rate, per-capita GDP and energy use (Jones, 2009 citing WRI, 2008).11
A solid theoretical foundation for differentiating mitigation commitments based on
capacity (essentially synonymous with level of development) exists in the literature and is
being employed in the international climate regime. However, the lack of any empirical
evidence that high mitigative capacity actually corresponds to mitigation (Jones, 2009)
suggests that the mitigative capacity concept may be playing a normative role in the
negotiations: it is not so much that countries with high mitigative capacity (developed
countries) can or do mitigate more, so much as they should mitigate more. Seen this way, the
capability-based fairness principle is already playing an important role in the negotiations.
As can be seen from Table 2, there are significant disparities in the proposed
mitigative capacity / development indicators, particularly in the GDP per capita and energy
use variables. Not only are the developing countries of Asia, South America and Africa less
responsible for the climate change problem (as demonstrated in the previous section), they
are also less able to implement solutions. This is may be part of the reason why so much of
the climate negotiation process seems to revolve around entrenched divisions between
developed and developing countries (Grubb, 1995). Nevertheless, climate change cannot be
solved by developed countries alone: even if emissions in OECD countries were to go to zero
in 2013 after the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol, the two-degree threshold of radiative forcing
would be reached before 2050 based solely on emissions growth in the developing world
(Moore & MacCracken, 2009). Given that key industrializing countries will have to be part of
an effective climate agreement, the rest of this section will ask whether these nations are
more capable of mitigating short-lived as opposed to long-lived greenhouse gases, again
using black carbon and fossil-fuel CO2 emissions as representative examples.
Literacy
Life
Expectancy Rate

North America
Europe
Asia
South America
Sub-Saharan
Africa

Years

Percent

78.1
74.8
68.9
72.4

99
98.7
78.4
90.8

Per Capita
GDP
$ per Year
(PPP)
41,141
21,513
4,547
8,263

59.9

1,755

49.9

Energy Use
Tons of Oil Equivalent per
Person per Year
7.9
3.8
1.1
1.2
0.7

Table 2. Selected capability indicators from WRI (2008).

Figure 3 summarizes the key differences between mitigation of short-lived and longlived greenhouse gases, using the US and East Asia as examples of developed and developing
11

In its current formulation, mitigative capacity can become conceptually confused with responsibility because
it is generally accepted that the capacity to reduce emissions increases with emissions (note both the
technological options determinant proposed by Yohe (2001) and the energy use indicator included by WRI
(2008)). This is a result both of the observed relationship between economic development and emissions and of
the idea of subsistence emissions (the emissions needed to provide basic human needs) as opposed to luxury
emissions that are easier to mitigate (Shue, 1993). This not only makes it more difficult to distinguish between
responsibility and capability principles, but also results in the paradoxical conclusion that enhancing mitigative
capacity requires increasing emissions (Jones, 2009).
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regions respectively. Technologies to reduce black carbon (and to a lesser extent tropospheric
ozone) have already been developed and deployed in the United States in order to abate air
pollution, resulting in a reduction of black carbon emissions by over half between 1950 and
2000 and by almost three quarters since emissions peaked in 1920. Similar declines have
occurred in Western Europe since the 1950s. In contrast, no developed nation has managed to
truly bring fossil fuel CO2 emissions under control and there are no examples of large,
wealthy countries with per-capita emissions low enough to be considered sustainable. In
other words, it is as yet unclear what a low carbon society with a high standard of living
would look like, which is not the case for short-lived greenhouse gases that are also air
pollutants.
The fact that air pollution abatement technologies were deployed in the North long
before global warming became a serious policy concern speaks to another element of the
capability principle. Pollution control confers benefits as well as costs and a country is more
capable of controlling pollution to the extent that it can benefit from those efforts – not only
does it make it more economically beneficial, but also more politically feasible in that
measures can be justified to constituents on the basis of local environmental improvements.
However, in the case of long-lived greenhouse gas emissions, this aspect of capability
becomes irrelevant because it would require states likely to suffer the most from climate
change to be responsible for the most mitigation. This not only runs in direct opposition to
the responsibility principle but is entirely impractical given that the most vulnerable states are
the least developed countries with extremely limited resources (Ringius, et al., 2002).
Nevertheless, in the context of mitigating short-lived greenhouse gases, which has substantial
local and regional co-benefits, the distribution of abatement benefits may have a significant
impacts impact on a country’s capability to take action.
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Figure 3. Left – black carbon emissions in the US and East Asia. Right – Fossil fuel CO2 emissions (Bond,
et al., 2007; WRI, 2008).
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Benefit:
Black Carbon
and O3

Fossil
CO2

Local
Reduced
morbidity
and
mortality
from
indoor and urban
air pollution.

Regional
Reduced
ABC
formation
and
associated glacier melt,
monsoonal disruption
and surface dimming.

Global
Reduced
impacts
from
global climate
change.

Relative
Magnitude:
Time Scale:

Substantial

Small to moderate

Moderate

Immediate

Immediate to decadal

Benefit:

None

None

NA

NA

NA

NA

Multi-decadal
Reduced
impacts
from
global climate
change.
Very
Substantial
Multi-decadal

Fuel
Relative
Magnitude:
Time Scale:

Table 3. Comparison of the geographical and temporal distribution of benefits for short-lived greenhouse
gases and fossil fuel CO2 emissions. The magnitude of the benefits is subjectively assessed and is relative
to the total benefits for that action. Variations in time scale result from differential responses of different
natural systems. Based on Ramanathan (2008) and WHO (2005).12

Table 3 compares the geographical and temporal distribution of direct benefits from
the abatement of short-lived greenhouse gases and fossil-fuel CO2 emissions. Industrializing
countries will be more capable of mitigation to the extent that a greater fraction of benefits
occur locally and immediately as opposed to globally and in the distant future. In this respect,
it is clear that abatement of short-lived greenhouse gases is a far better fit with the capabilities
of industrializing countries in that it would result in an immediately-apparent improvement of
local air quality. In fact, governments in developing countries are already implementing
policies to improve local air quality: New Delhi is switching the municipal bus system to
compressed natural gas to reduce air pollution while Beijing is considering making pollutioncontrol measures implemented for the Olympics permanent (Oster, 2008). Integrating these
existing and emerging policies with climate change mitigation efforts could both generate
significant improvements for the climate and overcome the developed-developing state
deadlock in the negotiations.
It appears from the analysis above that industrializing countries will be more capable
of mitigating short-lived greenhouse gases than CO2 emissions. Not only does the technology
to reduce these emissions exist, but it has already been widely deployed in developed
countries with demonstrated success. Moreover, these policies were implemented because of
air quality concerns alone, which are becoming increasingly serious in major industrializing
countries. Many of these countries are already looking to improve air quality. Because of this,
incorporating these policies into the climate regime, with its associated financing and
technological transfer benefits, is far more likely to be within the capacity of developing
countries than setting a cap, even an expanding cap, on fossil fuel emissions.

12

Mitigation of fossil fuel CO2 emissions can have significant side benefits in terms of reduction of co-emitted
air pollutants such as sulfates, NOx, and particulate matter (including black carbon; IPCC, 2007a, pp. 619-690).
The magnitude of these benefits will vary depending on mitigation strategies used. For example, they may be
substantial for fuel switching to renewables but minimal for carbon sequestration.
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Conclusions: China and Lifetime Leveraging
Despite the fact that it is still an emerging economy, China, as the world’s largest greenhouse
gas emitter, is coming under increasing pressure to reduce its role in global climate change.
Partly in response to these concerns, the Chinese government has already adopted ambitious
energy intensity, carbon intensity and renewable energy targets (Wong & Light, 2009).
Moreover, the country is one of the world’s largest investors in renewable energy with a
rapidly growing wind energy sector and the world’s largest solar hot water market (Martinot
& Junfeng, 2007). Nevertheless, it has continued to resist accepting a binding cap on its
greenhouse gas emissions in the international negotiations (Doyle, 2009).
Adopting aggressive mitigation of short-lived greenhouse gases such as black carbon,
tropospheric ozone and methane as proposed in the ‘lifetime leveraging’ architecture would
not only reduce China’s contribution to climate change by reducing the atmospheric burden
of these pollutants and the associated radiative forcing, but would also address its substantial
air quality problems. China contains four of the ten most polluted cities in the world and
urban air pollution is responsible for approximately 1 in ten of every death in China (WHO,
2007). Policies to improve industrial combustion efficiency, to replace traditional biomass
burning with improved stoves, and to reduce tropospheric ozone formation all have
substantial health co-benefits consistent with China’s national development strategy.
Moreover, the technology to implement these policies exists and has already been deployed
in developed nations.
The analysis above of the responsibility and capability fairness principles has shown
that ‘lifetime leveraging’ would be a fair and highly climatically effective way for China to
engage in climate change mitigation. Furthermore, engaging in such a strategy would give
China political leverage to demand more ambitious mitigation targets for long-lived
greenhouse gases from the developed world, as well as similar cuts in short-lived greenhouse
gases from other industrializing nations. Taken together, these actions by developed and
industrializing countries would be enough to give the world a good chance of avoiding the
two degree threshold and of achieving the UNFCCC objective of avoiding ‘dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate’.
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Social Economic and Political Aspects of Climate Change
Anandi Sharan1

Abstract
Instead of the notion that “developing countries will be able to use emission backed currency
units to pay off their debts”, we find “developing countries must forgive developed countries
their $ debts so that the ecbu-based climate regime can be introduced.” Looking at foreign
debt as it stands, India may not yet have an interest in an emission backed currency unit
(ecbu), and other developing countries might or might not either, or too, not until the dollar
mess is sorted out. More important before the introduction of the emission backed currency
unit is the demise of the dollar economies and their demise cannot be hastened by the
introduction of the ecbu because the quantum of ecbu bears no relation at all to the quantum
of foreign exchange circulating in the developed country economies today. The data suggests
that the old international economy based on dollars is finished. There is no way these
countries can ever pay back their debt, nor should they, because they would need fossil fuels
to do so. Therefore all debts in all currencies in all countries must be forgiven. This is the
same as saying the economies have to collapse. Once these economies have agreed to
collapse, a new climate bank is established. Every person gets three point eight emission
backed currency units and three point eight permits in the first year, declining to one permit
per person in 2050. In this period the world trades, gently, prudently, as India has been doing,
just to get what we need from the international market, which is basically renewable energy
systems.

Five Tracks for Achieving Equitable Sustainable Outcomes
India is lower on the Global Hunger Index than at any time in its history. We will not fix this
if we go it alone. In order to achieve an equitable sustainable outcome for India and all
developing countries at the UNFCCC, the post 2012 agreement will consist of three, and
ideally four and, for a global economy based on equitable arrangements, five parallel tracks
of actions.
One - Cuts
One will be the 40% reduction against 1990 levels by developed countries by 2020, or 50% if
CDM is still in the picture (but is it still needed? see item four below).
Two – Contraction and Convergence
Two will be a global agreement to achieve the objective of the Convention based on the Bali
Plan of Action, in which a contraction and convergence scenario will see a global
commitment to a reduction to 1 tonne carbon dioxide equivalent per person by 2050. This is a
global cut of 50% against 1990 levels by 2050.
Three – Country-Specific Trajectories
Three, all countries with emissions above the equitable sustainable emissions level will track
their trajectory against the commitment to achieve a reduction of emissions to the global
equitable sustainable per capita level of one tonne per person by 2050. If this is agreed, the
UNFCCC would have to create country-specific emissions trajectories, to be agreed as a
1
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follow up to Copenhagen, where the commitment might be that each country agrees to
finalise its trajectory with the Secretariat by the following CoP 16 and begins implementing it
thereafter.
Four – Cap and Share
Four involves monitoring of items one, two and three which will be much facilitated if the
emission reductions under track one above for developed countries and a reduction by high
emitting developing countries to the equitable sustainable per capita emissions level by 2020
under tracks two and three are managed through global cap and share, and replace CDM.
Cap and share will replace CDM as the trade relationship between developed and developing
countries under the UNFCCC, and has the advantage of avoiding several peculiarities of the
CDM system such as offsetting, additionality and incremental costing. Cap and share is a
simple trade regime for transfer of financial resources for new technologies for the
developing countries based on equitable and sustainable per capita allocation of permits in a
global regime AND thus making it more difficult for developed countries to escape their
obligations. Under cap and share the UNFCCC converts the global cap every year into a per
capita equal emissions entitlement. It allocates these entitlements to each citizen in the world
equally, and oil importers and coal producers must buy them from the banks and post offices
that act as bundling agencies of these permits in each country as citizens sell them in return
for money. The money helps citizens to some extent adjust to rising energy prices, though it
will not be enough for citizens in developed countries who must cut their emissions to stay
within equitable sustainable per capita emission limits and must therefore change their
development path radically. Developed countries will buy permits from developing countries
in order to back the emissions required to build renewable energy systems for export. In any
case no producer anywhere can emit greenhouse gases if they are not backed by permits. In
this scenario developed countries will still not be at the equitable sustainable global average
by 2020, but will reach this sometime between 2030 and 2040. On the other hand higher
emitting developing countries like China will begin their reduction path now and may be at
the equitable sustainable per capita emissions level earlier. The trajectories of all countries
may be watched against the global equitable sustainable per capita emission level. But it is
the permit system of cap and share by a new UNFCCC bank/fund/CoP agency that will
ensure that reductions take place as does development through financial flows from selling
permits from permit-surplus countries to permit-deficit countries. Only if a country is above
the equitable sustainable per capita emissions level will it have to buy permits from outside
the country. If it is below it gains from selling permits. India will double or triple its GDP
overnight. As the permits limit oil, coal and gas production to within the global sustainable
emission reduction trajectory, the price of permits can be left to the market, but see five.
Under cap and share monitoring of a country’s emissions becomes a subset of monitoring
coal, oil and gas production which must not take place without permits. This is a different
type of policing than there has been hitherto (there has not been any) and will require
cooperation from governments through their climate and energy ministries. This is no big
deal as industrialisation in India has not served the poor in any case.
Five – Emission Backed Currency Units
Unlike a real currency the UNFCCC permits cannot be horded and they expire at the end of
the year of issue. The USD and the Euro, the Pound Sterling and all other currencies of high
emission countries will lose value rapidly as they adjust to their buying power in relation to
permits. At present there is much too much of this consumer money in circulation in
developed countries and on the other hand money for food and livelihoods and energy equity
is not circulating to the developing countries. Thus there is a need for a new global currency
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backed by permits. The currency is distributed on the basis of population, as are permits, and
starts off at the parity value of one emission backed currency unit to one permit. Thus if
Ireland needs permits it must sell something to India for which India pays in ecbu, with
which Ireland in turn can buy permits for its excess oil or coal requirement, and there may be
competition for permits which will see their price rise to 2 or 3 emission backed currency
units for one permit. In this case the UNFCCC money management institution will recognise
that there is too much demand for fossil fuels and too much global trade, and it will take these
emission backed currency units (ecbu) out of circulation the following year to restore the
parity between the ecbu and a permit.
These are the five parallel tracks of action needed. After 2050 the emissions of 1
tonne carbon dioxide equivalent per person will be reviewed in the context of global and
country-level sinks and the UNFCCC will move the world towards a net zero emissions of
greenhouse gases regime. Most emissions will probably be used for high value internet
communication to facilitate the UNFCCC process. The sustainable per capita emission level
is assumed to be 3.8 tonnes carbon dioxide equivalent in Year 1, which is the average for
2006 less 15% for the Adaptation Fund. The projected transfers of permits from 2010 to 2050
are given in table 1. It is not possible to track the price of permits in ecbu at this stage, but it
should never remain very far away from parity given the monetary management expected.
You see that India and the USA are at opposite ends in the table. India has an historic interest
in achieving agreement on all five tracks to meet the objective of the UNFCCC.
Table 1: Surplus deficit of permits year 1

Country
Adaptation Fund
India
Indonesia
Bangladesh
Pakistan
Nigeria
Brazil
Ethiopia
Philippines
DR Congo
Vietnam
Myanmar
Tanzania
Egypt
Sudan
Kenya
Uganda
Colombia
Nepal
Afghanistan
Morocco
Mozambique
Peru
Cote d'Ivoire
Madagascar
Yemen

Surplus/deficit of permits Year 1
-4,003,329,227
-3,202,273,334
-602,359,134
-577,122,495
-558,600,283
-480,077,152
-350,630,579
-317,078,777
-279,995,995
-255,017,837
-241,663,971
-178,049,307
-165,681,206
-158,768,549
-150,399,983
-142,993,063
-126,420,095
-110,275,003
-110,273,357
-109,894,166
-89,482,937
-83,267,400
-81,033,480
-74,276,669
-73,788,081
-71,745,654
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Cameroon
Sri Lanka
Burkina Faso
Niger
Malawi
Cambodia
Mali
Zambia
Chad
Senegal
Guatemala
Angola
Rwanda
Guinea
Zimbabwe
Haiti
Algeria
Turkey
Burundi
Benin
Ecuador
Syria
Bolivia
Laos
Togo
Honduras
Sierra Leone
Paraguay
Papua New Guinea
Dominican Republic
Tajikistan
Eritrea
Tunisia
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Central African Rep
Kyrgyzstan
Liberia
Cuba
Georgia
Costa Rica
DRKorea
Serbia
Mauritania
Congo
Ghana
Albania
Lesotho

-67,750,991
-65,199,600
-60,673,115
-58,792,174
-58,461,586
-56,487,810
-49,766,105
-47,362,181
-43,473,718
-42,822,650
-41,664,705
-38,609,195
-38,170,458
-37,750,882
-37,371,416
-36,566,614
-34,481,228
-34,262,889
-31,972,287
-31,905,135
-26,455,697
-24,632,493
-24,266,749
-23,869,183
-22,698,551
-21,181,677
-21,018,539
-20,816,887
-20,528,356
-19,549,858
-19,390,903
-19,046,658
-18,044,098
-17,844,930
-17,348,817
-16,783,330
-15,822,965
-14,527,837
-14,332,723
-11,812,743
-11,081,797
-10,606,507
-9,856,000
-9,586,202
-8,672,265
-8,455,930
-7,893,824
-7,696,482
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Moldova
Uruguay
Gambia, The
Guinea-Bissau
Namibia
Timor-Leste
Somalia
Swaziland
Iraq
Western Sahara
Jordan
Botswana
Comoros
Mongolia
Bhutan
Fiji
Solomon Islands
Cape Verde
Guyana
Gabon
Armenia
Reunion
Vanuatu
Mauritius
Montenegro
Thailand
Maldives
Sao Tome
Samoa
Lebanon
Martinique
Kiribati
Macedonia
Saint Lucia
Tonga
Saint Vincent
Dominica
Belize
Grenada
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Helena
Cook Islands
Niue
Montserrat
Saint Pierre
Latvia
Nauru
Bosnia and Herz.

-7,376,513
-6,588,310
-6,319,267
-5,799,760
-5,492,988
-4,449,800
-3,716,362
-3,470,953
-3,321,820
-2,964,531
-2,795,646
-2,791,521
-2,512,863
-2,414,803
-2,344,613
-1,992,518
-1,831,340
-1,631,478
-1,258,291
-1,140,999
-1,003,403
-837,000
-810,296
-751,427
-626,000
-592,811
-557,616
-541,794
-537,749
-455,856
-406,000
-343,804
-303,729
-265,890
-254,332
-225,495
-163,737
-112,822
-79,651
-11,712
-8,083
-5,239
-2,000
23,226
48,430
94,756
98,471
259,910
161

Suriname
Djibouti
Cayman Islands
Barbados
Greenland
Antigua & Barbuda
Faroe Islands
Seychelles
Macau
Guam
Jamaica
Malta
Argentina
Lithuania
Panama
Iceland
Equatorial Guinea
Chile
Croatia
Bahamas
Gibraltar
Cyprus
Taiwan
Brunei
Slovenia
Azerbaijan
Luxembourg
Romania
Estonia
Switzerland
Uzbekistan
Slovakia
Hungary
Bulgaria
Oman
Portugal
Sweden
New Zealand
Puerto Rico
Belarus
Bahrain
Mexico
Norway
Turkmenistan
Libya
Ireland
Denmark
Finland

266,386
278,220
307,654
395,102
401,997
515,937
533,729
641,222
671,167
1,306,107
1,527,429
1,632,962
1,729,514
1,910,194
2,531,660
2,532,316
3,167,739
3,632,776
4,268,862
4,385,629
4,848,949
6,658,053
9,385,118
9,399,051
10,056,585
10,156,854
11,061,444
13,193,266
13,731,819
17,133,262
17,379,950
17,396,367
20,703,957
21,187,067
21,467,632
21,663,489
23,810,380
24,011,775
26,975,051
27,581,063
27,953,597
28,100,318
29,092,971
32,235,045
34,489,864
35,502,289
38,633,034
39,272,332
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Israel
Austria
Trinidad & Tobago
Hong Kong
Venezuela
Greece
Czech Republic
Malaysia
Kuwait
Qatar
Belgium
Singapore
UAE
Ukraine
Poland
Kazakhstan
France
Netherlands
Spain
Italy
Iran
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
South Korea
Australia
Great Britain
Canada
Germany
Japan
China
Russia
America

43,745,103
46,330,550
54,454,473
59,574,415
61,763,385
69,537,306
78,737,621
81,014,270
82,758,270
86,540,003
111,460,877
133,554,765
147,097,930
147,707,064
154,944,297
160,921,584
175,190,674
199,720,566
245,786,595
255,396,764
259,074,556
312,206,059
314,995,398
326,587,142
360,997,273
362,960,584
508,748,111
541,980,442
759,097,869
1,055,916,534
1,150,537,573
5,075,395,262

The Gold-Dollar System and Its Demise
It is no use getting ahead of one’s self and writing about economic ideas that have no bearing
on the real world - yet. Thus for our ideas to move to a second stage – where details are
worked out –the first stage must be completed. In so far as it is demonstrable, we wish to
demonstrate here why an emission backed currency unit (ecbu) to replace the USD as the
global trading currency will not suffer from the same short comings that caused the golddollar system of the last few decades to collapse; and this, it is argued here, is because of the
specific circumstances that make it necessary for central banks to adopt the new global
currency, not as a reserve currency, but as a trading currency. Reserves, under this new
system, will be entirely in the national currency. There will be sink capacity and food
production capacity and land and such like. But it will not be possible to hoard or save the
global trading currency, the ecbu, as it is linked to the declining supply of permits. Globally it
will be interesting, to say the least, whether it will still be possible or advisable let alone
desirable for the middle class to hold property or investments in second countries. How will
they get there to enjoy them, after all? It is apparent that the comparative benefits of holding
an emission backed currency unit relative to dollars cannot be calculated. In other words,
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central banks cannot know what reserve policy will make their country better off – and
perhaps they cannot even define precisely what “being better off” is. This was said by Milton
Gilbert, in 1968, with regard to holding gold or dollars, but applies as much to ebcus.
However today we know that “being better off” at the very least means avoiding the
temperature rise associated with excessive anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Thus the
purpose of this section is to provide some arguments for cap and share and for adoption of the
ecbu and to lay to rest some misgivings that people might have because of their experience of
the international gold-dollar system. Ideally this section will contribute to answering
objections there still might be that have kept the nearly twenty- year long proposal for a
global climate bank first mooted by G77 and China and AOSIS in 1991 out of consideration;
and therefore thus to hurry forward its acceptance at CoP 15.
India, ever since 1898, has provided the classic instance of the working of an
exchange standard. (The Gold Standard in Theory and History, 1985).
India has for at least one hundred years adjusted its currency system to the
imperatives of the global economy, first as a colony, and then as an independent state. To
understand India’s position we must first understand that the reluctance of all and sundry to
criticise America is rooted in this evolution of the colonial system into what we have today.
The reason America did not sign the Kyoto Protocol was that there were “few in official
circles bold enough to draw the apparently logical conclusion that the dollar was in
fundamental disequilibrium”. (Adapted from Milton Gilbert, 1968). No one questioned the
value of the economic growth that was made possible by the USA’s large balance of trade
deficits. With or without the oil-dollar investments and the tortuous commercial banking
instruments to get them into circulation of recent months and years, official circles never
drew the next logical conclusion of moving to devalue the dollar, and instead they thought
up, are continuing to think up “all sorts of pseudo measures for the long run correction of the
deficit.” “However, there is not a single successful case of long-run adjustment of a sizeable
balance-of-payment deficit – apart from the special cases of reconstruction of war damage to
the productive potential of the economy. .. The United States of America in particular has had
a long-term programme to restore balance for seven years and yet the goal is as elusive as
ever. Failure to face up to this reflects political attitudes – not economic analysis.” (Milton
Gilbert, 1968). In 1964 Albert Hart, Nicholas Kaldor and Jan Tinbergen proposed an
international commodity reserve currency (ICRC). “The scheme [was] not designed to
stabilize national price levels because countries are free to pursue autonomous monetary and
exchange rate policies but rather it [was] intended to stabilize the “real value” of the
international unit of account.” (Richard N. Cooper, 1982). Gold would be stabilised against
the ICRC. Others proposed indexation instead. Underlying all these attempts at reform was
thus the hunt for the holy grail of “real value” to control money supply globally. Today this
real value is climate stability and thus economic policy and monetary policy must adapt to
become agencies to limit emissions. This in turn has led to the call for establishing cap and
share on the basis of population.
Will The Supply of Emission Backed Currency Units be Too Tight?
Consideration of the emission backed currency unit involves three quantities: the ecbu, paper
money (including demand deposits) called Rupees; and some composite of goods and
services in which members of the public are directly interested, for example a composite that
we can call goods. There are three prices linking these three quantities: the Rupee price of
goods, the ecbu price of goods, and the Rupee price of ecbus, or the other commodity terms
of trade between the ecbus and other goods. Because any one of these relative prices can be
derived from the other two, only two of them are independent: (Rs/goods) = (ecbu/goods) x
(Rupee/ecbu) or (Rs/G) = (e/G) x (Rs/e) where G stands for Goods, and e stands for ecbu and
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Rs stands for Rupee. Inflation involves the first of these three prices, Rs/G. Now because
India will have a large stock of ecbus, officials in attempting to limit inflation would fix the
third price, the Rupee price of the ecbu. This can be done because the government has a
sufficiently large stock of ecbu relative to the stock of Rupees outstanding and it can thus
devote control of the supply of the Rupee to that objective. Alternatively if the economy must
be managed to fit with the global economy through which ecbus and thus permits to use fossil
fuels are available, inflation can be avoided by going to a pure ecbu currency in which
‘Rupees’ are ecbu. Now if ‘Rupees’ are ebcu, India will in effect have the new global trading
currency as its national currency. Every year as the supply of permits tightens, the
‘Rupee/ebcu’ should become more valuable, but as its supply is limited by the cap on permits
and by the need to limit global growth, the Rs/e remains constant. Economic activity is
internal activity based on the availability of permits to buy fossil fuels. In India this scenario
is possible because of the large ebcu surplus in relation to requirements. Now if on the other
hand ‘USDs’ are ebcus in America, America will also have the new global trading currency
as its national currency, but it will have a deficit, as its demand for fossil fuels is much
greater than its allocated permits. Thus America must devalue its currency and withdraw
large quantities of USDs from circulation in order to manage its balance of payments. This
process of adjusting to the ebcu will in effect be the transition to an economy designed to
ensure climate stability and equal access to energy that the globe has been waiting for from
the USA, but which was not possible to achieve for the USA without the rest of the world
figuring out how to a control of the global money supply, which is the same as saying
controlling America’s balance of payments deficit. (Everyone, incidentally, will be able to
pay off their dollar loans with ebcu and thus get out of the dollar). So whilst India will find it
easy for ‘Rupees’ to be ebcus, America will find it exceedingly difficult in direct proportion
to its inability to generate wealth without fossil fuels. In the transition they will earn some
ecbus by exporting renewable energy systems. This is because their economy in the transition
requires them to demand more ecbus than their fair share and they thus must trade for a time.
What will stop this system falling apart due to a too tight a regulation of the global money
flows and global trade is the fact that permits expire and ebcus are withdrawn from
circulation if the ebcu price of a permit rises above 1. As there is no incentive to hoard (save)
ecbus, trade is encouraged, until every country has a demand for ecbus that is identical to the
equitable sustainable per capita supply, and trade falls off. At this point trade will be very
low, and this will occur at the very latest once caps are at the equitable sustainable level of 1
tonne per person per year in 2050; all people in the USA will be walking and cycling to work
just as they do in India. Fossil fuels will hardly be burnt at all, but used for very high value
purposes. Only the UNFCCC with some part of the Adaptation Fund ecbus will have some
free ecbus to trade for precious oil in case its renewable energy supplies are not enough to run
its giant computer. Thus India and the rest of developing countries that are under the
equitable sustainable level of greenhouse gas emissions today will benefit from global trade
in permits allocated on the basis of population; and will benefit from the introduction of the
ecbu that ensures that only a recognised global trading currency can be used for buying
ecbus, thus effectively limiting unsustainable purchasing power in developed countries and
forcing them to build up their export trade in renewable energy technologies that developing
countries will be able to pay for in their ecbus which are also allocated on the basis of
population.
Is There Too Much Discretion?
Another objection, other than the objection above that money will be too tight, might be that
the ecbu authorities are empowered to vary periodically the official price of permits, and
since thus the system would embody discretion rather than automaticity, it would be bereft of
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its central feature which is to introduce price stability. But this is to confuse an emission
backed currency system with other gold-dollar systems of the past. Automaticity in global
monetary affairs is an illusion and goes counter to the need to stabilize the “real value” of the
international unit of account, which today is the value of the limited global resource, viz.
climate stability . Thus we are not interested in price stability primarily, but rather in the
preservation of an underlying “real value”. In fact India will be able to decide as time goes
on whether it allows inflation, i.e. rise in price of goods in Rupees, Rs/G. Instead of sticking
to the pure ecbu currency in which Rupees are ebcus, officials would allow a floating third
price, the Rupee price of the ecbu. This can be done as we mentioned above if the
government has a sufficiently large stock of ecbu relative to the stock of Rupees outstanding
and if, when necessary, it devotes control of the supply of the Rupee to that objective. In
India this is nothing other than what has been going on all this time in relation to the golddollar system. This time round however there is no scarcity of foreign reserve currency as the
limiting factor, but the scarcity of permits. Because we have less demand for permits than
what we are entitled to, we have a surplus with which to buy what we need and even after the
transition, we will never be in a position that is worse than where we are now, i.e. at one
tonne carbon dioxide equivalent per person per year – this is provided we control population
somewhat and make efforts to improve sinks, which will be easy once we no longer have to
contend with the industrial model of development that was patently not suited to our purpose.
Thus India has nothing to lose what so ever in agreeing to a global climate regime
based on contraction and convergence, with the proviso that a new global emission backed
currency unit must be introduced to control global trade to within the limit set by the global
cap. If India wishes to continue in the global system it has a responsibility to design a global
system that works. Though others might argue that it is incumbent on the USA as the country
with the deficit to solve its deficit problem, the fact is that unless the world argues strongly
for the viability of an alternative, the USA will remain the de facto provider of global trade
and investment capital. This scenario is incompatible with an equitable solution where
everyone must have energy equity in the context of global caps to preserve climate stability.
Relationship Between Foreign Debt and Climate Stability
Let us analyse now the interesting relationship between foreign debt and climate stability –
the gross foreign debt of some countries is listed in the Reserve Bank of India reports. We
will analyse them in relation to their position on the emission rankings table, with the aim of
understanding the effect of introducing an emission backed currency unit (ebcu). Remember
that the reason we are introducing the ebcu is because we found what economists have been
hunting for the holy grail of “real value” underlying the international economy and that we
think they can now be pointed to global climate stability as that holy grail. Here is the table
(see table 2).
What we find is that instead of the notion that “developing countries will be able to
use ecbus to pay off their debts”, what we are finding is “developing countries must forgive
developed countries their $ debts so that the ecbu-based climate regime can be introduced.”
Looking at foreign debt as it stands, India may not yet have an interest in an emission backed
currency unit, and other developing countries might or might not either, or too, not until the
dollar mess is sorted out. More important before the introduction of the emission backed
currency unit is the demise of the dollar economies and their demise cannot be hastened by
the introduction of the ecbu because the quantum of ecbu bears no relation at all to the
quantum of foreign exchange circulating in the developed country economies today. The
table suggests that the old international economy based on dollars is finished. There is no way
these countries can ever pay back their debt, nor should they, because they would need fossil
fuels to do so. Therefore: All debts in all currencies in all countries must be forgiven. This is
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the same as saying the countries have to collapse, well, not the countries we should say, but
their economies. Once these economies have agreed to collapse, a new climate bank is
established. Every person gets three point eight emission backed currency units and three
point eight permits. Then the world starts trading again, gently, prudently, as India has been
doing, just to get what they need from the international market, which is basically renewable
energy systems. Government concentrate much more on doing what is right for the people,
and forget about the international rat race they could not keep up with. So now we have the
global ecbu economy. If the price of a permit goes above 1 ecbu, the surplus ecbus are taken
out of the market the following year.
Are Emission Backed Currency Units Really Necessary?
Let’s think it through again. We must again look at the table below. We must again wonder
what would happen if there were only caps and no global emission backed currency unit.
Well, perhaps the rembini would step in, and perhaps the Rupee. But this transition from the
dollar to the rembini is fraught with difficulties because the USA and the rest of the
developed countries would not go quietly. The table shows the countries with the biggest per
capita foreign debts today in the first column and their per capita foreign debts in the second
column. In the fourth column a positive number denotes that the country is a permit deficit
country, i.e. the country has to reduce its emission of greenhouse gases and buy permits from
a country with surplus ecbus (a surplus is denoted by a minus symbol). A developed country
can only get permits by selling something to a developing country needs and is willing to pay
for in ecbus; so that then the developed countries can then use the ecbus to buy permits for its
own needs. The last column indicates that by 2050 there will be virtually no trade except
between oil and coal producers and oil and coal consumers to the extent that the sinks in any
one country allows such imports. This is what is meant by net zero emissions. National
currencies will be generating local value through community economic systems, and the
country governments will be managing the economy to ensure adaptation to climate change.
We can see that by dollar standards neither China or India have much interest in international
currency reform. Both have very low per capita gross foreign debt. But in ecbu standards
India has much to gain, and its trade with China would increase. This would help bring up
RETs in India, perhaps. India could also trade with the USA. In any case, it is seen that the
developed country dollar debtor countries are all also emission debtors – in other words, there
is a direct relationship between their profligacy in financial terms and their inability to control
their emissions. Checking one, and I believe this is the argument we are making when we
suggest introducing the ebcu, checks the other. But of course checking emissions can be done
just with caps. There is in principle no need for global currency reform. Or is there? Looking
at the numbers, one simply cannot see the transition occurring in developed countries without
a total and utter bankruptcy of the countries, after which they submit to a global climate
regime run democratically on an equitable basis. The high debt countries are resisting
managing their foreign debt for the same reason they are resisting limiting their emissions.
Now of course, ideally India would have found its holy grail earlier, in welfare, or
enhancement of freedoms and such like, but these were all subsumed within a global
economic paradigm shared with all other countries, and so even though economists tried to
find something that India could specifically do that was different from what developed
countries were doing, because the people were poorer and needed faster growth, in reality
they did not do anything much different, but simply deployed technology and education and
monetary and trade measures according to how they were taught to increase output faster and
create more jobs, with the result that India’s GDP at factor cost at current prices in the year
2008-09 is around Rs. 49,89,804 crore, and the average income per person is apparently
38084 Rs per person per year, though it is very unevenly distributed. But leaving income
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inequality aside, India has fallen steadily on the Global Hunger Index, and by any measure it
is not eradicating poverty.
A Reality Check
One may say that economists have failed us as indeed have politicians and political theorists
who observe without prescribing and then laugh because of a sudden realisation of a lack of
congruence between a concept and the real objects that had somehow been thought of by way
of the concept, and thus they laugh to express the incongruence, and this laughter I think is
probably happening more and more frequently in the halls of academic learning and indeed in
the offices of finance ministries around the world. And of course this incongruence is a
laughing matter, but that is not the end of the matter, because we realises that the people of
India, each individual person, and indeed each individual person on earth, is hostage to the
collective failure of these leaders to perceive things as they are, a relatively small group of
people whom we here call officials, but who include politicians and other decision-makers. If
we compare the gross foreign debts of the countries listed above with the emission backed
currency units each of these countries would get, we find that there is absolutely no
correlation. In other words these countries have been spending at the expense of climate
stability, and we all just stood idly by, and watched, and complained, but joined in; and we
will all continue to do so, unless we wake up, and then the “we” becomes “India”, and it is
India who takes the lead and suggests at the UNFCCC that the global community take all
hard currencies out of circulation and collapse these developed country economies and
introduce the ebcu. So there we have the interesting relationship between dollars and
emissions - an interesting relationship – of course why would there not be, we are looking at
the numbers for the reason that of course it is. And just by the way, it is also interesting that
the expected income in the UK from the sale of emission permits through the European
Emission Trading scheme as it is today, is being handled by – yes, the UK Debt Management
Office, which is managing a debt of no less than 10.746 trillion US dollars. Developed
countries may have come up with the idea of emission permits, but it is up to developing
countries to place them on the right footing. And in India we have known all along that there
have to be equal per capita emission rights and convergence of per capita emissions to a
global sustainable level of say 1 tonne of carbon dioxide per person per year by 2050. And in
China an eminent professor in China too recently called for a global climate pact that would
involve each country being allowed to emit a certain amount, based on their populations. So
what we are saying here is nothing other than what any economist who reads and writes in
order to present the facts as they are, would herself say, except that we must put the whole
thing in relation to the massive foreign debts of these developed countries today, and the need
to collapse them, as soon as possible. There will be welfare impacts of course, as there
already are in Ireland. But there is no way these lifestyles can continue. All countries must
have simple life styles – how many more different ways does this have to be said? PS: There
was a rumour that Germany does not like foreign debts because of war-time memories. The
figures indicate otherwise.
Table 2: Gross foreign debt exceeds by far available ecbus

Country
Ireland
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Netherlands

$/cap
foreign
debt
520,956
187,725
173,602
161,104

bn
$ million ebcu
deficit /surplus
foreign
in 2010
debt
2,391
35.52
1,426
17.16
10,746
362.73
2,683
199.67
168

target
ebcu
deficit /surplus
by 2050
0
0
0
0

Belgium
Norway
Denmark
Austria
France
Germany
Finland
Spain
Portugal
Greece
United States
Italy
Australia
Slovenia
Canada
Hungary
Estonia
Latvia
Japan
Israel
Croatia
Lithuania
Slovak Rep
South Korea
Czech Rep
Poland
Bulgaria
Kazakhstan
Chile
Russia
Turkey
Uruguay
Argentina
Malaysia
Ukraine
Tunisia
Mexico
Costa Rica
Georgia
El Salvador
South Africa
Belarus
Brazil
Peru
Moldova
Armenia
Colombia
Thailand

151,314
115,038
107,409
95,895
81,974
66,311
64,611
53,202
46,627
44,725
42,902
42,454
38,992
28,166
24,058
20,947
20,169
18,958
16,253
12,289
11,746
10,235
9,801
8,765
8,429
6,966
6,832
6,694
3,995
3,851
3,822
3,324
3,146
2,949
2,321
1,928
1,915
1,900
1,681
1,674
1,535
1,518
1,397
1,197
1,107
1,028
983
951

1,619
559
589
862
5,135
5,441
345
2,411
500
500
13,627
2,551
839
57
815
209
27
42
2,064
90
52
33
53
425
88
265
51
105
68
540
289
11
128
82
105
20
212
9
7
10
78
15
273
35
4
3
46
65
169

111.47
29.08
38.64
49.61
175.38
541.58
39.29
245.62
21.68
69.56
5075.90
255.42
360.97
10.06
508.69
20.74
13.74
0.09
759.43
43.71
4.28
1.92
17.37
326.41
78.71
154.81
21.22
161.00
3.60
1151.01
-34.07
-6.58
1.63
80.95
147.66
-18.05
27.66
-11.09
-11.81
-17.84
315.07
27.61
-349.81
-81.11
-7.37
-0.99
-110.19
-0.68

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Indonesia
Kyrgyz Rep
Bolivia
China
Egypt
India
Adaptation Fund
Bangladesh
Pakistan
Nigeria
Ethiopia
Philippines
DR Congo
Vietnam
Myanmar
Tanzania
Sudan
Kenya
Uganda
Nepal
Afghanistan
Morocco
Mozambique
Cote d'Ivoire
Madagascar
Yemen
Cameroon
Sri Lanka
Burkina Faso
Niger
Malawi
Cambodia
Mali
Zambia
Chad
Senegal
Guatemala
Angola
Rwanda
Guinea
Zimbabwe
Haiti
Algeria
Burundi
Benin
Ecuador
Syria
Laos

653
604
570
501
385
185
0

152
3
6
678
32
225
0
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-602.22
-15.82
-24.28
1056.23
-158.81
-3206.18
-4003.33
-577.12
-558.60
-480.08
-317.08
-280.00
-255.02
-241.66
-178.05
-165.68
-150.40
-142.99
-126.42
-110.27
-109.89
-89.48
-83.27
-74.28
-73.79
-71.75
-67.75
-65.20
-60.67
-58.79
-58.46
-56.49
-49.77
-47.36
-43.47
-42.82
-41.66
-38.61
-38.17
-37.75
-37.37
-36.57
-34.48
-31.97
-31.91
-26.46
-24.63
-23.87

0
0
0
0
0
0
-1500.00
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Togo
Honduras
Sierra Leone
Paraguay
Papua New Guinea
Dominican Republic
Tajikistan
Eritrea
Nicaragua
Central African Republic
Liberia
Cuba
Georgia
DRKorea
Serbia
Mauritania
Congo (Brazzaville)
Ghana
Albania
Lesotho
Gambia, The
Guinea-Bissau
Namibia
Timor-Leste (East Timor)
Somalia
Swaziland
Iraq
Western Sahara
Jordan
Botswana
Comoros
Mongolia
Bhutan
Fiji
Solomon Islands
Cape Verde
Guyana
Gabon
Reunion
Vanuatu
Mauritius
Montenegro
Maldives
Sao Tome and Principe
Samoa
Lebanon
Martinique
Kiribati

-22.70
-21.18
-21.02
-20.82
-20.53
-19.55
-19.39
-19.05
-17.35
-16.78
-14.53
-14.33
-11.81
-10.61
-9.86
-9.59
-8.67
-8.46
-7.89
-7.70
-6.32
-5.80
-5.49
-4.45
-3.72
-3.47
-3.32
-2.96
-2.80
-2.79
-2.51
-2.41
-2.34
-1.99
-1.83
-1.63
-1.26
-1.14
-0.84
-0.81
-0.75
-0.63
-0.56
-0.54
-0.54
-0.46
-0.41
-0.34
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Macedonia
Saint Lucia
Tonga
Saint Vincent
Dominica
Belize
Grenada
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Helena
Cook Islands
Niue

-0.30
-0.27
-0.25
-0.23
-0.16
-0.11
-0.08
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
0.00

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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The Non-Cooperator Pays Principle:
Pragmatic Norms and The US-China Mitigation Standoff
Jonathan Symons1

Abstract
If the US and EU agree to stringent emission targets in a post-Kyoto successor agreement but
China does not, would carbon tariffs on Chinese imports be justified? A dominant view of
climate justice affirms the 'polluter pays principle' as the most appropriate distributive
principle for allocating the costs of mitigating climate change and asserts that carbon tariffs
on developing world imports are unjust. Against this widely accepted standard of justice this
paper defends the appropriateness of more pragmatic climate norms. In particular the paper
defends a forward-looking 'non-cooperator pays' principle which states that under the
condition of anarchy, actors negotiating to secure a public good that cannot be provided
without wide-spread cooperation are justified in seeking to induce cooperation by imposing
costs on non-cooperators, even if this cost-allocation would be considered unjust in the
absence of the collective action problem. This principle’s most likely application would be in
the form of border tax adjustments (or carbon tariffs) that equalise the embodied cost of
greenhouse gas emissions on imports and exports. This position is contextualised within a
broader argument that the climate regime’s norm of ‘common but differentiated
responsibility’ is a barrier to the creation of an effective international climate agreement.
Taking the interests of the most vulnerable climate victims seriously may require us to move
beyond existing conceptions of inter-state justice and to accept that the distribution of costs
under a climate agreement that is both effective and politically viable may not reflect
historical responsibility.
1 Introduction
The first report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1990 marked
the beginning of what might be called a ‘twenty years crisis’ in the global climate regime. In
the two decades since a scientific consensus emerged warning of the dangers of global
warming, emissions of greenhouse gasses (GHG) have accelerated and the atmospheric
concentration of CO2 has tracked steadily upward from around 350 ppm in 1988 to
approximately 385 ppm in 2008 (Hansen et al., 2008). Predictions suggest that on the basis of
existing emissions alone the globe is now committed to a period of significant warming,
diminishing biodiversity, climatic instability and unnecessary human suffering.
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007: 45-54) This continuing failure of
international cooperation has prompted many suggested reforms of the climate regime (e.g.
Müller, 2008; Müller and Winkler, 2008; Prins and Rayner, 2007; Tickell, 2008). Most
normative analysis calls on the developed world to finance the bulk of climate mitigation and
adaptation measures and to repay their accrued ‘climate debt’ (Caney, 2005; Dobson, 2006;
Mace, 2006: 55; Vanderheiden, 2008).
This article cuts against this analysis by arguing that there is a trade-off between
fairness and effectiveness in the climate regime. It outlines why a more ‘pragmatic’ set of
climate regime norms would be more likely to lead to stringent global emission cuts and
proposes that these pragmatic norms might be normatively preferable to ineffective idealist
1
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norms. This argument draws on realist conceptions of political ethics such as those articulated
in Edward Carr’s analysis of the ‘twenty years crisis’ of ‘idealist’ policy-making which led to
WWII (1946). I argue that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s
(UNFCCC) incorporation of a norm of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ (CDR)
involves an analogous excess of idealism. CDR has become an impediment to effective
global action.
My argument springs from comparative analysis of the domestic politics of climate
change and the barriers within national political processes to the attainment of an effective
global agreement. The Kyoto Protocol set emission limits for developed states but not for the
developing world. In doing so it threatened to undermine the competitiveness of first world
industry. As a result, trade-exposed industries became implacable domestic opponents of
Kyoto’s ratification and implementation. In several states including the US this opposition
appears to have tipped the political balance against acceptance of significant emission limits.
This analysis of barriers to collective action within both international and domestic politics of
climate change forms the practical justification for the proposed ‘non-cooperator pays
principle’. Cooperation – in the form of international agreement to limit GHG emissions – is
key to the success of the climate regime. And yet, for reasons relating to the uneven
distribution of costs and benefits both within and between states, as well as the moral hazards
that emerge from the spatial and temporal separation of pollution from its consequences,
effective international co-operation remains unlikely. Given the value of the public good (a
habitable climate) at stake, and the severity of the cooperation problem, I argue that
traditional standards of justice might need to be suspended. It is more important that
cooperation and non-cooperation be rewarded and penalized within an effective climate
agreement than that the agreement achieves conventional standards of fairness.
The proposed ‘non-cooperator pays principle’ responds to the difficulty of solving
collective action problems in the absence of government. It proposes that under the condition
of anarchy, actors negotiating to secure a public good that cannot be provided without widespread cooperation are justified in seeking to induce cooperation by imposing costs on noncooperators, even if this cost-allocation would be considered unjust in the absence of the
collective action problem. This principle suggests that participants in an international
agreement that promises to stabilise atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations
would be justified in seeking to impose some costs on non-participants (e.g. through border
tax adjustments). While it has long been recognised that the climate regime should contain
incentives to attract developing world participation the ‘non-cooperator pays principle’ would
also justify penalties, such as carbon tariffs, which are currently perceived as unjust to the
developing world. The non-cooperator pays principle should not be the climate regime’s only
distributive principle. However, recognition of its normative appropriateness might be an
important step toward a more effective climate regime.
My argument proceeds in four parts. Section two briefly outlines the origins of the
norms of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CDR), ‘historical responsibility’ and
‘polluter pays’ and considers the relationship between these norms and the provision of
global public goods. The third section reviews the failure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto
protocol to limit global GHG emissions. It argues that in the last two decades the climate
regime’s idealist norms have worked against the acceptance of stringent greenhouse policies
within the domestic politics of many industrialised states.
Section four seeks to assess how this crisis of ineffective policy-making might be
ended by drawing implications for the design of an effective global climate regime from
comparative analyses of the national politics of climate policy. It proposes that if a global
climate regime is to both set stringent emission limits and be politically viable within
powerful industrialized states it must not disadvantage first world industry vis-à-vis
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developing world competitors. Just as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer induced developing world membership through a mix of carrots and sticks
(technology transfer funding and trade incentives) so must the international climate regime
restructure the calculus of state incentives so that participation is in the interest of the
developing world. Border tax adjustments (BTA) are valuable tools because they protect the
competitive position of developed world industries and also create incentives for developing
world participation in the climate regime.
The final section articulates the case within non-utopian normative theory for
‘pragmatic’ measures, such as BTAs, which would impose costs on non-parties to a global
climate agreement. It draws on the realist tradition of political ethics, which argues that
international institutions must be designed, via a balance of pragmatic and idealist thinking,
to work with the forces that motivate states. The argument for a non-cooperator pays
principle emerges from the need for norms that are effective in solving collective problems.
At first blush this argument – that an effective climate regime should be imposed on a
reluctant developing world by powerful states, and that such an agreement must not
disadvantage first world industry – might seem a piece of sophistry defending global iniquity.
However, if we place a high value on averting a catastrophic climate outcome then a
philosophical commitment to survival justify pragmatic norms. Likewise, assessed in terms
of Rawls’ difference principle (applied globally) the relative justice of competing approaches
should turn on the empirical question of which is most favorable to the earth’s least
advantaged people.
2 Global Public Goods and Norms Promoting Cooperation
There are three distinct ethical questions at stake in an assessment of the non-cooperator pays
principle. First, when, if ever, is it just for actors who contribute to securing a public good to
impose a fair share of costs on actors who do not contribute. Second, is it ever just for actors
to induce cooperation by promising to impose punitive costs on non-cooperators. Third,
should normative standards for state behaviour take into account domestic constraints on the
state’s freedom of action, or should the state be judged against ideal standards.
The third question concerns how to judge ethics in the context of a ‘two level game’
where action in each game is constrained by conditions in the other game (i.e. statespeople
whose international actions are constrained by domestic politics). Robert Putnam’s (1988)
analogy of international relations as being like a two-level game2 describes the foreign policy
decisions engage with both an international audience and a domestic audience. Making
judgements about ethics in two levels games might require a understanding of the level of
‘agential power’3 or ‘autonomy’ the state possesses in respect of the pressures of domestic
society and international structure (Hobson, 2000, pp 4-7). For example normative argument
concerning the obligations of a nation-state may require actions that are politically impossible
for a democratic government. If an ideal normative analysis says that state X owes $Y in
compensation for the harms caused by its historical pollution, but this level of voluntary
compensation is not possible given domestic political structures – how should we judge the
government which achieves the maximum possible outcome?
If we combine the second and third question we come to the nub of the climate
change dilemma. Imagine that an ideal normative analysis says that industrialised states
should meet the total costs of climate change mitigation and adaptation in order to
compensate the developing world for their historical responsibility for causing climate
change. In this scenario state X should contribute $100 billion per annum to domestic climate
2

Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International
Organization 42, no. 3 (1988).
3
John Hobson, The State and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000) 4-7.
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mitigation efforts and to mitigation and adaptation in the developing world. Now suppose that
domestic political constraints mean this level of expenditure could not gain congressional
approval. Instead, two different deals are possible. In one X commits only $40 billion
meaning that a portion of the historic debt is repaid on just terms but that the mitigation and
adaptation efforts will be insufficient and future generations will suffer unnecessary harm.
The other politically possible outcome sees the state contributing a possible $60 billion but
using the promise of adaptation payments and threats of punitive tariffs to extract $40 billion
of contributions from the developing world. In this scenario the threat of climate change is
dealt with effectively but on unjust terms. Future generations are spared unnecessary
suffering by an unfair international agreement. This paper seeks to identify which of these
approaches is more just.
The paper works from the premise that part of the purpose of social norms is to
promote behaviour that is mutually beneficial. Norms coordinate behaviour into patterns that
solve various forms of collective action problem. However the social norms with which we
are most familiar (e.g. shouting drinks in turn) have evolved within small communities where
the costs of non-compliance are obvious. The challenge posed by anthropogenic climate
change has a number of features – such as a time delay between emissions and their
environmental consequences, the difficulty of observing emissions, and the absence of an
authority to enforce compliance – that might make norms that have evolved in other contexts
ineffective in solving this global cooperation problem. For this reason, to understand the
UNFCCC’s failure we might begin with an analysis of the compatibility of the climate
regime’s norms and its stated goals.
‘Common but Differentiated Responsibility’
The UNFCCC’s most significant norm, established in Article 1, states that:
the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all
countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response,
in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities and their social and economic conditions
While the practice of differentiating responsibilities in multilateral agreements is
long-standing, and ‘differential and more favourable’ treatment has previously been given to
developing countries, the UNFCCC embodies differentiated responsibility as a central
principle. (Stone, 2004: 278-9) Adoption of the norm of differentiated responsibility in the
UNFCCC followed from earlier acceptance of the right to development. Once the right to
development was accepted it would have been inconsistent (and unjust) to ask developing
states to limit development by restricting GHG emissions. (Shue, 1995: 459).
While the UNFCCC contains no binding emissions targets, the CDR norm found its
practical expression in the differentiated targets negotiated at the third annual ‘conference of
the parties’ (COP-3) in 1997 and codified in the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Kyoto Protocol establishes binding
emission restrictions for Annex B states (developed plus some former communist eastern
European states), but includes no mandatory targets for non-Annex B (developing) states.
The decision to limit emission targets to Annex B states in this first commitment period
appears to have been largely a tactical move to delay dealing with the thorny question of
emission limits for developing powers such as India and China.(Vanderheiden, 2008: 69) The
intractable problem here is that while a climate treaty that excludes India or China will not
avert dangerous climate change, neither would these states accept emission limits that restrict
their capacity to develop. By deferring resolution of this impasse to another day – negotiators
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left unanswered the question of whether it is possible to achieve a climate regime that is both
effective and fair (as understood through UNFCCC norms).
‘Historical Responsibility’ and the ‘Polluter Pays’ Principle.
The argument in favour of CDR also draws on two subsidiary normative principles. The
‘polluter pays principle’ (Gardiner, 2004: 579; Shue, 1999: 534) (Jagers and Goran, 2008;
Shue, 1999: 537) reflects both goals of fairness (that the beneficiary of pollution should pay
for associated costs), and of efficiency (that collective wellbeing is optimised if full costs of
production are internalised rather than imposed on the community as a whole). The Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development makes the clearest articulation of the polluter
pays principle in international law:
Principle 16. Internationalization of Environmental Costs
National authorities
should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in
principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without
distorting international trade and investment.
In many cosmopolitan accounts of atmospheric justice, the ‘polluter pays’ principle of
compensation for harm is supplemented by an ‘ability to pay’ principle (Caney, 2005; Jagers
and Goran, 2008: 581-2; Shue, 1999: 537) or a ‘beneficiary [of past GHG pollution] pays’
principle (Page, 2008: 562-4) which is akin to the concept of ‘historical responsibility’
pushed by many developing states. For normative theorists allocation of responsibility for
present day costs on the basis of historical emissions raises questions about the fairness of
penalising acts whose harmfulness was not clear at the time (in the case of emissions pre
1990) or for imposing costs on present day generations for the actions of their parents and
grandparents. (Caney, 2005; Jagers and Goran, 2008: 581-2; Shue, 1999: 537) Politically, the
question of historical responsibility is also contentious because it demands enormous
transfers of wealth from industrialised states to the developing world. By way of example, the
UNDP’s estimate of the annual cost of climate adaptation in 2015 is $86 billion. (UNDP,
2007: 194)
Christopher Stone divides CDR into three types. Rational bargaining CDR emerges
from rational bargaining between parties who obtain an efficient agreement (Paretoimproving in the sense of leaving at least one party better off without disadvantaging others)
by recognising that parties’ contributions and benefits will differ. (Stone, 2004: 278-9)
Equitable CDR describes a negotiation where parties are still committed to a Paretoimproving outcome but agree to constraints on bargaining that limit possible outcomes to
those that ‘tilt the cooperative surplus more favourably toward a designated group of parties’.
(Stone, 2004: 278-9) In contrast to these two Pareto-improving forms inefficient CDR awards
the poor more than the entire net surplus of cooperation. Instead the negotiated outcome
seeks to correct previous injustices by transferring wealth from some parties to others. (Stone,
2004: 278-9)
Recognising that climate negotiations involve bargaining over the provision of a
global public good helps to clarify why CDR may be an inappropriate norm for the climate
regime. Global public goods are, by definition, goods that are both non-excludable and nonrival in the sense that once provided no state can be prevented from enjoying them, and no
state’s enjoyment of the good impinges on others. (Barrett, 2007, p. 1) Because public goods
are non-excludable they are amenable to free-riding and so, in the absence of government, are
likely to be undersupplied. A state choosing whether to spend money on climate change
mitigation measures will be aware that the vast majority of the benefits of expenditure will
accrue to others. In contrast the benefits of adaptation expenditure are exclusively local.
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Further, since the benefits of adaptation spending are more immediate and tangible it is likely
to attract greater political support. In the absence of a global agreement which guarantees
proportionate state contributions to mitigation efforts it may be rational for states to
preference adaptation to mitigation even if this approach is the less efficient (measured
globally). For these reasons the public good of climate safety is likely to be underprovided. If
climate regime negotiations are constrained by expectations of inefficient CDR then the
motivation for powerful states to make the necessary investment will be very low. Analysis
of the climate regime’s failure over the last twenty years demonstrates this point in greater
detail.
3 The Climate Regime’s 20 Years Crisis
In 1988 the World Meteorological Organization and the U.N. Environment Programme
established – with authorisation from the U.N. General assembly – the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC is an intergovernmental panel of scientific
experts charged with the responsibility to continually assess the risk of climate change caused
by human activity and to provide policy-relevant summaries of scientific knowledge. By
1988 there was a high degree of scientific certainty that carbon dioxide (CO2) and other
greenhouse gasses such as methane and nitrous oxide were accumulating in the earth’s
atmosphere and creating anthropogenic warming through their heat-trapping properties.
Concerns about global warming were also gaining prominence in the international political
agenda. The first IPCC report of 1990 confirmed the scientific evidence for anthropogenic
climate change and prompted the negotiation of the 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in the lead up to the Rio Earth Summit. Despite
these clear warnings and promising early negotiations, subsequent inaction means that
warming of considerably more than 2°C is now almost inevitable.
A picture of this coming crisis can be gained by comparing IPCC climate projections
against emission trends predicted in the International Energy Agency’s annual World Energy
Outlook reports. The IEA’s reference scenario, which predicts future carbon emissions
factoring in only conservation measures that have already been committed to, sees global
energy-related CO2 emissions rising from 28Gt in 2006 to 42 Gt in 2030. This projected
increase ‘puts us on a course of doubling the concentration of’ GHGs ‘in the atmosphere by
the end of the century, entailing an eventual global average temperature increase of up to
6°C.’(IEA, 2008: 11). Warming of this speed and magnitude is unprecedented in human
history. It is also possible that warming of this scale would take the planet past tipping points
that would trigger catastrophic change. At minimum it would result in unprecedented harmful
transformation to human and biological systems and mass extinctions of plant and animal
species.
The IEA’s assessment of alternative emission trajectories is also sobering. Two
alternative emissions scenarios are considered. The more plausible – which nevertheless
requires much more stringent emission limitations than we have seen to date – results in
550ppm CO2 equivalent that is projected to result in around three degrees of additional
global warming. Warming in excess of 2°C is generally considered unacceptably dangerous.
Limiting warming to this agreed ‘safe’ level would necessitate stabilizing atmospheric CO2
at 450ppm. The IEA’s 450ppm emission trajectory would require unprecedented financial,
scientific and political commitment. The IEA report notes:
‘The scale of the challenge in the 450 Policy Scenario is immense: the 2030 emission
level for the world as a whole in this scenario is less than the level of projected
emissions for non-OECD countries alone in the Reference Scenario. In other words,
the OECD countries alone cannot put the world onto the path to 450-ppm trajectory,
even if they were to reduce their emissions to zero. Even leaving aside any debate
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about the political feasibility of the 450 Policy Scenario, it is uncertain whether the
scale of the transformation envisaged is even technically achievable, as the scenario
assumes broad deployment of technologies that have not yet been proven. The
technology shift, if achievable, would certainly be unprecedented in scale and speed
of deployment. (IEA, 2008)
Yet even this, seemingly unachievable goal, may be insufficient to avert dangerous
warming. Some climate scientists argue that IPCC climate modeling, while accurate over a
period of decades, does not model a set of slow feedback mechanisms that are apparent from
paleoclimate data. According to this view “If humanity wishes to preserve a planet similar to
that on which civilization developed and to which life on Earth is adapted, paleoclimate
evidence and ongoing climate change suggest that CO2 will need to be reduced from its
current 385 ppm to at most 350 ppm.” The possible consequences of prolonged overshoot of
this target includes the “possibility of seeding irreversible catastrophic effects.” (Hansen et
al., 2008)
The eventual response to doubling pre-industrial atmospheric CO2 likely would be a
nearly ice-free planet, preceded by a period of chaotic change with continually
changing shorelines.(Hansen et al., 2008: 16)
The IEA emission trajectories also illustrate the need for the climate regime to limit
developing world emissions. In the reference scenario a full three quarters of the projected
increase in energy-related CO2 emissions arises in China, India the Middle East, while 97%
of increases are sourced from non-OECD countries as a whole. The pressure for emission
increases from the developing world only adds to the urgency of cuts in industrialized states.
For example, the IEA’s 450ppm emission trajectory ‘requires emissions in OECD countries
to be reduced by almost 40% in 2030, compared with 2006 levels. Other major economies are
required to limit their emissions growth to 20%.’ (Agency, 2008) The IEA also points out
that the long life of electricity infrastructure means that most of the emissions of the next 20
years are effectively ‘locked in’. The cost of past policy failures is high. If the required future
emission reductions look impossible a large measure of blame must go to the previous 20
years of policy inertia.
The Failure of the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol was always intended as a first step and a foundation upon which future
negotiations would build. However, it is instructive to review how complete the failure to
arrest emissions has been. In the period 2000 to 2006 global CO2 emissions increased at an
annual rate of 3.1% - a rate of increase which is more than double that of the 1990s (van
Vuuren and Riahi, 2008: 241). Whether this increase is a short term aberration, or is
reflective of a long term shift that renders the IPCC emission scenarios on which climate
predictions have been based as unduly conservative – is debatable (van Vuuren and Riahi,
2008: 241). What is clear is that emission levels are trending in the wrong direction and that
the Kyoto Protocol has done little to alter this trend. Whatever the future of the UNFCCC
process, the first 20 years since the creation of the IPCC has been a period of relatively
unconstrained emissions growth in which atmospheric GHG concentrations have overshot a
level of relative ‘safety’.
Given that Kyoto was intended to be only the first round of an ongoing negotiation
process, and only entered into force in February 2005 a defender of the UNFCCC process
might argue that my negative assessment is premature. However, the delay in the protocol’s
adoption (it only came into effect once states 55 states responsible for 55% of global
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emissions had ratified) and the modest targets adopted might equally be seen as key aspects
of the protocol’s failure.
Even the European Union – generally regarded as the green demandeur of climate
negotiations – agreed to aggregate targets under Kyoto that reflect little more than a business
as usual emissions trajectory. (Harrison and Sundstrom, 2008: 5)Germany’s post reunification closure of inefficient industries in the east, and the UK’s decommissioning of
inefficient coal power stations as part of a switch to natural gas meant that these two states
were recipients of windfall emission reductions. Together, their promised reductions account
for more than 100% of EU wide commitments. (Harrison and Sundstrom, 2008: 5) Major
states that took on significant reductions below a business as usual scenario in Kyoto either
refused to ratify (the United States), ratified but subsequently announced an intention to not
comply (Canada), or have adopted compliance plans based on investment in international
flexibility mechanisms rather than domestic taxation or regulation (Japan). (Harrison and
Sundstrom, 2008). While the Kyoto process has resulted in some efforts to limit GHG
emissions, evidence suggests that this form of agreement is hopelessly ill-equipped to meet
the challenge at hand.
A Cosmetic Treaty?
One possible explanation for the failure the UNFCCC process and its Kyoto Protocol is that
some parties never intended them to succeed. During the cold war the term ‘cosmetic treaty’
described an arms-control treaty that created the impression of progress without
implementing significant change. Such agreements might be domestically useful for both
sides. The Kyoto protocol is not purely cosmetic – for example it has lead to the creation of a
carbon market that today is worth over US$10 billion per year.(Tickell, 2008: 35) However,
it seems likely that the protocol (and future treaties) may be cosmetic in the sense that their
claimed benefits are not matched in reality. It would be logical for politicians facing a costly,
long-term, complex problem whose solution involves significant short term costs and job
losses to opt for an ineffective treaty that satisfies public expectations by creating the
appearance of progress at minimal cost. Such a treaty would very likely be in the short-term
political interests of all governments.
The Kyoto Protocol’s lack of an effective compliance mechanism might be viewed as
one sign of treatymakers’ cosmetic intent. As Scott Barrett argues the Kyoto Protocol
overreaches through reliance on its own specific compliance mechanisms. A failure to meet
commitments in the first commitment period does attract a notional penalty of more onerous
targets in the subsequent period. However, since subsequent commitments have not been
negotiated yet future bargaining positions will reflect (and therefore negate) Kyoto penalties.
Barnett contends that this problem arises because Kyoto fails to engage the ‘elemental forces
of sovereignty’ and states’ tendency to place their national economic advantage before the
protection of global public goods. (Barrett, 2007: 93-4)
Fingering Common but Differentiated Responsibility as The Culprit
The inherent cooperation problem involved in provision of a costly global public good is
surely one part of the explanation for the Kyoto protocol’s ineffectiveness. However, the
UNFCCC’s idealist norms have been another culprit ensuring that Kyoto has not lived up
even to its limited promise. Of particular significance is the expression of the norm of
‘common but differentiated responsibility’ in the Kyoto Protocol in the form of binding
emission targets that are applicable to some states and not others. This differentiated
treatment has been a significant contributor to the wasted years in which virtually no progress
toward limiting GHG emissions has been made.
Most analysis of the climate regime by political scientists has sought to explain the
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prospects for international cooperation by considering the motivations of states as unitary
actors. Recently this ‘structural’ international relations approach has been complemented by
comparative research that explains the climate regime’s ineffectiveness via analysis of the
domestic processes through which national climate policy is formed. (Harrison and
Sundstrom, 2008; Lantis, 2006) This research exposes the nature of the ‘two-level’
cooperation problem inherent in global climate change, and the way in which the norm of
‘differentiated responsibility’ has interacted with domestic political processes. Internationallevel cooperation to achieve the deep emission cuts required, is only realizable after the
resolution of domestic cooperation problems. By placing developed world industry at a
competitive disadvantage the norm of ‘differentiated responsibility’ tilts the playing field of
domestic politics: it gives powerful industries an additional economic incentive to lobby
against effective national climate policy and arms them with an appealing nationalist
argument. In advantaging developing states over developed, and in particular China over the
United States the norm of ‘differentiated responsibility’ also defies the realist precept that
internationally effective agreements should work with, rather than against, the forces that
motivate states.
Across a variety of western states such as the United States, Canada and Australia, the
seemingly one-sided nature of the Kyoto commitments empowered a nationalist argument
that ‘we should not reduce emissions unless developing states like China do so too.’ The US
Senate’s Byrd-Hagel Resolution (S. Res. 98, 2001) – which was passed unanimously and
stated that the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol that does not include
binding targets for developing nations as well as industrialized nations – is perhaps the most
significant expression of this perspective. It is a clear demonstration of the political obstacles
to US adoption of an international agreement that is obviously injurious to US economic
competitiveness. President Bush’s subsequent justification of his decision to withdraw from
the Kyoto Protocol, underscores the point through its focus on the unfairness of differentiated
responsibility:
I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of the world, including
major population centers such as China and India from compliance, and would cause
serious harm to the U.S. economy. The Senate’s vote, 95-0, shows that there is a clear
consensus that the Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of addressing
global climate change concerns.(Bush, 2001; cited in Vanderheiden, 2008: 64)
‘Jumping as High as the Political System Will Tolerate’
US Special Climate Envoy Todd Stern’s defense of the Obama Administration’s climate
policy that ‘we are jumping as high as the political system will tolerate’ underscores the
reality that congressional representation of sectional interests limits the US’s capacity for
strong climate action. The limited change to US policy under the Obama administration
perhaps provides the clearer evidence of domestic constraints than do Bush’s words (above).
Since the Bush administration appears to have been ideologically opposed to taking action on
climate change Bush’s words about fairness probably masked an underlying preference for
inaction. In contrast, Barack Obama was elected on promises to address climate change. In
the context of this apparent ideological support the limited emission cuts promised (20%
reduction on 2005 levels by 2020) by the Waxman-Markey ‘American Clean Energy and
Security Act’ (ACES) illustrate the enormity of the climate challenge. Even in the unlikely
event that this Bill obtains congressional approval without further dilution, this Bill is not
consistent with a global deal that even comes close to stabilization at 450ppm.
The evidence that the norm of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ has
prevented (or been used to justify opposition to) climate action is strongest in the case the
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United States and other opponents of the Kyoto Protocol. However the fact that no major
polluter has achieved substantial emission reductions below business as usual projections
during the Kyoto Protocol period suggests that this dynamic may be influencing the policy of
many other states. EU members such as the UK and Germany which have pushed hardest for
stringent emission cuts have largely been riding on the back of windfall emission reductions.
Their incapacity to deliver substantial emission reductions despite a receptive political
environment also suggests that the competition concerns of business may be at play.
The norm of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ is responsible for one
additional aspect of Kyoto’s failure – that it has encouraged the relocation rather than
reduction of GHG emissions. One consequence of a regime which limits emissions in some
states, but not others, is that it has encouraged the relocation of GHG intensive industry but
not the reduction of GHG intensive consumption. Analysis of the differences between
‘production-based’ and ‘consumption-based’ carbon accounting mechanisms is illustrative of
this point. Whereas on the UNFCCC production based methodology, UK Greenhouse Gas
emissions have fallen by 15% since 1990 considered in terms of consumption based
accounting, the illustrative outcome is a rise of 19% over the same period’ (Helm et al., 2007)
While the de-industrialisation of the west is obviously beneficial for developing world
economies it does not address climate change.
4 Practical Advantages of Imposing Costs on Non-Cooperators
“The essential challenge of a treaty is to restructure incentives so that countries are
better off participating than not participating, and better off complying than not
complying. (Barrett, 2007: 93)
Addressing climate change is a strikingly challenging political problem because the
immediate costs of action are high, the costs of inaction are delayed, and only cooperative
multilateral action can address the problem. An international collective action problem
(where states have differing commitments to addressing the problem, and all are reluctant to
take unilateral action that would create an economic disadvantage) is layered on top of a
series of national collective action problems (where the interests of polluting industries tend
to outweigh more diffuse general interests in national political process). (Harris, 2007) Given
the barriers to international cooperation the capacity to impose costs on non-cooperators – in
particular through carbon tax equalization measures – is important because it: 1) can act as
an incentive for participation in an effective international agreement; 2) reduces domestic
political opposition to emission restrictions by protecting trade-exposed industries; 3) enables
GHG emissions to be taxed at the point of consumption rather than production (a point with
important equity implications as discussed later). This section first outlines debate over the
legality and uses of carbon tariffs and border tax adjustment and then discuss these three
arguments in detail.
Carbon Tariffs
Adoption of carbon tariffs in conjunction with domestic GHG trading or taxation schemes is
the most likely form in which the non-cooperator pays principle might be applied. Amid
growing attention to the trade-related aspects of climate policy, plans to impose
countervailing duties, or equalizing ‘border tax adjustments’ are particularly contentious.
BTAs are taxes or subsidies that level the playing field between domestic industries subject to
GHG-limiting measures and competitors in states that do not take on binding emission
limitations. Such measures promise to reduce GHG emission by limiting ‘carbon leakage’
while creating incentives for all states to participate in the post-Kyoto successor agreement.
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Yet, despite their political appeal BTAs are commonly critiqued for amounting to ‘green
protectionism’ that is both economically damaging and unjust when directed against
developing states (Biermann and Brohm, 2005: 291). According to this view it is unjust to
impose western environmental standards on the developing world as to do so defies the
‘polluter pays principle’.
As we have seen key argument raised against emission trading schemes or tax
regimes that create incentives to reduce GHG emissions is that such measures will harm the
competitiveness of domestic industries. Border tax adjustments offer a solution to this
problem by imposing equalizing taxes on imports from states where GHG emissions are not
regulated, and by granting subsidies or tax-relief to exports. In so doing BTAs reduce
domestic opposition to environmental measures, create incentives for other states to adopt
similar laws and by protecting domestic industries from international predation encourage
technological innovation that minimizes environmental harm.
While Article III.2 of the GATT allows for BTAs that adjust for direct taxes on both
imports and exports there is no settled law on the question of whether adjustment is legal on
‘an input that is fully consumed during production, such as energy’(Tarasofsky, 2008: 11).
Indeed, some argue that rebate of ‘taxes on embodied fuels is barred by the GATT Subsidies
Code’s ban on rebating prior stage cumulative indirect taxes.’ (Hoerner, 1998: 8) Advocates
of BTA’s commonly argue that these measures are appropriate for use between developed
economies but not against imports from developing economies. Such discrimination, which is
justified by the developed world’s historical over-use of the atmospheric commons, would
probably be legal under WTO jurisprudence which must take into account widely ratified
treaties (Biermann and Brohm, 2005: 291). In this context the UNFCCC’s CDR norm
probably provides legal cover for discrimination based on participation in a treaty that
imposed differentiated burdens on different parties. (e.g. under the Bush administration
many Europeans argued that BTAs should be used to target US imports.) Non-discriminatory
application of the BTAs (application on imports from all non-parties to a Kyoto successor
agreement) would obviously be less vulnerable to legal challenge.
Restructuring Incentives to Make Cooperation Attractive
In the past, global environmental cooperation has often been achieved through what Elisabeth
DeSombre terms the ‘internationalisation’ of US domestic policies (DeSombre, 2000). In this
process once environmental standards have been adopted domestically by the US, industry
and environmentalists find common cause in demanding that these standards be imposed on
other states through economic threats. The cost of the overhaul of global energy systems
necessary to combat global warming is of an order of magnitude greater than any of
DeSombre’s examples of endangered species, air pollution, and fisheries conservation, so the
situations are far from comparable. Further, the United States is neither able nor willing to
impose global limitations on GHG emissions. However, it may be that if a group of
influential states were to agree to place a price on GHG emissions and to create appropriate
incentives for developing world participation, this agreement could be adopted widely.
The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (September
1987), although tackling a much simpler problem than global warming, offers an instructive
model as to how this process might work. This protocol limited the global use of
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which were suspected to destroy stratospheric ozone. One of the
most impressive elements of the agreement was that it was achieved prior to full scientific
certainty about the link between CFCs and Ozone depletion. By offering funds to assist
developing countries with adjustment costs, and using market access as carrots and sticks
(parties to the Montreal protocol were given continued market-access during a phase-out
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period, but non-parties were immediately excluded) this agreement gained almost universal
acceptance.
Eric Haas’s analysis of this highpoint of international environmental cooperation
reveals many of the reasons as to why Ozone-depleting substances and GHGs are not
analogous. There were only seventeen companies producing CFCs in a $100billion industry
with operations in sixteen countries. (1992: 197) In “this oligopolistic market, DuPont was
the world leader” holding 50% of the US and 25% of the global market”. In 1989 at the first
government review of the Montreal protocol, 81 countries agreed on faster phase-out times,
and to establish a fund to assist LDCs with adjustment costs (approx $240 mill with $40-$60
mil contributed by the united states). Since CFCs accounted for only about 2% of total
corporate profits, DuPont was able to take a long-term view. (Haas, 1992: 197) The size of its
other business made its corporate reputation more important than maximising profitability of
CFC production. DuPont’s scale also meant that once it decided to support a freeze and then
phase-out of CFCs, other industry players were forced to follow. Yet, despite the obvious
difference in the number of players and size of the industry affected the Montreal Protocol
example may still contain lessons for the climate regime as to how a group of powerful states
can coax a reluctant world into a treaty.
Existing efforts to encourage developing world participation in a post-Kyoto
successor agreement center on ‘carrots’ – such as technology transfer funding, adaptation
funding, and participation in an emissions trading market. These carrots all involve transfers
of resources from industrialized states to developing states and for this reason have, to date,
been poorly funded. It seems unlikely that these inducements alone will be sufficient to
motivate developing world acceptance of emission restrictions. The developing world also
makes a strong argument that this assistance should not be conditional. Since industrialized
states’ emissions have created climate change – assistance is viewed as repayment of a
historic debt. This is a key argument in favour of the ‘stick’ of BTAs. If avoiding taxes on
GHG emissions gives a state a trade advantage this militates against their participation in a
climate agreement. If participation instead carries an economic cost (via carbon tariffs) the
incentives are partially reversed.
A likely riposte to this argument points out that the changing economic power of the
industrialized world vis-à-vis developing powers like China and India means that it is no
longer possible for a small group of powers to impose solutions on the globe. Further, the
global character of GHG emissions – each state is involved – means that it is not possible to
round up all major emitters in a single agreement. Against these arguments we can note first,
that the severity of the challenge make rebutting counterproductive fairness arguments all the
more important. Second, we can observe various concentrations of emissions that create
possibilities for an effective treaty being reached by a limited number of parties. For example,
the production emissions are heavily concentrated (looking out to 2050 the IEA predicts that
the five largest emitters of energy-related CO2 – China, the United States and the European
Union, India and Russia will together account for almost two thirds of global CO2
emissions;(IEA, 2008: 12) the consumption of GHG-intensive good is heavily concentrated
in OECD countries, and that most GHG-intensive industries have a limited number of
‘supply’ points (such as oil refineries or coal washing states) whose regulation would have
extra-territorial effect. (Tickell, 2008)
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Changing Incentives Within Domestic Politics.
“If other countries don’t impose a cost on carbon, then we will be at a
disadvantage…[and] we would look at considering perhaps duties that would offset
that cost,” - Energy Secretary Steven Chu4
We have seen that the tendency for costs to fall on a limited number of polluting industries
creates strongly motivated opponents of GHG regulation, and thus tips the balance of
domestic politics against effective action. The argument that unilateral action to place costs
on GHG emissions will put domestic industry at a disadvantage is an important part of this
opposition. Carbon tariffs address this argument by re-establishing an even playing field
between domestic and foreign production. Obviously this change will not neutralise domestic
opposition to emission limitations. Polluting domestic industries will continue to resist
regulation of GHG emissions because they wish to minimise their costs. However, carbon
tariffs will have two important advantages. First, in situations where domestic industries have
lower emissions per unit of production than their competitors they may become advocates of
BTAs. Further, a BTA scheme will create economic incentives promoting the transfer of low
emission technologies even to states that are not party to a climate agreement.
The second domestic political advantage of BTAs lies at the level of rhetoric. As
President Bush’s argument about the unfairness of the Kyoto Protocol attests, arguments
against national action on climate change are normally couched in nationalist terms. Fairness
toward a state, and the risk of disadvantage in international competition are emphasized.
BTAs neutralize this nationalist rhetoric. Without the claim of being disadvantaged
internationally, polluting industries would be forced to argue against emission restrictions on
other grounds. It seems likely that public opinion will be less sympathetic to polluters’
arguments once the cloak of ‘shared national interest’ is removed.
Taxing Emissions at The Point of Consumption
A third advantage of a carbon tariff regime is that it allows emissions to be taxed at the point
of consumption. At present in Europe consumption of domestically produced goods incurs
carbon taxes, but imports do not. The developing world’s argument that their right to
development and improved living standards should not be sacrificed to protect western overconsumption is a strong one. But this argument militates in favour of, not against, carbon
tariffs. For example if exports from China to the E.U. were subject to equalising GHG duties,
this would mean that European consumers would be paying for the cost of GHG emissions
but Chinese consumers would not.
The ethical argument for differentiated treatment of states ultimately rests on a
concern for the wellbeing of people in developing states. This argument justifies opposition
to limits on emissions that contribute to developing world consumption. It does not justify
opposition to restricting emissions on developing-world production that is destined for first
world consumption. BTAs in fact offer an ideal mechanism for targeting emissions that are
linked to developed world consumption without penalising so-called ‘survival emissions’
5 A Normative Defense of Pragmatic Norms
I characterised the post-1988 climate regime as the subject of a ‘twenty years’ crisis’ both
because of the manifest lack of effective action over the two decades since the scientific basis
for global warming was firmly established, and to evoke E.H. Carr’s analysis of the earlier
‘twenty years crisis’ where creation of overly idealist international institutions following
WW1 ultimately led to the collapse of the international system and a second great war.(Carr,
1946) I suggest that the UNFCCC is at the centre of similarly ineffective and idealist climate
4
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regime, and that if current trends continue the eventual outcome of flawed idealist policy may
be a planetary catastrophe whose human impacts dwarfs WWII. The impacts on human
wellbeing of the 6°C or more of warming anticipated by the IEA’s ‘reference case’ projection
are extreme and unknowable. If averting such potentially catastrophic warming can be
considered an absolute moral good, then we might have reason to consider pragmatic policies
that avert dangerous global warming as ethical, even if they involve unfairness among states.
The argument in this section first outlines the lessons for non-ideal normative theory
contained in the moral thinking of the classical realists. It then considers how a concern for
probability of truly catastrophic climate change or for the interests of the least advantaged
should influence our assessment of pragmatic climate norms.
Non-Utopian Ethics, Idealism and Realism:
Henry Shue describes ‘non-utopian ethics’ as amounting to an ‘ethics of transition’,
asking how to move from the present toward the ideal (Shue, 1995: 464). Unfortunately, the
timeline for addressing dangerous climate change is tight. Action to reduce emissions must
begin now and be sustained over the coming century. It may be that no path leads toward the
‘ideal’ within the available timeframe. If so, then ‘non-utopian ethics’ must describe the
politically practical path toward averting catastrophe that is least ethically repugnant. This is
the ethics of the ‘least bad’ alternative, rather than an ethics of transition toward the ideal.
Fortunately, a developed literature on the subject of pragmatic ethics can be found within
twentieth century realism.
In his response to the interwar ‘twenty years crisis’ Carr, like most other classical
realists, did not argue that there was no place for idealism or morality in international politics
– but rather that ‘idealist’ policies which take insufficient account of the realities of power
will generally be counterproductive. Whereas classical realism is often characterized as an
amoral doctrine whose adherents advocate the naked pursuit of national interest, it might
better be understood as a form of ‘non-utopian theory’. For example, Carr proposes that
moral outcomes must be pursued through realist analysis:
All healthy human action, and therefore all healthy thought, must establish a balance
between utopia and reality, between free will and determinism. The complete realist,
unconditionally accepting the causal sequence of events, deprives himself of the
possibility of changing reality. The complete utopian, by rejecting the causal
sequence, deprives himself of the possibility of understanding either the reality which
he is seeking to change or the processes by which it can be changed (Carr, 1946: 1112)
This pragmatic approach to political ethics is echoed by other traditional realists.
Morgenthau, proposes:
The individual may say for himself: ‘Fiat justitia, pereat mundus (Let justice be done,
even if the world perish),’ but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who
are in its care…Realism then, considers prudence – the weighing of the consequences
of alternative political actions – to be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the
abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judge
action by its political consequences.(Morgenthau, 1972: 10-11)
Within contemporary political rhetoric and academic literature there is a resurgence of
the liberal view that order cannot be sustained without justice and that justice should be a
goal of statecraft. This resurgence reflects a perception that international society is less fragile
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in a time of lowered global tension. Indeed this confidence in the potential of interstate
cooperation and in the capacity for norms to constrain state behaviour seems to be strongest
in relation to environmental and other ‘new agenda’ issues..
Survivalist Ethics: Political Ethics Under The Shadow of Catastrophe
The flourishing of twentieth century classical realism occurred in the shadow of potential
nuclear annihilation. To understand the thinking of theorists as diverse as Raymond Aron,
George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau or even Hedley Bull, we must remember the immanent
risk of nuclear catastrophe that lead these writers to focus upon the attainment of order
through balance and consensus among great powers. When Morgenthau spoke of the ‘moral
principle of national survival’ or of working with, rather than against, the forces that motivate
states his advocacy of pragmatic policy making was premised in the knowledge that the
nuclear clock was set at five minutes to midnight. (Morgenthau, 1972: 10) Here, I advance
the general proposition that where there is a serious risk of planetary catastrophe, that the
goal of survival should be secured prior to recognition of claims of distributive or procedural
justice.
Economists seeking to provide a cost benefit analysis of action to mitigate climate
change have described the probably of a catastrophic climate outcomes (a fat tail in the
relevant probability distribution function) as confounding efforts to develop rational policy.
(Weitzman, 2009: 1). After identifying a 5% chance of a catastrophic outcome (greater than
10C of warming in the next two centuries) Martin Weitzman argues that the economics
profession is simply unable to provide authoritative guidance on a rational response to such a
risk. (Weitzman, 2009) Forming a response to the looming probability of catastrophe must be
a collective, political decision.
As I have argued above, normative political theorists have overwhelmingly responded
to this probable planetary catastrophe by demanding that the developing world shoulder the
costs of climate adaptation and mitigation. Their analysis has not been troubled by the
obvious political barriers to such altruism. Whether such idealism can be justified might
depend on how significant we regard the risk of planetary catastrophe as being. If the risk of
catastrophic climate change is as low as 5% then perhaps it would be wrong to accept
present-day injustice in order to avert a possible greater injustice against future generations.
However, this question – of the relationship between looming catastrophe and weighting of
present day injustice, intergenerational injustice, and recognition of the practical constraints
limiting on state action is one that deserves sustained attention.
Any coherent account of normative legitimacy must involve the application of
normative principles via a process of strategic reasoning informed by contemporary political
realities. (Macdonald and Macdonald, 2008) it proposes that potentially catastrophic
situations may render actions which would ordinarily be considered grossly unjust,
normatively legitimate. Any normative perspective which places survival as a primary value
is likely to endorse exceptional actions in the face of potentially system-destroying threats. If
actions that would normally be considered unjust, are necessary to ensure the survival of all
actors in a system, then these actions may be normatively legitimate.
Climate Policy for The Least Advantaged
I have argued that the existing climate regime is not constraining emissions and will not lead
to stabilization of atmospheric GHG levels at a safe level and that the norm of differentiated
responsibility is a major obstacle to a more effective agreement. If these claims are true, and
we also accept the IPCC’s finding that impacts of climate change ‘will fall disproportionately
upon developing countries and the poor persons within all countries.’((IPCC), 2002: 12) then
we might wonder if the interests of the earth’s most vulnerable people (now and in the future)
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would be best served by a climate regime that effectively limits GHG emissions – even if this
occurs at the cost of some developing world growth. This is an empirical question whose
definitive answer is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the answer to this question
might also determine our assessment of the legitimacy of pragmatic climate norms. Assessed
in terms of Rawls’ difference principle (applied globally) the relative justice of competing
approaches should turn on this empirical question of which is most favorable to the earth’s
least advantaged people. Given that most LDC growth processes initially bring few benefits
for the rural poor – the empirical claim that it is not worth sacrificing a small amount of
developing world growth in order to address climate change warrants careful examination.
Assessed from a utilitarian perspective – wherein justice is held to depend upon achievement
of the greatest good for the greatest number- the argument for pragmatic norms is even
stronger. The present (practically ineffective) climate regime may incorporate norms that
reflect standards of interstate justice – but an ineffective climate regime manifestly fails to
achieve justice between people.
Conclusion:
In today’s climate negotiations the developing world’s claim for compensation for the
consequences of climate change is presented as a moral entitlement. This paper has argued
against the unconditional repayment of this historic debt for that practical reason that doing
so would reduce the incentives to cooperate in mitigating future climate change. International
assistance for climate mitigation and adaptation should instead form part of a climate bargain.
Within the climate regime there appears to be a trade-off between justice and effectiveness.
At present justice norms are being honoured at the expense of effectiveness. Norms do not
erase states underlying material interests - they simply shape their expression. If climate
regime norms pull too far away from the interests of powerful states then it is likely that those
states will seek to undermine regime effectiveness.
Even absent the CDR norm, the cost-benefit structure of climate change mitigation
suggests that under-investment in climate protection is the most likely outcome. For this
reason efforts should focus on attaining a global agreement that will win domestic
acceptance. Fairness should be a secondary criterion. It seems likely that if a global
agreement is to achieve favorable reception within the domestic politics of powerful states it
must: not disadvantage the domestic industries of developed states vis-à-vis their major
international competitors; seek to animate new political allies for emission-constraint policy
by strengthening low emission industries in early negotiation rounds (in a process analogous
to that through which successive rounds of trade negotiations have reshaped domestic politics
by empowering the advocates of free-trade policies); separate politically challenging equity
measures from measures that promote emission reductions so that the one is not sabotaged by
the other; restructure incentives so that all states are better off participating and complying
than not; and create price-signals that stimulate private-sector innovation and investment.
I do not argue that a norm of CDR would not be ideally appropriate. However, the
application of CDR within the climate change regime has been counterproductive because it
strikes the wrong balance between ‘utopia and reality’. Nevertheless, it is important to
observe that the pragmatic political ethics which counsels states to prioritise practical
outcomes do not apply to individuals. If excessive first world consumption harms the global
poor then first world people may have obligations to compensate. Those most disadvantaged
by climate change have a moral entitlement to compensation, even if their practical interests
will be best served through effective international cooperation. Taking the interests of the
most vulnerable climate victims seriously may require us to move beyond traditional
conceptions of interstate justice but the imperative for cosmopolitan justice among people has
never been stronger.
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WTO Law as Leverage: An Inquiry into The Dynamics of Climate Negotiations
Between China and The United States
Dan Partan1
Abstract
Current U.S. “cap & trade” federal legislative proposals seek to maintain competitiveness of
U.S. industry by requiring certain importers to obtain greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
permits equivalent to the permits required from U.S. producers. Currently neither U.S. nor
Chinese producers are subject to such a rule. If China does not adopt what the U.S. views as a
“comparable” GHG emissions permit system, it is widely expected that the U.S. Congress
will require GHG emissions permit for imports. It is also widely expected that China will
challenge U.S. a GHG emissions permit requirement applied to Chinese exports as in
violation of WTO trade treaty obligations.
This paper examines the expected contents of U.S. competitiveness legislation in
relation to WTO treaty law, and assesses prospects for WTO constraints on the U.S. GHG
emissions permit system applied to Chinese exports. It also assesses the prospects for
utilizing a Chinese threat of WTO legal action to bridge the gap between U.S. and Chinese
positions in international climate negotiations. Under what circumstances might China adopt
a GHG emissions permit system that would be accepted by the U.S. as “comparable” to the
U.S. system?
Might a U.S.-China bargain include credible U.S. commitments to provide technology
and technical assistance sufficient to materially reduce China’s GHG emissions? Might the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) be revised and expanded in such a way as to
substantially increase the flow of CDM revenues to China? Might the U.S. and China join
together in coordinated efforts to solve technical issues hampering efforts to develop “clean
coal”, environment-friendly biofuels, and efficient means of long-distance energy
transmission?
In sum, might moderation, cooperation, and agreement be possible given increased
recognition of the cataclysm threatened by uncontrolled GHG emissions, together with the
leverage provided by a credible threat of potentially successful WTO litigation?

In the United States, current legislative proposals for a “cap & trade” system seek to
maintain the competitiveness of U.S. industry through two basic procedures relating to GHG
emissions. First, the principal draft bill pending in the U.S. Congress 2 (American Clean
Energy and Security Act [ACES], 2009) would cap overall domestic GHG emissions and
allocate greenhouse gas (GHG) “emission allowances” to certain carbon intensive and trade
sensitive industries without charge. In this paper I will call such emission permits “domestic
1
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The “American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009”, H.R. 2454, 111th Congress, 1st Session
(hereinafter cited as “ACES”). Unless otherwise indicated, the ACES provisions cited in this paper are
taken from the text of H.R. 2454 adopted on June 5, 2009, by the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce. Page references are to the ACES text as reproduced in the House Energy and Commerce
Committee report, H. R. Rep. No. 111-137, 111th Congress, 1st Session ( 2009).
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At this writing the ACES bill is pending before the House Ways & Means Committee which has
jurisdiction over the revenue aspects of the bill. Although the schedule has not been announced, Ways
and Means may hold its "mark-up" session for amendment of the bill by the end of June. However, to
become law, the bill requires acceptance both in the House of Representatives and the Senate, followed
by and the all-important final reconciliation through a House-Senate conference committee. At that point
the bill will be submitted to the President for signature.

emission allowances”. Second, in certain circumstances, the draft bill would require
importers to obtain “international emission allowances” equivalent to the domestic emission
allowances required from U.S. GHG emitters. Whereas domestic emission allowances
account for actual GHG emissions resulting from production and process actions in the
United States, international emission allowances account for GHG emissions assumed to
have resulted from production and process actions occurring abroad with respect to certain
products imported into the United States.
Currently neither U.S. GHG emitters nor Chinese exporters are subject to emissions
allowance requirements. However, if China or some other major exporter does not adopt
what the U.S. views as a “comparable” GHG emissions allowance system, it is widely
expected that the U.S. Congress will require some form of GHG emissions permit for
imports of certain carbon intensive goods. It is also widely expected that China or some
other exporter will challenge U.S. a GHG emissions permit requirement as applied to their
exports as in violation of WTO trade treaty obligations.
This paper examines the proposed contents of U.S. competitiveness provisions in
relation to WTO treaty law, and assesses prospects for WTO constraints on the proposed
U.S. GHG emissions permit system. With this in mind, the paper assesses the prospects for
utilizing threats of WTO legal action to bridge the gap between U.S. and Chinese positions in
bilateral or international climate negotiations.3
The following are among the issues potentially resolvable through such a strategy.
Under what circumstances might China adopt a GHG emissions permit system that would be
accepted by the U.S. as “comparable” to the U.S. system? Might a U.S.-China bargain
include credible U.S. commitments to provide technology and technical assistance sufficient
to materially reduce China’s GHG emissions? Might the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) be revised and expanded in such a way as to substantially increase the flow of
technology and of CDM revenues to China? Might the U.S. and China join together in
coordinated efforts to solve technical issues hampering such carbon emissions mitigation
efforts as programs to develop “clean coal” power plants, environment- friendly biofuels, or
efficient means of long-distance energy transmission?
This discussion has three parts. The first is a brief description of salient provisions of
“ACES”, the “American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009”4 , which is the leading
climate bill pending in the U.S. Congress (ACES, 2009). At this writing, ACES has been
adopted as amended by the Committee on Energy and Commerce, which is the lead House
committee on energy legislation, and is pending before seven other House committees, chief
among which is the House Ways and Means Committee. As the House committee primarily
responsible for revenue legislation, Ways and Means will examine and perhaps amend
provisions concerning both emitters’ rebates and importers’ emissions allowances, which are
discussed in the first part of this paper.
The second part of the paper briefly examines key WTO treaty provisions to assess
their potential application in WTO litigation concerning the conformity of ACES with U.S.
treaty obligations. The final part will suggest that the dynamics of China-U.S. climate
relations may be materially affected by the availability of a WTO forum for interpreting
WTO treaty provisions and applying them to climate measures such as ACES.
The key word here is “dynamics”. With the election of Barack Obama and the
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Although details of discussions have not been released, U.S. and British newspapers report recent meetings
between U.S. and Chinese climate officials (Broder& Ansfield, 2009; Goldenberg, 2009).
4
“Salient” refers to ACES bill provisions most closely related to treaty commitments under WTO agreements.
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appointment of his “dream team” of energy and climate officials5, the U.S. clearly expects to
play a leadership role in international efforts to restrict global greenhouse gas emissions.
Having surpassed the U.S. as the world’s largest source of current greenhouse gas emissions,
and considering its increasing need for efficient energy resources, China is similarly poised
for leadership. It may well be that the success or failure of the current international climate
negotiations will depend upon the ability of China and the United States to reach a common
understanding and a joint approach to the design of a post- Kyoto GHG emissions control
system. Hence the inquiry here addresses the dynamics of the China-U.S. climate
negotiations – and the important role that might be played by WTO treaty obligations and the
WTO judicial process.
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES)
Although the details of a U.S. “cap and trade” system remain unsettled, there is no longer
doubt that the U.S. will adopt domestic GHG controls through a “cap and trade” system. Led
by Barack Obama, the U.S. government now accepts that the global warming trend is real,
and that anthropomorphic GHG emissions are the principal cause of global warming. The
U.S. also accepts IPCC findings that climate change affects many natural systems, including
rising sea levels, altered drought and rainfall patterns, and “poleward and upward shifts in
plant and animal ranges” that affect human health through “changes in infectious disease
vectors”6 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2007).
ACES is essentially a lengthy omnibus bill (originally 946 pages). The bill adds a
new title VII (ACES, 2009, § 311; H. R. Rep. No. 111-137, 2009, p. 131 ff) to the existing
U.S. Clean Air Act: “Title VII—Global Warming Pollution Reduction Program”, and names
that Title together with scattered other ACES sections, the “Safe Climate Act” (ACES, 2009,
§ 301; H. R. Rep. No. 111-137, 2009, p. 131). The Act recites a legislative “finding” that
“Global warming poses a significant threat to the national security, economy, public health
and welfare, and environment of the United States, as well as of other nations” (ACES, 2009,
7

§ 311; H. R. Rep. No. 111-137, 2009, p. 131). The bill’s “findings” further specify that:
“Because they induce global warming, greenhouse gas emissions cause or contribute to
injuries to persons in the United States”, including inter alia “disease and loss of life”,
“damage to property and other interests related to ocean levels”, “scarcity of water”, and
“worsening of tropospheric air pollution” (ACES, 2009, § 311; H. R. Rep. No. 111-137,
2009, p. 131-132).8
The Safe Climate Act sets goals of capping and progressively reducing GHG
emissions from sources specified in the bill, which includes approximately 85% of total U.S.
emissions. The cap is intended to achieve to the following reductions measured as
percentages of U.S. 2005 emissions: reductions in 2012 to 97%; in 2020 to 83%; in 2030 to
58%; and in 2050 to 17% of emissions from covered GHG sources (ACES, 2009, § 311; H.
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In contrast to the Bush administration, high officials appointed by President Obama are committed to actions
that reduce and control U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. These include Steven Chu, Secretary of Energy, Gary
Locke, Secretary of Commerce, Lisa Jackson, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
Todd Stern, State Department Special Envoy on Climate Change, Carol Browner, White House “Climate
Czar”, and John Holdren, Science Adviser to the President.
6
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 4th Assessment Report (2007). The referenced
provisions are merely a brief sample of IPCC findings. The House Energy and Commerce Committee report
reviews many domestic and international impacts of climate change including the findings of climate
scientists and of the IPCC (H. R. Rep. No. 111-137, 2009, p. 300-316).
7
Adding section 701(a)(1) to the Clean Air Act.
8
Adding section 701(a)(3) to the Clean Air Act.
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R. Rep. No. 111-137, 2009, p. 132-133).9 Although these statutory goals fall short of the rate
of GHG emission reduction called for by some scientists and by some other governments, the
Safe Climate Act provides a measure of flexibility through the provisions described below.
Every four years beginning in 2013, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) is directed to submit to Congress an analysis of the status of worldwide GHG
reduction efforts based on an extensive list of the latest scientific information (ACES, 2009,
§ 311; H. R. Rep. No. 111-137, 2009, p. 133-134) 10 , including IPCC assessments.
Beginning with its quadrennial assessment report in 2017, the EPA analysis is specifically
required to include:
… the status of worldwide greenhouse gas reduction efforts, including
implementation of … policies, both domestic and international, for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, preventing dangerous atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gasses, preventing significant irreversible consequences of climate
change, and reducing vulnerability to the impacts of climate change (ACES, 2009,
§ 311; H. R. Rep. No. 111-137, 2009, p. 133).11
The quadrennial EPA assessment must specifically address whether the actions of the
United States and other countries are “sufficient to avoid”
(A) atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations above 450 parts per million carbon
dioxide equivalent; [and]
(B) global average surface temperature 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit (2 degrees Celsius)
above the pre-industrial average, or such other temperature thresholds as the [EPA]
Administrator deems appropriate (ACES, 2009, § 311; H. R. Rep. No. 111-137,
2009, p. 135).12
As noted below, the bill’s specifications of 450 ppm and 2 degrees Celsius as
thresholds of dangerous atmospheric GHG concentrations do not reflect an international
scientific consensus. Nevertheless some flexibility is provided by the authority of the EPA
Administrator to find that some other temperature threshold is appropriate in light of an
emerging scientific consensus.
Most importantly, each quadrennial EPA report must specify the quantity of
additional global reductions in GHG emissions that would be needed to avoid exceeding the
GHG concentration and the temperature thresholds specified in the bill or by the EPA
Administrator (ACES, 2009, § 311; H. R. Rep. No. 111-137, 2009, p. 135).13 Furthermore,
the bill calls upon the premier independent scientific body in the United States, the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS)14, to review the EPA quadrennial report, and to analyze the
9

Adding 703 to the Clean Air Act.
Adding 703 to the Clean Air Act, House Report pp. 132-33.
11
Adding section 705(a)(3) to the Clean Air Act.
12
Adding section 705(e)(2)(A) & (B) to the Clean Air Act.
13
Adding section 705(f)(3)(B) to the Clean Air Act.
14
The NAS by legislation signed by President Abraham Lincoln in 1863. As mandated in its Act of
Incorporation, the NAS role is to "investigate, examine, experiment, and report upon any subject of science or
art" whenever called upon to do so by any department of the government. NAS membership is composed of
approximately 2,100 members and 380 foreign associates, of whom nearly 200 have won Nobel Prizes.
Members and foreign associates are elected in recognition of their distinguished and continuing achievements
in original research. The Academy is governed by a Council consisting of twelve members (councilors) and five
officers, elected from among the Academy membership.
[Based on the Academy website
www.nasonline.org.]
10
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technologies that would be needed to achieve the GHG emission reductions recommended
by the EPA. Both the EPA quadrennial report and the National Academy analysis are to be
submitted to Congress (ACES, 2009, § 311; H. R. Rep. No. 111-137, 2009, p. 135).15 As is
normal under United States law, each of the many federal agency reports in the climate
review process will be available to the public, and several committees of the Congress will
likely hold public hearings when additional GHG emissions restrictions are proposed.
Finally, at the White House level, two years after each quadrennial EPA report, the
President is required to “direct relevant Federal agencies to use existing statutory authority to
take appropriate actions identified” in the EPA quadrennial assessments (ACES, 2009, § 311;
H. R. Rep. No. 111-137, 2009, p. 135).16
Furthermore,
[I]n the event that the National Academy of Sciences has concluded … that the
United States will not achieve the necessary domestic greenhouse gas emissions
reductions, or that global actions will not maintain safe global average surface
temperature and atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration thresholds, the
President shall submit to Congress a plan identifying domestic and international
actions that will achieve necessary additional greenhouse gas reductions, including
any recommendations for legislative action (ACES, 2009, § 311; H. R. Rep. No.
111-137, 2009, p. 135).17
As is normal in so wide-ranging a legislative effort as ACES, ultimate control over
changes in U.S. GHG emissions policy would be reserved to Congress. However, insofar as
the GHG emissions cap is concerned, ACES vests considerable influence, regulatory
authority, and operational control in EPA, which is an administrative agency within the
Executive Branch. The quoted ACES provisions delegate to the EPA and also to the
nongovernmental expert body, the National Academy of Sciences, two crucial issues rolled
into a single question: whether the statutory danger thresholds and existing GHG emission
controls are adequate to avoid climate catastrophe. While the adequacy of the danger
thresholds may be addressed in terms of climate science, the question of the appropriate
governmental response raises issues of societal values.
Much is now known about the climate change consequences of global warming, but
the point at which atmospheric concentrations of GHG emissions could cause “runaway”
GHG emissions remains subject to sharp differences of opinion among climate scientists.
An example would be the loss of heat-reflective ice cover in Greenland and Antarctica,
which would accelerate surface warming in Arctic and Antarctic regions. This would
potentially cause vast areas of permafrost to melt, releasing large amounts of the potent
greenhouse gas methane. Such an event has been seen as a so-called “tipping point” at
which runaway GHG emissions can no longer be brought under control (H. R. Rep. No. 111137, 2009, p. 297-298).
Through the statutory reference to “global actions [that] will not maintain safe global
average surface temperature and atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration thresholds”,
Congress plainly calls upon the EPA and the National Academy of Sciences to assess the
adequacy of the statute’s danger thresholds: atmospheric concentrations increase to 450 ppm
CO2 equivalent, and global average surface temperature increase of 2 degrees Celsius. Since
these benchmarks function as the basis for the ACES GHG emissions cap, such a finding
would imply an urgent need for more stringent measures to reduce carbon emissions. But
15

Adding section 706(a) to the Clean Air Act.
The first occasion for Presidential action thus comes in 2015. Adding section 707(1) to the Clean Air Act.
17
Adding section 707(2) to the Clean Air Act.
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climate science can do no more than address the risk in terms of greater or lesser degrees of
confidence (IPCC, 2005). Governments responding to such risks need to evaluate proposed
measures in light of societal values.
If the EPA or the NAS were to determine that existing measures are not adequate to
avoid danger levels, the operational question then becomes: what measures would be needed
to maintain GHG emissions levels below the amount projected to exceed the danger point?
Implicit in this issue is the degree of risk that would be responsible in light of the potential
for harm resulting from exceeding a “tipping point”. The stringency – and therefore the costs
– of a government’s response to such a risk more directly concerns societal values, which
will be addressed by Congress, but are not likely to be the subject of international
negotiation.
In this scenario it may be difficult to separate scientific issues from values issues, but
such a separation is needed for clarity of analysis. The causal links between GHG emissions,
climate change, and its consequences, are now subject to a growing body of scientific
evidence – which increasingly provides a solid basis for policy analysis. In contrast, the
value basis for tolerable risk levels is not subject to scientific analysis. Each government
must clarify its societal values and strive for transparency in its choice of responsive
measures. Care must be taken to view science – determining the causes and consequences of
climate change – independently of societal values that structure tolerable risk levels and
appropriate responses.
Structure of the ACES Emission Allowances Program
Beginning in 2012, the ACES emission allowance requirement applies to “covered entities”
which include all electricity generators, and producers or importers of petroleum- or coalbased liquid fuels, or natural gas liquids where combustion of the fuel results in emission of
more than 25,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent annually. In 2014 the emission
allowance requirement is extended to industrial facilities that manufacture certain products or
that burn fossil fuels at the same 25,000 metric ton emission standard as applied to producers
of liquid fuels. Certain natural gas distributors are also covered entities beginning in 2016.18
The ACES emissions cap is structured to begin with issuance by the EPA
Administrator in calendar year 2012 of the number of emission allowances equivalent to
97% of the GHG emissions by covered entities in 2005. The number of emission allowances
issued in 2012 (about 4.6 billion) rises to about 5.5 billion in 2016 as additional facilities
become subject to the emission allowance requirement. The emissions cap then tightens; the
number of allowances issued drops by roughly 100 to 150 million per year until it reaches
slightly over 1 billion for the year 2050 and following years (ACES, 2009, § 311; H. R. Rep.
No. 111-137, 2009, p. 143-144).19
Although the Obama administration had originally wanted emission allowances to be
auctioned with the auction revenue included in the federal government budget, the House
Energy and Commerce Committee bill would initially auction less than 30 percent of
emission allowances, which would drop to 17.5% by 2016 as additional entities became
covered by the emissions cap. The remainder, i.e., 82.5% in 2016, would be distributed free
of charge (H. R. Rep. No. 111-137, 2009, p. 362).
From 2016 through 2025, 35% of the emission allowances would be allocated to the
electricity sector without charge for the benefit of electricity consumers, and 9% would be
allocated for the benefit of natural gas consumers. In addition, for each year, 2012 through
2050, 15% of the emission allowances would be allocated for the benefit of low income
18
19

Covered entities are more fully described in H. R. Rep. No. 111-137, 2009, pp 360-361.
Adding section 721(e) to the Clean Air Act.
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consumers. ACES provides for many other generally much smaller free allocations of
emissions allowances for various purposes and varying time periods. These include home
heating oil and propane consumers, support for carbon capture and sequestration, investment
in energy efficiency and renewable energy, and rebates to certain energy-intensive, tradeexposed industries (ACES, 2009, § 321; H. R. Rep. No. 111-137, 2009, p. 177-180).20 An
economist who recently examined ACES allowances, their intended recipients, the purposes
for which they would be issued, and the varying free distribution periods and percentages
concluded that “80% of the value of [freely distributed emission allowances] accrue to
consumers and public purposes, and some 20% accrue to covered, private industry.”
(Stavins, 2009). 21
Emission Allowance Rebate and International Reserve Allowance Programs
In addition to freely distributed emission allowances, ACES establishes two programs that
address the competitiveness impacts of the U.S. industry in light of the costs of the cap-andtrade program. First, the “Emission Allowance Rebate Program” provides rebates to certain
industrial sectors to compensate for costs incurred in compliance with ACES emission limits.
Second, the “International Reserve Allowance Program” authorizes the President to require
that in certain circumstances, importers of certain products obtain “international reserve
allowances” intended to address the competitive imbalance in the costs of production
resulting from the difference between costs of complying with ACES and the costs, if any, of
complying with GHG emission programs in other countries (ACES, 2009, § 401; H. R. Rep.
No. 111-137, 2009, pp. 229-230).22
The basic purpose of the Emission Allowance Rebate Program is stated to be
preventing “carbon leakage” by rebating the bill’s GHG emission costs to firms in eligible
domestic industrial sectors. “Carbon leakage” is defined as a “substantial increase” in GHG
emissions “in other countries” if such increase is caused by a cost of production increase in
the U.S. resulting from implementation of the ACES legislation (ACES, 2009, § 401; H. R.
Rep. No. 111-137, 2009, p. 225). 23 To be eligible for a rebate, the firm must be in an
industrial sector that satisfies one of the following two criteria:
First. the sector must have either an “energy intensity” or a “greenhouse gas
intensity” of at least 5%24, plus a trade intensity of at least 15%25; or,
Second, the sector must have a “very high energy or greenhouse gas intensity of at
least 20% (ACES, 2009, §764(b)(2)(A)(ii); H. R. Rep. No. pp. 226).26
Calculations formulae (summarized in footnotes) show that access to rebates
20

Emissions Allowance Rebate Program, adding section 782 to the Clean Air Act. The rebate program is
separately described below.
21
The writer states that his analysis is based on the Waxman-Markey ACES bill as amended by the House
Energy and Commerce Committee.
22
International Reserve Allowance Program, adding sections 766-767 to the Clean Air Act.
23
Adding section 763(1) to the Clean Air Act.
24
To calculate “energy intensity”, divide (the cost of purchased electricity + fuel costs of the sector) by the
(value of the shipments of the sector). To calculate “greenhouse gas intensity”, divide [the number 20
multiplied by (the number of tons of direct and indirect CO2 equivalent GHG emissions)] divided by (the
value of the shipments of the sector) (ACES, 2009, §764(b)(2)(A)(i); H. R. Rep. No. pp. 225-226).
25
To calculate “trade intensity”, divide (the value of total imports and exports of the sector) by (the value of
shipments + the value of imports of the sector) (ACES, 2009, §764(b)(2)(A)(ii); H.R. Rep. No. 111-137, p.
226).
26
Note that the criteria given here indicate presumptively eligible sectors; the EPA may designate additional
eligible sectors. (ACES, 2009, §764(b)(3); H. R. Rep. No. pp. 227).
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increases as either the sector’s energy costs or its GHG emissions increase; trade intensity
increase similarly increases access to rebates as either or both imports and exports increase.
The ACES Emission Allowance Rebate Program includes both “covered entities”27
and firms that are not “covered entities”, but operate in an eligible industrial sector that
satisfies the criteria summarized above. Calculation of rebates differs according to whether
the industrial entity is or is not a “covered entity”.
For covered entities, rebates include both direct and indirect compliance costs, which
are termed “direct and indirect carbon factors”. Rebates for other industrial firms in an
eligible sector are measured solely by indirect compliance costs. Direct compliance costs are
carbon emission costs incurred by covered entities; indirect compliance costs are carbon
emission costs passed along to both covered entities and other eligible entities by their
electricity providers. Where emissions allowances were freely allocated to an electricity
provider and used for the benefit of industrial consumers, rebates for indirect costs are
adjusted to avoid rebates for costs that were not incurred by the industrial entity (ACES,
2009, §765(b)(1)-(3); H.R. Rep. No. 111-137, p. 228-229). The total distribution of rebates
for any year is limited to the amount of emission allowances allocated to the Emission
Allowance Rebate Program for that year (ACES, 2009, §321; H.R. Rep. No. 111-137, p.
178).28
As noted earlier, the ACES bill also provides for an “International Reserve
Allowance Program” that authorizes the President to require importers’ “international reserve
allowances” intended to address the competitive imbalance resulting from the difference
between costs of complying with ACES, and the costs of complying with a GHG emission
program, if any, in the exporting country. The program applies to imports of “primary
products” which are defined as products manufactured by an eligible industrial sector that are:
(A) iron, steel, steel mill products (including pipe and tube), aluminum, cement,
glass (including flat, container, and specialty glass and fiberglass), pulp, paper,
chemicals, or industrial ceramics; or
(B) any other manufactured product that is sold in bulk for purposes of further
manufacture or inclusion in a finished product (ACES, 2009, §401; H.R. Rep.
No. 111-137, p. 225).29
To invoke the international reserve allowance requirement with respect to imports of
primary products in an eligible industrial sector, the President must first determine whether
70% or less of the global output30 for the sector is produced or manufactured in countries
that meet at least one of the following four criteria (ACES, 2009, §767(c); H.R. Rep. No.
111-137, p. 230):
1. The country is a party to an international agreement to which the United States is
a party that includes a nationally enforceable greenhouse gas emissions reduction
commitment for that country that is at least as stringent as that of the United States.

27

“Covered entities” are defined in ACES section 312, adding Title VII to the Clean Air Act. (ACES, 2009).
Also see the summary description earlier in this paper.
28
Adding section 782(e) to the Clean Air Act, concerning “Trade Vulnerable Industries”. The allocation is
2% of the emission allowances for 2012 and 2013, but 15% for the year 2014, and 15% multiplied by various
factors for subsequent years.
29
Adding section 763 to the Clean Air Act.
30
Output means “the total tonnage or other standard unit of production (as determined by the [EPA]
Administrator) produced by an entity in an industrial sector.” (ACES, 2009, §763(5); H.R. Rep. No. 111137, p. 222).
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2. The country is a party to a multilateral or bilateral emission reduction agreement
for that sector to which the United States is a party.
3. The country has an annual energy or greenhouse gas intensity … for the sector
that is equal to or less than the energy or greenhouse gas intensity for such sector in
the United States in the most recent year for which data are available.
4. The country has implemented policies … that individually or collectively
impose an incremental increase on the cost of production associated with
greenhouse gas emissions from the sector that is at least 60% of the cost of
complying with this title in the United States for such sector, averaged over a twoyear period (ACES, 2009, §767(b); H.R. Rep. No. 111-137, p. 230).
Next, the President must assess the extent to which either emission allowance rebates
or the International Reserve Allowance Program either has or could mitigate or address
carbon leakage in the industrial sector at issue (ACES, 2009, §767(c); H.R. Rep. No. 111137, p. 230).
Upon making the 70% or less finding and the emission allowance and reserve
allowance assessments, the President must then either modify the percentages that govern the
direct and indirect carbon cost factors in calculating the emission allowance rebate, or
implement the International Reserve Allowance Program for the primary products involved,
or take both actions (ACES, 2009, §767(c)(3) and (e); H.R. Rep. No. 111-137, p. 231).
ACES provides that the International Reserve Allowance Program may not begin
before January 1, 2025 (ACES, 2009, §766(a)(4); H.R. Rep. No. 111-137, p. 230). It is in
essence a border adjustment program with the stated purpose of addressing “the competitive
imbalance in the costs of producing or manufacturing primary products in industrial sectors
resulting from the difference between” US GHG emission compliance costs and the “costs, if
any, of complying in other countries with greenhouse regulatory programs” (ACES, 2009,
§766(a)(2); H.R. Rep. No. 111-137, p. 230). Regulations issued by the EPA Administrator
would require submission of “appropriate amounts” of international reserve allowances on
importation of primary products, and prohibit “the introduction into interstate commerce of a
primary product without submitting the required number of international reserve allowances”
(ACES, 2009, §766(a)(1)(B) and 766(a)(1)(D); H. R. Rep. No. pp. 229-230).
WTO Treaty Compliance Issues
Brief comments about WTO jurisprudence may be useful before addressing WTO treaty
compliance issues under key ACES provisions. The three ACES provisions that appear most
vulnerable are: (1) The ACES grant of free allocations of emissions allowances; (2) the
“Emissions Allowance Rebate Program”; and (3) the “International Reserve Allowance
Program”. Each provision is summarized above.
The WTO judicial process is more complex than that of other major international
tribunals. In brief, there are four phases to the WTO judicial process: consultations between
the parties; proceedings before a Panel; appeals to the Appellate Body; and compliance
proceedings. Unlike the International Court of Justice, where the consent of the respondent
state is required, WTO Members are obligated by treaty to submit their WTO treaty disputes
to the jurisdiction of WTO tribunals. Although they do not bind other WTO Members,
decisions of the Appellate Body – and, where not appealed, of WTO Panels – are binding
with respect to the states parties to the dispute.
Under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the fundamental role of
the WTO judicial system is to provide “security and predictability to the multilateral trading
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system.” Hence the purpose of the WTO legal process is “to preserve the rights and
obligations of Members under the covered agreements and to clarify the existing provisions
of those agreements in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public
international law.” Article 3.2 adds that WTO dispute settlement rulings “cannot add to or
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.” (DSU, 1994, Article
3:2).
Thus, although WTO dispute decisions are to “clarify” existing WTO treaty
provisions, they must “preserve” rights and obligations, without increasing or reducing those
rights or obligations. This careful formulation appears to impose sharp limits on the
“clarification” function of dispute settlement, but Article 3.2 structures those limits by
mandating that the twin tasks of clarification and preservation be accomplished “in
accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law.” (DSU,
1994, Article 3:2). In common with international practice generally, the Appellate Body
reasonably accepts that customary international law rules of treaty interpretation are
embodied in Articles 31-33 of the widely ratified Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(1969) (“Vienna Convention” or “VCLT”) (Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 1996).
Also in common with international practice generally, the Appellate Body acknowledges that
some existing rules of treaty interpretation have not been codified in the Vienna Convention
(United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, 2000, ¶271).
I should emphasize that treaty interpretation is not a mechanical process that can be
accomplished by routine application of clear rules or standards of interpretation to the text of
a treaty. Rather, treaty interpretation requires close analysis of the treaty text, deep
understanding of treaty interpretation methodology, and sophisticated appreciation of the
limits to the interpreter’s authority. Thus it is by no means assured that but a single “correct”
result will be reached in any specific instance. What is desired and should generally be
attainable, however, are interpretations that fall within a relatively narrow band of potential
results.
In interpreting provisions of WTO agreements, the Appellate Body has often been
quite rigorous and systematic in applying the “rules” of interpretation laid down in Articles
31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Paradoxically, the Appellate
Body’s focus on rigorous application of international law treaty interpretive methodology is
sometimes criticized from both ends of the spectrum: either as far too mechanical an
approach or as enabling the Appellate Body to create law by masking insertion of its own
unwarranted trade policy judgments into WTO agreements. Neither polar criticism is
justified.
Typically Appellate Body review forcefully requires panels to begin with the
“ordinary meaning” of the treaty text as mandated by VCLT Article 31:1, which calls for
interpreting treaty text in light of “context” as is narrowly defined in VCLT Article 31:2, and
in light of the “object and purpose” of the treaty. The net effect of these provisions is to
focus the interpreter’s attention on matters intrinsic to the treaty. Although these provisions
constitute the “fundamental rule” of treaty interpretation, both panels and the Appellate Body
typically need to resort to other provisions of the VCLT, and sometimes to canons of treaty
interpretation found in customary international law outside of the Vienna Convention.
The concept of “ordinary meaning” is not defined. Although determining “ordinary”
meaning will typically require the interpreter to invoke dictionary definitions of the language
used in authentic treaty texts, the Appellate Body has observed that:
[D]ictionaries, alone, are not necessarily capable of resolving complex questions of
interpretation, as they typically aim to catalogue all meanings of words—be those
meanings common or rare, universal or specialized (United States—Gambling
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Services, 2005, ¶¶ 162-66).
A focus intrinsic to the treaty is equally clear in deriving meaning from the “context”
of a contested term. Although the term “context” may often bear a broader meaning, the
Vienna Convention gives the concept a narrow scope. VCLT Article 31:2 defines “context”
as meaning the treaty text, including its preamble and annexes, together with agreements
“relating to the treaty … made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of
the treaty”.
Article 31 also permits the interpreter to consult three other potential indicators of
agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty. The first is “any
subsequent agreement” “regarding the interpretation of the treaty”; the second is “any
subsequent practice” “which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation” VCLT Article 31:3(a) & (b). The third reference is to “any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties” VCLT Article 31:3(c). The
interpreter’s use of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice moves analysis beyond
the text of the treaty, but the focus remains the text the treaty as drafted; to be considered by
the interpreter, both subsequent agreements and subsequent practice must relate directly to
the interpretation of the treaty. Hence the interpreter’s resort to these factors is not a
substantial departure from the concept of deriving meaning from indicators of intent
“intrinsic” to the treaty.
Free Allocation of Emissions Allowances and Emission Allowance Rebate Program
To challenge free allocation of emissions allowances or the emission allowance rebate
program as in violation of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(Subsidies or SCM Agreement), a WTO Member would need to show that the ACES
measures constitute a “subsidy” and cause “adverse effects” to the interests of other
Members as those terms are defined in the Subsidies Agreement.
The SCM definition of a “subsidy” includes, inter alia, the following potentially
relevant forms of a “financial contribution by a government”:
(i)

a government practice [that] involves a direct transfer of funds
(e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion) …;

(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected
…;
(iii)

a government provides goods or services other than general
infrastructure…. (SCM Agreement, 1994, Article 1.1(a)(1)(i)-(iii)).

To be “actionable”, the subsidy must be “specific” in the sense of applying to
“enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries”, in contrast to grants made
pursuant to legislation which “establishes objective criteria or conditions governing the
eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy”. Furthermore, an “actionable” subsidy requires,
inter alia, “serious prejudice to the interests of another Member”, which may arise where
“the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like product of another
Member into the market of the subsidizing Member”(SCM Agreement, 1994, Articles 2.1,
2.1(b), 5(c), and 6.3(a)). The quoted provisions may serve as the WTO treaty basis for a
multifaceted challenge to the wide-ranging free allocation of emission allowances in the
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ACES bill.31
If a subsidies case were brought by an exporter of goods to the U.S. market, the
United States may seek to invoke the environmental exception of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XX(g), which provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
...
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption; ….
Although the Subsidies Agreement adopted at the Uruguay Round in 1994 relates to
certain articles in the original GATT agreement adopted in 1947, the GATT Article XX
“General Exceptions” do not explicitly apply to the other Multilateral Agreements on Trade
in Goods adopted at the Uruguay Round. Hence, quite apart from difficulties in interpreting
the language of the introductory clause, termed the “chapeau” of Article XX, and its
subparagraph (g), reliance on the General Exception of GATT Article XX may be rejected as
a defense to claimed Subsidies Agreement violations.
The Emission Allowance Rebate Program presents much the same subsidy issues as
presented by the free allocation of emission allowances, but the WTO analysis may differ
owing to the specifications of the program. The eligibility tests imply more limited access to
rebates in comparison to the wide scope given to free allocation of emission allowances. The
focus on “carbon leakage”, defined as a “substantial increase” in GHG emissions “in other
countries” if such increase is caused by a cost of production increase in the U.S. resulting
from implementation of the ACES legislation, implies that “leakage” refers to a shift of
production to countries that do not limit GHG emissions. This might be seen as a “disguised
restriction on international trade”, disqualifying the program for the “general exception”
provision of GATT Article XX(g).
Both measures, the free allocation of emission allowances and the Emission
Allowance Rebate Program, thus offer considerable scope for WTO legal challenge,
involving issues of interpretation and application of WTO treaties that are not easily
answered.
The International Reserve Allowance Program offers additional potential legal
challenges which, if anything, would be more complex than those arising under the free
allocation and emission allowance rebate programs.
As noted, the International Reserve Allowance Program is explicitly intended to
address the competitiveness of U.S. industry – the competitive imbalance that results from
the difference between costs of complying with ACES, and costs of complying with a GHG
emission program, if any, in the exporting country. The program would correct this
imbalance – level the playing field – by requiring exporters to acquire emission allowances
from the “International Reserve” established by the EPA Administrator.
The fundamental issue presented by the International Reserve Allowance Program is
that imports from WTO Members that control GHG emissions in a manner similar to the
U.S. are treated differently from exports from WTO Members that have not adopted such
31

See text regarding Emissions Allowance Rebate Program, above.
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controls. GATT Article I:1, General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, provides:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation . . . any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any [WTO] Member to any product originating in or destined for any
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other [WTO] Members.
[italics supplied]32
The italicized words “charges of any kind” and “like product” raise the issues of
whether the international emissions allowance requirement is in effect a “charge”, and
whether a product produced with GHG emission controls is “like” an identical product
produced without such controls. The latter is the product versus process or production
methods (PPM) issue which has arisen several times under GATT and WTO, but has yet to
be finally resolved. Once again these issues provide ample opportunity for WTO litigation.
In addition, the International Reserve Allowance Program presents potential barriers
to satisfying the requirements of the chapeau to Article XX. The General Exception clauses
of GATT Article XX would of course apply to measures that violate the MFN clause of
GATT Article I, but the question may be whether ACES International Reserve provisions
violate the chapeau because “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade”. Since the International Reserve
Allowances Program explicitly seeks to correct competitive trade “imbalances”, its
application will surely seek to restrict international trade, and it may be no defense that the
program is not effective until January 1, 2025. The terms of the Article XX chapeau seem to
contemplate a measure that has been “applied”, which may be argued to postpone analysis
until sometime after the effective date for the President’s invocation of the International
Reserve Allowance Program. Owing to their “chilling effect” on international trade,
however, the WTO has, however, adjudicated cases challenging statutory provisions before
they were implemented.
WTO Litigation as Leverage in Climate Negotiations
This brief survey of potential WTO legal challenges to ACES provisions is intended to show
that the adoption of ACES may trigger potentially well-founded WTO cases unless
agreement on GHG controls can be reached between major trading partners. In this context,
potential WTO litigation may serve as an impetus to reaching broader agreement on climate
issues. The filing of WTO cases will set in motion a lengthy and contentious process that
might harden government positions, threaten the WTO dispute settlement system, and
become yet another barrier to reaching climate agreement. Might moderation, cooperation,
and agreement be possible given increased recognition of the cataclysm threatened by
uncontrolled GHG emissions, together with the leverage provided by a credible threat of
potentially disruptive WTO litigation?
Perhaps a credible threat of WTO climate litigation would add to the pressure on the
United States to reach consensus on a post-Kyoto GHG emissions control regime. One
scenario for reaching a broader agreement might be serious planning for a WTO challenge to
the ACES legislation – planning that would necessarily be taken seriously by the United
States which has always had high stakes in effective WTO trade regulation. Facing such a
32

The original language of GATT Article I:1 referring to “contracting parties” was changed to WTO
Members with the establishment of WTO (GATT 1994, ¶ 2(a), Explanatory Notes).
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challenge, perhaps the United States may be willing move towards effective transfer of GHG
emissions reduction technology to developing countries and even to entertain proposals for
joint China-U.S. projects aimed at developing technology to address major GHG emissions
reduction issues.
Some examples follow: With abundant coal resources, both China and the U.S. would
profit from cost-effective carbon capture and sequestration. With rising pressures on food
resources, and concerns about energy independence, both China and the U.S. would profit
from cost-effective cellulosic ethanol production. With urgent plans to develop and market
the plug-in electric car, both China and the U.S. would profit from improvements in electric
storage battery technology. With rapid development of wind and solar power, both China
and the U.S. would profit from cost-effective long-distance energy transmission.
China-U.S. cooperative research projects in any one of these fields, and in many
others, could develop and disseminate needed technology, thereby contributing to the
reduction of global GHG emissions. Research costs might be shared in proportions agreed
between the two sides, and research facilities could be located in both countries. As is
normally true of U.S. government sponsored research, technology developed in such projects
should be placed in the public domain, available without cost to researchers and
manufacturers in all countries.
In embarking on such joint research projects, both China and the United States would
at least informally agree on the contours of a post-Kyoto climate agreement in which all
participants would undertake to accept limitations on their GHG emissions and to develop
national emission allowance trading schemes compatible with those of their treaty partners.
The participants would also agree to accept border adjustments as GHG emission compliance
mechanisms, and to support the adoption by the WTO Ministerial Conference of a climatefriendly interpretation of “like product” in relevant WTO agreements (Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article IX:2).33
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Climbing The Great Wall:
How The Interplay Between China And The United States Will Affect Mitigation In A
Kyoto Successor Treaty
Elizabeth Dinello1
Abstract
China and the United States have the ability to radically shape a successor treaty to the Kyoto
Protocol. China’s placement as a non-Annex I nation under the Kyoto Protocol has had
significant negative consequences for climate change, and China is now the top emitter of
greenhouse gases in the world. The United States has thus far refused to sign the Kyoto
Protocol. China will not sign a Kyoto successor treaty unless the United States is on board
and vice versa. If either party is uncooperative in negotiating a successor treaty, there will be
no effective treaty. The Kyoto Protocol has in large part failed because of the roles China
and the United States have played.
This paper will discuss how the interplay between China and the United States will
affect mitigation in a Kyoto successor treaty. This paper argues that China and the United
States must agree to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to eighty percent below 1990 levels by
2050. First, this paper will discuss basic climate change science, focusing on what the
experts say greenhouse gases (including carbon dioxide) and temperature must be stabilized
at as well as the mitigation measures necessary to achieve those stabilization goals. Second,
this paper will summarize what happened at the Bali and Poznan conferences and how those
two meetings set the stage for Copenhagen in 2009. Third, this paper will outline the
necessary framework for mitigation in a Kyoto successor treaty. Fourth, this paper will
address the challenges of implementing a Kyoto successor treaty in the United States and in
China. Lastly, this paper will discuss how the world, and in particular the United States and
China, is reacting and could react to mitigating climate change in light of the current
economic crisis. With the recent approval of Todd Stern as the United States Special Envoy
for Climate Change and the March 2008 elevation of China’s State Environmental Protection
Agency into a Cabinet ministry, both nations are now in the position to cooperate and lead
the rest of the world in negotiating a successful Kyoto successor treaty.
Introduction
“My dear ones, your generation will face a series of environmental challenges that will dwarf
anything any previous generation has confronted,” the Udalls wrote to their grandchildren.2
They then pointed out that the United States (U.S.) and China are responsible for forty
percent of carbon dioxide emissions and that “consequently these two nations have a moral
responsibility to be in the forefront of any global campaign to develop new technologies to
cut the emissions of this damaging pollutant.”3 Stewart Udall, a former Secretary of Interior,
“regrettably voted…for the Interstate Highway Program…act[ing] on the shortsighted
assumption that cheap oil was super-abundant and would always be available…it haunts
America today.”4 The U.S. has made a big mistake, and now China is following in America’s
footsteps. Americans are at fault, and we must take responsibility for our actions and make
things right. Many rural Chinese strive to emulate the affluent lifestyle of Americans. Wu
Yiebing and his wife, Cao Waiping, moved from a rural mountain village to Hanjing, and are
1
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dependent on their new coal-supported lifestyle: “…they have tasted the rising standard of
living from coal-generated electricity and they are hooked, even as they suffer the vivid
effects of the damage their new lifestyle creates.”5 As Zhang Jianyu, program manager of
Beijing’s Office of Environmental Defense put it, “ ‘The fundamental problem is that China
is following the path of the United States, and probably the world cannot afford a second
United States.’ ”6
The Kyoto Protocol (Kyoto) has failed. Under Kyoto, developed nations were
supposed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by five percent below 1990 levels. Not
only have developed nations as a whole not reduced their emissions, they have actually
increased their emissions. Professor Gwyn Prins points out that the European Union (EU), at
the helm of Kyoto, actually increased its emissions by ten percent. 7 In an earlier article
Professor Prins and Steve Raynor argued that Kyoto “failed…not just in its lack of success in
slowing global warming, but also because it has stifled discussion of alternative policy
approaches that could both combat climate change and adapt to its unavoidable
consequences.”8 They insist that the “rational thing to do in the face of a bad investment is to
cut your losses and try something different.”9 In an open letter to Barack Obama, journalist
Michael Page points out that “Kyoto is noble but ineffective” and encourages Obama to
abandon his cap and trade plan in favor of a tax-and-dividend system.10 Since Obama has
already pledged support for a cap-and-trade system, a carbon tax is unrealistic at this time.
Kyoto has in large part failed because of the roles China and the U.S. have played.
Under the Bush administration, the U.S. refused to sign Kyoto. Bush consistently
complained that China “was entirely exempted from the requirements in the Kyoto
Protocol.”11 Bush also argued that “mandatory reductions in emissions will undermine the
American economy…”12 Eight years later, the American economy is in a shambles and the
American people are angry—very angry at Mr. Bush. China has continued to follow
America’s lead in terms of economic development. Significant negative environmental
consequences have come with this development. Professor Paul G. Harris argues that “the
most profound environmental consequence of these developments is China’s contribution to
climate change.”13 Americans have set a horrible example for the Chinese. The U.S. has
made the situation even worse by failing to take a leadership role in the global climate change
arena and by failing to act at all. Even though the Chinese are racing to catch up to the
Americans’ affluent lifestyles, and in their race promising to increase carbon emissions to
“600 million metric tons in 2010,” citizens must remain optimistic that the two countries can
come together and end this terrible game of “chicken.”14 As Margaret J. Kim and Robert E.
Jones argue, “This global game of ‘chicken’ is a game that the world cannot afford to play.
5
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While the United States continues to drag its feet, knowing full well that China will not ‘blink
first,’ China’s emissions continue to grow at an alarming rate.”15 As Professor Harris says,
“The great challenge, and opportunity, China faces is to chart a development path that doesn’t
imitate the destructive example of developed Western countries.”16 The U.S. and China must
call a truce and together lead the world in creating a practical post-Kyoto framework.
This paper will discuss how the interplay between China and the U.S. will affect
mitigation in a Kyoto successor treaty. This paper argues that China and the U.S. must agree
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to eighty percent below 1990 levels by 2050.17 First, this
paper will discuss basic climate change science, focusing on what the experts say greenhouse
gases (including carbon dioxide) and temperature must be stabilized at as well as the
mitigation measures necessary to achieve those stabilization goals. Second, this paper will
summarize what happened at the Bali and Poznan conferences and how those two meetings
set the stage for Copenhagen in 2009. Third, this paper will outline the necessary framework
for mitigation in a Kyoto successor treaty. Fourth, this paper will address the challenges of
implementing a Kyoto successor treaty in the U.S. and China. Lastly, this paper will discuss
how the world, and in particular the U.S. and China, is reacting and could react to mitigating
climate change in light of the current economic crisis. With the recent approval of Todd
Stern as the U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change and the March 2008 elevation of China’s
State Environmental Protection Agency into a Cabinet ministry, both nations are now in the
position to cooperate and lead the rest of the world in negotiating a successful Kyoto
successor treaty.18, 19
Climate Change Science—What The Experts Say
It is generally accepted in the academic community that humans have contributed
greatly to global warming and that “Global atmospheric concentrations of CO2, methane
(CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) have increased markedly as a result of human activities since
1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial values determined from ice cores spanning many
thousands of years.”20 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
“In order to stabilise the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere, emissions would need to
peak and decline thereafter. The lower the stabilisation level, the more quickly this peak and
decline would need to occur.”21 The IPCC stresses that we must take action quickly. The
longer it takes us to initiate action, the harder it will be to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions
15
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at low levels: “Mitigation efforts over the next two to three decades will have a large impact
on opportunities to achieve lower stabilisation levels.”22
At a 2005 conference hosted by the United Kingdom (UK) Met Office in Exeter,
“preliminary findings were that a rise of 3 degrees Celsius (5.4 degrees Fahrenheit) relative to
pre-industrial levels may by well past the edge of the comfort zone.” 23 At the Exeter
meeting, scientists “strengthened a consensus that a 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees
Fahrenheit) warming above pre-industrial levels, or about 1.2 degrees Celsius (2.1 degrees
Fahrenheit) above today’s global temperature, is the best goal for climate stabilization.” Both
NASA and the IPCC “have also endorsed the need to stop before warming by 2 degrees
Celsius.”24 In the scientific community, “the consensus is that the limit should be 400 to have
a good chance of restricting the global temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius.”25
It its Fourth Assessment Report, the IPCC states that “limiting temperature increases
to 2°C above preindustrial levels can only be reached at the lowest end of the concentration
interval found in the scenarios of category I (i.e. about 450 ppmv CO2-eq using ‘best
estimate’ assumptions).”26 In category I scenarios, emissions must peak between 2000 and
2015 and the change in global emissions in 2050 must be between fifty and eighty-five
percent of 2000 levels. 27 Limiting the temperature increase to 2.4°C-2.8°C (category II)
would mean that emissions must peak between 2000 and 2020 and the change in global
emissions must be between thirty and sixty percent of 2000 levels.28 Limiting the temperature
increase to 2.8°C-3.2°C (category III) would mean that emissions must peak between 2010
and 2030 and the change in global emissions must be between five and thirty percent of 2000
levels.29
In a May 2008 letter, the Union of Concerned Scientists called for “reduc[ing]
emissions on the order of 80 percent below 2000 levels by 2050.” 30 The signatory scientists
called for the first step to be “reductions on the order of 15-20 percent below 2000 levels by
2020, which is achievable and consistent with sound economic policy.”31
The Road to Copenhagen: What Happened in Bali and Poznan
The Thirteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 13)/ the Third Session of the Meeting of
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP 3) held December 3-15, 2007 in Bali, Indonesia
produced the Bali Roadmap. Bali saw the formation of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-
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term Cooperative Action under the Convention.32 The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term
Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) is known as the “UNFCCC track”
and runs parallel to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties
under the Protocol (AWG-KP), the “Kyoto Protocol track.” The creation of the new AWFLCA is vital to the negotiation of a post Kyoto successor treaty by Copenhagen in 2009: “The
key decision in Bali was the launch of a negotiating process under the Convention that will
now run in parallel with the Kyoto negotiations with the expectation that – although not
formally linked – the two tracks will converge in a comprehensive post-2012 agreement in
2009.”33 The two tracks must merge to create one cohesive regime.
At COP 13, both developed and developing nation parties adopted mitigation
measures for the first time. Developed nation parties committed to “Measurable, reportable
and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified
emission limitation and reduction objectives, by all developed country Parties, while ensuring
the comparability of efforts among them, taking into account differences in their national
circumstances.”34 Developing nation parties committed to “Nationally appropriate mitigation
actions by developing nation Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and
enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and
verifiable manner.”35 Bali marked the first time that developing nations agreed to any kind of
binding mitigation measures under either the UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol tracks.
The Fourteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 14)/ the Fourth Session of the Meeting of
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP 4) held December 3-15, 2007 in Poznan, Poland
served mainly as a “pit stop” on the road to Copenhagen and “barely produced any
remarkable results.” 36 Largely due to the political situation in the United States, most
developing countries did not make significant moves in Poznan.37 Poznan lacked the sense of
urgency needed to lay an aggressive and attainable course on the road to Copenhagen. The
EU called for reductions on the part of both developed and developing countries but
developing countries called for “stronger support” from developed countries.38
In Poznan, the AWG-KP “reached no conclusions on the range of emission reductions
to be undertaken by developed countries.”39 Most were “unprepared” to negotiate without the
U.S. on board.40 The AWG-LCA managed to accomplish significantly more at Poznan than
the AWG-KP. The AWG-LCA “resolved to ‘shift into full negotiating mode in 2009’ ”41 and
“adopted a work program authorizing its chair to draft the documents needed to carry its
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work forward.”42 The documents are 1) “a document ‘describing areas of convergence in the
ideas and proposals of the Parties, exploring options for dealing with areas of divergence and
identifying any gaps that might need to be filled in reaching an agreed outcome;’ ” and 2) “a
negotiating text for consideration at the AWG-LCA’s second session next year, in June
[2009].” A disagreement also arose in Poznan as to the “kind of legal outcome aimed at in
Copenhagen.”43 The legal form of a Kyoto successor treaty will be addressed in the next
section.
Necessary Framework for Mitigation in a Kyoto Successor Treaty—The “Copenhagen
Protocol”
A mitigation framework for a Kyoto successor treaty must include several key components.
First, a Kyoto successor treaty must include all nations. Second, the reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions to eighty percent below 1990 levels by 2050 must be across the board and
cannot be based on a nation’s per capita emissions.44 Third, the treaty must take the form of a
new legal instrument under the UNFCCC that replaces the Kyoto Protocol rather than an
amendment to the Kyoto Protocol or a Meeting of the Parties (CMP) decision.45 The new
legal instrument, the “Copenhagen Protocol,” must incorporate Kyoto elements into the new
instrument. 46 However, elements of Kyoto that are not functioning properly should be
eliminated from the Copenhagen Protocol. Fourth, Annex I nations must establish a fund
solely to provide monetary aid to non-Annex I nations to achieve their mitigation
commitments. Fifth, the Copenhagen Protocol must establish a comprehensive enforcement
mechanism. This paper will focus on the basic framework for the mitigation aspects of the
Copenhagen Protocol. The mitigation framework proposed here is not meant to be
comprehensive.
An all-inclusive Kyoto successor treaty will give all nations the opportunity to sign on
and will tone down any anger or resentment nations could have about being left out of the
process. Kyoto critics endorse other approaches such as “bring[ing] together a more limited
number of major-emitting and like-minding countries.” 47 Others advocate that countries
should “make pledges of particular domestic measures.”48 Bringing together a smaller group
of the major polluters could potentially work only if it was part of the post-Kyoto mitigation
framework. One design for this smaller group “is an agreement among the dozen or so major
emitting countries—the United States, China, Europe, Russia, Japan, India, Indonesia, Brazil,
Australia, Canada, Mexico, Korea, South Africa, and perhaps a few other major countries—
in a regime to limit global GHG emissions.”49 A design of this sort will never work as part of
“a parallel regime in a plurilateral approach” because China will never sign onto anything
that interferes with the UNFCCC or Kyoto tracks.50 Any action that smaller groups take with
regard to the Copenhagen Protocol must complement rather than replace and official work
under the UNFCCC and more specifically, the AWG-KP or the AWG-LCA.
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Professor Prins argues that “the only way to save the Copenhagen meeting from
failure would be to shift away from the top-down approach of the Kyoto framework, and end
the quest for tighter emissions targets, closer timetables and more building regulations.”51
Prins’ recommendation for “end[ing] the quest for tighter emissions targets [and] closer
timetables” in Copenhagen contradicts the entire UNFCCC and Kyoto approach. The science
in the IPCC Fourth Assessment report clearly shows that we must act now. Completely
revamping our approach less than a year prior to Copenhagen is a recipe for disaster. Xie
Zhenhua, the minister and vice-director of China’s National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) has already warned that the Chinese will not shift away from “the topdown approach of the Kyoto framework:” “ ‘Any attempt to deviate from, breach or re-define
the Convention, or to deny the Kyoto Protocol, or to merge the Convention process with the
Kyoto Protocol process, will be detrimental, and will ultimately lead to a fruitless
Copenhagen Conference.’ ” With the proper technology transfer and significant monetary
aid, though, China may be willing to deny the Kyoto Protocol and merge the AWG-KP and
AWG-LCA tracks.
The reduction in greenhouse gas emissions to eighty percent below 1990 levels by
2050 must be across the board.52, 53 Reduction commitments cannot be based on a nation’s
per capita emissions. Basing reduction commitments on per capita emissions will actually
increase emissions. Professor McCubbin argues for China’s cap to be based on “greenhouse
gas emissions per unit of GDP.” 54 She argues that “this approach would allow China’s
economy to grow, but it would require its emissions to grow more slowly than if left
uncontrolled.”55
The Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period ends in 2012. The Copenhagen
Protocol must cover the time period from 2012 to 2050. The first commitment period for the
Copenhagen Protocol should begin in 2012 and go until 2020. This first commitment period
will be shorter than the other three commitment periods. The next three commitment periods
will run from 2020 to 2030, from 2030 to 2040, and from 2040 to 2050. The year 2030 will
serve as the official “midpoint” of the Copenhagen Protocol timetable.
This proposed framework is in keeping with the “A Shared Vision for Long-Term
Cooperative Action” (hereinafter “Shared Vision”) proposed by the AWG-LCA in documents
submitted in advance of the Bonn Climate Change Talks held March 29-April 8, 2009.56 This
Shared Vision contains “A Long-Term Global Goal for Emission Reductions.” 57 In
paragraph five, the Parties agree that 2050 “is an appropriate time frame for a long-term
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goal.”58 Proposals by the Parties include stabilization of GHG emissions “of around 450 ppm
carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2 eq) or 350 ppm CO2 eq;” limiting the global average
temperature increase to between 1.5°C and 2°C above pre-industrial levels; and
quantification of “GHG emission reductions at a global level,” reducing to “50 percent of
1990 levels, or without specifying the base year,” “reductions of between 75 and 85 percent
(including ranges within these figures) of 1990 levels;” and per capita GHG emission
reductions.59
During the first commitment period from 2012 to 2020, non-Annex I nations,
including China and India, will be allowed to increase their greenhouse gas emissions. After
the first commitment period, non-Annex I nations must begin to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions. The Fourth IPCC report indicates that “global greenhouse gas emissions growth
needs to stop within the next 10-25 years, followed by a sharp decline.” 60 Non-Annex I
nations will still be expected to meet the target of an eighty percent reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions by 2050. Non-Annex I nations should be allowed to increase their greenhouse
gas emissions during the first commitment period to gain time to aggressively put in place
energy efficiency programs and new, clean technology. The new fund established under the
Copenhagen Protocol will assist non-Annex I nations in achieving these goals. Professor
McCubbin agrees that a cap on China’s greenhouse gas emissions must be “set above current
levels in order to allow for growth.”61 Most experts agree that worldwide greenhouse gas
emissions should peak by 2020 then must fall in order for emissions to stabilize at 400-450
ppm carbon dioxide equivalent and to cap warming at two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels.
The Copenhagen Protocol must take the form of a new legal instrument under the
UNFCCC regime that incorporates Kyoto elements into the new instrument. The
Copenhagen Protocol should retain the following Kyoto elements: an emissions trading
scheme (often referred to as “cap-and-trade”) and the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM). The Copenhagen Protocol should eliminate Joint Implementation (JI). The
Copenhagen Protocol must also incorporate UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol principles such as
common but differentiated responsibilities and equity.
Kyoto’s emissions trading scheme should be continued in the Copenhagen Protocol
because it functions well and has established a carbon market. Article Seventeen of the
Kyoto Protocol sets out the emissions trading scheme. Article Seventeen “allows countries
that have emission units to spare—emissions permitted them but not ‘used’—to sell this
excess capacity to countries that are over their targets.”62 Article Seventeen created a carbon
market with carbon being tracked and traded as a new commodity.63 Replacing the emissions
trading scheme with a carbon tax “could congest an already difficult negotiation.”64
The Copenhagen Protocol must overhaul the CDM system because the CDM has lost
credibility in recent years. Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat agrees that “the CDM has not met
expectations that it would promote emission reducing investments throughout the developing
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world, and we now have an opportunity to revisit it.” 65 The CDM is defined in Article
Twelve of the Kyoto Protocol and “allows a country with an emission-reduction or emissionlimitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to implement an emissionreduction project in developing countries. Such projects can earn saleable certified emission
reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which can be counted towards
meeting Kyoto targets.” 66 Essentially, developed nations are able to “[lower] their
greenhouse gas emissions by financing emission reduction projects in developing countries
where investment is cheaper.”67
CDM overhaul should include several key components. First, the new CDM should
mandate CDM project quotas for countries which have historically hosted fewer CDM
projects, such as many African nations. As of early March 2009, there were “850 clean
development mechanism projects in 49 developing countries but only 23 of those projects
[were] in Africa.”68 Second, Copenhagen negotiators must streamline and speed up the CDM
project approval process. Third, the new CDM should contain front-loaded time-limited
participation incentives to keep the CDM operational despite the economic crisis.
The Copenhagen Protocol should eliminate JI because it allows developed countries
to conduct projects in other developed countries and produces a lot of “hot air.”69 Article Six
of the Kyoto Protocol sets out the JI mechanism. Article Six “allows a country with an
emission reduction or limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to
earn emission reduction units (ERUs) from an emission-reduction or emission removal
project in another Annex B Party, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which can be counted
towards meeting its Kyoto target.”70 JI is totally ineffective; it is simply a way for developed
countries to earn ERUs for less than it would have cost in their own respective countries. The
“benefited” developed country is receiving a benefit that it never needed anyway.
Article Three of the UNFCCC sets forth hortatory (“should”) guiding principles “for
actions by the parties to achieve the objective of the UNFCCC, including common but
differentiated responsibilities.” 71 The UNFCCC describes common but differentiated
responsibilities in terms of developed and developing nations and equity:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country
Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.72
In documents submitted in advance of the Bonn Climate Change Talks, the AWGLCA particularly focused on the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and
equity in its “Shared Vision.” Two topics under this “Shared Vision” complement the
UNFCCC principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and equity:
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(a) Approaches to long-term cooperative action on the basis of equity and in
accordance with the provisions and principles of the Convention, in particular the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, taking into account
social and economic conditions and other relevant factors;
(g) The determination of developing countries to take nationally appropriate
mitigation actions (NAMAs) in the context of sustainable development and the determination
of developed countries to provide support in the form of technology, finance and capacitybuilding, all of the above in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner.73
The NAMAs, first proposed in Bali, help link the principles of common but differentiated
responsibilities and equity with a more specific mitigation strategy.
The Copenhagen Protocol must take form of a new legal instrument that replaces the
Kyoto Protocol rather than 1) “A COP decision addressing further actions under the
Convention; 2) “Adoption by the COP of an amendment to the UNFCCC or to an annex,
setting forth additional actions and/or commitments by UNFCCC parties;” or 3) “Adoption
by the COP of a new legal instrument that…supplements…the Kyoto Protocol.”74 Creating a
new legal instrument would enable nations that are not parties to Kyoto to sign the new
instrument and bypass Kyoto entirely. Although Chris Spence, the Deputy Director of
Reporting Services for the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) has
indicated that there is “no clear consensus” on the legal form that a future agreement will
take, Professor Bodansky proposes that: “A comprehensive outcome establishing a single
integrated climate regime would have several benefits.” 75 He logically connects a single
integrated climate regime with “adoption of a single new instrument under the Convention
(either a Convention amendment or a new protocol), which addressed actions and/or
commitments by both Kyoto Protocol parties and Convention parties that are not parties to
the Protocol.” Because all nations must meet the same emission reduction requirements,
there is no need to differentiate these commitments. Non-Annex I parties will be given extra
time and resources to achieve their emissions targets. Adding another annex will complicate
the situation.
The Copenhagen Protocol must establish a fund solely to assist Annex-I nations in
providing monetary aid to non-Annex I nations to help the non-Annex I nations achieve their
mitigation commitments.76 Developing nations will not sign onto the Copenhagen Protocol
without significant technology transfer and monetary aid. Providing significant funding to
non-Annex I nations will help enable them to meet emission reduction commitments of
eighty percent by 2050. This fund should be separate from the CDM.
The Copenhagen Protocol must correct the ineffective Kyoto Protocol compliance
system. The Kyoto Protocol compliance system only applies to Annex I nations, and does
not apply to all aspects of Kyoto. Kyoto has failed in part because: “Under Article 18 of the
Protocol, any compliance procedures entailing binding consequences must be adopted as an
amendment to the Protocol.”77 Article Twenty sets out procedural requirements for amending
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the Kyoto Protocol.78 Article Twenty states that parties should try to reach consensus on the
proposed amendment, but if consensus is not reached, “the amendment shall as a last resort
be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the meeting.”
This means that if a nation decides it does not want to ratify an amendment, it can essentially
nullify the entire enforcement process.
The Copenhagen Protocol must contain comprehensive legally binding enforcement
mechanisms. The new enforcement mechanisms should apply to both Annex I and nonAnnex I nations and should impose penalties for noncompliance in every part of the
Copenhagen Protocol including any flexible mechanisms or funds. The new compliance
regime could build on the Expert Review Teams and Compliance Committee established
under Kyoto by the Marrakesh Accords.79 The roles of both entities would expand to cover
all signatory countries. The Copenhagen Protocol would need to establish new enforcement
bodies to monitor aspects not subject to enforcement under the Kyoto Protocol.
The Copenhagen Protocol must detach penalties under the enforcement regime from
any amendment process. Penalties must be negotiated and put into the actual original
document, not left incomplete for discussion later. Penalties for non-compliance could be
linked to each of the four commitment periods with penalties becoming more severe as 2050
approaches. Additional sanctions could include cutting off mitigation assistance funds to
developing nations for non-compliance.
China agrees that an enforcement mechanism is a necessary part of the Copenhagen
discussions. Su Wei, the Chinese delegation chief to the UN climate change talks in Bonn,
said that an “ ‘effective supervision mechanism’ should be set up to monitor the abovementioned technology transfer and funding.”80
While a number of potential approaches to a post Kyoto treaty have merit, many fail
to address what countries have said they will or will not do. There are some aspects of a
Kyoto successor treaty that nations may be willing to compromise on, but a viable solution
cannot ignore fundamental views on approaches to the successor treaty. Monetary aid and
technology transfer will assist in bringing some nations on board, but any successful Kyoto
successor treaty must follow the UNFCCC principles of common but differentiated
responsibilities and equity.
If We Build It, They Will Come
In its January 2009 report entitled A Roadmap for U.S.-China Cooperation on Energy and
Climate Change, the Pew Center on Global Climate Change proposed a global climate
change framework for a partnership between the U.S. and China:
…if human beings hope to avoid the worst consequences of global climate change,
the United States and China—respectively the world’s largest developed and
developing nations, the two largest energy consumers, and the two largest producers
of greenhouse gases—have no alternative but to become far more active partners in
developing low-carbon economies.
To prevail in such a common effort, both countries will need not only bold leadership
and a new set of national policies, but also a path-breaking cooperative agenda that
can be sustained over the long run. The advent of a new U.S. presidential
administration in Washington, D.C., coupled with a central leadership in Beijing that
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is increasingly aware of the destructive impact and long-term dangers of climate
change, presents an unparalleled opportunity for this new strategic partnership.81
The report first recommends that the U.S. and China have a summit between the two
leaders as soon as possible after Obama takes office to form a “U.S.-China Partnership on
Energy and Climate Change.”82 The partnership is to be directed by two parallel groups. The
U.S.-China high-level council will include high-ranking environment, energy, and finance
officials from both countries.83 The second tier of bilateral task forces will include senior
officials and independent government experts.84 Priority areas of collaboration will include:
1) deploying low-emissions coal technologies; 2) improving energy efficiency and
conservation; 3) developing an advanced electric grid; 4) promoting renewable energy; and 5)
quantifying emissions and financing low-carbon technologies.”85
The U.S. and China are the two countries best suited to form a partnership and take
the lead on curbing greenhouse gas emissions because both countries have a lot to gain, and
conversely, a lot to lose. The U.S. and China are inextricably tied together in the global
climate change conundrum: “For whether we choose to recognize it or not, these two
countries are both crucial in the effort to address climate change. Simply put, if these two
countries cannot find ways to bridge the long-standing divide on this issue, there will literally
be no solution.”86 It is time for the global game of “chicken” to be over. Unless the U.S. and
China can create adequate incentives, “the prospects for an adequate multilateral agreement
are dim. The post-Kyoto process does not appear to be developing fast enough among a
sufficient number of major emitters to avoid a doubling of atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide from preindustrial levels.” 87 The U.S. and China must seize this unique
opportunity to create this partnership and show the rest of the globe they are serious about
global climate change and a Kyoto successor treaty.
The Time Is Now: Implementing The Copenhagen Protocol in The U.S. and China
Since the election of Barack Obama to the U.S. presidency, world leaders and global climate
change supporters have adopted a much more optimistic attitude towards a Kyoto successor
treaty. Americans feel relieved that Mr. Bush is now out of office and that the U.S. can move
forward and fulfill its leadership role in the global climate change debate. Mr. Bush “framed
his approach to global warming around two talking points: the uncertainties in forecasts of a
dangerously human–heated world and the certainty that economic harm would come from
mandatory cuts in emissions of heat-trapping gases.”88 The New York Times observes that
President Obama has completely gone in the other direction: “Mr. Obama has taken precisely
the opposite track. He spoke late last month of the specter of ‘violent conflict, terrible
storms, shrinking coastlines’ and other perils from unchecked warming, while pressing his
vision of prosperity rebuilt around clean cars and pollution-free power from the wind and
sun.”89 While Obama seems to be headed in the right direction, he still needs to educate some
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Americans “ ‘grappling with uncertain science and a grinding recession that work on longterm energy and climate security cannot be deferred until better times.’ ” 90 Some of that
convincing may need to be directed towards the U.S. Senate.
Under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, President Obama has the power to make
treaties, but “two thirds of the Senators present [must] concur.” 91 Three U.S. Senate
committees currently “all claim jurisdiction on climate change.”92 These committees are the
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources
Committee, and the Senate Finance Committee. 93 These committees, as well as several
committees in the U.S. House of Representatives (House), are currently working on climate
change legislation. 94 In the Senate, there is potential for the more pro-environment
Environment and Public Works Committee to produce a bill which not be able to garner
support in the full Senate.95 It is doubtful that the Senate will be able to produce a climate
change bill this year, which does not bode well for the Senate passing a Kyoto successor
treaty.
A U.S. domestic climate change bill could originate in either the House or the Senate,
but the Senate must pass a Kyoto successor treaty with a two-thirds vote. The timing this
year will probably be such that neither the House nor the Senate will produce a climate
change bill before Copenhagen. Even if a Kyoto successor treaty is produced in Copenhagen,
there may be further delay before the U.S. will ratify the treaty. The Senate may insist that
domestic climate change legislation is in place before signing onto a Kyoto successor treaty.
In his campaign for the American presidency, President Obama promised to
“implement an economy-wide cap-and-trade program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
80% percent by 2050.”96 Since taking office earlier this year, “President Obama has radically
shifted the global equation, placing the United States at the forefront of the international
climate effort and raising hopes that an effective international accord might be possible.”97
On January 26, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the appointment of Todd
Stern as the Special Envoy for Climate Change. 98 In making the announcement, Clinton
emphasized that the new administration is committed to crafting a new global climate change
plan for the U.S.:
And that is just a start. As the President has made clear, he is committed to enacting a
far-reaching new energy and climate plan. As we take steps at home, we will also vigorously
pursue negotiations, those sponsored by the United Nations and those at the sub-global,
regional, and bilateral level that can lead to binding international climate agreements. No
solution is feasible without all major emitting nations joining together and playing an
important part.99
Steven Chu, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy, has now confirmed that
the U.S. plans on being a leader in Copenhagen: “ ‘President Obama has made it clear that
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the US should act first…Using China as a reason not to act is no longer an option.’ ”100 Even
with the current economic crisis, the outlook of the new administration towards a Kyoto
successor treaty seems to be one of optimism.
At the end of January and within days of President Obama’s inauguration, Senator
John Kerry and former Vice-President Al Gore began to lobby the Senate on a Kyoto
successor treaty. Senator Kerry, former Vice-President Gore, and Mr. Alden Meyer with the
Union of Concerned Scientists sat down with Richard Harris of National Public Radio News
(NPR News) who spoke with them about a Kyoto successor treaty and what must happen this
year for Copenhagen to be a success.101
Richard Harris: Massachusetts Democrat John Kerry, who chairs the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, reminded his colleagues the new treaty will be negotiated in December
of this year.
Senator John Kerry (Democrat, Massachusetts): That means there is no time to waste.
We must learn from the mistakes of Kyoto, and we must make Copenhagen a success.
…
Mr. Gore: Recent statements by Chinese leaders have made it very clear that they are
changing, and changing rapidly.
…
Harris: China has been reluctant to make binding promises until the United States
does. And since the U.S.
wants promises from China up-front, it’s a bit of a game of
chicken at this point. Meyer says unfortunately, a lot of senators don’t realize that
developing nations are doing as much as they are.
…
Harris: Yesterday, Al Gore started selling members of the Senate on the need to act
and act fast. And while he had a very sympathetic audience at the Foreign Relations
Committee, it takes 67 senators to ratify a treaty, and it’s clear that there’s a lot more
convincing to do.102
China also seems to be turning a corner, but China’s turning the corner will depend on
U.S. participation in Copenhagen and the meetings leading up to Copenhagen throughout this
year. Even if the U.S. does manage to get China on board, implementation of the
Copenhagen Protocol will be difficult in China: “Even if China were to adopt significant and
binding GHG emissions, there are serious concerns about how they would be implemented
and whether such targets could be effectively achieved.”103 Professor Yang identifies two
barriers to the implementation of a binding GHG emissions scheme: “First, China’s
continued overwhelming focus on economic development objectives, which runs through
China’s climate programs, raises questions as to whether its policies can promote
environmental sustainability. Second, the weakness of China’s existing environmental
regulatory infrastructure and legal institutions put into doubt its ability to limit GHG
emissions effectively.”104 Professor McCubbin echoes many of Professor Yang’s concerns:
...this article focuses in particular on three key points, often overlooked in discussions
about China’s role in addressing climate change, that will be critical to those negotiations:
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(1) the synergy between China’s domestic environmental goals and the international
community’s objectives, (2) the need to harmonize environmental protection with China’s
continued economic growth, and (3) the importance of improving China’s rule of law in
order to meet the environmental aims.105
The Cable News Network (CNN) documentary “Planet in Peril” shows the situation
powerfully and vividly. As the documentary team approached the outskirts of the city of
Tialinjin, “brown stinking water from local chemical factories was flowing into ditches near
the [Heilongjiang] river. We learned quickly that pollution is a touchy subject in China. As
we left the river, word of our presence started to get around. So it didn’t take long for the
police to find us.”106 The police wanted to see the documentary team’s passports, find out
what they were doing, and question them.107 When the documentary team knocked on the
mine director’s office at nearby Dabaoshan mine, he refused to answer any questions.108
Despite potential problems implementing the Copenhagen Protocol at the provincial
and local levels, the national government in Beijing has shown that it can act swiftly and
effectively on environmental matters. The “plastic bag story” is one of the best examples of
Beijing’s unique ability to quickly effect environmental change. As Thomas Friedman puts
it, “One morning in late 2007 China’s shopkeepers woke up and found that the State Council
had announced that beginning June 1, 2008, all supermarkets, department stores, and shops
would be prohibited from giving out free plastic bags, in order to discourage the use of these
petroleum-based products. In the future, stores would have to charge customers for them.”109
Friedman asks “What would be so bad? China? Just for one short day?”110 The U.S. could
learn an awful lot by being China “for just one short day.”111
A binding enforcement mechanism in the Copenhagen Protocol would enable the
international community to more effectively “push China for legal reforms.”112 Professor
McCubbin suggests using “both the promise of aid and the threat of sanctions to bring those
commitments to fruition.” 113 New York Times columnist Paul Krugman also thinks that
rogue greenhouse gas emitting nations will face serious consequences in the near future:
“Sooner than most people think, countries that refuse to limit their greenhouse gas emissions
will face sanctions, probably in the form of taxes on their exports.”114
A Kyoto Successor Treaty and the Economic Crisis
Most commentators argue that a Kyoto successor treaty should not be affected by the current
economic crisis. Many argue that the economic crisis may help the “green revolution.”
Developing countries especially do not want climate change efforts compromised:
Costa Rica, for the G-77/China, said efforts to address climate change should not be
compromised by the current financial crisis. She also noted that adaptation and mitigation
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must be addressed as equal priorities, deep emission cuts should primarily be undertaken
domestically by developed countries, and nationally appropriate mitigation actions for
developing countries should be considered in the context of sustainable development.”115
London’s The Independent argues that the environment and green technology could
be the answer to pull us out of this economic crisis: “…the environment ought to be at the
centre of attempts to pull us out of this slump. Unemployed labour should be put to work on
schemes that help conserve household energy. And if governments invest in renewable
energy schemes while resources are relatively cheap, they can use this downturn to lay the
foundations for future green growth.”116
Not acting now on climate change could make the economic situation even worse
down the line. The Stern Report, released in October 2006 by the British Chancellor of the
Exchequer “estimated that the future adverse consequences of climate change could drain as
much as 5% of the global gross domestic product (GDP) in the coming years, whereas
immediate, aggressive steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would cost only 1% if global
GDP.”117
Conclusion—“We Have Exactly Enough Time—Starting Now.”118
China and the U.S. must agree to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to eighty percent below
1990 levels by 2050. A Kyoto successor treaty must employ a top-down approach that
includes all nations, must contain across the board cuts, and cannot base emissions reductions
on per capita emissions. If emissions cuts are based on per capita emissions, China will still
be able to increase its emissions and the treaty will be a failure. The largest polluters, China
and the U.S., must take a leadership role in the post-Kyoto regime. China and the U.S. must
form a partnership as the Pew Center document A Roadmap for U.S.-China Cooperation on
Energy and Climate Change suggests. China and the U.S. cannot allow their respective
alliances and national interests affect their commitments to the emission reduction levels a
post-Kyoto treaty must have.
“There is no time to waste. The most risky thing we can do is do nothing,” wrote the
Union of Concerned Scientists in its May 2008 letter.119 The question is: if the scientists are
so concerned about global climate change, then why are the rest of us not? China and the
U.S. are now the top two emitters of greenhouse gases in the world. If China and the U.S.
cannot work together to help craft a Kyoto successor treaty, then there is no hope.
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China, The United States and Global Warming:
A Planetary Prisoners’ Dilemma
Philip S. Golub and Jean-Paul Maréchal1
Abstract:
The paper examines some key economic dimensions and the international relations
implications of the last question posed in the call for papers: “Given that China and the
United States are the largest national sources of gas pollution, albeit with very different
capabilities and historical responsibilities, how might they work together to protect the
atmospheric commons?”
1. The Trap
The first part of the paper is dedicated to some structural aspects – logical and empirical - of
the decision making framework generated by American and Chinese important levels of GHG
emissions.
The logical aspect of the question can be grasped through the notion of “prisoners’ dilemma”.
This notion permits to highlight the fact that both China and the United States are confronted
to a contradiction between their short-term and long-term interests.
The empirical aspect of the question is put into evidence by the fact that the environmental
Kuznets’ curve… does not exist. In other words it is useless to expect that an increase in the
GDP per capita of a national economy would lead, above a certain threshold, to an automatic
betterment of the quality of the environment.
2. Solving the Dilemma
The second part examines fundamental debates concerning the burden sharing (between the
US and China) of global warming mitigation. These debates concern both the economic
instruments and practical implementation.
Carbon taxation and “cap and trade” pose three kinds of questions, at international and
domestic levels. The first deals with the “where equity requirement”, i.e. the best way to
reduce GHG emissions at the lowest marginal cost. The second deals with the best indicators
to define the obligation of each country. The third relates to the domestic level: how to spread
the burden between social groups?
3. Forging International Cooperation.
Since shared meanings (in Michael Walzer’ sense) need time to change and as the
procrastination penalty in the field of global warming is very high, the last part of the paper
examines trust-building mechanisms between the US and China, and the larger issue of
cooperation under conditions of rising domestic constraints.
Governments seek in crisis circumstances to find short-term solutions to pressing social and
economic problems, and to transfer adjustment costs to others. This accentuates rivalry and
fragmentation at international level. The intellectual and normative challenge is to imagine
new forms of pluralist cooperation leading to convergence around common global agendas
that are in the overall human interest.
In an article published in November 2008, “Science: The Coming Century”, Martin
Rees writes that if the science of climate change is intricate, it is “straightforward compared
to the economics and politics” (Rees 2008: 41). Indeed, global warming poses a unique nexus
1
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of economic, political and philosophical challenges — a “perfect moral storm” (Gardiner
2006: 397) — for at least three reasons. First, its causes are globally dispersed and its effects
are non-localized. Simply put, driving a car in Paris has no more effect in France than in
Hong Kong, and vice versa. Second, the mean lifetime of fossil fuel CO2 ranging between 30
to 35 thousand years, there is a very long time lag before the natural carbon cycle neutralizes
the anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases (GHG). (Archer 2005: 5) The effects on sea
levels of driving a car today will become manifest only in a couple of decades. Consequently,
we have to consider the problem of justice both on the intragenerational level (between
individuals, nations and social groups today) and on the intergenerational one (between
persons, groups etc. living in different periods of time). Last but not least, our “theoretical
ineptitude” makes it difficult to solve the problems at hand. As Stephen Gardiner aptly points
out, “we are extremely ill-equipped to deal with many problems characteristic of the longterm future. Even our best theories face basic and often severe difficulties addressing basic
issues such as scientific uncertainty, intergenerational equity, contingent persons, nonhuman
animals and nature”. (Gardiner 2006: 407)
The facts on which our judgments should be based are well known and well
established. Expressed as a global average, surface temperatures have increased by more than
0.70°C over the past century. The rate of temperature change has also accelerated. During the
last 50 years the rate of increase was 0.13°C per decade, or twice what had been observed
during the previous century, and has accelerated over the past two decades. (OECD 2008:
141-143) The “linear” consequences of these temperature changes include the decline in
snow pack and ice cap coverage, the retreat of glaciers, increasingly frequent extreme wet
and dry weather events, the proliferation of pathogenic agents and so on. “Non-linear”
consequences include, for instance, the disturbance of deep-ocean circulation or abrupt
collapses of ecosystems. The third IPCC report (2001) leaves no doubt about the causes of
these modifications: “There is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed
over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities”. In fact, it is caused by the emissions
of gases such as carbon dioxide and methane gases, to cite the most important ones, which
are included in the “GHG” category. Carbon dioxide concentration, which has risen 20 parts
per million (ppm) during the last 8,000 years, rose from 280 to 379 ppm during the twentieth
century. Atmospheric carbon dioxide and methane concentrations are now higher than at any
time during the last 650,000 years.
These transformations threaten the human prospect. In the absence of decisions today,
the effects sketched above will at the very least inhibit human development and might in fact
generate truly catastrophic systemic outcomes in future. By upsetting the balance of the
ecosystem, anthropogenic interference with the climate2 threatens the “mother of all public
goods”. (Nordhaus 2008: 62) Yet, since there is no simple coincidence between the
descriptive and the normative, we face major difficulties in translating knowledge into an
effective global agenda. Having a grip on the facts does not tell us what should be done.
James Garvey summarizes the complexity of the situation when he writes: “The spatial and
temporal smearing of actions and agency can be deeply confusing, because sometimes moral
responsibility depends conceptually on another sort of responsibility: causal responsibility…
We lack both the wisdom and the theory to cope with [global warming]. It’s possible… that
our theoretical failure can lead to a moral failure, a kind of deception in which we focus on
one part of the problem and not others. The complexity can be an excuse, a problematic
excuse, for doing nothing at all”. (Garvey 2008: 61) Indeed, the broad scientific consensus
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over global warming has not been matched by a shared commitment at the political level to
find solutions founded on the universal human interest.
The universal dimension of the crisis, a word whose etymology implies that we are
facing a historical moment of decision, requires that we pay careful attention to the different
issues raised by climate change. The aim of this article is to contribute to the theoretical
debate by focusing on the issue of distributional justice among states and social classes.
Nation states have varying capabilities and different historical responsibilities in the process
of global warming, a reality that derives from their historical pattern of insertion at the centre
or periphery of the global political economy, with implications regarding burden sharing. At
the same time, given the rise of a large class of consumers in “emerging countries”, a serious
appraisal must imperatively distinguish between social classes. The purpose of new
theorising is to find ways to overcome the contradiction between global human needs and the
presently reality of the segmentation of the international system into discreet national units.
To discuss these issues we have chosen to take the cases of the United States and China, the
two largest emitters the actions or non-actions of which will largely determine global
outcomes. The question is how trust-building mechanisms could be developed that would
lead to effective cooperation allowing states to break out of the prisoners’ dilemma they
otherwise face, and move forward towards a global project of protection of the atmospheric
commons.
The first part of this paper is devoted to structural aspects of the decision-making
framework generated by American and Chinese GHG emissions. The second part examines
fundamental debates concerning burden sharing between the US and China in global
warming mitigation. The third deals with the intellectual and normative challenge to imagine
new forms of ordered pluralist cooperation leading to convergence around common agendas
that are in the overall human interest.
I. The Trap
There is a significant difference between knowing that something should be done and
knowing what must be done. In the case of global warming, this difficulty is not only linked
to technological challenges that are real and perhaps not solvable, but also to the problems
raised by existing decision-making frameworks. There is a manifest contradiction between
the understanding that survival in the long run depends on stopping the present course of
climate change and the utility maximising logic of homo economicus. The available scientific
data leads to the inescapable conclusion that there is an overwhelming common interest to act
today. Yet, at the same time, aiming to maximize short-term benefits, individual agents have
an interest in continuing voracious consumption of fossil fuels and other natural resources.
The logic of homo economicus, leads all actors – states, firms or individual citizens, rich and
poor people alike – to being unreasonable at the deepest level of reason. Economists call this
a “prisoner’s dilemma” (PD). In the case of global warming, this dilemma is made
particularly acute by three specificities: first, it concerns a “common resource”, second it is
both intra and intergenerational, and, third, it involves different categories of nation-states
with different historical responsibilities in global warming, including newly industrialised
countries such as China.
A. Public Goods
The common resource endangered by global warming is the carbon-absorbing properties of
the planet, properties that are sometimes called “carbon sinks”. In what way are these carbon
sinks a common resource?
Goods can be classified according two attributes: whether they are excludable (people
can be excluded from consuming them) and whether they are rival (one person’s
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consumption of a considered good reduces the amount available to other consumers). Private
goods (cars, oranges…) are both excludable and rival. Public goods, on the other hand, are
goods that are non-excludable (nobody can be excluded from consuming them) and non-rival
(the consumption of one unit of such a good does not diminish another agent’s possibility to
consume it). Some public goods such as sunshine are produced by nature and virtually
imperishable (at least on a human time scale). Others are man made, for instance national
defence or lighthouses. If private goods can be efficiently produced and consumed on a
competitive market, this is not the case for public goods. Because of the lack of financial
incentives to produce them or to pay for their consumption (a free-rider problem) they must
be provided by government and paid for with taxes.
There is a large spectrum of goods between purely private and purely public goods.
These in-between cases - sometimes called “impure” public goods (Stiglitz 1999) - belong
either to the category of “club goods” if they are exclusive but non-rival (coded TV
broadcast…) or to the category of “common resources” (or simply “commons”) if they are
non-exclusive but rival (fish stocks...). The climate can be considered as a pure natural public
good or, to be more precise, it was a pure natural global public good prior to the ability of
human beings to modify it. Since the end of the eighteenth century, when humanity became a
kind of geophysical force (Vernadsky) and the planet entered in a new age that Will Steffen,
Paul Crutzen and John McNeill call the “Anthropocene” (Steffen, Crutzen, McNeill 2007),
the earth’s climate has gradually became a global public good that has, in part, to be created
by human beings. Of course, what has to be created is not the earth climate in se but earth
climate stability. (Traxler 2002: 120) Put differently, climate stability is no longer a “pure
natural public good”, nor a “pure artificial public good”. It is partially both. It is a “global
common” or, to be more precise, “carbon sinks” are global common resources. The rise of
earth temperatures - that can be defined as a “public bad” (Samuelson & Nordhaus 1985:
713) - is the result of an overuse by some economic agents (states, producers, consumers…)
of the carbon absorbing capacities of the planet.
Left to market mechanisms alone, common resources suffer from overuse. A
consumer can freely deplete the available amount of commons. This is what Garrett Hardin in
a famous article called the “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 1968). Thus, it can be said
that the carbon-absorbing properties of the planet is a common resource and that GHG
emissions are a form of appropriation of this common resource. The overuse of carbon sinks
can be analysed as a possible payoff of a prisoners’ dilemma. The prisoners’ dilemma
generated by global warming is both intra and intergenerational.
B. An Intra and Intergenerational Prisoners’ Dilemma
The intragenerational aspect of the dilemma can be expressed the following way:
“(PD1) It is collectively rational to cooperate and restrict overall pollution: each agent
prefers the outcome produced by everyone restricting their individual pollution over the
outcome produced by no one doing so.
(PD2) It is individually rational not to restrict one’s own pollution: when each agent
has the power to decide whether or not she will restrict her pollution, each (rationally) prefers
not to do so, whatever the others do”. (Gardiner 2006: 400)
This is a good example of the traditional prisoners’ dilemma. In the real world it could
be resolved when the parties involved benefit from a wider context of interaction, that is to
say when reciprocity or mutually beneficial decisions play an important role. Trade and
security are good examples of such a situation. That is why Joseph Stiglitz has proposed to
use trade sanctions as a mean of enforcing the U.S.‘ participation in the Kyoto Protocol. In
2006, Stiglitz wrote: “Fortunately we have an international trade framework that can be used
to force states that inflict harm to others to behave in a better fashion. Except in certain
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limited situations (like agriculture) the WTO [World Trade Organization] does not allow
subsidies — obviously, if some country subsidizes its firms, the playing field is not level…
Not paying the cost of damage to the environment is a subsidy, just as not paying the full
costs of worker would be. In most of the developed countries of the world today, firms are
paying the cost of pollution to the global environment, in the form of taxes imposed on coal,
oil, and gas. But American firms are being subsidized — and massively so. There is a simple
remedy: others should prohibit the importation of American goods produced using energy
intensive technologies, or, at least impose a high tax on them, to offset the subsidy that those
goods currently are receiving”. (Stiglitz 2006: 2)
A slightly different line of reasoning leads to very similar conclusions. Game theory
teaches us that to progress from rivalry to cooperation there is no need for friendship
(fortunately: if there were, we should consider moving at once to another planet!) but only
interaction taking place over time. (Axelrod 1984) To put it more precisely, sustainable
relations between players may generate cooperation. Who could deny that negotiations on
climate control are an example of this kind of situation? But there is always the possibility of
tit for tat: one player failing to attend might push others into retaliating by staying away. This
outcome would, in the case of climate negotiations, be a recipe for disaster.
A disaster could also result from the intergenerational dimension of the prisoners’
dilemma. The risk linked to this temporal characteristic appears clearly when we consider a
“pure” version of the intergenerational problem, that is to say a case where different
generations do not overlap. This “Pure Intergenerational Problem” (PIP) can be expressed as
follows:
“(PIP1) It is collectively rational for most generations to cooperate, (almost) every
generation prefers the outcome produced by everyone restricting pollution over the outcome
produced by everyone over polluting.
(PIP2) It is individually rational for all generations not to cooperate: when each
generation has the power to decide whether or not it will over pollute, each generation
(rationally) prefers to over pollute, whatever the others do”. (Gardiner 2006: 404)
This second trap (PIP) is worse than the first (PD).
PIP1 is worse than PD1 because the first generation is not taken into account in the
logical process. Thus, the first generation has no incentive to act and this inaction has a
domino effect on subsequent generations, an effect that undermines the possibility of a
collective project of compliance. PIP2 is worse than PD2 because, since the different
generations do not coexist, they are unable to influence each other’s behaviour through the
building of institutions setting binding norms.
PIP is thus more difficult to resolve than the PD “because the standard solution to the
Prisoner’s Dilemma are unavailable: one cannot appeal to a wider context of mutually
beneficial interaction, nor to the usual notion of reciprocity”. (Gardiner 2006: 405)
C. The Challenge of Emerging Countries
The dilemma has been sharpened during the last few decades by the impressive economic
growth of some newly industrialized or re-industralizing countries. China is the perfect
example of this new situation.
Some figures give a very precise idea of the problems that are before us.
In 1970, total greenhouse gas emissions were 23.9 GtCO2eq. The share of the “BRIC
countries” (Brazil, Russia, India, China) was 5.9 (i.e. 24.6%) and the share of the OECD
counties was 13.7 (i.e. 57.3%). In 2005, total greenhouse gas emissions were 46.9 GtCO2eq.
The share of the BRIC countries was 16.1 (i.e. 34.3%) and the share of the OECD countries
was 18.7 (i.e. 39.8%). If no new policy actions are taken, in other words if we follow a
business as usual scenario, global greenhouse gas emissions are projected to reach 71.4
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GtCO2eq in 2050. The share of the BRIC countries will reach 26.2 (i.e. 36.6%), 23.5 (i.e.
32.9%) for the OECD countries (see Table 1).
Table 1

Emissions of all anthropogenic gases. Baseline (figures in GtCO2eq)
Group
1970
2005
2050
OECD
13.7
18.7
23.5
BRIC
5.9
16.1
26.2
ROW
4.3
12.1
21.7
Total baseline
23.9
46.9
71.4
Source : OECD (2008), OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030, Paris: OECD, p. 25

In 1980, Chinese emissions of CO2 were about 1.5 billion tons, the emission per
capita being 1.5 ton. That same year, the American figures were respectively 4.8 billion and
21. In 1990 these figures were 2.3 billion and 2 for China against 4.8 billion and 20 for the
United States. In 2005 they were more than 5 billion and 4 for China against nearly 6 billion
and 20 for the United States. In 2006, the trends curves crossed (see Table 2). According to a
report published by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency in 2008, overall
Chinese emissions in 2006 were 7% above the US emissions, 14% above in 2007. (Rosenthal
2008)
Forecasts by the International Energy Agency (IEA) indicate that the increase in
China’s emissions of CO2 between now and 2030 — 4 additional gigatons (Gt) — would by
itself constitute 40% of all additional emissions by all the world’s countries and nearly double
those of the old industrialized countries. (IEA 2006: 188)
Such a situation raises a very difficult ethical question. China’s right, as well as the
right of all other “emerging” countries to economic growth and development cannot be put
into question. But how can this entirely legitimate right to economic development be
guaranteed without nullifying international efforts to limit GHG emissions? What is more,
the effects caused by the size and populations of these countries make it impossible for us to
argue solely in relative terms. The fact that each American emits on average 4.3 times more
CO2 per annum than a Chinese person cannot in any way lead us to conclude that, in the
interest of “justice”, no measures for controlling Chinese emissions should be taken so long
as Chinese individual emissions lag behind American ones. Indeed, if individual emissions in
China reached levels comparable to those in America, one can easily imagine the state that
the world climate would be in.
Table 2

Global* and per capita** US and Chinese CO2 emission between 1980 and 2006
1980
1990
2000
2005
2006
United
Global
4,788
5,028
5,860
5,994
5,902
States
emission
Emission
21.0
20.1
20.8
20.3
19.8
per capita
China
Global
1,460
2,293
2,966
5,429
6,017
emission
Emission
1.5
2.0
2.3
4.1
4.6
per capita
10.0
9.0
4.9
4.3
US emission per capita / 14.0
Chinese emission per
capita
* Expressed in million metric tons of carbon dioxide. ** Expressed in metric tons of carbon dioxide.
Source: website of the Energy Information Administration (EIA). Official Energy Statistics from the U.S.
Government
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Yet another element makes the situation even more complex: the countries which have
(on average) the biggest ecological footprint have also the highest HDI (Human Development
Index). And those which have the highest HDI have also (always on average) the highest
GDP per capita. (Table 3)
Table 3

CO2
Combined
Life
CO2
Human
Number GDP
Share
gross
expectancy
Development
of
per
emissions
emissions
of
enrolment (Mt CO2) world
at birth
Index
countries capita
per
ratio for
(years)
capita
(PP
2004
total*
primary,
2005
(t CO2)
US$)
(%)
secondary
2005
2004
2004
and
tertiary
education
(%)
2005
High human
70
23,986
76.2
88.4
16,616
57
10.1
development
1 ≥ HDI ≥
0.8
85
4,876
67.5
65.3
10,215
35
2.5
Medium
human
development
0.8 > HDI ≥
0.5
22
1,112
48.5
45.8
162
1
0.3
Low human
development
0.5 > HDI ≥
0
World
177
9,543
68.1
67.8
28,983
100*
4.5
*The world total includes carbon dioxide emissions not included in national totals. These emissions
amount to approximately 5% of the world total.
Source: UNDP (2007), Human Development Report 2007/2008, p. 69, 232.

Similar comparisons can be made between the United States and China (Table 4).
Table 4

United
States
China

HDI

GDP
per
capita
(PPP
US$)
2005

0.951

41,890

0.777

6,757

CO2
Life
Combined
expectancy
gross
emissions
at birth
enrolment (Mt CO2)
(year)
ratio for
2004
2005
primary,
secondary
and
tertiary
education
(%)
2005
77.9
93.3
6.046
72,5

69.1

5.007

Source: UNDP (2007), Human Development Report 2007/2008, p. 69, 232.
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Share
of
world
total
(%)
2004

CO2
emissions
per
capita
(t CO2)
2004

20.9

20.6

17.3

3.8

Jean Gadrey has highlighted a strong linear correlation between CO2 emissions per
capita and GDP per capita. Up to 13,000 US dollars per capita, when GDP per capita
increases by 3,000 dollars, GHG emissions increase by 1 ton. After 13,000 dollars (only 36
countries in the world, out of 177 ranked by the UNDP), this relation weakens. (Gadrey 2008:
70) To get a simple idea of the margin of progress that can be achieved by the United States,
it is useful to have in mind examples such as Japan, which has an HDI of 0.953 and a CO2
emission per capita of 9.9 tons or France where these two figures are respectively 0.952 and
6.
Notwithstanding the problems discussed above, the target humanity has to reach is
clear. If we want to avoid what the OECD calls “dangerous” climate change, the rise of the
earth’s temperature must not exceed 2°C during this century. Above this threshold, the risk of
“large-scale human development setbacks and irreversible ecological catastrophes will
increase sharply”. (UNDP 2007: 7) However, if we want to limit the temperature increase to
2°C above the pre-industrial level, the GHG concentration must not exceed 450 ppm (as we
noted above, this concentration has risen from 280 to 379 over the past 100 years). At 450
ppm the probability to stay beneath 2°C is 50%. At 550 ppm this figures shrinks to 20%. To
fulfil the objective, the carbon budget for the whole twenty first century must be limited to
1,456 GtCO2, that is to say 14.5 GtCO2 per year. (UNDP 2007: 46) This figure must be
compared to our present annual emissions: 28.9 GtCO2! Table 3.)
A number of scenarios have been suggested. The UNDP has identified a pathway to
keep the planet under the 2°C threshold. World emissions, after a peak around 2020, would
have to decline by 50% by 2050 (from a 1990 base-year) and fall toward zero in net terms by
the end of the century. Of course, the burden of such a mitigation strategy must be equitably
shared between countries of different development levels. That is why the UNDP
distinguishes two groups of counties: industrialized and developing. The first would have to
target an emissions peak around 2012, then a 30% cut by 2020 and 80% by 2050. In the
second group there would be of course large variations. Major emitters would maintain a
trajectory of rising emissions to 2020, peaking at around 80% above current levels, with cuts
of 20% as compared to 1990 levels by 2050. (UNDP 2007: 48) These goals are very
ambitious and are based on the assumption that there is a universal obligation to avoid
negative outcomes. They require imagining “efficient policies”, that is to say policies that
permit to reach these objectives (the 2°C threshold needn’t be justified here3) at the lowest
possible costs. This question is however inextricably linked to the question of the burden
sharing rules.
II. Burden Sharing Rules
Climate stability being a common resource, collective action is needed to preserve or, in a
certain sense, to create it. Reduction and adaptation measures are thus required. Reduction (or
“abatement” or “mitigation”) means the curbing of GHG emissions and adaptation means a
set of actions designed to prepare humanity to meet the challenges of the rise of the
temperatures that is, whatever is decided, underway. If the ecological necessity to act is
obvious, this requirement is as we have seen above linked to the aim of improving human
development. In other words, the new climate regime that has to be conceived and
implemented must place the right to development at its core. Collective choices and
commitments must therefore be taken at the world level.
3

As it seems to exist a consensus (or at least an « near-consensus ») on this figure and on the pathway of GHG
emissions reduction the world has to follow, we will not discuss here what William Nordhaus for instance call
the « when efficiency requirement », that is to say the level of the rate of social time preference that must be
applied to the cost-benefit analysis. (Nordhaus 2008) The likelihood of a “dangerous” climate change if the rise
of temperature should exceed 2°C seems great enough to justify action.
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The UNFCCC aptly summarizes some of the major challenges that are (still) before
us when it underlines that “the global nature of climate change call for the widest possible
cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate
international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated capabilities and
their social and economic conditions”. The problem to solve is thus a question of distributive
justice concerning the use of carbon sinks or, to put it differently, a problem of sharing the
world’s carbon budget in a way that will avoid an increase of temperature superior to 2°C in
the next 100 years. As James Garvey underlines it: “The carbon sinks of our world are a finite
resource which has been shared out unequally. Justice demands that we redress the balance”.
(Garvey 2008: 76)
A. The “Relevant Agents” Question
In the climate regime to come it will thus be necessary to define an acceptable regime of
burden sharing among economic agents. But, who are the relevant agents? To put it
differently: “Who is obligated to act and to aid?” (Harris 2008: 482) Traditionally, the
answer has been “the nation state”. In the debate on burden sharing rules, arguments are
frequently based on aggregate emissions per state and emission per capita in a given state. All
comparisons between states or between individuals take nation-states as the unit and building
block of the reasoning. This state-centric approach has a perverse effect since it masks
emissions differentials within states among social classes. As Paul Harris argues, many of the
solutions to climate change will, of course, have to involve states. “But this reality needs not
absolve capable individuals from explicit responsibility and obligation, especially when states
are not doing nearly enough”. (Harris 2008: 483) He rightly asks: “Why should a poor person
in, say, Germany be lumped with the wealthy of Germany to aid both the poor and the rich in
China or other developing countries who suffer from the effects of climate change, especially
when the latter pollute far more?” (Harris 2008: 484) The question is not simply theoretical,
the Indian and Chinese middle classes being more numerous than the German population.
Any answer must thus address both levels. The state-centred approach must lead to an
international climate justice framework with enforced national obligations. The social class or
citizen centred answer requires a cosmopolitan or rather global climate justice framework
with individual obligations.
B. International Climate Justice
The principle of states’ obligations is the foundation of the international climate justice
approach. But how should we define the “obligations” of any particular state? At least two
criteria can be taken into consideration: the historical responsibilities of the state considered
and its present (economic, technological…) capacities to contribute to its mitigation.
Concerning the first point, is it useful to stress that some states have contributed far
more than others to the present rises of earth temperatures? In fact, the disparities in current
levels of GHG emissions reflect the disparities in cumulative emissions since the industrial
revolution. The United States, for instance, which is the first per capita emitter of the planet
and until 2006 was the first emitting country, is responsible for almost 30% of cumulative
CO2 emissions between 1850 and 2002. The European Union ranks second with 26.5% and
Russia third with 8.1%. From 1850 till now, the “developed” world has been responsible for
76% of CO2 emissions, a figure that means that the responsibility of the “developing” world
is limited to 24%. (Garvey 2008: 70) These figures clearly show that some countries have
overused the carbon sinks of the Earth. Second, it is also obvious that the industrialized states
have greater financial and technological capacities to develop climate friendly technologies
or at least more energy efficient technologies.
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Burden sharing principles must thus be adopted. But, what makes such a decision
difficult to take is that there are different kinds of rules that rely on different moral
justifications. Martino Traxler, for instance, proposes an interesting typology that
distinguishes between “just” and “fair” principles. Just principles are “backward looking”
“historical rectificatory principles” that are “intended to restore an acceptable moral order
that past actions had disturbed”. Examples of “just” proposals could be: 1. to pay or
contribute in proportion to the benefits received from the total historical emissions of GHGs;
2. to pay in proportion to the total historical emissions of GHGs; 3. to pay in proportion to
responsibility, the responsibility being for instance limited to emissions after a given year of
reference, for example 1990. (As a matter of fact, in the field of pollution, nobody can be
held responsible for a damage caused at a period when science had not evidenced such
damage. That is why the year of the publication of the first IPCC can be considered an
acceptable starting point). Fair principles are “forward looking”. They “seek to maintain
matters at least as morally acceptable as they are found to be at present in the future”. An
example of a “fair” proposal is to pay on an equal per capita basis.4 (Traxler 2002: 117-131)
In this perspective, the Kyoto Protocol is both unjust (because some developing countries like
China are in the Annexe 2 even though they will soon contribute to global warming far more
than many developed countries) and unfair in the sense that these developing countries are
not bound to emissions reduction.
Paul Baer, Tom Athanasious, Sivan Kartha and Eric Kemp-Benedict - authors of The
Greenhouse Development Rights Framework - propose a “Responsibility Capacity Index”
(RCI) to calculate national climate obligations. First, they fix a “development threshold”, that
is to say a level income (7,500 dollars per capita and per year, in purchasing power parity
(PPP) at which people achieve acceptable levels of the Millennium Development Goals
indicators. On this basis, a nation’s capacity is the sum of all individual incomes above the
threshold. Its responsibility is likewise defined as cumulative emissions since 1990,
excluding emissions that correspond to consumption below the development threshold. These
measures can be combined in the “Responsibility Capacity Index”. (Baer et al. 2008)
With a RCI = aR + bC (with a = b = 0.5) we obtain the following figures (Table 5) :
Table 5

Greenhouse Development Rights Framework for United States and China
2010
2020
2030
Capacity Responsibility RCI (% RCI (% RCI (%
Population GDP
of
of
(% of global) of
(% of
per
(% of
global)
global)
global)
global)
capita
global)
($ US
PPP)
United
4.5
45,640
29.7
36.4
33.1
29.1
25.5
States
China
19.7
5,899
5.8
5.2
5.5
10.4
15.2
World
100
9,929
100
100
100
100
100
Source: from Baer et al. (2008), The Greenhouse Development Right Framework, Heinrich Böll
Foundation, Christian Aid, Ecoequity and the Stockholm Environment Institute, p. 55.

4

It is not useless to note that in 2004 the CO2 world emissions per capita is 4.5 tons. A figure to compare to the
Chinese figure: 3.8 tons and to the American one: 20.6 tons. These figures are obtained with a world total
emission of almost 29 gigatons. With the annual budget of 14.5 gigatons cited above, these figures should (with
the same population) be reduced by 50%! We understand why Chinese authorities prefer “intensity targets”
(carbon intensity of economic growth, energy intensity of the economy…) to “absolute targets”. For a critique
of a contribution on equal per capita basis, see Traxler (2002: 124 -125).
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It must be noted that because the measure of capacity excludes the income of poor
people, a rich country’s capacity will be larger in percentage terms than its share of global
income, and a poor country’s capacity will be smaller. In the same way, a wealthy country’s
responsibility will be larger than its share of cumulative emissions because fewer of its
historical emissions will be excluded. If we assume that the total cost of the global climate
program is 1% of gross world product, or about 1 trillion dollars in 2020, we obtain the
following estimates of obligation to pay (for mitigation and adaptation) (Table 65). (If one
believes that the cost will be 2%, then one should multiply by 2 the last two columns.)
Table 6

United States
China
World

National
income
(billion $)
18,177
13,439
94,405

National obligations to pay
National
National
capacity (%
capacity
GDP)
(billion $)
15,661
86.2%
5,932
44.1%
59,388
62.9%

National
obligation
(billion $)
275
98
944

National
obligation (%
GDP)
1.51%
0.73%
1.00%

Source: from Baer et al. (2008), The Greenhouse Development Right Framework, Heinrich Böll
Foundation, Christian Aid, Ecoequity and the Stockholm Environment Institute, p. 58.

Even if these figures seem huge, they must be considered in a perspective of
economic growth. As Christian Azar and Stephen Schneider demonstrate, the abatement cost
of global warming would be overtaken after a few years of income growth. “If the cost by the
year 2100 is as high as 6% of global GDP and income growth is 2% per year, then the delay
time is 3 years, whereas as the delay time is only 1 year if income grows by 3% per year and
the abatement cost is 3% of GDP.” (Azar and Schneider 2002: 77) If you rank countries
according their average obligation per person above the development threshold, it appears
that 17 of the top 40 countries are not countries included in the Annex 1 of the Kyoto
protocol. (Baer et al. 2008: 62) But states are not the only relevant actors obligated to act.
What about affluent people, whatever their nationality? Taking this question into
consideration leads to the concept of cosmopolitan climate justice.
C. Cosmopolitan Climate Justice
As Paul Harris argues, the cosmopolitan conception of justice points to individuals as global
citizens of one world. “A cosmopolitan approach places rights and obligations at the
individual level, discounting the importance of national boundaries”. (Harris 2008: 486) In
such a perspective, national boundaries are not considered as a morally distinctive feature for
the elaboration of burden sharing rules. The cosmopolitan conception of justice can thus be
seen as an application, at the international level, of John Rawls’ veil of ignorance. As
Charles Beitz puts it: “For purpose of moral choice, we must… regard the world from the
perspective of an original position from which matters of national citizenship are excluded by
an extended veil of ignorance”. (Beitz 1979: 176) But, why should such a shift from
international to cosmopolitan justice be considered so important?
The answer is quite simple: in “emerging” countries a growing number of people
enjoy a middle-class lifestyle in terms of consumption patterns. (Myers & Kent 2004) The
first methodological step to grasp the importance of this new class of consumers is, in order
to compare national economies on a robust basis, to express their GNP (gross national
product) or GNI (gross national income) not in conventional or international-exchange
5

Explanation : the figure 275 billion dollars for the United States (column 5) is obtained the following way:
944.05 x 0.291 (from Table 5 column 7) = 274,7. (944.05 is 1% of world GDP)
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dollars but in “purchasing power parity” (PPP). Using PPP provides an indicator of
wellbeing that is free of exchange rates distortions. This leads to sometimes substantial
modifications in country rankings. (Table 7). (In 2007, expressed in current dollars, US GDP
was $13,886 billion and China GDP was $31,121 billion. The indications of Table 7 are thus
still, not to say more than ever, valid.)
Table 7

United States
China
World

Two of the world’s largest economies in 2002
$, billions
Rank
PPP $, billions
10,138
1
10,138
1,237
6
5,732
32,253
47,426

Rank
1
2

Source: from Myers & Kent (2004), The New Consumers. The Influence of Affluence on the Environment,
Washington, Covelo, London: Island Press, p. 9.

The “new consumers” can be defined as “people within an average four-member
households who possess purchasing power of at least PPP$10,000 per year, or at least
PPP$2,500 per person”. (Myers & Kent 2004: 8) These new consumers being more and more
numerous, a new category of nations has progressively emerged that can be called: the “new
consumer-countries”. If we limit this group to the countries that have had vigorous economic
growth in recent years and a population of at least 20 million people, we obtain a set of 20
countries, headed by China (Table 8). This is unsurprising since between 1978 and 2003, the
country has multiplied its GNP by almost 7 and its real income per capita by almost 5.
(Maddison 2007: 69) To limit ourselves to one example (for a detailed presentation of the
situation, see Huchet & Maréchal 2007), the Chinese car fleet rose from 1.6 million in 1990
(152 million in the United States) to 8 million in 2000 (175 million in the United States, this
figure including SUVs), and was expected (in 2004 by Myers & Kent) to exceed 40 million
by 2010, that is to say to equal the German fleet. In fact, in 2007, there were 53 million cars
on the Chinese roads! In short, China’s “ecological footprint” is rising rapidly. Both the
United States and China have now an ecological deficit. (Myers & Kent 2004: 60) Whatever
the economic instrument chosen in the next years (tradable emission permits or carbon tax)
negotiations are going to be difficult and potentially conflict ridden between “developed” and
“developing” countries.
Table 8

The New Chinese and Indian Consumers in 2000
Population
Per-capita
Per-capita
New
(millions)
GNI ($)
GNI (PPP$)
consumers
(millions and
% of
population)

China
India
Totals of the
20 counties
ranked

1262
1016
3632

840
450
xx

3920
2340
xx

New
consumers’
purchasing
power
(PPP$
billions and
% of national
total)
303 (24)
1267 (52)
132 (13)
609 (39)
1059 (29)
6305 (67)

Source: from Myers & Kent (2004), The New Consumers. The Influence of Affluence on the Environment,
Washington, Covelo, London: Island Press, p. 17.
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III. Ordered Pluralist Cooperation
Because of its global scope, the first crisis of its kind in recorded history, global warming
poses an acute practical and normative challenge for political philosophy in general and
international relations theory in particular. It follows from what has been said that the
normatively best approach to solving global warming would be based on a holistic
assumption of species and eco-systemic unity, or universal interdependence transcending
national and cultural distinctions. This in turn implies the inalienable right of all individuals,
present and future, to a “good life”, that is a life worth living “with and for others under just
institutions”. (Ricœur 1990: 202) In a cosmopolitan setting, the distributional issues raised by
the need to offset global warming would translate as a problem of social justice among
individuals and social classes at the global level rather than simply between nation states.
This in turn assumes the need for empowered institutions of global governance, the purpose
of which would be to define and implement universal public policies designed to secure inter
and intra generational equity. In the pursuit of this normative goal, theory should be geared
towards generating a cosmopolitan ethos and shared inter-subjective meanings regarding the
human prospect that are based on solidarity.
The difficulties of implementation of such a cosmopolitan perspective are however
enormous. It presupposes the passage from the modern or Westphalian inter-national system,
which is segmented into sovereign national territorial units, to a post-modern configuration of
post-nationality. Yet, the imagined communities (Anderson 1991) we live in and have
constructed since the rise of the modern nation state are based on ontological assumptions
about identity, belonging and obligations that cannot be simply swept away by new scientific
facts (this is another way of saying what we affirmed earlier regarding descriptive and
normative judgments). National, religious and indeed racial segmentation remain stubborn if
often unfortunate social facts. Despite deepened transnational linkages at various levels, we
are still very far from the post-international and post-national politics envisioned by some
political theorists in the aftermath of the Cold War (Rosenau 1992; Habermas 1996). Even if
we assume that a shared understanding is indeed gradually emerging that the collective
human fate is inescapably bound to finding global answers to transnational problems, the
abstract understanding of shared humanity (species being, in Marx’ formulation6) does not
automatically translate into a cosmopolitan ethos since it runs counter to daily experience of
difference, otherness and self-interest (however flawed these can be shown to be). Likewise,
even if we are able to rid ourselves, individually and collectively, of philosophies of radical
selfishness (homo economicus) this does not mean that they will spontaneously give way to
empathy towards “strangers”, much less universal altruism. Moreover, while the statement
“we are all likely to die or at least to suffer extremely deleterious consequences if we don’t
share the burden of global warming” is certainly accurate, it does not tell us how in fact
various nations and social classes should share it, or who will define the terms of the
settlement. Lastly, even assuming that global institutions can be created to find ways out of
our present collective predicament, how to we ensure that they will be just?
A. Partial Cosmopolitanism
These are extremely difficult problems to resolve. Perhaps the best way out of contradiction
is to reject options that are either undesirable or unattainable. The first undesirable outcome
would be a sharpening of international segmentation through an exacerbation of struggles
over scare resources, an outcome predicted by realist and neo-realist international relations
theory. Still dominant in the contemporary literature, neo-realism postulates that nation-states
6

Indeed, one can argue that global warming confronts individuals to the existential reality of species-being, in
the sense given to that concept by Marx. See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, New
York: International Publishers, 1973.
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are functionally undifferentiated self-seeking units that are conditioned by structural anarchy
to maximise their power and minimise their insecurity, to the exclusion of all else. Under
conditions of eco-systemic crisis, this Hobbesian assumption, which has been subjected to
powerful critique,7 implies a sharpening of interstate conflict. Said otherwise, realism and
neo-realism have to be rejected outright if there is any hope of solving the greatest challenge
humanity has as yet faced. However, as Richard Falk has rightly pointed out, we also have to
exclude a number of “post-Westphalian scenarios” as either undesirable or unattainable or
both, among them the notion of a self-regulating global market system, the limits of which
are now plainly apparent, or the idea of a world government. (Falk 2004) If it were possible,
which it is not, world government would erase pluralism and is not synonymous with
democratic global governance. A world Leviathan would more likely reproduce at global
level, under highly coercive circumstances, the social inequalities that presently exist within
national boundaries, than establish global justice.
Having rejected a priori both interstate anarchy and these two post-Westphalian
scenarios, what options are we left with? Falk points to a solution when he calls for the
“gradual emergence of an accountable global polity” (Falk 2004: 9) To be legitimate, that
global polity would be inclusive, democratic, pluralistic and founded on human solidarity. In
a similar vein, Mireille Delmas-Marty has suggested that the alternative to the chaos of
interstate rivalry or to hegemonic rule by a single world state or a world empire would be for
the international system to move incrementally towards “ordered pluralist cooperation”.
(Delmas-Marty 2006) The concept of ordered pluralist cooperation implies the gradual
convergence of actor agendas around common goals across different issue areas. Rather than
erasing pluralism, it would seek to identify areas of convergence that allow for cooperative
action in a pluralistic setting, successful cooperation in any one area generating trust and
opening the possibility for advances in other areas. In contrast to hegemonic regimes, the
rules and disciplines of which are set by a dominant power, ordered pluralism would not be
based on hierarchy but on the mutual needs of various actors with different capabilities (the
European Union being at political level a good heuristic example of a non-hegemonic ordered
plural system). In other words, we should eschew attempting to achieve an unattainable
complete cosmopolitan order but rather imagine the frameworks that would allow movement
towards convergence, that is a partial cosmopolitanism that does not erase plural traditions
and identities. (Appiah 2007) We can apply these concepts to the question of global warming
by identifying areas of congruence between national and universal interests. In the case under
study, there is a real opportunity for the United States and China to set goals that meet mutual
needs, and by extension to secure the global atmospheric commons.
A very good concrete example of possible cooperation and convergence around
common goals is the proposal made by recently by Hu Angang, a senior figure of the Chinese
Academy of Sciences, for a fair global settlement, taking into account “average greenhousegas emissions per capita, total greenhouse-gas emissions, [and] historical and current
responsibilities”. (Hu Angang, 2009) In Hu’s proposal, the Human Development Index (HDI)
of countries would serve as the metric of burden sharing rather than GDP. Thus, various
categories of countries – High (above 0.8), Medium High (between 0.65 and 0.8), Medium
Low (between 0.5 and 0.65), and Low HDI (under 0.5) – would contribute differentially to
the reduction of emissions. If all the largest polluters, which include both High HDI (the
“developed countries”) and Medium High HDI countries (such as China, HDI = 0.777) will
be required to make major efforts to cutback emissions, the High HDI countries, which owe
their present position of wealth and power to their historical position at the core of the
7

See for instance Richard Ashley’s and Robert Cox’ critiques in Robert Keohane (ed), Neorealism and its
Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
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hierarchical late modern world system, would be called upon to make the greatest
unconditional efforts not only in terms of emissions reduction but also in terms of providing
financial and/or technological assistance to the other groups of countries. This would help to
significantly mitigate climate warming while correcting the patterns of international
inequality set in the nineteenth century and that still shape the world today. Medium Low
HDI countries would “benefit from low-interest loans from international financial
organizations and low-cost technological assistance”. Obligations of various countries would
of course evolve according to their shifting position in the Human Development Index. Thus
Medium High HDI countries would become unconditional reducers once they have reached
High HDI status. The global effort would be enforced by a United Nations agency established
to that effect and which would set binding targets for all countries.
B. Convergence Around Norms
Global distributive justice would have to be complemented by fair social bargains at national
level. At the national level distributive justice in burden sharing would be accomplished
through redistributive policies such as progressive tax policies, incentives to invest in green
technologies, punishing disincentives for polluters, etc. In other words, the global bargain
would have to be sustained by domestic social democratic bargains based on a fair
distribution of resource consumption among social classes and a reorientation of patterns of
consumption to make that possible. A few years ago, proposals of this type would have
appeared hopelessly unrealistic since homo economicus was triumphant and the most
powerful state in the international system had abandoned cooperation and international law
and adopted policies of unilateral power maximisation policies. Today however, a new and
far more hopeful political configuration in the United States makes it possible to move
forward once again and to break out of the prisoners dilemma discussed in this article. In
spite of persisting competitive pressures, domestic and international, it is no longer
impossible to imagine convergence around shared understandings and norms. In that sense,
the present generation of world leaders have an immense historic responsibility since they
will define whether survival oriented outcomes will prevail or not. The responsibility is
however not theirs alone. There is a need to overcome the “theoretical ineptitude” discussed
at the outset. A concerted theoretical effort is required to generate the intellectual and
political conditions to make optimal outcomes possible. Theory is reflexive rather than
positive in the sense that the thinking subject is not separate from the object of thought but
plays a determining role in the constitution of the “real”. Along with historical actors,
theorists have the responsibility to help construct the cosmopolitan ethos that will underpin a
world order based on pluralist cooperation rather than rivalry.
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Emerging Opportunities for Responding to Climate Change in The Obama
Administration: Why China Should Propel Developing Countries Towards Global
Carbon Reduction Cooperation
Richard Ingwe1 S. P. I. Agi2, and James Okoro3
Abstract
The use of diplomatic brinkmanship by the USA and her more recent uncooperativeness with
global response to the climate crisis (Kyoto Protocol) under the presidencies of George W.
Bush and Bill J. Clinton has led to fears in quarters that China, a rapidly industrialising
country might opt to become uncooperative in the global climate change efforts. We use
suitable conceptual frameworks of international relations to review the US’ previous conduct
in international relations during the “cold war” among others to analyse recent issues
pertaining to global carbon reduction under the Kyoto Protocol. We argue that China’s rising
profile in economic, political and social spheres especially the way it offers loans on softer
terms compared to the Western Consensus model, her ratification of the Kyoto are among the
several indications that her relationship with the USA and other nations in carbon reduction
portend good relationship in future. We argue also that Presient Obama’s promise of
acknowledging the reality of climate (change) science and to lead other nations in responding
to the crises seem to be getting fulfilled based on recent evidences. We conclude that the
future for global cooperation between the USA and China, on one hand, and between USA
and the rest of the world, on the other, present grounds for optimism that global carbon
reduction would proceed more peacefully and profitably than it was hitherto.
Background
The world faces a multiplicity of challenges. Widespread and prolonged poverty afflicting a
large proportion of the world’s population especially in the developing world since previous
decades had frayed nerves leading to numerous conflicts and wars. Ideological differences
had in the 1960s brought the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust when the defunct
USSR and USA threatened to go to war which could have culminated in the deployment of
nuclear weapons. In August 7, 1998, terrorist networks had emerged and instrumented
bombings of US missions simultaneously in Nairobi (Kenya) and Tanzania killing hundreds
of people and destroying precious property compelling the US to retaliate with Tomahawk
cruise missile attacks on al-Qaeda bases in eastern Afghanistan, followed by unilateral and
later multilateral sanctions by the US and UN security council resolutions 1267 and 1333
aimed at subduing the Taliban leadership to surrender and trial.
The 9/11 and 11/11, 2001 bombings of the twin towers of the World Trade in centre
New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C Killing over 2000 people in the former
represents the escalation of terrorism. The US response packaged as “Operation Enduring
Freedom” on Afghanistan was expanded to cover Iraq leading to a bitter experience for both
Americans and Iraqis. Although the Taliban regime fell on 13 November 2001, the US
offensive on Iraq persists and formed one of the central issues of the US presidential
campaign in 2008 (Maley in McLean and McMillan 2003:9-10). These existing widespread
conflicts will be exacerbated with increasing warming of the world, abrupt and dangerous
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changes in climate and the environment. Among the several widespread and serious
consequences associated with global warming a few deserve our present attention: the
indifference and irresponsibility of governments towards it and its potential to perpetuate
conflict among nations leading to the legacy of conflicts/wars characterizing recent history.
Official acknowledgement of global warming/climate change Despite the report of global
warming in 1896 (i.e. 113 years ago) by Svante Arrhenius, whose work was preceded by
another colleague (Joseph Fourier in 1827 (182 years ago), official acknowledgment of the
destructive phenomenon was disregarded by politicians until recently when reports by
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) became more alarming. It was only in a
few counties such as the European Union and a few others that carbon reduction programmes
including sustainable (renewable and efficient) energy programmes were implemented
(Droege 2008: 1-14). The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon acknowledged the threats
posed by climate change and energy crisis to global security and peace. This is especially
true for regions which have a rather longer experience of conflicts and where relationship
with neighbours had collapsed and are not aware of the accumulative effects of global
warming and its consequences (Ki-moon, 2007: xvi).
Irrespective of the UN’s acknowledgment of the problem, it has been difficult to
muster the political will of global leaders to tackle the problem. This point was clearly made
by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan who stated the world lacks leadership in the
environment (including climate) sector (cited by Ingwe 2008). Another dimension of the
poor political leadership worldwide is the tendency of some countries to resort to previous
historical disappointments, directly or indirectly, with their peers or counterparts in the
development process to forge national policy strategies that do not strive towards achieving
optimum results in terms of mitigating and adapting to climate change to the global benefit
by aiming to drastically reduce their green house gas (GHG) emission. This has been the
case in the global climate change response behaviour of the European Union (EU), on the one
hand, and the USA and between the rest of the world (nations of the advanced North which
have joined/endorsed the global mechanism (the Kyoto Protocol) for tackling global warming
and the USA, on the other.
This article examines differences in the nature of response to global warming taken by
China, a rapidly industrializing developing country, as a result of her perception and
consideration of the attitude of the USA towards the global climate change/carbon emission
reduction. This undertaking is justified for several reasons. Under the context of the failure
of the advanced industrialized countries to fulfill their promise to deliver aid (except the
Scandinavian/Nordic nations) and the increasing manifestation of climate change impacts On
Africa (such as the flooding of about 20 Africa countries in 2007 alone) global response to
the crises is urgent and imperative in the wake of the complication o the continent’s
problems. It is apposite to examine the response to climate change) by countries which are
the greatest emitters of Green House Gases (GHG). The USA and China fit the case study
approach due to their representativeness of the advanced and developing worlds in a rapidly
changing world. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated the
unequivocality of the contribution of anthropogenic forcing as the cause of global warming:
revealing that earth surface temperature increase since 1800 but more rapidly between 1970s
and the present (about 1.7OF) (www.epa.gov.250inafrica:12).
The Problem
As elaborated later, the global effort to reduce carbon emission initiated in 1997 in Kyoto
(Japan) involved 38 industrialized countries which committed themselves towards achieving
a target of eight percent GHG emission reduction by 2012 compared with their 1990 levels
(European Commission 2009:18). Although developing countries were expected to
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cooperate in the emissions reduction effort, there is a gap in information and knowledge of
their contribution to the programme. The case of China deserves careful analysis for several
reasons among which deserve mention here. China possesses a large proportion of the global
population, has been experiencing high rhythms of economic growth due to rapid
industrialization and technological development and has more recently attained a globally
enviable position of a national economy that was capable of lending the USA funds required
for prosecuting the stimulus (financial) package designed for resuscitating the economy after
the global financial meltdown and the economic recession within the last part of 2008 until
the present. Ruefully, report on global effort to address global warming still concentrate
discriminatively on the advanced countries of the North irrespective of recent advocacy for
the restructuring of the global economic and political order which led to the expansion of the
G8 nations to create the new G20 nations by including other countries which are experiencing
promising signs of contributing to revamping the global economy and reducing its
vulnerability to the financial and economic crises which recently devastated the USA and
several other G8 economics. Despite China’s rising political and economic status response to
climate change is poorly understood.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the potential role which China-a rapidly
industrializing and economically rising economy-to the global efforts to reduce GHG
emissions.
The specific objectives are: To show the evolution of the current effort to address global
warming through the mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol;
To describe the role that the USA played in the global effort to reduce GHG emission;
To highlight the opportunities presented by the new Obama administration of the USA for
promoting a more acceptable framework for accelerated reduction of GHG emission.
To show how China and the rest of the world should adjust their paradigms of international
relations to fit the new thinking and actions in Washington D.C as a better way of achieving
sustainable development.
In the remainder of the paper, we describe the problem of global warming (climate
change) in the second section to provide a basis for understanding the arguments. We follow
this up by presenting relevant theory in the nexus of international relations aiming to resolve
problems that concern several nations. These include: catastrophe theory, which sets the tone
for understanding the context of widespread catastrophic consequences that scientists predict
will come with the ongoing and increasing global warming. Brinkmanship theory has
characterized previous crises involving the USA and its counterparts and its legacy might be
determining the recent strategy of the US response to the Kyoto protocol. We introduce the
theory of neoliberalism due to its variable connotations as used by the advanced countries and
the contrasting view of the developing world. Moreover, the response of nations to global
warming or carbon reduction is determined by their economic circumstances and the
consideration of the economic benefits perceived to derived from specific political action(s).
Neoliberalism captures these political and economic dimensions. We present global response
to global warming in form of the Kyoto Protocol, and the attitude of the USA towards it
ratification/enforcement and the distinctive achievements of the European Union under its
framework in section three. In section four, we show the opportunities presented the new
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Obama administration for leveraging the global effort to reduce GHG emissions. Here too,
we review the actions taken by the Obama administration towards fulfilling his promise to
accept climate science and lead the global campaign to reduce GHG emission.
In section five, we review recent changes in the Chinese economy, industry, and
position regarding the approach of the US and the advanced nations to global GHG emission
reduction. Based on the paradigmatic shifts in the international relations style of the Obama
administration, we conclude the paper by urging China and other nations to place global
interest as equal pedestal as country by more honestly.
Climate Change: The Consequence of Global Warming.
This phenomenon refers to steady and accumulated build up of six major (greenhouse) gases
GHG dominated by carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere over a long period has led to
entrapment of solar radiation resulting from the formation of a kind of ceiling by the GHGs
over the upper atmosphere thereby heating up the earth surface due to prolonged prevention
of solar radiation from being reflected back into space. Its consequences over the years
include the alteration of climate and weather events: their physical behaviour, dynamics of
rainfall, temperature etc) and by extension environmental characteristics. It also involves
changes in the mixture of atmospheric gas composition and earth surface temperature has
fluctuated over the years. The consequence were initially considered uncertain but more
recent findings from more reliable scientific studies show that they would involve widespread
catastrophe including deforestation, desertification, poleward extension of vegetation and
animal population, increases in sea levels and declining precipitation scientific evidence
shows that CO2 emission from fossil fuel burning contributes 80% of worldwide GHG
emissions (Matthes 2006:293, Humphrey in Mclean and McMillan 2003: 225).
Although a consensus is yet to be reached, it is widely known that limiting global
mean temperature increase resulting from global warming to two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels is mostly considered to be a reasonable point beyond which widespread
catastrophic consequences of global warming on human society and natural system will occur
(the European Council (no date) in Matthes 2006:295). A tolerable level of further global
warming is put at 1.4OC since the 19th century. Therefore, a mean long term global warming
rate of 0.2OC per decade, not more, is considered safe and must not be compromised (WGBU
2003 and 2004 in Matthes 2006:295).
Based on various global warming reduction
parameters (climate windows) and various alternatives for GHG emission reductions
strategies, it was proposed that a climate policy targeting stabilization of GHG concentrations
at 440 parts per million (ppm) to 450ppm (equivalent to stabilization of CO2 concentrations
at 350 to 400ppm represents an ambitious climate policy (Meinshavsen 2005). This proposal
represents a GHG emissions reduction by about 50% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels
(Matthes 2006:296). The intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC) has
demonstrated that human activity mainly fossil fuel use is incontrovertibly responsible for
increasing GHG emission leading to global warming/climate change. Using the GHG
emission; profile of the past century, there is likely to be an average global temperature
increase of between 2 and 4.5OC by the year 2100 compared to 1990 levels (IPCC 2007, 2001
in Byrne 2008:27). Scholars have engaged in frightening number game projecting the scale of
consequences that will arise from climate change in future. As many as 200 million people
could be displaced by monsoon systems, rainfall regimes, severe droughts, flooding when
climate change reaches an advanced stage in about 2050 (Myers 2005 in Oli 2008).
Another popular study reveals that while most coastal and low lying parts of the world
would suffer widespread damage and economic losses, Africa is the most vulnerable of all
regions of the world. It recommends a GHG emissions reduction at least 80% by all
countries to avoid the catastrophe (Stern 2006).
241

Catastrophe Theory Presents a Good Framework for Understanding Climate Change
The manner in which US Governments under President George W. Bush and to some extent
Bill Clinton failed to cooperate with the global movement to respond to climate change and
the predictions of doom and worsening impacts of the environmental crisis. The theory
offers a suitable way of systematically classifying abrupt disruptions in conditions of stability
thereby enthroning chaos. The theory has been employed for analyzing a wide variety of
phenomena studied by both physical and social scientists from the freezing of a liquid to the
disintegration of an empire that was hitherto a formidable socio-political entity, or violent
action of inmates of a prison or the bending and breakage of solid objects such as a metal.
Although its use engendered controversy by the mid 1970s, it enjoyed popularity in the social
sciences in the early 1970s through its employment Christopher Zeeman and colleagues, after
its creation around the mid 1960s. The popularity of the theory among non-mathematicians
has been attributed to two major reasons First, it produces more easily comprehensible
general ideas of spatial intuition derived from more appropriate qualitative methods
contrasted to quantitative approaches used by mathematicians to analyse surfaces and
topology. Secondly, the theory is amenable to use for explaining in a discriminatory way
only circumstances that have deviated or changed radically in a discontinuous way from an
original initial conditions that were considered to pose problems for easy explanation using
available scientific methods that are based on Newtonian paradigm and characteristic and
peculiar to social and political events. Despite the popularity it enjoyed in political science
scholarship within the decade (1965-1975) and perhaps until the present, the catastrophe
theory is yet to attain a more respectable status in the discipline. Its use has been adjudged to
be more successful as a heuristic instrument than for detailed studies. However, its
popularity is beneath the level achieved by its counterparts e.g. game theory, its rather
transient popularity within a decade has been likened to chaos theory its other counterpart
(Jones in McLean and McMillan 2003:66-7). The suitability of catastrophe theory to the
analysis of climate is in the way global warming has already been acknowledged to be
characterized by abruptness, suddenness and danger.
The way its impacts trigger various consequences that by themselves lead to
disruptions in several sectors such mass migration of people in search of more livable
environments compared to their original usual places of habitation and work make it suitable
for analyzing predictions about widespread catastrophic events such as extreme weather
events (flooding, drought, storms and so forth (Helmuth et al. 2007, Meyers, 2005, Stern
2006 etc). Climate change in its own right triggers catastrophic events in the physical
environmental subsystems (atmosphere, hydrosphere, and lithosphere) and also catalyses
catastrophic decisions within the social (human) and political systems a matter we turn to
presently.
The legacy of “Cold War” brinkmanship: According to Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, the
term brinkmanship refers to the tendency of the superpowers during the “Cold War” era to
deliberately cause a crisis associated with accelerating a “potential nuclear holocaust”. This
habitual tendency smacking of “going to the brink” (of civil action) was aimed by either of
the two superpowers to stampede its rival to concede on the issue of military supremacy.
Some examples include; the 1961 crisis over Berlin-the former and current capital city of the
United German Federal Republic and the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 i.e. only one year after
the former (1961) crisis. It involved USSR’s installation of nuclear weapons in Cuba, near
Florida, US and US demand that the Russians clear-up the offensive threats. Theses crises
have been documented elsewhere and do not bear repetition here due to the need to
concentrate on our present task and title/issue (see Peter Byrd in McLean and McMillan
2003:129-131 for detailed account of the Cuban Missile crisis). Brinkmanship also describes
other political “gamesmanship” actions that are of high stakes which are capable of affecting
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international politics and relations among sovereign states (Underhill in McLean and
McMillan 2003:53).
The theory/concept is relevant in this article due to the way it captures the way US
Governments under presidents George W. Bush and Bill J. Clinton a topic described
elsewhere in this paper. The way the problem of global warming has become inextricably
interrelated to the financial crises and the economic recession of the late 2008 up to the
present beckons for other theoretical and conceptual frameworks that capture these twin
crises.
The Relevance of Brinkmanship of The Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC)
The CMC was regarded as a paradigm case in “crisis management” in the West because it
represented a novel deployment of diplomatic tactics by the US to resolve the crisis which
was inexorably heading towards a painful nuclear war between the defunct USSR and USA
with Cuba and the rest of the world bearing enormous brunt. Its high points include the way
the US fine diplomatic action (or response) to the adamancy and belligerence of the Russian
leader: Nikita Krushcher over withdrawing nuclear weapons installed in Cuba yielded
beneficial results. The potency of the US action was credited to the use of brinkmanship (the
threat of war) to cause the opponent to acquiesce and also the inclusion of an allowance of a
last resort for the opponent to prevent the escalation of disagreement of a very serious kind
(Underhill in McLean and McMillan 2003:53). The theory of brinkmanship might have been
a legacy that appealed to President George W. Bush and his supporters but is inappropriate as
a strategy to apply to the problem o global warming which is irreversible in a world that has
attained a relatively higher degree of awareness deriving from advanced scientific and
technological methods of producing and disseminating/communicating information of the
type used by Barack Obama in prosecuting/managing his presidential campaign.
Neoliberalism, Postneoliberalism and Climate Change
The recent global financial crises of the last quarter of 2008 which rapidly degenerated into a
global economic recession has raised to high pedestal the theory of neoliberalism. There is
increasing interest in the potency and value of the theory which is being held responsible for
the crises. The following account will demonstrate the globalization of the theory, through its
application in various senses/meanings in both the advanced and developing worlds. The
way the theory covers both advanced and developing worlds makes it suitable for analyzing
the way China has responded to the USA’s approach towards managing the global warming
problem.
Andrew Hurrel and Laura Gomez-Mera have provided a comprehensive definition of
the term by highlighting its different meanings. The term has been applied in the field of
academic international relations as a theoretical approach developed to analyse institutions
thus earning it other names: neoliberal institutionalism or regime theory. Created in the mid
1990s, this strand of the term was developed as a response to the non-realist paradigm
involving the demonstration of the possibility of realizing the goals of international
cooperation based on the principles of non-realism. In pursuing this goal, the cooperating
states are considered to be rational, unitary actors interested in maximizing their utility within
a rather anarchic international system. The neoliberal institutions are regarded as effective
mechanism for facilitating cooperation among the states involved through deliberate
reduction of uncertainty, articulation of issues of common interest to the cooperating states,
monitoring the conduct of the states and promoting appreciation of the benefits of reputation
among the parties involved. Under the context of the absence of a sovereign authority in the
international arena, a problematic situation that causes frequent conflicts among states,
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cheating and defection among states, the foregoing measures are regarded to be capable of
providing solutions.
Theorists of Neorealism have challenged the arguments of the
Neoliberals/institutionalists by emphasizing the gains of relative gains as superior to those
derivable from the absolute gains. The Neorealists argue that powerful states create
institutions that they customize to pursue interests/goals of their own states while relegating
issues that concern other states to the background and treating them as impediments.
The second meaning of neoliberalism refers to a set of policies related to marketliberal economic system. There are two meanings of the term under this family;
corresponding to the perceptions of the advanced countries and developing countries. In the
advanced countries, neoliberalism is associated with Thatcherism (after the economic and
political strategies applied by former British Prime Minister: Margaret Thatcher). It emerged
as a challenge to Keynesianism, an economic policy approach associated with the economist
John Maynard Keynes.
Neoliberalism is used in developing countries to challenge the infamous national
development strategies of import substitution industrialization applied intensively from 1945
to the early 1980s. Here the term is commonly tied to the Washington Consensus
characterized by implementation of privatization and deregulation, liberalization of trade and
financial mechanisms, curbing of the role of states in national economic processes and
institutions, emphasis on foreign direct investment. Additionally, the term refers to the
structural adjustment programmes (SAP) that were notoriously implemented by international
governmental organizations such as the international Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank. Some (including anti-globalization movements) have used neoliberalism to describe
the globalization of capitalism representing an economic ideology advocated by the advanced
countries. Although the various meanings of neoliberalism are related, its economic
meanings are perceived to have remained rather imprecise and general (Hurrel and GomezMera in McLean and McMillan 2003:368). Postneoliberalism has most recently emerged as a
challenge to the economic impasse presented by the financial and economic crises
devastating the global economy. Scholars and activists contributed 15 articles examining
various facets of postneoliberalism: its analytical value, promises to bailout crisis ridden
economics, bifurcations, relationship/differences with capitalism, counter hegemonic
potential, value to biodiversity, food security and women peasants and its legacies in different
countries/continents (development dialogue Melber 2009:212 pp +4).
Global Responses to Climate Change
The United Nations Framework convention on climate change (UNFCCC) represents the
most serious global response to the problem of global warming because of the measures it has
created to manage the debacle. The convention was adopted in 1992 at the Earth Summit
held in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). Its principal objective is the “stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
(human-made) interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within
a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure
that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a
sustainable manner (Detailed information is available at the UNFCCC Secretariat website at:
http://www.unfccc.int/resources/docs/conveng/pdfcitedinUNDP,UNEP,WorldBank&WRI20
03:240).
The Kyoto Protocol
This refers to a protocol established in a Japanese city called Kyoto in 1997 by the third
session of the conference of parties (COP-3) including 38 industrialized countries to the
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UNFCCC. It stipulated that when ratified by 55 countries would represent the commitment of
advanced countries to reducing their collective emissions of six key green house gases CO2,
CH4, and so forth by 5.2% on average by 2012. The emissions reduction was expected to be
at least five percent lower than 1990 levels by a deadline which initially ranged from 2008 to
2012 compared to the emissions levels that would be expected to be achieved 2010 devoid of
applying emissions control devices. The target emission of the protocol was equivalent to a
30 percent cut. It represents an agreement to reduce emissions and to promote adaptation to
future climate change impacts by both developed and developing countries, their reporting of
information on their national climate change programme and inventories; promotion of
technology transfer; scientific and public research cooperation and promotion of public
awareness raising, education and training programmes. To cause it to come into force,
ratification by 55 parties to the convention representing parties that contribute 55 percent of
CO2 emissions in 1990 by Annex 1 parties (describing industrialized nations) was required.
The ratification of the Protocol by 94 countries represented only 37 percent of the
Annex/countries emissions was attained by September 2002. See further information in a
Guide to the climate change convention process, available online at
http://www.unfccc.int/resources/process/guildeprocessp.pdf<UNDP,UNEP,WorldBank&WRI2003:240). In February 2005, the Protocol came into
force following its ratification by Russia and other countries. The 5.2% average emissions
reduction was far below the 60% target recommended by scientists of climate as a means of
avoiding further dangerous global warming which they have severally warned would lead to
widespread catastrophic consequences for the earth’s climate and environmental systems
(land, water and atmosphere).
US Contrivance of Intransigencies and Frustration of the Kyoto Protocol Ratification
The USA is a major driver of carbon emission in the world (with a total CO2) emissions in
1999 of 5,584.8 million metric tonnes (24.1% of global total) representing 15.2 percent
change since 1990 and per capita of 19.9 metric tones per person in 1999 representing 4.7
percent change since 1990 levels. These were the highest carbon emissions worldwide. For
China, the total CO2 emission in 1999 was 3,015.3 (29.6 percent change since 1990) while
the per capita CO2 emission was only 2.5 (i.e. 16.6 per cent change since 1990) (UNDP,
UNEP, World Bank and WRI 2003:258-9). Only one year later, the total CO2 emission of
the US rose to 5,762.1 million metric tonnes representing 24.11% and 17.9 percent change
since 1990 China’s CO2 emission in 2000 was a total of 3,473.6 million metric tonnes i.e.
39.3% change since 1990 while her per capita CO2 emission was 2.7 tonnes per person in
2000 (i.e. 26.2% change since 1990 (UNDP, UNEP, World Bank and WRI 2005:204-5).
Contrary to expectations of the USA to lead global response to reduce carbon emissions that
it contributes enormously to, US Governments under Presidents George W. Bush and Bill
Clinton failed to cooperate with global efforts aimed at tackling the world’s greatest threat.
The way the US posed impediments to the global efforts to reduce carbon emission
could be better understood by reviewing, albeit briefly, the crucial intergovernmental
meetings that have been organised to mobilize support towards transforming the Kyoto
Protocol into a ratified treaty thereby empowering it with legal instruments to command or
effect enforcement. An account of global warming given by Mathew Humphery provides a
foundation for doing this. The first intergovernmental meeting held in the Hague in
November 2000 ended in disarray following the European Union’s (EU) disagreement with
the USA especially over the insistence of Americans that forests and vegetation must be
included in the list of “Carbon sinks” and should be used in measuring the level of their
emission of carbon through fossil fuel use or burning. Owing to the uncertainty, transiency
and instability of the carbon storage capacity of vegetation, the EU feared that the use of
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vegetation as carbon sink in the agreement would create loopholes that the Americans would
exploit to cheat. On his inauguration, President George W. Bush promptly caused the
unilateral withdrawal of the US from the Protocol claiming that it had the capability of
severely damaging its economy. The US failure to cooperate with others in this and similar
carbon reduction efforts represents one of the most serious impediments to sustainable
development of the world-considering that the US emits the largest quantity of CO2
worldwide.
The second intergovernmental meeting on climate change held in Bonn (Germany) in
July 2001 assembled 186 countries created a treaty out of the Protocol. Unfortunately, this
was achieved only when unnecessarily huge concessions were granted to Canada (the US
North American neighbour aiming perhaps to break the gang-up in the region), Australia,
Japan and Russia regarding the acceptance of forests as “carbon sinks” and the instrument for
enforce any agreement reached. These concessions are perceived to represent drastic
reduction of the effective size of the initial emission reduction proposed at 5.2 percent on the
1990 levels to as low as between 1.8 and 3 percent (Humphrey in McLean and McMillan
2003:225-6).
More recently, in late 2008, another intergovernmental meeting on climate change
held in the Indonesian city of Bali. It has been credited with achieving a roadmap for
pursuing the goals of global carbon reduction.
Sadly, the Bali climate change meeting missed the participation, directly or indirectly
of Barack Obama, who at the time was still campaigning for the US President but had
announced that his administration would acknowledge the climate change problem, scientific
evidence and also tackle it seriously. Therefore, the efforts of the Obama administration to
dissociate from climate change science denial as a means of cheating, frustrating global
climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts deserve attention here. Before undertaking
that, it is apposite to examine the achievement of the EU in the area of carbon reduction
based on the Kyoto Protocol as mechanism. The obstinacy of US Governments, especially
under President George W. Bush, in applying brinkmanship while ignoring the global effort
in the Kyoto compelled “civil action to shrink the carbon footprint in the US (Byrne et al
2008:27-53). It is apposite to consider the distinctive contributions of the European Union
towards global carbon reduction.
What Has The European Union (EU) Achieved in The Kyoto Protocol?
A recent heartwarming report that “Brussels draws closer to Kyoto” explains that the
EU has almost achieved its targets regarding the fulfillment of its greenhouse gas emission
reduction obligations as stipulated in the mechanism or agreement. Citing the European
Environment Agency (EEA), recent reports show that the EU’s GHG emissions declined by
0.3% between 2005 and 2006 to a level (of) 7.7% below the 1990 level. Two reasons were
given to account for the cheering record. First, certain chemical factories had recorded
declining production. Second, the mild weather experienced in 2006 led to reduced use of
heating fuel. Despite increases in major emission in Finland and Denmark as a consequence
of rising coal consumption, the EU-15 at a regional level deserve commendation for leading
the global quest for carbon (emission) reduction. The 12 new EU member states were
reportedly poor carbon emission reduction performers. Whether the heartwarming reports
from parts of the EU will be sustained in the future is yet to be seen (European
Commission/research*eu 2008:18 citing http://reports.eea.europa.eu).
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The Distinctive Opportunities of The Obama Administration for Global Carbon (GHG)
Reduction
Despite the enormous dust raised by the global financial meltdown and economic recession
which occurred in quick succession within the last part of 2008 in the USA and the way these
crises beclouded the campaign and inauguration of President Barack Obama of USA the
sterling credentials, qualities and commitment of the new administration towards carbon
reduction remain clear and discernible. Irrespective of the enormity of these financial and
economic crises and their capacity to dampen a revolutionary spirit, the firmness and
commitment of President Obama to carbon reduction remains indefatigable. Owing to the
fact that opportunities have everywhere and every time proven to be sublime, difficult to
perceive and exploit, there is need for greater and elaboration and here to make them visible.
Perhaps the most promising opportunity of President Obama in global carbon
reduction might be credited to his pedigree, association and paradigms and worldview.
Obama’s pedigree in carbon reduction campaign dates back to his anonymous days when he
was either a quieter Illinois Senator, community mobiliser, editor of the prestigious Harvard
Law Review (Journal) or voracious researcher when he took interest in climate change
science and campaign. This has been documented and does not bear repetition here. Obama’s
association with climate change science/campaign is well illustrated with the roles played by
world renowned climate change campaigners. Perhaps the most noteworthy was Obama’s
introduction by the sustainable development/climate change Nobel Laureate and
creator/narrator of the environmentally friendliest film: The Inconvenient Truth: Al Gore
(former Vice-President of the USA during the Clinton regime) as the presidential candidate
of the Democratic Party in ………. 2008.
What is most valuable about Obama’s paradigms generally is their radicality, novelty
in the political arena, and their deep intellectual foundation. The political arena in most of
the world has been entrapped/imprisoned in conservatism, status quo thinking, policy and
action. Yet Obama has differed. Obama’s development and energy production and use
paradigm is that the USA and the world requires renewable and efficient energy resources to
achieve greater sustainable development. He has argued that sustainable energy and
environmental programmes promise more jobs for Americans and has invested impressively
in the green technologies on inauguration only in January 2009.
Obama’s worldview is harmony and peaceful coexistence between USA and other
counties of the world. To Cuba one of the US longest political foes, to Iran, to Korea and
several other nations, President Obama has offered and is pursuing international cooperation
and relations as equal partners.
To the climate change group of nations generally and especially those which have
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, President Obama offered to acknowledge the scientific evidence
available and lead in the global campaign to drastically reduce carbon emissions as a means
of achieving sustainable development. Obama’s worldview in this regard was succinctly
captured in his inauguration speech thus:
“The world will remember a person not on the basis of the damage/harm done…. But
on the edifices she built…
The Impressive Actions of Obama Administration on Carbon Reduction
Development scholars are declaring that “the colour of stimulus goes green” (Robbins et al
2009). Robbins and colleagues (2009) reveal that governments across the globe have
allocated over USD43billion in fiscal stimulus focusing on key climate change reduction
investment themes with the USA and China in the lead worldwide. While the USA invested
$973.0, i.e. US$186.0 (USEESA) and US$787.0 for USARRA, China invested: $586.1
(Robbins, Clover, and Singh 2009).
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Perhaps more heart warming is the US’ recent joining of the membership of the
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). Despite IRENA’s recency, the global
environmental sustainability community, including civil society and non-government
organizations are praising the Obama administration for its climate friendly programmes and
policies. For example, in a press release, the World Wind Energy Association recently
praised the recent policies of President Obama as a good response to climate change (World
Wind Energy Association, 2009). For example, Volker Thomsen, Chair WWEC2008 Board
Member World Wind Energy Association and a member of: the World Council for
Renewable Energy (WCRE), Eurosolar in Germany, and Co- founder WWEI World Wind
Energy Institute Denmark, revealed happily that most recently the USA together with
Australia joined the membership of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA),
whose membership as in June 2009, is nearly 100 countries (http://volkerthomsen.com/irenathe-international-renewable-energy-agency/, personal communication via email to WWEA
network, 13 June 2009). The flourishing IRENA generally and the joining of its membership
by the US is being commended by the sustainable development and energy community
worldwide. Additionally, Steve Bouchard recently reports good news that the US House of
Representatives has just passed a landmark bill that was designed to propel the nation toward
a clean energy future.
The debate moves on to the Senate where opponents of the clean energy proposal are
expected to pose obstacles to the bill’s passage. However, clean energy advocates, whose
momentum has been raised are resolute and promise to mount pressure in order to re-enact
the recent success recorded in the lower federal legislature in the US Senate. Today, we have
something to celebrate. Bouchard notes: “For the first time in decades, we have taken bold
action to help solve the climate crisis” (Personal communication to the World Wind Energy
Association, WWEA, networkers, 27 June 2009).
China is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol. Her CO2 (International Dollars) of GDP
declined from 1,523 metric tonnes in 1990 to 949 metric tonnes in 1996 (UNDP, UNEP,
World Bank and WRI 2001:282) while the CO2 emissions in 1999 was 3051.1 and 25.6
percent change since 1990.
the increasing GHG emission results from rapid
industrialization/economic activity in the world’s most populous country with over 1.2 billion
in 2002 (UNDP, UNEP, World Bank and WRI, 2003: 278, 258).
China’s Response to Climate Change and US Strategies
The analysis of China’s attitude to global climate change and her evaluation/assessment of
the role played by the USA must be based on specific premises. It is important to accord
China the status of a leading country in the developing world-a status which she gained
several years ago when her economic growth rate shot up beyond the expectations of the
world-especially the industrialized/advanced countries which foisted development models
based on the Washington Consensus on the developing world based solely on their own
economics histories and development experiences. More recently, China’s global leadership
role rose higher when it become a lender to the US and donor to Africa based on terms of
friendship without the rather stringent conditions that contradicts the insistence of the Bretton
Woods institutions and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) on the notorious “debt
sustainability framework” describing stringently formulated documents and conditions. In
this regard, china is commanding greater respect and following. This is important for the
expectation of developing countries to join the global carbon reduction efforts. Additionally,
China has been a candidate for a position in the membership of the UN Security Council for
quite some time.
Therefore, China’s response to the global climate change and the
role/attitude of the US to the campaign will certainly influence most developing countries
especially those which have benefited from more favourable development assistance and
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expect same from the new economic and political force represented by China (Bayer 2009:
99).
It deserves statement that while China’s economic and political might is not the main
issue in assessing her response to climate change but it provides the foundation for their
international relations policies and strategies.
The foregoing position is likely to be true also of 12 other “sustainable growth”
countries which together with China have emerged as achieving economic growth rates of
seven percent or higher within the past 25 years. They include: Botswana, Brazil, (China),
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Oman, Singapore, Taiwan and
Thailand. China’s achievement of the rapid economic growth rate has been credited to the
decision of her leader (Teng Hsiao Ping), after visiting to learn from the glamorous financial
centres of Malaysia and Hong Kong in 1979, to avoid the strategy of undertaking the “great
leap forward”. On the contrary, he preferred to take the approach of “gradualism” while
retaining existing communist institutions but reformed them by injecting into them
appropriate doses of market structures and processes (Spence 2008 in Bayer 2009: 91).
The Global Carbon Reduction Effort Requires Respectable Fresh Ideas in China and
Sustainable Growth Countries
By achieving impressively high economic growth rate (7%+) by applying strategies different
from the neoliberalism prescribed insistently by the proponents of the Washington
Consensus, China and its peers clearly demonstrated their originality and potency of their
thinking in terms of achieving their economic and social development objectives. This point
was acknowledged in “The Growth Report” written by academics, World Bank staff, UN
officials and similar professionals when they stated that the era is over when the Washington
Consensus was regarded as the most potent and effective route to national development.
They report that the achievement of the sustainable growth countries was the result of the
application of local resources/contributions, non-conventional strategies, regard for lessons
learnt from practical experience of implementation of new ideas considered as promising by
endogenous/indigenous planners and citizen participation in the process of fashioning
appropriate strategies that befit local circumstances. This contradicts the insistence of the
Washington Consensus on the existence of a “grand scheme” for pursuing development in the
global South (Rodrik 2008 in Bayer 2009:92).
China’s Leading Investment in Green Technologies
Very recent evidence shows that China is one of the leading investors in green technologies
(including renewable and efficient energy sources and environmentally sustainable
programmes). Only the USA has invested more money into green technologies than China
has recently.
China Needs Not/Will Not be Hostile to the USA at this Time
Several factors justify our optimism and suggestion that China’s response to the global
climate change campaign will remain responsible, ignore disappointments exhibited by any
country (be it the USA or others). Apart from her present rising economic and political
profile, China has charted a refreshingly impressive diplomatic style involving her
proposition of friendship rather than the typical model of diplomacy that is prone to
brinkmanship.
China’s recent tremendous investment in green technologies demonstrates her
appreciation of the problem of climate change and the urgency and imperativeness of carbon
reducing development approaches.
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The USA under the Obama administration is vigorously implementing a new
international relationship model (on equal basis) with Iran, Cuba and wooing the cooperation
of countries belligerently, pursuing nuclear proliferation programmes which President Obama
is discouraging with persuasive commitment.
EU-15’s impressive achievement of its Kyoto Protocol targets provides a lesson
which China ought to emulate rather than look up to any disappointments from the USA
and/or other countries.
China must be aware of the enormity of the adversity that would befall her huge
population (The world’s most populous country) whose 1.22 billion people in 2002 was
projected to rise to 1.5 billion in 2025 (UNDP, UWEP, World Bank and WRI 2003:278). In
the event of escalation of climate change impacts, there is no other country that would suffer
as many casualties as Chinese within and outside China.
Conclusion
Although the global climate change/carbon reduction strategies under the mechanism of the
Kyoto Protocol (evolved in 1997) suffered a setback through the withdrawal of the US
administration of President George W. Bush, recent phenomena portend favourable
international cooperation/relations. Almost coincidentally, two major impediments to the
Kyoto were neutralised within the short period between August 2008 to November 2008.
First, the collapse of the US real estate, and financial institutions and rapid recession of the
economy and its reverberation worldwide has been unanimously interpreted as the collapse of
the “neoliberalism” (Washington Consensus) which has had a long history of about 30 years
and engendered faulty economic development thinking and strategies. The emerging
postneoliberalism involves popular endorsement of increasing investment in green
technologies which represent carbon reduction measures. This has provided a point of
agreement among a growing number of countries led by the USA, China and a host of others.
Secondly, the election of Barack Obama in November 2008 and his policies since
inauguration in January 2009 seems to be indicating an end of the 47-year era of employment
of diplomatic brinkmanship by US Governments. Evidence of reversals of USA’s diplomatic
extremism with Cuba, Iraq, Iran and so forth seems to be mounting.
Specifically, Obama administration is fulfilling his promise to acknowledge climate
change science and lead the global campaign to reduce carbon emission.
The recent changes have enthroned a new slate for carbon reduction by fresh
resources from the USA and China to complement the achievements recorded by the EU
under the Kyoto Protocol.
It must be acknowledged that global awareness raising of global warming has been
the responsibility of civil society and non-government organizations, these range from
international government organizations supported ones such as the IPCC the World Council
for Renewable Energy (WCRE), World Wind Energy Association, WWEA etc, to national
ones like “the Royal Society”, and so forth.
Recommendations
We recommend that President Obama’s leadership of the global carbon reduction effort
should be realized by pushing for the upward revision of the target of carbon reduction
(which was reduced drastically from 5.2% to between 1.8 to 3 percent as a bait to get the
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Canada, Australia and so forth) after ratifying the Kyoto
Protocol. That would be the best fulfillment of the global leadership promised by Obama
under the context and history of unnecessary compromises that hurt the carbon reduction
effort.
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Considering the excellent track record of environmental and energy NGOs in
mobilizing global and national response to the climate environmental change crisis, the role
of ENGOs in catalyzing increasing appreciation of the enormity of the crisis to US
Government functionaries and civil society cannot be overemphasized.
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EU-China Relations on Climate Change Policies and The Role of Bilateral Cooperation
for a Global Climate Change Regime
Astrid Carrapatoso1
Abstract
What must the European Union do to make China commit to binding regulations on
greenhouse gases? China has been one of the major veto players with regard to binding rules
on carbon emissions in context of the Kyoto Protocol and the negotiations of a Post-Kyoto
arrangement. And yet, China is one of the largest polluters in this respect. Because of its
economic growth rates, emissions are likely to rise in the future. It is therefore necessary to
find viable solutions that encourage China to limit and finally reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. In contrast, the EU has internationally showed leadership in climate change
policy. The EU is often considered as a normative power, i.e. having the ideational power to
define what can be perceived ‘normal’ on the international level.
The question is whether the bilateral cooperation between the EU and China on
climate issues can help to (a) promote norms and values and generate an increased awareness
of climate change both on the political and societal level, (b) establish comprehensive
environmental policy frameworks on a bilateral basis with a positive impact on national
policy making and (c) positively influence environmental policy making on the international
level such as the Post-Kyoto negotiations on climate change.
This paper seeks to set a research agenda for the exploration of the EU’s normative
power with regard to climate change policy in China. As the main research objective will be
to find out about the acceptance and adaptation of norms related to climate change, the
concept of normative power and the discussion on norm diffusion and norm localization will
be central to this analysis. Furthermore, this study will be embedded in the debate on ‘new
bilateralism’, thus concentrating on new actors, agendas and instruments in bilateral
relations.
Introduction
To institutionalize and enhance their cooperation on climate change issues, the European
Union (EU) and China agreed on a partnership agreement in 2005, which sets out key
objectives for further efforts to jointly address the issue of climate change. This declaration
was translated into a Rolling Action Plan (RWP) in 2006. Since then, the EU and China
regularly launched bilateral consultations and summits to further develop joint projects such
as, for example, the COACH project (Cooperation Action with CCS China-EU). The joint
declaration is meant to “fully complement the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Kyoto Protocol. It will strengthen cooperation and dialogue on climate
change including clean energy, and will promote sustainable development” (EC 2009). This
comment raises three questions that will guide this research: (a) Will this cooperation merely
include technical issues or does it have the potential to promote the norm of sustainable
development and climate change being part of it? (b) Will such a bilateral cooperation be
successful in establishing sound environmental policy frameworks on a national basis? (c)
Will bilateral cooperation on climate change such as the one between the EU and China help
or hinder the development of a global climate change regime after the Kyoto Protocol will
have expired? These questions will become crucial in the light of the upcoming negotiations
of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen in
December 2009. Here, member states will decide on the future directions of global climate
change policy making and the integration of China into such an agreement and China’s
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acceptance on quantitative emission goals will be decisive. At the UNFCCC conference in
Bali in 2007, China for the first time agreed on discussing these issues in context of a PostKyoto-Protocol. Whether this leads into a binding commitment will not only depend on
China’s willingness to do so but also on the industrialized nations’ assistance in developing
and implementing climate change policies in China and in giving the right incentives for
China to also independently set up policies to address problems causing and caused by
climate change. Both the EU and the U.S. will play an important role in this respect.
The objective of this research project is to explore the sources of EU and Chinese
climate change policy making and the role and function of EU-China relations on climate
change policy for international relations. To find out about the sources will help to map
existing or potential cooperation between European and Chinese actors. Based on the
assumption that official cooperation frameworks such as the above mentioned joint
declaration are not only implemented through political actors but also through business and
civil society actors, one research goal of this project is to find out about both political and
societal actors involved in this cooperation. Furthermore, this analysis wants to illustrate EUChina cooperation on different levels, i.e. projects on the political, business and civil society
level to explore the nature and key aspects of EU-China bilateral relations.
The analysis will be embedded in the debate on ‘new bilateralism’ (Kiatpongsan
2008), ‘bilateral inter-regionalism’ (Ponjaert 2008) or ‘quasi-interregionalism’ (Hänggi 2006)
and blended with insights gained from foreign policy analysis (Hudson 2005;
Goldstein/Keohane 1993; Boekle/Rittberger/Wagner 1999; Risse 2000). New bilateralism
focuses on new actors beyond government-to-government relations, new agendas also
emphasizing issue linkages such as trade and environment or sustainable development and
new instruments that include ‘multiple issue-specific alliances’, which means that bilateral
agreements focus on specific policy areas (Kiatpongsan 2008; Smith/Tsatsas 2002). The
study of EU-China relations on climate change policy therefore seeks to explore both the
political and societal actors involved in climate change policy making, their objectives and
motivations, the climate change agenda, the instruments to be used, including strategic
dialogues, summits, track-two-diplomacy and policy networks and the effect of these bilateral
relations on the international system. Furthermore, as this study deals with the promotion and
establishment of the norm of sustainable development in context of climate change, this
analysis will be guided by the literature on the EU as a normative power and the aspect of
norm localization (Manners 2002; Acharya 2004). Here, the question refers to the ideational
power of the EU “to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations” (Manners 2002:
239), i.e. to promote its ideas on climate change policies in a multilateral and bilateral
context. Acharya reflects this process from the perspective of the norm-taker, which means
that he asks about the process of adapting external norms and ideas “to meet local practices”
(Acharya 2004: 251). The question is on which levels such norms are promoted and
localized. The analysis of both the political and societal level is therefore necessary.
Methodologically, the analysis of EU-China relations on climate change issues
consists of two parts. First, a theoretical discussion of ‘new bilateralism’, ‘interregionalism’
in addition to Europe as a normative power and norm localization will lead to an analytical
framework for the exploration of environmental foreign policy making in context of bilateral
inter-regional relations. Constructing an analytical framework out of these concepts and
theories is challenging on several counts:
(a) the major focus of the ‘new bilateralism’ and ‘interregionalism’ debate has been
on trade and economic issues and has not been applied to environmental issues yet,
(b) considering the EU as a normative power leads us to constructivist foreign policy
theory, which deals with norms, values and belief systems. This not only bears
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definitional problems but requires profound cultural knowledge; moreover, the
security agenda still dominates foreign policy analysis so that an analysis of
environmental foreign policy making needs a clarification of environmental norms,
(c) the concept of the EU as a normative power is highly contested and needs further
clarification with regard to environmental issues.
(d) foreign policy analysis of both international and bilateral environmental
cooperation is close to non-existent so that only few academic writings can serve as
reference points.
The major objective of the theoretical part will thus be to work out the main characteristics of
‘new bilateralism’ such as actors, agendas and instruments (e.g. Kiatpongsan 2008), the
sources of climate change policy making, the functions of interregional relations such as
agenda-setting or identity-building (e.g. Rüland 2001), and the role of norms as part of the
constructivist agenda (e.g. Risse 2000; Sedelmaier 2004), including the EU’s role as a
normative power (e.g. Manners 2002) and the perception of this role or reaction by China.
The theoretical part will be followed by an empirical analysis of EU-China relations
with regard to climate change policy. The analysis will be done in three stages:
(a) On a sub-systemic level, the sources of the EU’s and China’s climate change
policy behaviour will be identified. This is crucial to explain the two parties’
motivations for bilateral cooperation in environmental issues. Here, the focus lies in
domestic and societal aspects of climate change policy making.
(b) On a systemic level, the EU and China will be considered as the primary actors in
bilateral relations and their interaction on the bilateral level will be explored.
(c) The analysis will then continue to link the sub-systemic with the systemic level,
thus highlighting the role of societal actors including business in the implementation
of policies decided on at the systemic level.
(d) In a final step, the interplay between bilateral cooperation and the international
system will be analyzed. The challenge is here to work out causalities between the
bilateral and multilateral level.
The research will follow a discourse analytical design. To begin with the research
process, I will explore the relevant discourses regarding EU-China cooperation on climate
change. The discourses will be identified on both the sub-systemic and systemic level, i.e.
discourses on the business and civil society level as well as on the level of EU-China political
relations. The analysis will be based on a document analysis and qualitative interviews. The
study of EU-China relations with regard to climate change will be based on the analysis of
primary and secondary sources, i.e. academic literature to be found in university libraries and
the internet, legal documents, official (government) websites and press releases (such as
http://europa.eu), media releases (official newspapers), websites from societal actors such as
environmental non-governmental organizations or foundations (e.g. Asia-Europe
Foundation), websites and documents from business, documentation of strategic dialogues
and summits (including the Asia-Europe Meeting, ASEM), documentation of the work of
policy and scientific networks (e.g. Green Diplomacy Network). This document analysis will
be complemented by qualitative interviews – narrative and expert interviews -, which are
based on a semi-structured questionnaire to allow for greater flexibility in more or less
informal interview situations. The selection of interviewees will be based on a network
approach.
The methodological tools will be complemented by the method of process tracing.
This helps to understand the causal relationships between different variables over time. The
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analysis starts with the establishment of the EU-China Strategic Partnership in 2005 and
follows the current negotiations on a Post-Kyoto Arrangement until a final agreement is
decided on in Copenhagen 2009. To remain flexible, the period to be analysed might be
expanded.
As the research project is in its early stages, this paper is meant to explore the
theoretical dimension of this research agenda and give a first broad overview of the empirical
part. I will focus on the concepts of new bilateralism and norm localization as a possible
analytical framework for the outlined research project. I will then continue to outline existing
cooperation between the EU and China on climate change policies, identify incentives for
China to strengthen and deepen cooperation with the EU in this respect and to describe
instruments that are or might be important in this cooperation. Possible actors that could act
as norm promoters and norm takers will be worked out.
New Bilateralism – What Is The Concept About?
The concept of new bilateralism was introduced in the 1980s (e.g. Haggard/Cheng 1989) and
has since been discussed under the terms of inter-regionalism (e.g. Rüland 2001) or quasiinterregionalism (e.g. Hänggi 2006). Scholars became interested in the changing nature of
international relations and the emergence of new forms of bilateral cooperation instead of
relying merely on multilateral structures. This observation could specifically be made in the
area of trade and finance. A well-known phenomenon is the boom of bilateral and inter- or
cross-regional free trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the 1990s
(e.g. Dent 2006). Ravenhill (2003) sees new bilateralism as a reaction to the failure of
existing international and regional institutions and the positive effects that could be
established through new forms of bilateralism. The main research question is why states
actively pursue these new forms of bilateral cooperation despite the advantages of
multilateralism that are widely accepted by policy makers. The related question refers to the
short-term and long-term impacts of new bilateralism for the international system.
The main characteristics of new bilateralism can also be derived from the literature on
new regionalism. Rüland (2001) identifies four key features of new regionalism:
•
•
•
•

more diffuse membership,
growing agenda complexity,
development of its own organizational infrastructure,
emergence of new independent actors.

Kiatpongsan (2008) translates these features into new bilateralism by concentrating on
new actors, agendas and instruments. On a government-to-government basis, new actors
particularly come in on the level of track-two diplomacy. Here, corresponding officials,
academics or experts become important players. Furthermore, business and civil society
actors regularly participate in this kind of interaction (ibid.: 23). The traditional agendas of
bilateral relations – economy, security, development – are conceptually modified. With
regard to the economy, for instance, more sensitive issues such as the environment or
agriculture are addressed in bilateral agreements (e.g. Fritz Carrapatoso 2007). The security
agenda now follows a more comprehensive understanding of the security concept, thus
integrating non-conventional security issues including topics such as, for example, the
environment (ibid.: 27; see also Buzan/Weaver/de Wilde 1998; WBGU 2008;
Diehl/Gleditsch 2001). The development agenda has shifted away from the traditional aid
pattern and is now strongly based on issue-linkages. This means that development objectives
are now linked to, for example, trade or security policies (ibid.: 32).
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States or regions decide to establish bilateral relations in addition to multilateral
efforts for many reasons. Smith and Tsatsas (2002:3-9) highlight the following factors
determining bilateral relations:
•
•
•
•
•

Geographical, historical, religious, cultural and trade factors influence the scope and
depth of bilateral relations.
Pragmatism is a key factor, i.e. choosing partners with compatible interests to achieve
shared objectives.
Existing personal ties and regular contact between political actors facilitate
cooperation.
Good personal relations are decisive for the effectiveness of bilateral relations.
Coalition-building is influenced by the existence of traditional alliances and
geographical proximity.

Bilateral relations have always been in the logic of EU policy-making. They have
played a vital role in EU decision-making and are therefore important not only within the EU
but also in its external relations. However, Smith and Tsatsas see “a danger in overemphasizing bilateral initiatives. They may be vital for effective policy-making, but
achieving desired policy outcomes remains the key aim” (ibid.: xiii). In addition to creating
and implementing effective policies, bilateral cooperation frameworks bear the potential to
promote norms, motivate social learning and thus can help to bring about a paradigm shift in
a country’s policy making. Whether an organisation like the EU can act as a normative power
depends on two factors: First, the development of a norm such as sustainable development
needs a strong societal basis for two reasons. On the one hand, such a norm is considered a
legitimate basis for policy-making when it is accepted by a wide range of societal and
political actors. On the other hand, norms are promoted on both a political and societal level.
To avoid contradictory policies and activities, a strong consensus on a norm is important.
Second, the cooperating country must be willing to adopt such a norm. This is the basis for
identifying common interests and effective policy-making. The acceptance and adoption of
external norms does not only have to be by merely imitating but can also happen through the
process of norm localization. This provides a norm like sustainable development with more
legitimacy in the cooperating country and sets a long-term basis for future policy-making.
The main characteristics of the concepts of normative power and norm localization will be
discussed in the following section.
Normative Power Europe – How Norms are Spread and Localized
With his article “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Ian Manners (2002)
started a lively debate on the potential of the European Union to shape ideas and norms both
within and outside Europe. In the tradition of Europe as a civilian power (Maull 1990),
Europe’s power is not seen in the realm of military action. Rather, Europe is considered to
have the ideational power “to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations”
(Manners 2002: 239). The EU has a strong normative basis which guides EU policies and
external relations. Manners identifies five core norms and four minor, although far more
contested, norms. The first ones include peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human
rights. The minor norms refer to social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable
development and good governance (Manners 2002: 242). He continues in his argumentation
by emphasizing the necessity not only to accept but to diffuse these norms in order to speak
of a normative power. There are six factors shaping the process of norm diffusion: contagion,
information, procedures, transference, overt diffusion and cultural filter (Manners 2002: 244245). Contagion refers to unintentional diffusion, meaning that the EU acts as an example of
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successful regional integration. The aspect of information centres upon strategic
communications, while procedures mean the institutionalization of a relationship with a third
party. Transference highlights the diffusion taking place when the EU practices its politics,
e.g. through the exchange of goods. Overt diffusion emphasizes the role of the EU through its
physical presence in a third country. Finally, norm diffusion is shaped by a cultural filter,
which is based on the “interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of
social and political identity” (Manners 2002: 245). The aspect of a cultural filter becomes
crucial in the literature on norm localization rather than norm diffusion. While norm diffusion
seen from a constructivist perspective of socialization is considered as a result of adaptive
behaviour, i.e. that “local practices are made consistent with an external idea”, localization
“describes a process in which external ideas are simultaneously adapted to meet local
practices” (Acharya 2004: 251). Acharya argues in favour of “a dynamic explanation of norm
diffusion that describes how local agents reconstruct foreign norms to ensure the norms fit
with the agents’ cognitive priors and identities” (ibid.: 239). Norm localization emphasizes
the role of domestic actors in determining the “reception of new global norms”, thus focusing
on political, organizational and cultural variables in the specific country or region (ibid.:
243). Localization shows three characteristics: framing, grafting and congruence of ideas.
Framing refers to the creation of issues, particularly through language. Grafting is understood
as associating new norms with pre-existing norms. In a final step, through re-interpretation
and re-representation of foreign norms, these norms are made congruent with prior local
norms. Congruence-building is done by so-called “norm takers” (ibid.: 244). In sum, Acharya
defines localization “as the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and
cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing
significant congruence with local beliefs and practices” (ibid.: 245). Why foreign ideas are
adjusted can be traced back to three factors: strengthening of existing institutions, rational
exclusion of elements of new ideas to preserve the existing social order, enhance the profile
and prestige of local actors and beliefs (ibid.: 246). The willingness or necessity to localize
these foreign ideas can be found in the questioning of existing rules in context of a major
crisis, systemic change, domestic political change in the norm taker or because of an
international or regional demonstration effect (ibid.: 247). There are some conditions why
localization is pursued and some advantages attributed to this process. First, the localization
of foreign norms can improve legitimacy and authority of local actors without challenging
existing social identities. Second, the strength of pre-existing local norms will become
visible. Third, there must be local actors who are both credible and powerful in terms of
shaping the discourse. Finally, the norm-takers have to have a strong sense of identity, i.e.
they are aware of existing values and their uniqueness. (ibid.: 248-249)
The understanding for the process of norm localization becomes crucial when it
comes to the question of how to promote European norms in third countries to facilitate
cooperation. Past and current relations of the EU and member states to China show that
Chinese self-perception and values are key to their commitment in the area of, for instance,
climate change. In addition to taking the Chinese cultural and historical background into
account, the normative role of the EU in climate change issues highly depends on its own
developments in this respect (Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007:448). An ambitious climate change
policy will not only enforce the EU’s leadership in climate protection but being the global
best practice case will increase its credibility.
The EU’s identity-building with regard to climate change was influenced by the
opposing position of the U.S. under the Bush Administration. The more the U.S. opposed the
Kyoto Protocol the more unified the EU got and the more ambitious its policies were
formulated. It further strengthened its self-perception as the leading power in climate issues.
(Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007: 445-446). The EU thus became an attractive partner in the
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worldwide promotion of technology transfer, the exchange of know-how and the
enhancement of global and regional and national strategies for mitigation and adaptation
measures. Leading by example can thus be considered as the strongest power of the EU to
integrate other countries into multilateral efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change. This
means the EU’s major strengths lie in its contribution to norm-spreading and institutionbuilding by using appropriate instruments such as multilateralism, diplomacy, precaution and
the establishment of binding rules through international law-making (Scheipers/Sicurelli
2007: 451-452).
Constructing norms and promoting them does not take place in a vacuum and norms
are not “a given”. From a European perspective, the norms shaping EU policies come from
civil society and political elites (Manners 2002: 251). These norms are then mostly delivered
through transnational and supranational organizations. Business as well has become decisive
in promoting norms through their activities and cooperation with businesses in other
countries. It is therefore likely that the process of norm localization takes place on three
levels: civil society, business and political elites. The question is not only to what extent these
norms are promoted through transnational or bilateral co-operations but also through which
actors and networks this is done. We should therefore ask who acts as a norm promoter from
a European perspective and who are the norm-takers or norm-localizers in China. This means
we have to, first, ask about the sources of norm creation on the European level and, second,
to identify the counterparts for norm localization in China. Finally, we can ask about the
relevance of these forms of cooperation in (a) promoting norms on sustainable development
and climate change in China and (b) the contribution of this alternative ways to
multilateralism in enhancing the global climate change regime.
In the following section, I will discuss the role of the EU as a norm promoter by
outlining the key aspects of its climate change policy. By showing leadership in climate
change policies and instruments, the EU has a best practice case as a solid basis for
promoting the norm of sustainable development. This will be followed by a brief introduction
into China's environmental problems as a trigger for an intensified cooperation with foreign
partners. In a subsequent step, I will outline the major cooperation frameworks between
China and the EU on the systemic level and continue with some examples of other
institutional cooperation such as between China and the European Environment Agency
(EEA) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). A first overview will be given on
cooperation on the sub-systemic level. In the research project, cooperation between business
actors and civil society actors will be analysed. In this paper, the focus will however be on
civil society.
Showing Leadership: The EU Policy on Climate Change
In 2008, the European Parliament and Council agreed on a “Climate Action and Renewable
Energy Package”, which was drafted by the European Commission. In this package, the
member states re-emphasized their commitment to the mitigation of and the adaptation to
climate change. The following goals were set out (European Commission 2009, 2009a,
2009b):
•

Cutting emissions to at least 20 per cent by 2020 compared to levels in 1990; member
states agreed to reduce emissions to 30 per cent if other developed countries agreed on
comparable reductions in a Post-Kyoto agreement. The instrument to be used is the
Emission Trading System (ETS). This instrument, which is in effect since 2005, has
to be strengthened. It is “the largest multi-country, multi-sector Greenhouse Gas
Emission Trading System world-wide” (European Commission 2009c).
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•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Cutting emissions of sectors excluded from the ETS (transport, agriculture, waste and
households) to 10 per cent compared to the level in 2005 by 2020. This has to be done
through binding national targets. With regard to transport, the aviation sector will be
integrated into the ETS from 2012 onwards. Furthermore, CO2 emissions from new
cars have to be reduced to an average of 130g per km.
Increasing energy use of renewable energy to 20 per cent by 2020. Having a 10 per
cent share for sustainably produced biofuels and other renewable fuels in transport.
Cutting energy consumption to 20 per cent by 2020 through improving energy
efficiency.
Promoting the development and safe use of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)
technology.
Increasing research and development in environment, energy and transport to further
enhance and promote clean technologies and to widen the understanding of climate
change and its impacts.
Reducing air pollution and health costs.
Increasing employment through the support and development of eco-industries.

The EU is a strong promoter of the norm of sustainable development, which becomes
visible in its efforts to tackle climate change. The EU has developed a leading position in the
global climate change regime and acts as a best-practice example with regard to its emission
trading system and the development of new technologies. The ambitious goals with regard to
CO2 emissions and the integration of further economic sectors into the ETS are promoted on
an international level. Nevertheless, in order to remain competitive on the global market, the
EU requires other developed countries to show similar efforts and wants developing countries
like China to agree on binding rules with regard to emission reductions. To underline the
EU’s own commitment to global climate protection, it would further increase its own
emission targets.
The EU has shown that climate protection can be economically beneficial through the
development of new industries and the creation of new jobs in addition to the implementation
of a successful emission trading scheme, which has not created significant economic
downturns. Furthermore, the EU enlargement process has illustrated that economic
development and environmental protection can be integrated. European environmental
standards had to be adopted and implemented by the new member states. To meet future
challenges in innovation, the EU opted for both push- and pull-strategies. The pull-strategies
include the development of a market value for greenhouse gases and the phasing out of
environmentally harmful subsidies. Moreover, the development and implementation of
market-based instruments should be facilitated. The push-strategies are composed of an
increase in financial support for innovative research and the establishment of public-privatepartnerships, especially to foster international cooperation (European Commission 2005).
Speaking in Manners’ terms: the EU promotes its norms through contagion, which
means that the EU acts as a successful example for the development of a sound climate
change policy that integrates economic and environmental policies to fight global warming.
The EU is however criticized for not fully using its potential through complex internal
negotiations (Gupta/Ringius 2001). Nevertheless, many countries consider the EU as a best
practice case. This picture is further promoted by the EU itself through international
cooperation, which the example of the EU-China relations on climate change shows. To
strengthen cooperation with a country like China, the EU seeks to give economic incentives,
to improve information exchange and communication structures, but a successful cooperation
also depends on China’s willingness to seriously participate in this. Such willingness is
further pushed through external factors like serious environmental degradation in China. This
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reality has been accepted by the Chinese government, which facilitates international
cooperation in this respect and also increases the likeliness of the Chinese government and
society to adopt and localize the norm of sustainable development. The next section will
briefly outline China’s most urgent environmental problems, which are also all related to
global warming.
Environmental Problems in China: A Catalyst for Cooperation?
Environmental problems in China are manifold and now bear the potential for social unrest
on a national level and diplomatic conflicts on an international level. In addition to (unequal)
economic growth and a huge population, the lack of political transparency and the
inequalities in the enforcement of environmental policies put further stress on the Chinese
environment (Edmonds 2008: 271, 295). The major environmental challenges that could be
identified for China are deforestation, water scarcity, desertification, flooding, soil erosion,
glacial retreat, population growth and pollution (Economy 2005: 204-205; Edmonds 2008:
271). All these problems are and will be intensified by climate change, which the IPCC report
clearly illustrated with regard to China (IPCC 2007). In 2008, the Chinese government
reacted to climate change issues and recently published its „White Paper: China's policies and
actions on climate change“ (Chinese Central Government 2009), in which they point out the
situation and impacts, develop strategies and objectives for addressing climate change and
laid out policies and actions decelerate and adapt to climate change. The government also
emphasizes the importance of enhancing public awareness and the necessity to cooperate
internationally.
The urgency of China's environmental problems including those caused and
intensified by climate change was underlined by a World Bank report in 2007. In this report,
the World Bank states that even though economic development has positively impacted on
the environment in terms of technology improvements, a changing industrial structure in
terms of energy efficiency and pollution control and general pollution control policies, the
environmental problems are pressing and cause a lot of costs. Increasing health problems,
crop and material damage through air and water pollution, deterioration of the water problem
would cost the Chinese government billions of dollars per year (World Bank 2007). China is
therefore interested in cooperation with both international institutions and other countries to
tackle its environmental problems. China has received strong assistance from the World
Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and
Japan. They helped China in developing and implementing environmental protection work
such as monitoring systems, developing a legal system and analyzing energy alternatives
(Economy 2005: 209-210). Nevertheless, economic growth should not be compromised for
the sake of environmental protection. The best case scenario would therefore be to combine
continuing growth, democracy and environmental protection. The reality however shows a
different picture. This has once again become clear in the ongoing negotiation process of the
Post-Kyoto-Protocol. To assure China’s participation in a global climate change regime, not
only financial and economic incentives given by other countries and international institutions
to help China develop a “greener” economic structure are essential. Moreover, a fundamental
change in values is required (Economy 2005: 213). It is therefore necessary that the major
industrialized and polluting countries lead by example and actively contribute to the design of
“China’s environmental future” (Economy 2005: 214).
Here, the cooperation with the EU can become crucial. First, the EU has a strong
history in environmental protection and has developed expertise in instruments to combat
climate change. Second, the EU can act as a norm promoter with regard to sustainable
development and help to raise public awareness in China about environmental and climate
issues. Third, the EU has various possibilities to promote these norms – either through its
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official ways or through its member states. Finally, many actors including civil society and
business are and can be involved in fostering environmental and climate protection. Through
their work on the ground, it can be assumed that their assessment of potential cooperation
frameworks is more realistic and based on practical experience.
‘New Bilateralism’ to Fight Global Warming? The EU-China Relations on Climate
Change
Norm diffusion is facilitated through the establishment of strategic communications and the
institutionalization of bilateral relations, which then further supports this diffusion process
through concrete actions, i.e. transference. As I do not assume that the Chinese government
and society simply imitates and adopts the norm of sustainable development as stated by the
literature on norm diffusion, I argue that these are also the processes that trigger the process
of norm localization as interaction is a prerequisite for this.
A starting point for the analysis of EU-China relations on climate change is the “EU
and China Partnership on Climate Change”, which was established between the two parties in
September 2005 (European Commission 2005a). In the “Joint Declaration on Climate Change
between China and the European Union”, the EU and China set the agenda for future
cooperation on climate issues. Both parties seek to strengthen cooperation on climate change
policies through dialogue, practical co-operation in the fields of development, deployment
and transfer of clean technologies and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
Furthermore, more cooperation is sought on research and analysis on the consequences of
climate change in addition to enhanced cooperation on capacity building and strengthening of
institutions through, e.g. raising public awareness and environmental education and training.
In parallel, the two parties agreed on “The China-EU Action Plan on Clean Coal” and “The
China-EU Action Plan on Industrial Co-operation on Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energies”. The EU-China Rolling Work Plan (RWP) on Climate Change, which the two
parties agreed on in October 2006, serves as the major reference document in which they set
the agenda for further cooperation. The following forms of cooperation have been decided on
(European Commission 2006):
•
•

•

EU-China summit: ensuring high-level political follow-up and where necessary
provide further guidance.
Bilateral Consultation Mechanism: ensuring contacts at working level, involving
representatives from the Chinese Ministries concerned and the EU Troika (current and
future EU Presidency and Commission) to provide broader political coordination and
guidance for the implementation of the Partnership and strengthen their dialogue on
climate change policies and exchange views on key issues in the climate change
negotiations. This Mechanism shall meet at least once and where necessary twice
every year.
Direct cooperation between the EU environment counsellors group and relevant
Chinese ministries: the EU environment counsellors group will ensure coordination
between EU Member States and day to day follow-up of the Partnership.

In this document, the importance of bilateral sectoral cooperation under specifically
framed bilateral mechanisms was highlighted. I could be assumed that a broader cooperation
including the integration of not only political actors but also business and societal actors was
aspired to gather experts in their fields in order to establish effective cooperation in specific
areas. This was further emphasized through the recognition of priority areas (PA) in which
practical cooperation becomes crucial (European Commission 2006):
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Energy efficiency and energy conservation;
New and renewable energy;
Clean coal technologies and carbon dioxide capture and storage for near-zero
emissions power generation
Methane recovery and use
Hydrogen energy and fuel cells
Power generation, transmission and distribution
Clean Development Mechanism and other market-based instruments such as
Emissions Trading Schemes
Impacts of and adaptation to climate change
Capacity building, strengthening institutions and raising public awareness.

Based on this work plan, the following joint projects are currently listed on the
European Commission’s website (European Commission 2009):
•

•

•

•

EU-China CDM Facilitation Project to strengthen the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) as a central pillar of sustainable development in China. The establishment and
improvement of China’s policy and regulatory frameworks in addition to quality
management of the CDM process will be the key areas of cooperation.
Carbon Capture and Storage (“Zero-Emission” Demonstration Plant) to promote
“practical cooperation on the development, deployment and transfer of clean fossil
fuels technologies, to improve energy efficiency and to achieve a low carbon
economy”. There are currently two feasibility studies on CCS (Carbon Dioxide
Capture and Storage) in process. First, the Near Zero Emission Coal (NZEC) project
and the COACH project (Cooperation Action with CCS China-EU)2. These projects
are supported by the STRACO2-project (Support to Regulatory Activities for Carbon
Capture and Storage). The activities will be continued in a phase two and three, which
will, first, specifically focus on site-specific design and feasibility studies, and,
second, focus on the construction and operation of a demonstration plant with CCS
technology.
The EU-China Energy and Environment Programme (EEP) seeks to promote
sustainable energy use and thus to improve the environmental and health conditions in
China.
There are regular meetings under the Bilateral Consultation Mechanisms, the EUChina NZEC Steering Committee, annual summits, official visits, study visits, joint
workshops and expositions.

Under the umbrella of the European Environment Agency (EEA), several smaller
projects have been pursued such as the China (Kunming) Environmental Protection and
Renewable Energy Exposition, the China Europa 2009 or the China Carbon Trade Summit
20093. This trade summit is an interesting institution as it seeks to serve as a networking
arena for senior executives, tradesmen and environment and technique expert to discuss
issues relevant for carbon industry. China has become an important player in the CDM
market, now covering 51 per cent of the global CDM trading market. China is therefore an
2

For further information on these programmes see NZEC, http://www.nzec.info and COACH, http://www.co2coach.com (07.06.2009).
3
For further information on these events see China (Kunming) Environmental Protection and Renewable
Energy
Exposition,
http://technologies.ew.eea.europa.eu/Events/eve204704;
China
Europa
2009,
http://www.eea.europa.eu/events/china-europa
or
the
China
Carbon
Trade
Summit
2009,
http://ccts.cbichina.com/english.html (07.06.2009).
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attractive partner for foreign investment to reduce carbon emissions. This is a good example
to illustrate business interest climate change policy.
At the 10th China-EU Summit in 2007, political leaders decided on the establishment
of a China-EU Clean Energy Centre. The objective is to strengthen cooperation on energy
efficiency and on exploring new clean technologies2. The commitment to combat climate
change through joint projects was reaffirmed at the 11th EU-China Summit in 2009. In
context of the summit in 2007, the European Investment Bank (EIB) considered to offer
China a EUR 500 million framework loan, the China Climate Change Framework Loan
(CCCFL) to invest in projects combating climate change (Presidency of the European Union
2007). This loan now provides China with a total of EUR 220 million that will assist the
Chinese government in investing in projects helping to mitigate climate change. The funding
of projects includes forestation programmes, the construction of wind farms and energy
efficiency and pollution reduction. These projects shall all be registered under the Clean
Development Mechanism (European Union 2009d).
The general and by far not exhaustive illustration of EU-China cooperation on climate
change shows that the emphasis is put on the transfer of technology and know-how through
joint research projects, practical cooperation and investment programmes. The political
framework is set and developed through regular dialogue and bilateral consultation
mechanisms and high-level summits, which further emphasize both parties’ commitment to
this process. The projects also meet strong business interests such as in the carbon market,
clean energy technology and renewable energies. The EU thus integrates China into the
global combat of climate change through financial and economic incentives, which are in the
end beneficial to both sides. The question remains whether this rather technical and economic
cooperation also leads to a re-thinking about the relationship between economic development
and environmental protection, i.e. following the path of sustainable development rather than
treating the economic and ecological sphere separately. This leads us back to the initial
question of the EU as normative power acting through various channels on the systemic and
sub-systemic level. So far, I have briefly outlined cooperation that primarily takes place on
the systemic level between the EU and China. The illustration of the EEA's activities
emphasized the role of business in promoting climate protection measures. In addition to the
political and business level of cooperation, there is also civil society cooperation on climate
change issues. Under the framework of new bilateralism, the research agenda of this project
is to analyze the diverse actors, agendas and instruments. In the following section, I will give
a first overview of some civil society cooperation frameworks.
Civil Society: Actors, Agendas and Instruments
A first entrance point for the exploration of EU-China civil society relations is the EU-China
Civil Society Forum. As stated on the forum's website, the main objective is „to foster the
development of relations between the EU, its members and China and to ensure that their
relations promote social justice, contribute to the protection of the environment and
strengthen human rights“ (EU-China Civil Society Forum 2009). To achieve this goal, the
forum wants to enable informed public debate, assist political institutions within the EU and
its member states in building relations to China based on principals like social and ecological
justice and human rights, ensure the maintenance of labour and environmental standards in
business activities and to increase cooperation between and among civil society groups in the
context of EU-China relations. This network is run by civil society organizations from
Germany, Austria, France and Belgium. Cooperation partners in China differ depending on
the topic. With regard to the environment, the following organizations are listed:
•

Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge (Kunming, China)
264

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

CANGO-China Association for NGO Cooperation (Beijing, China)
Roots&Shoots (Beijing, China)
Green Watershed (Kunming, China)
Green Stone (Nanjing, China)
Animal Asia Foundation (Hong Kong, China)
The Green Volunteer League of Chongqing (Chongqing, China)
Green Earth Volunteers (Beijing, China)
Xinjiang Conservation Fund (Beijing, China)
Moving Mountains (Beijing, China)

If we take a closer look at the Chinese organizations listed, the most interesting one
with regard to the networking aspect is CANGO. The aim of CANGO is to provide a
platform for the exchange of information and experience for Chinese NGOs working on
poverty alleviation, environmental protection and social development. CANGO also seeks to
“broaden corporative channels between CANGO and government, business, and research
institutes” and also acts “as an intermediary agency and partners with foreign NGOs, bilateral
and multilateral organizations and Chinese NGOs to enhance fundraising, provision of
technical support and capacity building of grassroots NGOs in China” (CANGO 2009). In
addition to various European-based organizations and institutes (and other international and
foreign organizations and institutions), the European Commission is part of the partners and
donors of CANGO, which means that there is a close affiliation from the EU to this network.
The agendas of these civil society organizations and networks are diverse. Their role
is to promote a better understanding for environmental issues including environmental
protection, conservation and climate change. They are diverse in their constitution and
missions but they share similar goals, namely to protect the environment on a local, national
and global level. As most of the NGO umbrella organizations, CANGO has the potential to
support exchange of the various existing environmental NGOs in China and link them with
foreign NGOs and transnational networks in addition to providing them access to government
and business actors to strengthen their lobbying capacities. A crucial role of NGOs is also
public information and education. A wider network can assist them in professionalizing in
public relations and information management. NGOs and other civil society groups can
therefore act as norm takers as they are rooted in their society and are accustomed with its
values and ideas so that external norms can be localized. To what extent this can happen and
what the EU can contribute in this respect has to be further analyzed on the basis of personal
interviews.
Conclusion
EU-China relations can significantly contribute to a strengthening of the global climate
change regime beyond international negotiations under the UNFCCC. As it is difficult to
integrate a country like China into an international agreement with binding regulations on
emission reductions, the EU as a best practice example for the integration of economic and
environmental policies with regard to climate change can act as a normative power. This
means, the EU can first show leadership in the field of climate change policy and illustrate
how significant emission reductions are possible without challenging high economic
performance. Second, the EU can assist China in developing and deploying new clean
technologies and help to direct its economic growth in a sustainable way. And, third, by
promoting its norm of sustainable development (and climate protection being part of it)
through the its activities and the institutionalization of EU-Chinese relations, the EU can help
in raising awareness for climate change issues and to show ways in dealing with this problem.
The potential for a paradigm shift in Chinese policies and thinking increases the more
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interaction there is between European and Chinese actors on a political, business and civil
society level. It is however more probable that the Chinese government and society localize
the norm of sustainable development than merely imitating and adopting European norms
without embedding them into local traditions. If a norm is localized, it will be more accepted
within politics and society. It is therefore not only more enduring but also more likely to
bring about a cognitive shift. If this happens, China’s participation in multilateral negotiations
on climate change policy will positively alter, which will be beneficial for the promotion of a
global climate change regime. That such bilateral cooperation has the potential to act in the
way of norm diffusion or norm localization and to act as a catalyst for further commitment on
the multilateral level could already have been observed during the pre-negotiations in Bali
2007, when China accepted to talk about quantitative reduction goals in upcoming
negotiations. Copenhagen 2009 will show how strong this commitment finally is and which
are the influential factors in getting a turning point in global climate change policy-making.
The role of “new bilateralism” for the strengthening of a global climate change regime
in addition to the questions of how Europe can act as a normative power and to what extent
the norm of sustainable development in the context of climate change is localized in China on
the political, business and civil society level will be further analyzed in this research project.
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Reverse Positions: Can China be The Winner in Sino-EU’s Post-Kyoto Negotiations of
Combating Climate Change?
Yu Qiao1
Introduction
This study examines the Sino-EU’s post-Kyoto negotiations for combating climate change
from 2007 to 2008, and answers the question why the EU could not lead China to adopt the
post-Kyoto quantitative reduction targets on greenhouse gases by exploring the
characteristics of China’s climate negotiation strategy.
This study argues that until the end of 2008, the reason that the “tug of war” between
China and the EU did not result in any new perspectives or feasible outcomes is due to
China’s reluctance of adopting the post-Kyoto quantitative reduction target and the EU’s lack
of leadership. Both China and the EU wanted to gain as much as possible from the other side
through minimal effort.
This study also argues that since the beginning of 2007, in the Sino-EU’s post-Kyoto
negotiations, the Chinese government reversed its passive position gradually and reached its
objectives, which were to refuse binding quantitative objectives, keep a responsible
stakeholder image, and gain international support, which included funding and technology
transfers, by using its advance and retreat strategy. On the other hand, the EU’s role in the
negotiations has switched gradually from leading to waiting and seeing.
Chapter I of this study introduces how China has been involved in the post-Kyoto
negotiations. Chapters II, III, IV analyze China’s advance and retreat negotiation strategy.
The last chapter concludes this study.
1. China’s involvement in post-Kyoto climate change negotiations
1.1 Rising emissions and China’s position in the 1980s and 1990s
China is the largest emitter in the world of greenhouse gases after the United States. China’s
booming industry and its corresponding burst in energy consumption and rapid urbanization
are largely responsible for its rapidly climbing greenhouse gas emissions.
Figure 1: China’s Energy consumption by source (Quadrillion Btu)

Source: Energy Information Administration, 2007
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Figure 2: Energy (1000 BTU) per unit of GDP, (1980=100)

Source: Energy Information Administration World Energy Outlook

Since the beginning of international negotiations on climate change in the 1980s,
China has consistently emphasized that developed nations must be held responsible for past
greenhouse gas emissions. When the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997, China officially
stated that it would not consider limiting greenhouse gas emissions until it reached a
“medium level of development” which would be reached around the middle of the twentyfirst century.
Years have gone by; the Chinese government has been more flexible in participating
in international efforts to mitigate climate change. This flexibility has included participating
in the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism, and cooperating on the
technological development of renewable energies, as well as on carbon capture and storage.
Beijing saw climate change negotiations as an integral part of its foreign policy, and a terrain
on which it, and other developing countries, would need to protect development rights and
opportunities.
After the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997, the Chinese government shifted
responsibility for climate change policy from the China Meteorological Administration
(CMA), which was given the responsibility of advising the government on policy options
since the 1980s, to the more powerful National Development and Reform Commission. The
move indicated a shift in perspective: for China, climate change had become predominantly a
development issue.
1.2. The EU Prepared for the Post-Kyoto Negotiations
The EU is a world leader in combating climate change. It is setting an example with tough
objectives on cutting energy use and emissions within the EU.
The EU believes that the present commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change are only the first step in
addressing the climate change threat, and that the necessary cuts in global emissions can be
achieved only if all countries contribute their fair share according to their responsibilities and
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capacity.2 Therefore, the EU is leading the world in preparing post-Kyoto negotiations that
are under way to conclude a global agreement at the UN climate change conference in
Copenhagen for the period after 2012.“To keep global warming to tolerable levels we need
an ambitious new international agreement to cut greenhouse gas emissions, and we need to
reach it urgently so there will be no gap when the Kyoto targets expire in 2012.”3
After the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Kyoto Protocol, the EU realized that without
the effort of developing and emerging countries, it would be extremely difficult to combat
climate change. Therefore, the EU called for developing countries to join the industrialized
countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As the biggest developing country in the world,
China’s action and effort to reduce greenhouse gases was necessary for the EU. The EU then
set up its next objective which was involving China in the post-Kyoto negotiations.
1.3. China Becomes Involved in Post-Kyoto Climate Change Negotiations
With a view to modernizing Sino-EU bilateral relations, under the leadership of the EU’s
ambitious plan of combating climate change, China became involved in the Sino-EU postKyoto climate change negotiations.
Agreeing on the growing importance of Sino-EU relations, in September 2005, both
sides highlighted the need to move towards early negotiations on a new Sino-EU framework
agreement to reflect the full breadth and depth of the strategic partnership between China and
the EU. British Prime Minister and acting President of the Council of the EU, Tony Blair,
said, “[…] the strategic partnership between China and the European Union is of immense
importance, not just in terms of trade and the economy, but also in terms of our cooperation
in all the major political issues the world faces” when he attended the 8th EU-China summit
in Beijing with Chinese President Hu Jintao.4
After several presidential- and ministerial-level meetings, in October 2006, the
Commission adopted a communication “China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities”.
This document covers all fields of bilateral relations. In terms of energy and climate change,
it encourages Beijing to be a responsible energy partner, stresses in particular the importance
of the EU’s encouraging China to reduce the growth of its energy demand, increase its energy
efficiency, use renewable energy and clean technology. Moreover, this document claims that
both parties must also enhance their cooperation to meet their shares responsibilities under
the Kyoto Protocol.5 In the beginning of 2007 the EU sent a group to persuade China to
cooperate more.
China then became involved into the actions of fighting climate change with
cooperation of the EU in a positive way.
2. Showing Her Good Intentions
2.1. Devotion inside the EU Increases Quickly
Inside the EU, combating climate change was taken very seriously. In the first half of 2007
Germany was in charge of the Council’s Presidency. The energy/climate problem was the
“most important subject” on the Council’s environmental agenda.
2

Europa-the European Union on-line, (2009).The EU’s contribution to shaping the future global climate change
regime. Web site: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/future_action.htm
3
Agence Europe. (2006, December). Leading role of EU in fight against climate change is more necessary than
ever, Bulletin Quotidien Europe No.9331, 9.
4
Agence Europe. (2005, September). Signing of several agreements at EU-China Summit demonstrates desire to
boost strategic partnership, Bulletin Quotidien Europe No.9020, 4.
5
Agence Europe. (2006, October). Commission adopts new strategy to modernize EU’s economic and political
relations with Beijing, Bulletin Quotidien Europe No.9293, 7.
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In February, the European Parliament also sent a strong message to the EU. It was: in
order to reach the international target subscribed to by the EU- to reduce the average rise in
global temperature to 2°C compared to the pre-industrial era- a minimum 30% reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions was needed in industrialized countries in the run-up to 2020 to
reach 80% reduction by 2050. And the EU must not imagine that international talks on the
post-2012 period could fail or aim at a unilateral reduction in emissions targets.6
After the German Council’s Presidency made an integrated energy and climate
strategy an absolute priority in the fight against climate change, in Brussels on 9 March, the
heads of state of the 27 EU member states agreed to a unilateral, binding 20% reduction in
EU emissions.7 Pointing out the need to take immediate action to limit the increase in the
average temperature of the surface of the planet, the EU expressed the need for effort from
both developed and developing countries.
2.2. The EU’s Challenge of Persuading Beijing
As a developing country ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, China did not undertake to make any
quantified reduction in its emissions. The European Commission reiterated the importance of
the fight against climate change by saying in press that “Energy security and climate change
are priorities for the EU in 2007. Neither can be effectively addressed without China”. 8
Therefore, persuading Beijing to join the efforts of the developed countries in the framework
of a global binding agreement was a massive challenge for the Union.
In January 2007, negotiations on a new Sino-EU partnership and cooperation
framework agreement had officially begun. External Relations Commissioner Benita FerreroWaldner and Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing held a first round of talks. During these
talks, Ms Ferrero-Waldner tried to persuade Beijing to improve energy efficiency and reduce
Chinese greenhouse gas emissions. 9 The Union’s goal was quite clear. It wished to win
Beijing over to its cause to combat climate change. This challenge was at the heart of
European foreign policy.
Calling for urgent action to reduce gas emissions, at the end of March 2007, industry
and enterprise commissioner Günter Verheugen went to China to discuss the bilateral
economy and energy cooperation issues. The question of energy efficiency was also a key
focus of the talks, as the Union sought to propose to its partner that it shared its experience in
this field.10
In the beginning of April, Stavros Dimas, European Commissioner for the
Environment, stressed that if the group of industrialized countries was to aim for a reduction
of 30% in its greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, the developing countries should also make
efforts… the emerging countries must agree on binding reduction objectives.11
As an emerging economy, facing increasing pressure from the EU and the worsening
climate situation, China realized the necessity of reducing greenhouse gases and the
importance of joining the binding reduction objectives. However, fearing that any effort in
6
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this direction would hinder its economic growth, and with its lack of funds and technology,
China was pushed to make a choice.
2.3 Beijing Shows Her Intensions of Taking Global Warming Seriously
Wary of maintaining the dynamism and sustainability of the Chinese economy which was a
huge consumer of hydrocarbons, the Beijing authorities were reluctant to adopt binding
objectives on limiting emissions. Facing the EU’s pressure, China had made her choice,
which was earning time by showing her intensions of taking global warming seriously, while
making limited actual effort.
In January, when the External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner
visited China, she was pleased to point out that China is “taking global warming seriously”.
As Beijing kept showing her difficulties in joining the binding reduction objectives, Ms
Waldner said, “[…] for the moment, we are not going that far. We understand China regards
herself as a developing country”. 12 Beijing sent the Europeans back home, and with good
intentions earned time to develop and prepare for the bigger pressure, which came several
months later.
The climate negotiation at this stage was part of the negotiations of redefining China
and EU bilateral relations, which meant that the negotiations were influenced by other
political economy negotiations, making it difficult sometimes for the EU to exercise its
leadership effectively.
In the EU/China ministerial meeting in Hamburg, the head of German diplomacy and
acting president of the Council, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and the Commissioner for External
Relations, Benital Ferrero-Waldner, called on China to continue to open up its markets, and
expressed their wish for China to adopt the post-Kyoto quantitative reduction targets on
greenhouse gases.
The Chinese said they shared the European’s priorities on climate change and the
environment, but they argued for a fair balance between environmental considerations and
development demands. The Chinese minister for foreign affairs stressed: "[…] the current
status of climate change is not the doing of the developing countries”. He continued to point
out that his country had set itself targets on controlling growth in greenhouse gas emissions
and reducing energy consumption per capita by 20% between 2006 and 2010. The minister
added: “We need to take note of what China has achieved. Naturally, we want to have an
exchange of views on how we can do better”.13
However, the EU needed China to open up its markets to reduce trade deficits,
which was estimated to have risen to €130bn in 2006. And since the EU wanted her demands
in trade to be fulfilled, it could not push Beijing too much in the climate domain. China’s
attitude towards the climate negotiations therefore was considered to be on the right track.
Diplomats in Hamburg had to accept that they had failed to convince the Chinese authorities
of joining them in a commitment to reduce CO2 emissions by 30% as part of the post-Kyoto
international agreement.14
3. Asking for Funding and Technology from the EU
China saw the climate change negotiations not only as a way to protect the environment, but
also as a good way to gain funding and technology to prepare for future reduction and to
12
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catch up with the industrialized countries. 15 To reach this goal, Beijing again used its
advance and retreat strategy: first it refused the EU’s requirements by highlighting and
upholding the “common but differentiated responsibility”. Then China retreated by showing
the EU its domestic reduction target to let the EU understand its will of protecting the
environment and the difficulty of lacking funds and technology.
By using this strategy, Beijing not only conveyed its message well, but also handed
her own funding and technology problems to the EU successfully. Beijing turned on the
pressure that came from the EU back to the EU to get its help, and if Beijing’s requests were
refused, then it would be a good excuse to avoid taking responsibility for not signing the
binding target which was the EU’s requirement. In this way, China could maintain a positive
image internationally. Therefore, the problem was kicked into the EU’s field.
3.1. The “Common but Differentiated Responsibility” Principle
Launching the widest possible negotiation process in Bali in order to strike agreement in
2009 on a global post-Kyoto system for combating climate change had been the main thrust
of the highly ambitious negotiation mandate in October 2007. The mandate wanted binding
commitments from all industrialized countries that they would cut their greenhouse gas
emissions by around 30% by 2020 on the 1990 figures; a contribution from emerging
economies and developing countries that was adapted to match their responsibilities and
capacities. The EU was strongly committed to leading the post-Kyoto negotiations and to
leading the climate change battle.16
Preparing for the upcoming Bali conference, the EU expressed the urgent need of
turning words into actions and of finding an over-arching, international and binding solution,
hoping to convince not only the U.S., but also the emerging countries to find a binding
solution to the climate problem.17
On the other hand, China saw this kind of forum as a very good chance to let her
voice be heard, to let her difficulties be understood, to have other emerging countries share
the same view, and if possible to change her passive position in the climate negotiations.
Beijing then decided to use its advance and retreat strategy again to win the EU’s support of
funding and technology.
Speaking for China, Ronglai Zhong from China’s representation office to the EU said
common but differentiated responsibilities had to be decided at the global level, which would
introduce a universal mechanism for the transfer of clean energy that adding to the
Millennium Development goals climate targets for sustainable development policies. Trying
to sound more cooperative, Mr. Zhong then stressed that China had already been hugely
successful in combating climate change and pledged to continue restructuring its economy in
order to promote green technology and cut CO2 emissions. He then tried to impress the other
countries by saying that his country would reach the 10% target for renewable energy in 2012
and 16% in 2020.18
Soon the strategy proved to be working; Beijing had its voice heard in respect of the
common but differentiated principle. Later, the European Parliament’s temporary committee
on climate change outlined a wish-list of ingredients to ensure success at the Bali conference.
15
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In the ingredients, the EU asked for effort from emerging economies through making fair and
proportionate targets.19 In defending its firm position given by the adoption of the ingredients,
the EU Environmental Commissioner Stavros Dimas said developing countries had to be
helped to play their role, and he added that new funding sources had to be found for the
negotiation process.20
As time passed, the EU noticed that by leading China to join the climate change
battle it needed to win the negotiations, and to win the negotiations, it needed to understand
China’s position first. After outlining its own position in the Bali conference, the EU sent a
delegation to China to understand hers.
3.2. Negotiations for Funding and Technology
In the hope of promoting a consensus between industrialized and developing countries on the
modalities for a post-Kyoto agreement, in the beginning of November 2008, Guido Sacconi,
the chairman of the parliamentary temporary committee, and his delegation visited Beijing.
At the meeting, Sacconi pointed out that “As the most populous country in the world and a
fast growing economy, China certainly has an important role to play”. 21 Karl-Heinz Florenz,
the temporary committee reporter added: “Establishing a new international climate change
regime after the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 will only be possible if countries like
China or India are part of such an agreement… We would like to learn more about what
China is doing in the area of climate change and to better understand the Chinese position” on
this issue.22
Beijing had sensed the EU’s willingness to help developing countries with funds and
technology since the end of October 2007, and decided to make good use of its willingness.
Therefore, the Chinese delegation expressed that Beijing was very committed in the fight
against climate change and ready to engage in the area of emissions reductions, and energyefficiency. At the same time, the Chinese acknowledged the importance of cooperating with
industrialized countries on technology transfer, as well as the need for financial assistance in
this field.23
Beijing’s efforts in showing their intention of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and
convincing the EU to provide funds and technology brought rewards. The EU was happy to
learn that “the Chinese authorities are adopting and implementing legislation to successfully
start the fight against climate change”. And Karl-Heinz Florenz said that he was convinced
that China would be a close and key partner of the EU in the negotiations for a post-2012
agreement.24 Soon the EU claimed that industrialized countries had a moral obligation to help
developing countries. In Strasbourg on 15 November, the EU set out its position, which it
would recommend for the EU’s strategy at the upcoming Bali conference. According to this
position, the EU planned to find instruments, financial and other, for clean development and

19
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technology transfer and deployment, including further development of the Clean
Development Mechanism for developing countries.25
At the end of November 2007, the tenth China-EU Summit was held in Beijing, and
premier Wen Jiabao of China attended the meeting with the President of the European
Council, Prime Minister Jose Socrates of the Portuguese Republic, and the President of the
European Commission, Mr. Jose Manuel Barrose. 26
The two sides reiterated, in accordance with their common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities, the need for developed countries to continue to
take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas emissions beyond 2012 and to assist developing
countries in enhancing their contributions to addressing climate change. Leaders emphasized
the importance of a post-2012 agreement to help within the context of the UNFCCC and the
Kyoto Protocol to make clean technologies accessible and affordable to developing countries
by technology transfer, deployment, and dissemination as well as the importance of
strengthening the global carbon market and intensifying cooperation on adaptation to the
increasing adverse impacts of climate change. Leaders witnessed the signing of a 500 million
euro framework loan to the People’s Republic of China from the European Investment Bank
to support projects that contribute to combating climate change.27
Beijing’s advance and retreat strategy worked again. Predicting that the EU needed to
exercise leadership in the negotiations and was willing to convince developing countries by
providing funds and technology, Chinese authorities took the opportunity and pushed the EU
like a boat downstream. Not only gaining the understanding of her insistence of respecting
the Kyoto Protocol framework and the common but differentiated principle, China also won
some limited investment and a promise of technology transfer even before the negotiations of
Bali conference. This joint statement also influenced the EU’s view of helping developing
countries in negotiations at the Bali conference. Beijing therefore became an example of
emerging countries facing similar pressure from the EU.
On the other hand, the EU was trying to lead the whole world to fight the climate
change battle in a bad situation. In the Bali conference negotiations, the United States, the
only industrialized country not yet to ratify the 10-year-old Kyoto Protocol, was still refusing
to hear of any specific objectives for the reduction of its greenhouse gas emissions. The large
emerging countries such as India and China, for their part, continued to take the view that it
was up to the industrialized countries to lead by example, if they wanted the less
industrialized countries to commit in turn. Facing this difficult situation, on 12 December,
Ban Ki-Moon, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, urged the ministers to obtain a
“breakthrough”, unless they wanted to be deficient in their duties. “The fate of the future
generations depends on this”, he warned.28The EU therefore pleaded for the industrialized
countries to take the measures necessary to gain the confidence of the developing countries.
Stavros Dimas, European Commissioner for the Environment, pointing out the importance of
efforts of developing countries stated “[…] the developed countries have both a moral
obligation and the resources required to take the lead in reduction efforts.” A member of the
delegation to Bali, Alejo Vidal Quadras said that “[…] the developing countries fear that
25

Agence Europe. (2007, November). EU negotiating mandate for Bali should focus on halving global
emissions by 2050- industrialized countries have moral obligation to help developing countries, Bulletin
Quotidien Europe No.9545, 11.
26
Full Text of Joint Statement of the 10th China-EU Summit. (2007, December). From People’s Daily Online
Retrieved December 4, 2007, Web site: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6314110.html
27
Full Text of Joint Statement of the 10th China-EU Summit. (2007, December). From People’s Daily Online
Retrieved December 4, 2007, Web site: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6314110.html
28
Agence Europe. (2007, December). EU urges industrialized countries to set example to gain confidence of
emerging countries and ensure that Bali can launch negotiations on post-2012, Bulletin Quotidien Europe
No.9563, 12.

276

behind the rhetoric on climate change, a protectionist agenda is hidden, which put the brakes
on the Bali negotiations … it is time to recognize the provisions taken by China, India and
other emerging economies”.29
The EU’s reaction to these reluctant developing countries did not convince these
countries completely at this stage. The EU’s effort in trying to understand and help without
any requirement of emission reduction targets was probably considered as a signal of
weakness which led to an unpredicted bargaining situation the EU did not want to see.
4. Leading Developing Countries Fight with the Developed Countries
After the EU partly satisfied Beijing’s requirements of funding and technology transfer, they
kicked the problem back into China’s field. Instead of adopting the post-Kyoto quantitative
reduction target, Beijing chose to satisfy the EU by making a great effort to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, and by showing itself in the image of a responsible partner in the
world.
China saw the climate change negotiations as a good opportunity to build this
responsible image internationally. Although Beijing was reluctant to adopt the post-Kyoto
quantitative reduction targets on greenhouse gases, it still wanted to show the world that
Chinese authority was taking climate change seriously, and it truly did all it could to commit
to decreasing emissions, even if it could not do as well the EU wanted.
Therefore, China united the other developing countries, especially other emerging
countries, in holding the same position in the negotiations and to fighting with the developed
countries, especially the EU.
In this stage, Beijing also used its advance and retreat strategy. It kept asking for
funds and technology transfer from the EU and finally united the other developing countries
to put pressure on the EU. On the other hand, China also comforted the EU by showing
indications of its readiness to adopt domestic emission reduction policies in an international
agreement.30
4.1. Beijing’s Reaction to the EU’s Help
China was stimulated by the EU’s help and worked hard to keep on the gravy train. Since the
EU had kicked the problem back into China’s field and kept requiring the adoption of
quantitative reduction targets, China had to show the world that instead of adopting the
binding target, her way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions was also effective. In its efforts
to respond to global climate change, National Development and Reform Commission’s Xie
Zhenhua said “as a responsible government, the Chinese government will definitely take
effective measures and is always ready to cooperate with all countries across the world”.31
In March 2008, Beijing started checking provincial-level governments’ performances
in conserving energy and reducing pollutant emissions, and the results, to be taken as a major
index for administration evaluation, would be publicized in May or June. About 1000 key
enterprises were also put under the scrutiny, whose performances would be examined by
provincial-level governments. Those who miss the annual goals in energy conservation and
emission reduction, either governments or enterprises, would be required to make
explanations and take measures for improvement within a set time. They would also be
denied any honor or award, and the approval of new high energy-consuming projects in the
province or of the enterprise would be suspended, said Xie Zhenhua, Vice Minister in charge
29
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of the NDRC, at a press conference held on the sidelines of the ongoing parliament annual
session.32
The central government was confident in reaching its goal which was to cut China’s
total energy consumption by about 20% and the emission of major pollutants by 10% by the
year 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao announced in his government work report in the beginning of
March. And China reported, historically, a drop of both sulfur dioxide emission and COD in
2007.33 Beijing also comforted the EU by showing indications of its readiness to its domestic
emission reduction policies in an international agreement.34
At the same time, Beijing was also taking every opportunity to get more help from
developed countries. In the meeting of the Group of 20 on climate change in March 2008, Xie
Zhenhua, Vice Chairman of the China NDRC, called on developed nations to allocate, in
accordance with a U.N. treaty, some of their official development assistance to set up a fund
facilitating the distribution of high-end technologies, indicating that developing nations
should enjoy free or low-cost access to those environment-friendly technologies.35
4.2. China Leads Developing Countries and Builds Responsible Image
As an implementation of the roadmap created at the Bali conference continued, the gap of
negotiation positions between developing and developed countries became clearer and
clearer. As wealthy nations urged the developing world to cut carbon dioxide emissions by
absolute values, developing countries which were worried about shackling their economic
growth, and therefore, called on the developed countries to bear more obligations in global
anti-climate change efforts. After China and the EU issued their joint statement at the end of
November 2007, other developing countries faced similar difficulties of reducing greenhouse
gases emissions and the same pressure from developed countries saw China as a model and
fell into step.
In the beginning of February 2008, the European Parliament temporary committee on
climate change visited India and found that India had a similar negotiating position as China,
who was becoming more aware of the problem of global warming, interested in technology
transfer and not ready to accept binding greenhouse gas reduction targets as part of a global
system to combat global warming beyond 2012.36 Another emerging economy Brazil, pointed
out that it was not obliged to reduce its emissions, yet it already had over 106 projects for the
Clean Development Mechanism, equivalent to 10% of the global total.37
During the negotiations with the EU and other developed countries, Beijing also tried
to build funds and technology transfer to benefit other developing countries, which no doubt
put its leadership on a firm footing in the developing countries. In the G20 meeting in 2008
China supported the proposal of establishing the Multilateral Technology Access Fund,
which could bring more technologies into the box of “public goods”.38 In July 2008, Chinese
President Hu Jintao put forward a three-point proposal for the world’s major economies on
32
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the fight against climate change in the meeting with leaders from Australia, Brazil, India,
Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea and the Group of G8 at the Hokkaido Toyako
Summit, Japan. Hu Jintao pointed out that “[…] We should work to improve the Global
Environment Facility and other existing financing mechanisms and promptly implement the
projects under the Adaptation Fund to provide new and additional financial support for
developing countries as they endeavor to adapt to climate change”. The President also urged
the international community to establish effective technology transfer and dissemination
mechanisms and realize technology sharing to ensure that developing countries can get
affordable technologies that are both climate-friendly and environment-friendly.39 In October
2008, China called for the establishment of a commission for technology and its transfer.40 On
the 23rd to the 24th in October 2008, the Asia-Europe Meeting was held in Beijing. The
summit devoted a chapter to the “Declaration of Beijing on sustainable development” to
climate change and energy security. In their declaration, the leaders of the ASEM stated that
the developed countries should continue to show strong leadership and to take appropriate
national commitments to combat climate change, with quantified objectives for the limitation
and reduction of emissions. These countries should also provide financial support and
transfers of technology for the developing countries.41
China’s effort of benefiting itself and other developing countries was welcomed by
most of the developing countries, especially the emerging economies. In the Poznan
conference, China played an increasingly leading role among developing countries. By facing
the pressure of developed countries, especially the EU, Beijing united members of the Group
of 77 developing countries and put forward proposals that funding from developed countries
should equate to 1% of their GDP. “As China is playing a leading role in combating climate
change, it is eager to be understood by the international community”, said Wu Changhua,
director of the environmental organization in greater China for the climate group. For the first
time, the Chinese delegation held a night event at the conference to showcase its efforts in
countering climate change.42 In the conference, China also raised a number of proposals in
mitigation, adaptation and technology transfer, a move that demonstrated China’s support for
and involvement in international cooperation in tackling climate change.43
Beijing’s efforts in becoming understood created the desired effect. Although China
still refused the quantitative reduction targets, its efforts of reducing greenhouse gases was
recognized by both developing countries and developed countries. The UN General
Secretary, Ban Ki-Moon, said that China had been playing a positive and constructive role in
the Poznan talks and had worked out a national climate strategy to address the problem on its
own, thereby setting an example for other countries to follow.44 Former US Vice President, an
environmentalist who shared the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to draw attention to
global warming, AL Gore gave a speech in the conference, and he pointed out that “China,
once seen as a looming obstacle to world efforts to reduce CO2 emissions, has itself a green
stimulus of 600 billion dollars over the next two years… Chinese leaders are mobilizing a
national effort to introduce CO2 reduction initiatives, and have already begun the largest tree39
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planting program the world has ever seen.” 45 Not only Gore, but also US Senator John Kerry,
widely viewed as the representative of President-elect Barack Obama, praised China’s
achievements in addressing climate change on its own.46
4.3. The EU’s Lack of Leadership
On the other hand, the EU lost its leadership little by little in the negotiations; it could not
suggest an ambitious reduction plan in the Poznan conference, and could not fulfill China’s
and other developing countries’ requirements of funding and technology transfer. Therefore,
the EU could not rally China to adopt the post-Kyoto quantitative reduction targets on
greenhouse gases.
Knowing that the EU27 could not convince developing countries to commit to
targeted objectives post-2012 in the G8 Summit in 2008, 47 the French Presidency of the
Council called for reaching an internal political agreement on the climate/energy package in
time to allow the EU to defend an ambitious and credible stance at the UN climate conference
in Poznan. President-in-office of the Environment and Energy Council Jean-Louis Borloo
stressed: “The aim of the EU is to achieve a 30% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in
the event of international agreement.” The Presidency’s intensions were for rallying China
and India to the cause before Poznan Conference. Mr. Borloo said: “[…] rallying China to a
global ETS (emission trading scheme) should not be too difficult”.48
In August, the French Presidency of the Council hoped that there would be sufficient
progress to convince emerging and developing countries that developed countries were firmly
committed to accepting the lion’s share of the ambitious post-2012 regime.49 However, any
hope of collective efforts was extinguished. After the financial crisis hit the world, several
member states became reluctant. In October, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi
suggested the EU to ‘pause for thought’ in its talks on the energy and climate package,50
which triggered a discussion in the EU. In the end, a majority of the member states
considered the EU would lose credibility, and chose to reach agreement of burden sharing.
Finally, in December, although the EP Temporary Committee on Climate change set a target
of a 25-40% reduction in emissions by 2020,51 the EU could only reach an agreement of 20%
reduction of CO2 emissions in the adoption of the climate/energy package.52
In the Poznan conference, instead of being a positive climate negotiations pusher, the
EU’s performance was retrogressive. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi launched an
attack in public. He thought that considering the financial crisis, the discussion of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions was absurd. In addition, the EU became very harsh to developing
countries, in terms of providing funds; it complained that the EU members were not
automatic teller machines; in terms of technology transfer, the EU complained about
intellectual property rights, in terms of reducing emissions, it asked emerging countries to use
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more efforts. 53 “More and more countries are discovering the enormous gulf between the
words of the EU and its deeds, and this is not helping discussions in Poznan”, said the NGO
Birdlife. The environment NGOs expressed their disappointment that they were currently
seeing too many shameless attempts of the European governments to turn their backs on their
own ambitious promises.54
At the UN climate change conference in Poznan, China and some other emerging
countries were willing to develop renewable sources of energy, willing to improve energy
efficiency, and had made national reducing greenhouse gas emissions targets. However, the
EU and other developed countries did not want to discuss medium-term emission reduction
targets, playing wait and see, in particular to look at the new U.S. President-elect Obama’s
attitude and other developed countries’ actions.55 These developed countries, Al Gore said,
“are backsliding from strengthening their commitment to fighting climate change; they are
blocking the introduction of a mid-term goal of cutting 25 to 40% emissions over 1990 levels
by 2020 in the industrialized countries.”56 The end of the conference was marked by poor
results. The EU’s wait and see attitude finally made it lose its leadership in pushing the
climate change negotiation to a higher step and in rallying China into the ETS market.
5. Conclusions: China’s Advance and Retreat Negotiation Strategy
5.1. Reversing Positions
This research answers the question why the EU could not lead China to adopt the post-Kyoto
quantitative reduction targets on greenhouse gases. On one hand, the EU lacked leadership
power; on the other hand, China, who was reluctant to adopt binding targets, reversed her
passive position in the negotiations with the EU by using her advance and retreat negotiation
strategy.
China is a huge country with many problems, but in terms of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, it did make an effort. First, compared with her position in the 1990s, China
became much more positive in fighting climate change and dropped its idea of not reducing
emissions until the middle of the 21 century. Second, China made a domestic reduction target
in 2005, when reducing energy consumption per capita by 20% between 2006 and 2010.57
Furthermore, this target was gradually adjusted until the Poznan conference. China also
raised a number of proposals in mitigation, adaptation, and technology transfer, which
reflected the reality of developing countries as a whole and helped the other partners to
understand the problems. Third, China pushed the EU and other developed countries to work
harder to reach a higher stage in climate control negotiations.
Nonetheless, China was reluctant to adopt the EU’s requirements for the post-Kyoto
quantitative reduction targets on greenhouse gases. This reluctance was brought about
because China first believed that adopting the quantitative target should not be the doing of
developing countries. Second, China believed that the developed countries should make
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appropriate national commitments to combat climate change, with quantified objectives for
the limitation and reduction of emissions. It was up to the industrialized countries to lead by
example, China felt, if they wanted the less industrialized countries to commit in turn. For
example, Japan, New Zealand, Canada and Australia were all backsliding from strengthening
their commitment to fighting climate change, and even the EU itself could not promote an
ambitious reduction plan. Therefore, Beijing believed that instead of the adoption of a
quantitative target such as the EU wanted, her effort towards reducing greenhouse gas
emissions was effective enough as it was in this stage of the negotiations.
During the negotiations, China read the EU’s moves well and prepared well to defend
herself and to build a responsible image, which did not leave the EU with complaints. For
example, when the EU asked for cooperation from developing countries, Beijing showed its
progress and good intensions in fighting the climate battle; when the EU came to visit,
Chinese authorities showed their difficulties in lacking funds and technologies, which also
pushed their willingness to the EU, thus making the EU responsible for what China could not
achieve in the battle. China also gathered other developing countries’ ideas and helped these
ideas to reach the developed countries, which made her the leader of the G77.
On the other hand, the EU lost its leadership in the bilateral negotiations little by little
due to its own lack of ability in creating a consensus among its member states as well as its
lack of negotiation skills with China. Facing Beijing’s requirements of funding and
technology transfer; the EU became optimistic and did not ask China for any quantitative
binding target on greenhouse gas emissions in return. Furthermore, after the financial crisis
hit the world, the EU did not have enough funding to keep its leadership. The €22 million the
EU spent to support projects in Africa and Asia58 was considered by developing countries as a
drop in the bucket.59
Therefore, although China did not accept the EU’s requirements, it did change its
passive position in the negotiations. When China received funds and technology transfer from
the EU, it built its responsible international image by using its advance and retreat negotiation
strategy.
5.2. Advance and Retreat Negotiation Strategy
The advance and retreat strategy worked well because China prepared well for almost all the
negotiations, and did not allow the EU to put blame on them. Furthermore, China read the
EU’s steps carefully, which provided her with good ideas to use in defending herself. In this
case, China knew exactly what it wanted and how to get it from the EU. On the other hand,
the EU members lacked a consistent strategy to defend themselves and to push China to the
goal which was adoption of a binding target.
From the beginning of 2007 to the Cop 14 negotiations at the end of 2008, China
retreated by showing her good intention of taking climate change seriously and by her
willingness to reduce greenhouse gases. This could be seen in both every bilateral negotiation
and in the international conferences in Bali, Toyako and Poznan. By showing her efforts,
China made her point that she was making progress constantly and this should be recognized
internationally. The strategy worked well; China’s progress was not only recognized well in
Poznan, but she also set an example with Ban Ki-moon, the UN General Secretary, which
also helped China to bargain with developed countries, especially the EU.
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Meanwhile, China advanced by asking for help from developed countries, and by arguing
about the history of high emissions from developed countries. This action did not stop until
the end of Poznan in December 2008, which made the EU worry about its pocket especially
in the financial crisis, and made the EU27 fall apart in its attempts to further an ambitious
plan to reduce emissions. Meanwhile, Chinese authorities held tightly the “common but
differentiated principle” and the Kyoto frame to protect itself from the EU and other
developed countries.
With a responsible presence and support from other developing countries, Beijing was
much more powerful in negotiating with the EU. Eventually China reversed her passive
position in the post-Kyoto negotiations with the EU by using her advance and retreat
negotiation strategy successfully.
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Sectoral Approach:
What is in it for The Chinese Economy?
Joyashree Roy1, Moumita Roy and Shreya Roychowdhury2

Abstract
In any international negotiation on climate change close link among science, economics and
politics can hardly be ignored. The argument for mitigation in case of long lived stock
pollutants can never be rationally based on current growth level. It is a complex situation and
any over simplifies approach will further complicate rather than lead to any positive solution.
Competitiveness argument, border adjustment, trade barriers on emission intensive goods and
services of Annex I countries can hardly be justified even at the current market share in trade,
production, consumption. The best way to approach the problem can be to combine domestic
and international actions judiciously. Need for transition to globally low carbon economy by
the end of the century is least contested today. Common responsibility of attaining
decarbonised growth path for global human welfare is uncontested but much contested is the
differentiated responsibility design mechanism. Differentiated responsibility is a dynamic
notion. So who should do how much and when, in dynamic context, is still an unresolved
research question. But what is understood well is a fully functional global carbon market with
global carbon price can provide a least cost solution with desired level of autonomy chosen
by each country. Past attempts through CDM provide a small short term step towards that for
flow of finance in niche investments and new technology, Sectoral Approach (SA) can
provide a second level of stepping stone towards fully functional carbon market through
financial flow into non niche market such as energy efficiency type of investment. China
today is the leader among Non-Annex I countries in CDM and with first layer of capacity
building it can be the natural leaders in SA.
I. Background
Need for transition to low Green House Gas (GHG) economy by the end of the century is
least contested today. Least contested is also the scientific assessment based on wide variety
of information from rigorous research studies that the production and consumption path of
the diverse economies followed since industrial revolution till date across the world do not
guarantee low GHG future. Global pollutant character and long resident time (decades to
centuries) of GHGs emitted from economic activities make it a special challenge in nationally
governed world (Roy 2007) to achieve low carbon future. Multiple gases can be expressed in
single unit of carbon equivalent so low carbon can be synonymously used for low GHG.
GHGs produced by human actions are not primary products rather by products of
consumption and production. Various institutions manage production and consumption
activities across world where both price mechanism and regulatory mechanism have roles to
play. Major challenge is how can these institutions (defined by price and regulations) be
redesigned to drive the production and consumption activity decisions towards low carbon
future. Hope has been raised by the various global assessments over past years (IPCC 2007,
Stern 2007, IEA 2008) that given the global pool of technology and knowledge it is
achievable through ideally designed and followed well coordinated global action. However,
to deliver this “global good” in the form of low carbon involves costs and investment
decisions. Globally efficient solution is possible through co-operation as nationally
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acceptable “global deal” can deliver a price and regulatory mechanism which can deliver
least cost solution to achieve low GHG transition. However this transition cannot happen
overnight so the path to transition needs to be worked out. This involves inter-temporal
decision and investment allocation. Multiple time horizons, multiple countries, and multiple
players, multiple goals are creating complexity in a world nationally defined, divided,
governed and managed (Roy 2008). However, apparent complexity should not work as a
barrier towards solution. So far human society has solved sharing of global goods by defining
national boundaries and national endowment of resources. Initial difference in endowments
have been solved through creation of market exchange and price has played an important role
to allocate across multiple players. Same market-price mechanism has been applied across
nations in the form of trade relations. To correct any perceived inequality regulatory
mechanisms and various social, economic and political adjustment processes have been tried.
It is most logical and possible to show that similar known and much practiced market-price
and regulatory mechanisms can be applied to share the ‘new global good’ as well. So crux of
the problem is how do we define the size of the ‘new global good’ or the natural resource
and how the total endowment can be shared initially and then how can trade as a vehicle both
intra- and inter- nationally can lead to redistribution of the initial endowment given the
demand for it. This implies in macro sense adding to our list of markets like labour market,
commodity market, money market, bond market, capital market, a fully functional ‘carbon
market’. However, this new “carbon market” will have some unique features due to its global
public good character. So it is important to design this new market in such a way that it does
not distort the current resource allocation, income distribution and political autonomy of the
nations. So it is crucial to adopt a systems approach so that additional features introduced
through carbon market in the global economic system has a smooth linkages with other
markets without creating disruptions in the globally linked national markets. Besides this
macro aspect of the transition, micro aspect is can this market generate enough market signals
for relevant players. Real challenge is how to make this transition smooth and faster. Sooner
we decide the global deal on this carbon market size, initial allocation of the total carbon
rights and initial carbon price, better we manage the transition path. Finding the shortest route
(time and cost wise) to this ultimate goal is the real challenge today. Major hurdle in the way
is to answer this complexity arising out of lack of information on whether least cost solution
will produce Pareto efficient solution. Any Pareto inefficient solution i.e., that makes any
country worse off than today in the global deal will not be acceptable. It is the distributive
impact of transition pathway least understood and most contested. Given the stock pollutant
nature historical burden sharing and distributive justice question was attempted to be resolved
through common but differentiated responsibility criterion. However, differentiated
responsibility is not a static deal it is inherently dynamic. Over time responsibility of various
countries will continue to change depending on their contributions to GHG stock.
In this paper we try to analyse how this reality is changing over time for China. How
transition towards the global carbon market is emerging and how nations are responding to
global deal and what are the forces that might distort emergence of global deal and how
national strategies need to be revised in keeping with the changing realities.
II. Changing Reality
The reality is changing fast for FLDCs: China, Brazil, India, Mexico and South Africa,
among Non annex I countries. In absolute terms carbon emissions is rising for Non annex I
countries. The absolute emission rose for Small Developing Countries in the 2000-2005
period, from 4925.97 million metric tonnes in 2000 to 6031.28 million metric tonnes in 2005.
It is interesting to note that over the same period the carbon dioxide emission of the five large
developing countries increased from 4292.79 million metric tonnes to 7671.04 million metric
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tonnes in 2005.The CO2 emission of FLDC increased by 78% in the span of five years (20002005). The percentage contribution of FLDCs in world emissions increased steeply from 18%
to 27%.In the same period the carbon dioxide emission of China increased from 2912 million
metric tonnes in 2000 to 5322 million metric tonnes in 2005.The percentage contribution of
China in world emission increased from 9% in 200 to 19% in 2005.The CO2 emission of
China doubled in the span of 5 years. This is clearly a cause of concern and calls for rapid
implementation of low carbon intensive growth policies.
Regional CO2 emissions in 2000 and 2005
Pe rce ntage s hare of e ach re gion in w orld carbon
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Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tableh1co2.xls (Authors’ estimates)

It is true that still developed nations account for most of the historic emissions but the
emerging economies are fast catching up too. It is interesting to note that today’s emission
becomes historical contribution tomorrow in term of carbon emission so among the
developing countries FLDCs, especially China has an important role to play in designing the
global deal to facilitate faster adoption of low carbon development pathway through
technology and investment decision and choice of carbon free production and consumption
behaviour.
III. CDM and Leadership of China
In the process of transition to low carbon economy the missing link is a global carbon market
with global carbon price as facilitator. Sooner we start on moving to this inevitable transition
path better it is as no other solution is superior to this both in terms of cost efficiency and
distributive justice. This implies in macro sense adding to our list of markets like labour
market, commodity market, money market, bond market, capital market, a fully functional
‘carbon market’. However, this new “carbon market” will have some unique features due to
its global public good character. So it is important to design this new market in such a way
that it does not distort the current resource allocation, income distribution and political
autonomy of the nations. So it is crucial to adopt a systems approach so that additional
features introduced through carbon market in the global economic system has a smooth
linkages with other markets without creating disruptions in the globally linked national
markets. Besides this macro aspect of the transition, micro aspect is can this market generate
enough signals for relevant players. Experimentation started at the beginning of this century
through Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
Upfront it is important to understand that CDM needs to be looked into as first
experiment in the path of transition through certain niche markets. Niches have been defined
286

through additionality criterion. CDM can at best be understood as demonstration project.
Carbon reduction as a ‘good’, eligible for trading, pricing, marketing has been established
and accepted today through CDM demonstration projects. Economic agents have an idea now
who can be a buyer and who can be a seller. Figures 1 through 4 shows how China has
become market leader in CDM. As first mover China has participated and gained in terms of
major share in carbon market through new economic activity generation by carbon projects
and trading of CERs. China currently accounts for 34% of total CDM projects registered by
host country. Almost one third of all the CDM projects (registered by host country) belong to
China.
Figure 1

Source: http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/
Figure: 2

Source: http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Issuance/
China accounts for more than 44% of the total CERs generated.
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Figure.3

*Estimated
Source: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2008/CDM-Project-Development-Workshop/CarbonMarket-Toru-Kubo.pdf,

Without going into detailed discussion we want to state that EU ETS system which is
regional in nature has generated a much bigger market than CDM. This has to do with non
participation of few larger emitting countries in the buyers' market, knowledge intensity and
high transaction cost has made seller market small as well. In the sellers' market for carbon
credit China is the leader (62%) and the buyers' market for carbon credit is dominated by
United Kingdom (46%).
Figure: 4.

Buyers of Carbon Credit

Sellers of Carbon credit

Source: Energy, Transport and Water Division, Regional & Sustainable Development Department Asian
Development Bank (accessed 30th Nov,2008)

But what could be learnt so far is through CDM all kinds of stakeholders:
government, private producer, financial market players all can relate their benefits through
participation in a carbon market. But all these success stories should not lead the current
players in CDM market with the complacence or bias for maintaining the status quo (Roy
2008). However, CDM has its own limitations. The chief among them is scale of operation
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due to the additionality criterion which makes it a good instrument for ‘niche investments’
only.
So scaling up to economy wide activities and investment is necessary both to achieve
stabilisation goal and participation from all. CDM should be taken as a learning phase and
now need is to move up to next level for transition towards global carbon price and carbon
market. The capacity building under CDM phase in fact puts China one step ahead of other
developing countries who are late comers or who have not yet jumped into the business of
CDM due to lack of enough knowledge, understanding and capacity to make CDM markets
functional. China through South-South Cooperation can indeed act as leader for other
developing countries in post 2012 phase for CDM markets in non participating developing
countries for capacity building and Annex I countries can continue to participate in niche
market investments. However, CDM has long term impact than need for immediate
decarbonisation target and can be allowed only for niche markets and new additional
mechanism need to be developed to achieve immediate decarbonisation target in post 2012
period.
IV. Sectoral Approach (SA): A New Vehicle to Transition
Target is to decarbonise economic activities globally at such a rate so as to reduce CO2
equivalent by 50% by 2050. This means the decarbonisation rate needs to be between 0.62.5% . Historically, over past decades we could decarbonise by 0.3% which is way below
desired rate of decarbonisation. Global collective track record so far has been far from
satisfactory. We have added 70% more GHGs over 1970-2004 (IPCC 2007) despite 33%
reduction in energy intensity globally. Doubling or trebling of energy efficiency improvement
for fossil fuel use in next two decades is urgent need to achieve the target stabilization by the
turn of the century somewhere between 450-550 CO2 eq. However, for some experts the
target is even more stringent like 400 ppm CO2 eq by turn of the century. Much deeper and
wider actions must be achieved collectively in a very short span of time. These are facts and
need to be accepted. Now the question is what can then be done to achieve such deeper and
wider cuts in emission? The target transition cannot be reached with current or enhanced
level of unilateral Annex I country actions and CDM driven non-Annex I country actions
(Schmidt et al., 2006, Baron et al., 2006).
In case of any other market (financial, commodity etc.) in a fully functional global
carbon market each player has the autonomy to select level of emission reduction (supply of
carbon credits) and generation (demand for carbon credit). The only difference is total credit
or size of the market will be globally managed through negotiation across nations starting
from an initial allocation of total endowment across nations. CDM is far off from this final
market size and extent. National preparedness also do not show readiness towards that due to
lack of enough information, capacity and knowledge. SA is an intermediate step between
CDM and global carbon market.
Though not a new concept in climate negotiation literature, sectoral approaches (SAs)
have gained prominence in post 2007 and after publication of Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) assessment of sectoral mitigation potential and in post 2007 Bali
Convention. While there are conflicting interpretations of what SAs may bring about but one
thing is clear that SA need to target at- broad based participation in mitigation action,
widening of options and opportunities in mitigation action compared to current additionality
driven narrow coverage of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), increased financial flow
in mitigation activities, making technology diffusion faster in sectors with high mitigation
potential, bridge the gap between now and future globally active carbon market without
creating distortions through early actions.
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Sceptics argue SA is designed to address leakage and/or competitiveness argument of
current carbon constrained developed countries. It is important to understand that it is neither
a time for scepticism, nor of blame game nor of non cooperation. Rather it is time to put
forward national priorities with clear goal oriented targets and to find out of the box solutions
to help in evolving a globally functional carbon market through information generational and
negotiation. SAs is not a closed chapter rather it provides a platform for global discussion and
opens up scope for designing mechanism for each country/ group of countries to choose a
win-win kind of interim solution in post 2012 period. This paper focuses on the concerns of
China and how China can play an integral role in SA negotiations, ensuring that SAs reflect
their interests and long-term development goals. With voluntary participation, they can
realise the potential gains of sectoral approaches that can facilitate technology transfer, utilise
carbon trading mechanism for broader development goals, enhance existing capacity and
pave the way for global carbon market participation.

V. Competitiveness Argument based SA and Trade Instruments: Weak Argument to
Trigger Participation
Competitiveness argument in sectoral approach focus on large developing countries Brazil,
China, India, Mexico and South Africa. Because of their low historic emissions, FLDCs do
not face mandatory emissions cuts under the Kyoto Protocol, given the principle of “common
but differentiated responsibilities” and they have not been actively engaged in the “universal”
sectoral approaches negotiating process. Producers of steel, cement, aluminium, pulp and
paper and agrochemicals and other energy-intensive goods in the developed nations allege
that such climate change policies would put them at a disadvantage compared to developing
nations as far as international trade in the energy intensive goods sector is concerned. They
argue that by introducing a price for carbon, the cost of production in the energy intensive
sectors in developed countries would rise compared to developing nations and that would
cause them to lose market share to foreign competitors that do not face similar costs at home.
Many of these industries are facing tough competition in the global market from large
emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil that are not bound to have emission
cuts under the current international climate regime. The developed countries propose to either
limit the price of carbon these producers face or impose similar costs on imports of carbonintensive goods from their competitors in developing countries.
In figure 5 rest of the world is Annex I countries and the small island countries whose
share is almost negligible. Annex I countries dominate with disproportionately high share in
world export, import as well as GDP barring population which gives them market power,
competitive edge and more responsible. China represents only 8 percent of world
merchandise exports (Figure 5). The share of China in world exports of merchandise goods
has increased from 4% in 2000 to 8% in 2006 and share of China in world imports have
increased from 3% in 2000 to 6% in 2006. Any kind of trade barrier will be detrimental to
their growth and cannot make them competitive in next one decade with rest of the world.
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Figure 5 Regional shares in global total 2000, 2006

Source: (Roy and Roy 2008)

As of now, Annex I countries clearly dominate in both the export and import of
energy-intensive goods (Figure 6). Apart from iron and steel where China commands nearly 8
percent of the worlds export in 2006, China and other FLDCs could barely make their
presence felt in other indicators and sectors. Pulp and paper, aluminium and fertilisers
exports are almost entirely dominated by Annex I nations. Annex I nations account for 80%
of the world export of pulp and paper in 2006.Thus the competitiveness argument proposed
by developed countries saying that climate change strategies that do not impose carbon
constraints on developing nations are going to hurt the competitiveness of developed
countries in energy intensive sector is not validated in the light of empirical evidence. Annex
I countries therefore dominate the global market for energy-intensive goods, it is clear that all
developing countries should be given preferential treatment in catching up, with emphasis
placed on emerging economies like China. Thus any climate policy led trade policy such as
lowering the carbon price for producers of energy intensive goods in the developed countries,
or imposition of trade barrier in the form of import tariffs on energy intensive goods imported
from developing countries cannot find approval from the developing economies in post 2012
period. Also such trade barriers are not efficient as only one third of China’s steel is traded,
the rest is consumed domestically. Exporters will have any incentive to cut emissions in case
their goods are checked at the border. But the domestic producers will not have any incentive
to adopt cleaner technology if trade instruments are used. So the basic aim of achieving a
broader participation is not addressed.
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Figure 6. Share in Global total exports of Iron and Steel, Pulp and Paper, Aluminium, Fertilisers, 2002
and 2006

Source: (Roy and Roy 2008)

Sectoral Approach that address the issue of competitiveness and at the same time aim
to involve new players especially the large developing countries and does not show how large
emitters like US can be involved, in climate change framework will find low success story.
However, a sector wide approach based on self assessment of sectoral mitigation potential
with crediting facility may be more acceptable to developing nations than an arbitrary
country wide target in very near future.
VI. Efficiency Target Based SA
Large untapped potential for mitigation through energy efficiency improvement is widely
accepted fact among various stakeholders. But CDM additionality criterion cannot take it as
niche investment. This potential is not only in non annex I countries but exist in developed
countries as well though this is not obvious from aggregate metrics as emissions GHG
intensity as it is 0.68 kg CO2eq/US$ GDPppp for Annex I countries and 1.06 kg CO2eq/US$
GDPppp for non-Annex-I countries. Sectoral assessment across various countries can yield
accurate mitigation potential assessment and market size. How sectoral potential can be
achieved through all country participation through trading will be an effective vehicle to
enhance the market and realise the potential through technology and financial flow. Although
new facilities in developing countries in major energy intensive sectors are adopting new
efficient technologies replacement need of existing technologies are high but competition for
investment fund do not make it attractive for investment. Top down CDM cannot achieve this
due to its specific goal. Bottom up approach for Deployment of best available technology
(BAT) in a sector across countries sound idealistic solution. In practice either it should lead
to monopoly or few firms dominating the sectors with multinational character which will face
several known barriers. Second option will be diffusion of technology liberally across
companies which may be facing hindrance through competitiveness argument and business
ethics. So transnational sectoral standard or deployment of BAT both may fail to succeed
though may look attractive upfront. Who owns BAT to be used as standard is highly
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controversial due to asymmetry of information. Moreover, this may act as disincentive for
new technology development.
VII. Possible Components of SA and Role of China
SA can best be an intermediate step between CDM world and globally functional carbon
market world. It needs to maintain the trading in carbon credit feature of CDM and need to
include two essential features of future global carbon market: one, negotiated total emission
level and decision by players to select their chosen emission reduction level based on self
assessment. This will honour business ethics and will incentivise the players for correct
reporting. In practice these two market features for SA will be negotiating among sectoral
players. For example, it may be for emission reduction level in 2012-2020 period and
declaration of reduction targets by each player at the beginning of the period. These two need
to match through negotiation among the players. Throughout the committed period players
will get chances to trade among themselves. Carbon price will be determined through demand
and supply within the market or on a pre negotiated price. Price will act as incentive.
Defaulters will need to pay the price of committed but unrealised reduction and any reduction
beyond committed reduction will fetch revenue at the carbon price. If there is over supply for
good practices by each player in the sector a pool of carbon credit can be created that can be
auctioned and money be redistributed among the players and if there is default that will fetch
in pool of finance from the defaulters at carbon price at the sectoral level and through sectoral
action money can be ploughed back . Ideally in a macro economy wide functional market
these will be traded across sectors and macro balance will be maintained through price
mechanism.
To be broad based SA must have wider coverage by allowing any measurable carbon
reduction strategy starting from energy efficiency. It avoid political apathy for commitment
due to enough information, but allows the direct stakeholders to participate in the negotiation
process. However the players need to consider national circumstances and macro goals. They
need to be consistent and players cannot commit with private motive alone. So there is need
for close interaction among national government and sectoral players as the sectoral players’
commitments need to be consistent with country’s development goals. This may need some
enabling policy support as well. This sector wide participation of investors in carbon trading
and market generation with third party investor’s role will help in capacity building towards
smooth transition to global carbon market. Therefore, in order for sectoral approaches to be
effective both government and business needs to build mutually acceptable incentives to be a
reliable partner in the process.
To encourage both developing country objective of development and new investment
and Annex I country problem of lock in through high emission intensive investment due to
past decisions but ownership of efficient technology can be solved if voluntary target
emission reduction declaration by industry players are allowed and trading is allowed in
carbon with third party investment possibility as well then all players across nations get
incentive to reduce efficiency. The trading can be within one group of industry players as
well as between industry players and third party investor. Carbon price will be determined by
size of the market. This SA arrangement can continue with CDM for investments in niche
areas as well as mandatory target for Annex I countries. There is no need for country wide
commitment for Non annex I countries. Emerging economies due to sheer size of their
market and economic activity can take leadership in SA and gain much through financial
flow and technology transfer in non CDM covered markets and build additional capacity and
preparedness for next beyond 2020 period. CDM with niche character will be shrinking in
China and will be finding new locations in unattended markets so far and SA can play much
larger role in China. This will help China to monitor emissions in its high growth path with
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ultimate aim of decoupling emissions from growth and will allow on carbon neutral growth
path .
In the global economic transition China is bound to play important role with almost
one fifth of the global population. Human welfare at global scale will be determined by how
fast China and other developing nations can generate and distribute economic benefits. So
anticipated growth rates in the range of 5-10% is inevitable. So how to manage this global
economic transition on a low GHG pathway is the challenge which is a global responsibility
in a very idealistic situation. But as soon as national interests and national autonomy creeps in
aligning national goals with global goals becomes a major challenge. The conflict of global
and national goal becomes explicit when goods cross borders. When it does not then issue is
much simpler. Best strategy for countries in SA will be to select major emitting sectors like
power, steel, aluminium, cement, transport and buildings etc and allow each country players
to come up with nationally consistent strategies. It makes next few month very crucial in
terms of information generation. Unless such intermediate step is followed in post 2012
period the stabilization process will be delayed leading to more adaptation and steep
mitigation cost burden on developing economies in near future. Additionally wide capacity
building through practical experience will be delayed. Neither efficiency nor justice can be
achieved by delaying the process of expansion of carbon market through SA especially when
world is not ready for globally functional full scale carbon market. China with peaking
economic activities in next one decade need to take lead role in design of SA to achieve low
carbon growth path in next decade and to avoid high adaptation and mitigation cost a decade
later and gain in 2012-2020 period from historical advantageous position due to low share in
global GHG pool.
VIII. Concluding Remarks
Sectoral Approach (SA) needs to be clearly defined keeping mind its role as stepping stone
towards fully functional carbon market. It need to go beyond CDM and replicate global
carbon characteristics at a sectoral scale. China today is the leader among Non-Annex I
countries in CDM and with first layer of capacity building they can be the natural leaders in
SA and by assuming an active role can enhance the financial and technology flow from the
very beginning by expression of interest consistent with national advantage. In global deal
for 2012 period China can bargain for much broad and target flow of finance and technology
as per national developmental need assessment and very well play the role of Global deal
maker in voicing their need in SA and in determination of carbon price and sector selection.
How carbon price can be used as incentive for participation of low emitters and as payment
vehicle for non delivery of commitment by large emitters for ploughing back into the system
through enhanced investment are some of the bargaining points for China in post 2012
period. In CDM, China needs to push for more niche investments from Annex I countries and
can become provider of knowledge and capacity building in underserved nations in CDM
first phase. CDM and SA can scale up the experiments with newer carbon market concept
and lead the way to fully functional carbon market through appropriate capacity building.
Next few months for China before 2012 deal is made are very crucial in terms of information
generation towards SA. Post 2012 period need to be devoted for knowledge sharing in design
of initial endowment and carbon price that will prevail in future.
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Evaluating CO2 Capture Ready Investment in New-built Thermal Power Plants in
China
Xi Lianga*, David Reinera, Jon Gibbinsb, Jia Lib
Abstract
The total thermal power capacity has grown by 65GW to over 600GW by the end of 2008
(CEC, 2009). Chinese government, industry and academic stakeholders perceive that China
will not mandate new plants to be built with carbon dioxide capture and storage systems in
the short term and there is little incentive even to contemplate
the first steps needed to fit plants with capture equipment (Reiner et al, 2007). Therefore, we
evaluate CO2 Capture Ready (CCR) investment, which would enable thermal power plants to
be retrofitted to capture CO2 without unnecessary additional costs when the appropriate
policy and /or economic drivers are in place (IEA, 2007).
In order to understand the value and investment characteristics of CCR in China, a
typical 600MW pulverized-coal fired ultra-supercritical power plant was assessed. Combined
with a detailed engineering assessment, we obtained the costs for different CCR scenarios. To
analyze CCR investment opportunities, we apply a cash flow model for valuing Capture
Options, as developed in Liang et al (2007). Results are obtained by Monte-Carlo simulation,
with assumptions based on engineering surveys and the IEA (2007) CCR study, as well as
plant performance information and expert estimations on carbon prices, coal prices and
electricity prices.
1. Introduction

Fossil fuel power plants are the largest source of carbon dioxide, accounting for more than
40% of CO2 emissions globally, and the trend is expected to continue through 2050 (IEA,
2006). Most of incremental emissions globally will come from China and India and the
largest increase in magnitude comes from coal (Figure 1).
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Mitigating climate change must be treated as an investment, spending now can help
avoid the risks of serious damage in the long term (Stern, 2006). Ideally, all fossil fuel power
plants should be built with Carbon Capture and Storage to minimize the risk of dangerous
climate change. However, currently there are insufficient incentives and no mandatory policy
is currently in place in any countries to encourage large scale CCS deployments before 2015.
CO2 Capture Ready (CCR) is a modest investment expenditure in the planning, design
a
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and construction stage of a fossil fuel plant, to minimize the risk of future ‘carbon lock-in’ by
significantly easing a future retrofit of carbon capture and storage (CCS). Following the
Gleneagles G8 (2005) submit, the IEA Greenhouse Gas Programme (2007) published a study
which identified the following key elements for CCR power plants:
•
•

•

A CO2 capture ready power plant is a plant which can include CO2 capture when the
necessary regulatory or economic drivers are in place. The aim of building plants that
are capture ready is to reduce the risk of stranded assets and carbon lock-in.
Developers of capture ready plants should take responsibility for ensuring that all
known factors in their control that would prevent installation and operation of CO2
capture have been identified and eliminated. This might include:
o A study of options for CO2 capture retrofit and potential pre-investments
o Inclusion of sufficient space and access for the additional facilities that would
be required
o Identification of reasonable route(s) to storage of CO2
Competent authorities involved in permitting power plants should be provided with
sufficient information to be able to judge whether the developer has met these criteria.

A minority of companies are considering making their plants Capture Ready.
Appendix shows examples of the industry approach to planning new plants Capture Ready by
self-motivation. However, there have been relatively few studies looking at CCR investment
decisions. Rutkowski et al (2003) investigated the impact of pre-investment on NPV and
Sekar (2005) applied real option analysis on the value of pre-investment IGCC or Oxyfuel.
Both studies emphasized the absence of economic drivers needed to make capture ready preinvestment worthwhile. These studies mainly focused on pre-investment in the form of the
extra cost of building an integrated gasifier combined cycle (IGCC) systems, however, while
most new coal-fired power plants built by 2020, are likely to be conventional pulverised coal
power plants. They also assumed limited fixed retrofitting date, rather than the likely real
situation of a range of possible dates, which may lead to the value of pre-investment being
underestimated. Liang et al (2007) conducted a stochastic analysis on the option value of
CCR in pulverised coal power plants in China, but this study used data inputs from public
domain sources for generic power plants rather than realistic plant data and also only used
standard deviation to describe risk.
In this paper, we conducted a more detailed survey of actual pulverised coal power
projects in China which began construction in 2005 and 2006 and decided to focus on a plant
located in Guangdong which began construction in 2007 and started operations in 2009. All
costs and revenue data are adjusted by historical or estimated inflation. As the risk of a
project cannot be assessed simply by comparing the NPV of a project, we also analyze the
risk profile in addition to NPV analysis.
The paper aims to address the following research questions:
z
z

z

Is CCR a sound economic investment in China?
What are the implications of different CCR configurations for the economics of postcombustion at pulverised coal power plants?
What are potential mechanisms to make CCR happen?

2. Valuation Methodologies
The principle in evaluating the value of CCR and capture options includes eight steps in
evaluation process are explicitly stated below:
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Step 1: Set up project lifetime cash flow projection profile (annual basis, static), and build a
decision tree on retrofitting to capture and early closure applying backward deduction
methodology to determine the optimal retrofitting option exercise policy.
Step 2: Investigate the distribution and inter-correlation of stochastic inputs, including carbon
prices, coal prices, and electricity prices.
Step 3: Assume plant performance variables without CCS, such as power supply efficiency,
load factor and etc
Step: 4: Estimate economic variables, including inflation rate, tax rate, depreciation schedule
and etc.
Step 5: Determine a proper discount rate.
Step 6: Input plants performance, required capital investments, operating and maintenance
costs with respect to retrofitting to capture CO2. The costs for storage, monitoring and
transportation are accrued to CO2 per ton.
Step 7: Run Monte-Carlo simulation to generate results and conduct sensitivities studies for
different scenarios. (10,000 trials give the best trade-off).
Step 8: Analyse results including the option value, the impact of capture option on project
risk profile, retrofitting probability and early closure possibility
2.1 Valuing Option for Retrofitting CO2 Capture (Capture Option)
For the purposes of this analysis, we assume the mean net present value (NPV) of cash flow
is the main investment decision criteria. The NPV is the net present value of the future aftertax cash flows after subtracting initial investment outlay and adding present value of terminal
year non-operating cash flow, or
n
CFt
TNOCF
(2-1)
NPV = ∑
− Outlay +
t
(1 + r ) n
t =1 (1 + r )
CFt = after-tax cash flow at year t
r = required rate of return for the investment (or discount rate)
Outlay = initial investment cash flow at time zero
n = life of the power project
TNOCF = terminal year after-tax non-operating cash flow
The value of being CCR is calculated by subtracting the ‘mean NPV of total cash flow of a
project without option of retrofitting CO2 capture during its lifetime’ from the ‘mean NPV of
total cash flow of a project with option of retrofitting CO2 capture’:

ValueOption = NPVwith −option − NPVwithout −option

(2-2)

NPVwith-option = NPV of total cash flow with retrofitting option
NPVwithout-option = NPV of total cash flow without retrofitting option
In order to estimate the mean NPV of total cash flow including the option of retrofitting to
CO2 capture, a decision equation with regard to retrofit timing is required. The model
assumes that plant owners or capture option holders are free to retrofit the plant to capture
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CO2 at year T when the projected average NPV of total future cash flow with retrofitting is
larger than the projected average NPV of future cash flow without retrofitting:
n

CFretro _ t

∑ (1 + r )

n

>∑

CFno− retro _ t

(2-3)
′
+ Valueoption
(1 + r ) t −T
CFretro_t = expected after-tax randomized cash flow at year t with retrofitting to Capture
CFno-retro_t = expected after-tax randomized cash flow at year t without retrofitting to Capture
Value’option = the option value of retrofitting to Capture in the future
T = retrofitting year
n = life of the power project
Retrofitting to Capture if

t =T

t −T

t =T

2.2 Assessing Benefits of CCR
The additional capital investment required to make a new plant CCR can be quite different
depending upon the siting of the plant, engineering design and local costs of reserving
additional land, thus we focus on the gross value (before capital outlay) of CCR:
GValuecr = Valueoption −cr − Valueoption − nocr
(2-4)
GValuecr = value of CCR before capital outlay of CCR
Valueoption-nocr = value of Capture Option without CCR
Valueoption-cr = value of Capture Option with CCR
A distinct advantage of building new plants as CCR is increasing the cumulative probability
of retrofitting CCS economically over the course of a plant’s lifetime:
T

Pcapture−T = 1 − PunCapture−T = 1 − ∏ (1 − pcapture−t )

(2-5)

t =1

n

pcapture−T = p(∑

CFretro _ t

n

>∑

CFno − retro _ t

)
(2-6)
(1 + r ) t −T t =T (1 + r ) t −T
Pcapture-T = cumulative probability of retrofitting to Capture at Year T
Puncapture-T = cumulative probability of not yet retrofitting to Capture at Year T
pcapture-T = probability of retrofitting to Capture at Year T
t =T

The net value of CCR is equal to the ‘gross value of CCR’ less ‘additional capital outlay on
CCR’:

NetValue cr = GValue cr − Outlay cr − PV _ O & M cr

(2-7)

NetValuecr = net value of CCR (after CCR capital outlay)
GValuecr = gross value of CCR (before CCR capital outlay)
Outlaycr = capital outlay of CCR
PV_O&Mcr = PV of the additional operating and maintenance expense of CCR
2.3 Cash Flow Components
The base power project in the study is a new investment, thus the initial capital outlay is
equal to the investment in new fixed capital plus investment in net working capital.
Outlay = FCInv + NWCInv
(2-8)
FCInv = Investment in new fixed capital
NWCInv = Investment in net working capital
The annual after-tax operating cash flow is equal to ‘revenue (or sales) less cash operating
expenses and tax expense, plus depreciation charge’:
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CFt = ( St − Ct − Dt )(1 − Tax) + Dt

(2-9)

St = revenue from electricity sales at year t
Ct = cash operating expenses (fuel cost + carbon cost + other O&M costs) at year t
Dt = depreciation charge at year t
Tax = corporate tax rate
The paper assumes the net salvage value (including site cleanup) is zero at the end of the
project, because the salvage value has little impacts on either the value of capture option or
the value of CCR. Therefore the terminal year non-operating cash flow is equal to

TNOCF = NWCInv+ Tax × BTN

(2-10)
TNOCF = terminal year after-tax non-operating cash flow
BTN = book value of fixed capital on the terminal date
2.4 Option of Terminating Ahead of Schedule
If the prospect of continuous operation (with a retrofit option or after retrofitting CO2
capture) is extremely unfavourable, the underlying plant will be closed down ahead of the
end of its intended life. The paper assumes that the plant will be shut down if the spot NPV of
estimated future cash flow with closure options is lower than zero. The paper also evaluates
the value of the closure option and the probability of early closure under different CCR
scenarios.
3. Assumptions
3.1 Costs and Performance Assumptions of CCR
The assumption regarding additional proportion of costs and performance for CCR in Table 1
is based on the IEA GHG (2007) study of pulverised fuel power plants, using figures for
post-combustion amine scrubbing technologies.

Unit: million euro/MW (net output)

Non-CCR

CCR essential
with throttled
LP turbine
1.2913

CCR essential
design with
floating LPT
1.2945

CCR essential
design with
clutched LPT
1.3220

Total investment cost (2006)

1.2850

0.49%

0.74%

2.89%

0.3030
23.58%

0.2828
21.90%

0.2828
21.85%

0.2807
21.23%

0.0585
0.1013
73.15%
-25.78%

0.0585
0.0974
66.43%
-22.78%

0.0585
0.0958
63.73%
-21.51%

0.0585
0.0948
62.07%
-20.70%

Additional pre-investment
Total investment for retrofit (2006)
Additional investment for retrofit (Total
Investment for retrofit/Total investment costs)

Non-fuel O&M costs before retrofit (2006)
Non-fuel O&M costs after retrofit (2006)
Additional O&M costs
Electricity output change after retrofit

Table 1 Capital investment and O&M costs comparisons across different configurations of CCR in PC
power plants (IEA GHG, 2007: 61-62)

3.2 Technical, Operational, Financial and Market Assumptions
Based on a detailed assessment for a power plant in South China, we assumed the operational
performance, financial and market assumptions of the 600MW ultra-supercritical pulverised
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coal power plants as shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4. Inputs regarding future costs and prices are
adjusted by the long term inflation rate. The net reductions of CO2 per MWh electricity are
assumed to be 83.1%, consistent with the IEA GHG (2007) case study on CCR plants.
However, we assume the average capacity load can increase to 80% to partially offset the
effect of the energy penalty. The paper also assumes that the resulting carbon reductions can
provide an extra income stream through the CDM from beginning operations until 2020 and
then that carbon emissions will be constrained and hence subject to a penalty after 2020.
Unit Type
Installed Capacity
Start-Construction Timing
Construction Cycle
Operating Life
Average Capacity Load
Equivalent Availability Factor
Power Supply Efficiency (average)
Emissions Factors before Retrofit
Initial Capital Outlay
O&M costs
Storage costs scenarios
Potential retrofitting year

Ultra Supercritical Pulverised Coal
600 MW
Jan 2009
24 months
30 years or 2010 to 2040
Before retrofit 66%
After retrofit
80% (estimated)
94.5%
44.1%
0.752 ton CO2/MWh
CNY3900/kW (2006 base, 0 salvage value) plus extra 5% working
capital
CNY0.236 million/MW (2006 base)
CNY-50/tce (low), CNY50/tce (medium), CNY100/tce (high)
2015, 2020, 2025, 2030

Table 2 Technical and operational performance assumptions

Exchange Rate (consider
price)
Corporate Tax Treatment
Base Required Return
Inflation assumption

forward 6.5 (CNY/USD), 10 (CNY/Euro)

Average Coal Prices

Local Carbon Prices (costs after 2020)

Average On-grid Electricity Prices

Correlation (coal, carbon)
Correlation (electricity, coal)

25% tax rate
8%
Base

(10-year straight line)

3% (applied to fixed capital, O&M, and
retrofit costs)
Base
CNY469 (2007)
Std dev
10%
Annual Growth = basic inflation
Base
CNY80/ton (2006)
Std dev
20% (< 2020), 10% (> 2020)
Annual Growth = 2 times basic inflation
Base
CNY312/MWh (2007)
Std dev
2.5%
Annual Growth = basic inflation
-20% (low), -80% (high)
20% (low), 80% (high)

Table 3 Financial and Market Assumptions

4. Results
The stochastic cash flow model reveals that the value of CCR ranges from CNY-29.6 to
+10.5 million (or €-3.2 to +1.1 million), depending on the level of CCR investment, as shown
in Table 4. The economics of Essential CCR with a simple throttled LPT and Essential CCR
with floating LPT are both promising; their difference is not significant as Essential CCR
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with throttled LPT has slightly higher mean NPV but higher standard deviation. By
comparing with the non-CCR scenario we find that, although CCR investment would not be
recovered if a plant is not retrofitted during its lifetime, the overall economic impact of CCR
pre-investment is not significant (as shown in Figure 2).

Essential CCR with Essential CCR with Ess.CCR with
throttled LPT
floating LPT
clutched LPT

non-CCR

Capture ready pre-investment
Mean Value
9.6
Std dev
25.0
Std err
0.3
Power plants with retrofitting option
Mean NPV
620.6
630.1
Std dev
243.4
247.0
Std err
2.4
2.5

10.50
33.63
0.3

-29.6
39.2
0.4

631.0
249.8
2.5

590.9
251.8
2.5

Table 4 NPV of projects investment and CCR additional investment in USCPC plant (million CNY)

Cumulative Probability

100.00%
80.00%
60.00%
40.00%
20.00%
0.00%
-

-40

-

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Ess.CCR with Throttled LPT

Mean of Ess.CCR with Throttled LPT

Ess.CCR with Floating LPT

Mean of Ess.CCR with Floating LPT

Ess.CCR with Clutched LPT

Mean of Ess.CCR with Clutched LPT

14

Figure 2 Cumulative probability distribution of NPV for CCR investment (million CNY)

The value of a capture option ranges from CNY113 to 144 million (€11 to 14 million),
a substantial fraction (18.2% to 24.4%) of the power plants’ NPV (Figure 3). By revealing the
value of capture option, perhaps more importantly, we find the maximum loss at a confidence
level of 99% of a non-retrofittable plant with ‘carbon lock-in’ can be significantly improved
by enabling retrofitting options, from a loss of CNY150m (€15 million) to a gain of
CNY179m (€18 million). Furthermore, by investing in an Essential CCR plant, the
retrofitting option increases the maximum loss of project NPV at 99% from a loss of
CNY272 (€27 million) to a gain of CNY201 (€20 million).
The significant option value found from making plants CCR to avoid ‘carbon lock-in’
status can be much higher than the performance benefits estimated by IEA (2007), reflecting
the flexibility of an ‘American’ option as assumed here rather then using a fixed retrofit date.
The conclusion of the IEA study, that significant expenditure beyond that required to avoid
‘carbon lock-in’ is not justified, still stands, however.
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160
140
113

CNY:million

120
100

24.4%

22.2%

21.1%

30.0%

144

140

133

25.0%
20.0%

18.2%

15.0%

80
60

10.0%

40
5.0%

20
0

0.0%
non-CCR

Ess. CCR w ith
Throttled LPT

Capture Option NPV

Ess. CCR w ith
Floating LPT

Ess. CCR w ith
clutched LPT

(Capture Option NPV/ Plant NPV)

Figure 3 Value of capture options and as a percentage of total NPV of power plant

CCR increases the cumulative probability of retrofitting capture by 4.8% to
6.7% from 2015 to 2030 (Table 5). The CCR configuration also affects the probability
distribution: greater investment in CCR can achieve a higher probability of capture
and greater likelihood of retrofitting earlier. By investing in CCR, the probability of
closing a plant prior to its design life is 6.5% to 9.8% lower (Figure 4), and
consequently the value of closure option is less valuable after investing in CCR. Plant
operators can decide whether to close or to retrofit CCS to cope with high carbon
emissions costs. Both closure and retrofitting have higher odds of happening in 2030,
20 years after starting operation, than in 2015, 2020 or 2025.
Non-CCR

Essential CCR with Ess. CCR with floating
throttled LPT
pressure LPT
5.20%
6.50%
5.80%
5.40%
10.00%
12.10%
27.50%
27.60%
49.59%
50.75%

2015
4.25%
2020
4.44%
2025
8.90%
2030
26.10%
Cumulative 44.77%
Standard error < 0.1%

Ess. CCR with
clutched LPT
6.30%
6.90%
8.70%
28.00%
51.52%

Table 5 Retrofitting probability distribution
30.0

80.00%

25.9

70.00%

CNY:million

25.0
20.0

19.3
48.00%
41.50%

15.0

60.00%
17.7

16.7

50.00%

38.20% 40.00%

39.50%

30.00%

10.0

20.00%
5.0

10.00%

0.0

0.00%
non-CCR

Essential CCR w ith Ess. CCR w ith
throttled LPT
Floating LPT
Value of closure option

Ess.CCR w ith
Clutched LPT

Probability of closure

Figure 3 Closure probability and value of closure option
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When we assume only a single potential retrofitting date (option) in each scenario, we
find the value of CCR is significantly understated. As shown in Figure 5, some CCR
investments which could be justified under the scenario of four potential retrofitting dates are
not economic in the case of a single retrofitting date. In reality, a plant can be retrofitted to
capture at any time during its life. As the retrofitting nodes are thus unlimited, the value of
CCR using the four retrofitting options nodes assumed in our study may still be understated.
PV of CCR Investment (million CNY

10.00
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
-2.00

2015

2020

2025

2030

-4.00

Four
Decision
Nodes

Retrofitting Nodes
Essential CCR w ith throttled LPT

Essential CCR w ith floating LPT

Figure 4 Present Value of CCR under Single Potential Retrofitting Date Scenarios vs. the Four
Retrofitting Dates Scenario (This graph shows how the present value of an option to retrofit at any one of
the four dates shown is more valuable than an option to retrofit at a single discrete date.)

5. Enabling CCR Via Market Based Mechanisms
CCR does not reduce emissions directly, and therefore it is not eligible to be financed through
either the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) or the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) available to developing countries. Unlike developed countries, where there is a
credible possibility that governments will mandate CCS on all new coal plants in the near
future (e.g. Committee on Energy and Commerce, 2009), developing countries such as China
may rely on outside investors to encourage CCR, at least in the short term.
Furthermore, China is building more new coal-fired power capacity than anywhere
else in the world. However, the current prospects for financing CCR domestically in China
are not promising. Reiner et al (2007) conducted a survey of more than 100 key opinion
leaders on CCS in China. CCR, described as a pre-investment option to ease retrofitting with
CCS in the future, was recognized as an option by a majority of respondents, but about half
of respondents suggested that the Chinese government should not intervene in the CCR
decisions of individual projects. Industry, especially the electric power industry, was also
found to be risk averse with respect to CCR investment. As a result, the chance of
incentivizing CCR through existing channels, whether through the Chinese government,
industry or the CDM is low in the near term.
To resolve the dilemma, Liang et al (2008) suggest that newly built fossil fuel plants,
which are not currently considering CCR because of the absence of any incentive, issue
Capture Options in order to finance and optimize CCR by drawing in foreign investors and
others interested in this unique low-carbon investment opportunity.
6. Conclusions
Across one non-CCR and three CCR scenarios applied to a pulverised coal power plant, the
‘CCR essential (throttled low pressure turbine)’ and ‘CCR essential with floating pressure
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LPT’ options are the most promising, as they can be justified by positive NPV, higher
retrofitting probability and a higher chance of retrofitting earlier. We find the value of CCR
may be significantly understated if only considering only one or few retrofitting potential
dates.
Under all scenarios the value of a capture option is significant, approximately 20% of
base plants’ mean NPV, therefore ‘carbon lock-in’ will cause plant owners to lose significant
capture option value. Thus, there are sufficient market-based incentives for the modest CCR
investment that avoids a plant’s initial ‘carbon lock-in’. In other words, in the absence of
clear retrofitting strategies from both the technical and regulatory sides, making a plant CCR
is an attractive investment option. To conclude, the economic value of avoiding ‘carbon lockin’ can be much greater than the cost of CCR.
z
Is Carbon Capture Ready (CCR) an economically sound investment in China?
Investment in CCR for pulverised coal-fired power plants in China can be justified on several
grounds: USCPC plants with CCR have a 5% to 7% higher probability of retrofitting to
capture at a later date, a 6.5% to 10% lower probability of early closure (thereby enhancing
the security of the electricity supply), and a positive NPV for the additional CCR investment
(for 2 out of 3 CCR scenarios). The detailed economics of CCR depends on a number of
factors, including the initial design of the plant, the level of CCR pre-investment and carbon
price assumptions
z

What are the implications of different CCR configurations for the economics of
pulverised coal power plants?

The paper evaluated the three PC CCR technical scenarios investigated in the IEA
GHG (2007) study and found CCR with essential features and CCR with essential features
plus throttled low pressure turbine or floating low pressure turbine to be more economic than
CCR with essential features with a clutched low pressure turbine. It is also worth noting that
a clutched turbine cannot so easily take advantage of advances in CO2 capture plant
performance (Lucquiaud, 2009).
z

What are potential mechanisms to make CCR happen in China?

Although China is building more than 1 GW of coal power plants per week, currently,
there is no immediate financial mechanism or policy available to encourage CCR in China.
However, the capture option concept could finance and optimize CCR immediately.
Furthermore, power generation companies who place a reasonable probability on a high
carbon price scenario or are concerned about the risks of mandatory early closure for coal
plants because of their carbon emissions may consider investing in CCR to avoid ‘carbon
lock-in’ and lower early-closure probability.
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Appendix: Projects with Proposals for CO2 Capture Ready Design

Data
2005

Company
SaskPower
(Canada)

Activity
Feasibility study of Capture Ready lignite fired power
plant, focus on technology and economics (Booth
2005)
Retrofit SSE’s 500MW Ferrybridge Power Station in
2006.6 Scottish and
Southern Energy Yorkshire by installing Mitsui Babcock’s supercritical
boiler and turbine unit onsite to facilitate the
(SEE)& Mitsui
subsequent development of post-combustion
Babcock
technology for carbon capture and storage (SEE 2006).
2006.
E.ON
Submitted a proposal to build two new 800MW coal
10
fired power plants with Capture Ready in Kent, if
successful, the plant can be operated by 2012 (Platts
2006)
2006.
TXU
New plan to build 9000 megawatts (MW) of coal fired
11
capacity; it also mentioned that the new plants would
have room for construction of additional equipment for
capturing CO2. The plant design will consider its
access to Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) sites for CO2
burial as well (TXU 2007)
2006
SASOL
Study the feasibility of building two 80,000 barrels per
day (bpd) CTL plant in China, involves Capture Ready
design (SASOL 2006).
2007.8 Barking Power
The Chequers Lane Power plant at Dagenham got a
CCGT extension for being capture ready (Barking,
2007).
2008. 1 EDF
West Burton’s 1270MW Capture Ready CCGT plant is
now under construction (EDF, 2008).
2008.4 UMPPs
Totally nine Ultra Mega Power Projects of a capacity
of 4GW each. Aiming at established the definition of
capture ready plant for India, and ranking of all nine
proposed projects in terms of feasible CCS option
(FCO, 2008).
2008.7 CIC Energy
Mmamabula power plant will be designed as 'capture
ready' by Environmental Resource Managers (ERM). It
will focus on potential storage sites in Botswana. (CIC
Energy, 2008).
2009.3 Dong Energy
One 800MW CCGT Power plant at Newport, South
Wales. The plant is due to start Operating in 2010,
which was acquired from Seven Power in March, 2009
(SEVERN, 2009).
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Liability for Climate Change:
A Decentralized Approach to Long-Term Climate Policy
Detlef Sprinz1
Abstract
An international agreement on deep emission reductions is unlikely to materialize in the near
future. What can be done if we wish to further an ambitious long-term climate policy goal?
This article proposes a liability system that starts with at least one frontrunner and allows
itself to be taken to court for the damages related to its emissions. Such a system will be fully
upscalable to larger liability pools, and allows the rule of law to prevent dangerous climate
change to a reasonable degree. Furthermore, I suggest strict proportionality as a
distributional rule to provide powerful incentives to mitigate emissions. In order to limit the
challenge of time inconsistency, we need one actor to serve as the frontrunner. The EU can
credibly serve this function if it chooses to do so; alternate frontrunners are welcome to join
or build their own liability fund(s). Since all four components (ambitious benchmark,
liability system, distributional rule, and prevention of time inconsistency) reinforce each
other, it appears to be prudent to believe that we can make substantial headway towards
achieving a low greenhouse gas future by the end of the century without having to rewrite
politics as we know it.
1 The Challenge
The Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
mandates ratifying industrialized countries to undertake emission reductions during 20082012. Given recently agreed upon scientific evidence as reflected in the Fourth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change 2007a), it appears to be wise to halve anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gases (GHG) until 2050 (German Advisory Council on Global Change 2008) and
to go for a low greenhouse gas economy by the end of the 21st century. Among the major
emitters, only the EU shows willingness to pursue such a challenge. An international
agreement on deep emission reductions is unlikely to materialize in the near future. What can
be done if we wish to further an ambitious long-term climate policy goal? This article
proposes a liability system that starts with at least one frontrunner and allows itself to be
taken to court for the damages related to its emissions. Such a system will be fully upscalable
to larger liability pools, and allows the rule of law to prevent dangerous climate change to a
reasonable degree. Furthermore, I suggest strict proportionality as a distributional rule to
provide powerful incentives to mitigate emissions. In order to limit the challenge of time
inconsistency, we need one actor to serve as the frontrunner. The EU can credibly serve this
function if it chooses to do so; alternate frontrunners are welcome to join or build their own
liability fund(s). Since all four components (ambitious benchmark, liability system,
distributional rule, and prevention of time inconsistency) reinforce each other, it appears to be
prudent to believe that we can make substantial headway towards achieving a low-GHG
future by the end of the century without having to rewrite politics as we know it.
The paper is structured as follows. In the second section, I briefly show why climate
change is a challenging long-term policy problem and why hopes for a “global deal” (e.g.,
Stern 2008) within the near future may be overly optimistic. In the third section, I introduce
the fourfold architecture of what is needed, incl. a guidepost for a long-term target, the setup
of a liability system, the distributional rule for liability and awards, as well as how to get it
1
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started by overcoming the time inconsistency problem. A response system based on this
fourfold architecture will raise legitimate doubts among policy practitioners and academics
alike. In response, the fourth section is geared towards proposing a range of practical finetuning of the liability system. The architecture proposed will never be able to solve the
challenge of preventing dangerous climate change by itself, yet the concluding section will
highlight the central advantages of the proposed scheme which requires comparatively little
international agreement and relies on decentralized enforcement for a transition to a lowGHG future.
2 Why Responding to Long-term Climate Change is Difficult2
Governing climate change is not a trivial problem. It encompasses a range of challenges,
including generic ones such as intergenerational, distributional, informational, and time
inconsistency issues. Superimposed on this are domestic policy problems and the challenge
of international cooperation. Given that any of these challenges is not trivial to solve, we
should not expect to simultaneously solve all of them as well as the interactions among them.
Adverse impacts from climate change are likely to grow over time (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change 2007b). Much of the atmospheric changes have been set in motion
by present and past generations, but given current trends, we are unlikely to immediately
switch to a low-GHG economy. The benefits of a low-GHG economy are likely to be felt by
future generations, thereby not offering present generations the positive rewards of an
investment into a low-GHG economy. We thus face an intergenerational problem. In
addition, we are confronted with the distributional issue between industrialized and some
industrializing countries – the latter wishing to keep open the option to substantively increase
their GHG emissions as part of their development process. Furthermore, present generations
may not believe that future generations will share their preferences for a low-GHG future,
thereby creating an incentive not to invest now into a GHG-frugal future. It is difficult for
present generations to bind future ones; and for future generations, it is difficult to bind
present ones. We therefore face time inconsistency problems in terms of rule adherence, and
the expectations mechanisms favors moral hazard among the present generation. This aspect
is devoid of any aspect of lobbying for the status quo in order to pursue industrial policy,
defend current markets, or favor particular groups in society.
Partially cutting across this set of challenges are the domestic politics and
international cooperation issues. Put briefly, even the best internationally agreed plan can be
pulled apart by the push-and-pull of everyday politics and the eagerness of most leaders to
appeal to particular constituencies in return for their vote. As climate changes may often not
be as high a priority item as food security for the near future (although it may very well be
the case for long-term food security), requests for improving social security for particular
constituents, or dealing with the next budgetary crisis, we should expect an imperfect
domestic climate policy in most countries – especially if we are interested in long-term
climate policy. Furthermore, the transition to a low-GHG world economy requires open or
tacit collusion among the top 10 to 20 emitting countries and to a lesser degree collusion by
countries embarking on adaptation (Sprinz 2001, 272-276). Based on past observations,
including the Kyoto Protocol, we are unlikely to see the replication of the relative success of
the efforts to reduce stratospheric ozone-depleting substances under the Montreal Protocol as
well as successor agreements. It would indeed be a rare feat to see the world manage a
couple of percents of world GDP collectively and harmoniously over a century for the sake of
protecting planet Earth. Even the World Trade Organization is characterized by sufficient
2
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difficulty to promulgate a world of perfect international trading. Not even common markets,
such as the EU, would claim this privilege. We should not expect global climate policy to
easily beat well-oiled regulatory institutions such as the EU or the GATT/WTO system. The
negotiations about a post-2012 climate order appear to have arrived at some stage of
uncertainty or crisis. But crisis also implies opportunities, and this article sketches the outline
of a strategy that circumvents a range of the problems mentioned above.
3 A Fourfold Architecture
The architecture proposed consists of four components. First, we need an ultimate goal that
gives some operational meaning to the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC (United Nations
1992, Article 2). Second, I propose a liability system that compensates for damages caused
by anthropogenic climate change. Third, awards through the liability system necessitate a
distributional structure. I propose that strict proportionality of shares in the causing agents
should guide proportionality in awards. And fourth, such a system has to come into existence
by overcoming aspects of time inconsistency. I suggest that a leading actor, such as the EU
or others, could set a liability system in motion that might evolve and mature over time.
First, a benchmark is needed to establish liability. At a minimum, a positive price for
GHG emissions should prevail. The Kyoto Protocol succeeded in creating the difficult-torevert belief that there will be a positive price for carbon now as well as in the foreseeable
future. The governance structure of the Kyoto Protocol essentially displays all the problems
described briefly in Section 2. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that the present Kyoto
architecture by itself – rather than different factors – will serve as a self-propelling and
energetic incubator for a transition to a low-GHG future. A positive price for carbon or GHG
emissions is, however, not sufficient. Only an ambitious long-term target can serve as a
benchmark, and only the impacts caused by deviations from the (counterfactual) benchmark
can serve as grounds for liability for “residual damage,” (Verheyen 2005), i.e., damages not
prevented by mitigation or adaptation.
In effect, the UNFCCC stipulates such a benchmark:
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner
(United Nations 1992, Article 2).
Interpreting this objective is a non-trivial undertaking (Ott et al. 2004). In practical
terms, there is no universal agreement what this goal means and whether countries can be
held accountable to fully contribute to achieving it. A voluntarily erected liability system
actually does not necessitate universal agreement on Article 2, but it needs an ambitious
benchmark to establish that residual damages should be avoided and otherwise be
compensated. An ambitious goal such as a 2 degrees Celsius temperature change as
compared to pre-industrial periods 3 or a 450ppm carbon equivalent goal may serve this
purpose. There is no need for universal support for such a goal in legal form, just a broadly
held belief that such an ambitious goal would be in line with Article 2 of the UNFCCC. It is
the climate impacts associated with an operationalization of Article 2 UNFCCC which would
3
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constitute a zero liability benchmark, and any excess damages relative to this benchmark
would be considered for compensation. The damages themselves need to be caused by
anthropogenic climate change, not by normal fluctuations in climate.
Second, Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative serves as a point of departure for
liability for damage. As Kant stipulated:
Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should
become a universal law (Kant 1993 [1785], 30).
Kant suggests that a concerned party should act in accordance with a collective goal
in mind and no fallacy of aggregation exists (Sprinz 2000). If everyone behaved accordingly,
there would be no need for a liability fund as everyone would be satisfied. This is unlikely to
be the case for the foreseeable future as a transition to a low-GHG world economy is
expected to take 25 to a hundred years. The charm of the liability fund is to entice parties to
join the liability fund such that the emissions of major emitters become more broadly aligned
with Article 2 UNFCCC – akin to compliance with an intertemporal Kantian categorical
imperative on unwanted climate change.
Attribution of cause and effects ought to be in the hands of a neutral judicial body that
has no interest whether and which amount to award. For simplicity, let us define it as the
climate court. It should simply apply judicial rules and procedures to see whether there is
sufficient evidence that links anthropogenic emissions to climate-induced damages.4 If this
link can be credibly established based on judicial best practice, the climate court would make
an award. The effective award to be made from the liability fund would be proportional to
the percentage of emission covered by the members of the liability fund. In terms of
establishing cause and effect, climate change resembles liability for smoking-induced health
care damages. While early warnings were issued already by the midst of the 20th century
(Doll and Hill 1950), it took court cases several decades to reasonably establish cause and
effect relationships and make financial awards to relevant parties5 and to arrive at the WHO
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control of 2003. 6 The rule of law and independent
adjudication are at the core of a liability system for anthropogenic climate change. Awards
would only to go members of the liability fund.
Third, the distributional rule used is strict proportionality. This applies to the
damages covered, compensation received, and the contributions to be made. While there are
many alternatives to strict proportionality considered in the climate negotiations, including
work by this author (Schröder et al. 2002, 140-141), it appears that simplicity and
transparency afford the greatest advantage. Proportionality over time adjusts who is liable to
which degree. Until now, most industrialized countries would be disproportionally liable due
to their high share of emissions. If current projections regarding an increasing share by
rapidly developing countries such as Brazil, China, and India are correct, then their share of
emissions will increase over time.
This would increase the percentage of contributions which these countries make to the
fund. Such a system has one undisputable advantage: It rewards any country for outright
mitigation, as GHGs not created cannot cause liability, necessitate no contributions to the
liability fund (in the extreme case of no emissions). This rule applies to past emissions since
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the reference year, and also provides incentives to curb future emissions regardless of current
aspirations for economic development.
The liability fund would make awards using strict proportionality.7 As we presently
consider countries (rather than consumers or individuals) to be liable for climate change, they
would be held liable for the percentage of damages caused by climate change in proportion to
their emission share since a specific reference year. For example, if the EU were responsible
for 17% of worldwide CO2 emissions since 1990 (reference year for emissions in the
UNFCCC), then the EU were liable for 17% of the anthropogenically induced climate
damages occurring after 1990 (see Figures 1 and 2 for illustration). The same rule applies to
all other countries. Alternative reference years could be 1992 (the opening for signature of
the UNFCCC). The parties to the UNFCCC, which enjoys close to universal support, have
explicitly endorsed both reference years, and it is the integral of emissions since the reference
year (minus potential depreciation of GHGs due to atmospheric processes) that creates the
basis for counting cumulative emissions. In order to become a plaintiff, the country of the
plaintiff has to join the liability fund, and make payments to it in proportion to its
intertemporal integral of emissions since the base year. The liability fund thus takes care of
the disparity of shares in emissions and shares in damages and provides an overall incentive
for emission reductions. Those actively expecting a net transfer in their favor will likely join
such a fund, others are more likely to abstain in the beginning. In order to have some funds
at its outset, a major emitter needs to join the liability fund. Proportionality of coverage of
cumulative emissions translates into identical proportions available for compensation. If this
fund covers 40% of worldwide emissions since the reference year, it would only make
awards equivalent to 40% of the damages and self-indemnify from the remaining 60% of
damages by pointing plaintiffs to the actors responsible for the uncovered damages. This
procedure limits the threat of immediate insolvency and a run on the fund, besides the length
of time needed for the adjudication of the case. If the damages from smoking are any
guidance, it will take several decades for court decisions to award compensation. In the
meantime, the fund could be build up to relevant size.
Fourth, the time inconsistency problem has to be restrained. In their Nobel-prize
winning work on time inconsistency, Kydland and Prescott (1977) demonstrate that optimal
choices at one point in time may be at odds with optimal choices at future points in time.
Policies may be designed such that one policy rule is administered in the first period, e.g.,
encouraging low emissions. However, at a later point in time, it may be the best policy to
actually permit high emissions. More generally, governments are tempted to renege on
earlier promises given changes in circumstances. “The suboptimality arises because there is
no mechanism to induce future policymakers to take into consideration the effect of their
policy, via the expectations mechanisms, upon current decisions of agents” (Kydland and
Prescott 1977, 481). Naturally, the challenge of time inconsistency applies to long-term
climate policy.
A prominent way to escape this challenge is to essentially tie one’s hands irrevocably
to an ambitious goal and have an institutional setup that does not allow for easy departure
from the path chosen earlier. Thus, the need for a credible frontrunner arises who irrevocably
wishes to lead in terms of aiming at a low-GHG future while contributing the kernel of a
liability fund of credible size to demonstrate its sincerity. At this point in time, the EU may
be the only group of countries of substantial size that has a long-term ambition (2 degrees
Celsius goal),8 prepares for unconditional emission reductions (20% by 2020 as compared to
7
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1990), and aims at halving its emission by the middle of this century.9 In addition, the EU
has created a carbon market for roughly half its industrial emissions and the income
generated from auctioning all permits could serve as the contribution to the liability fund.
Any other country is encouraged to join, but there may be little competition to be the first
mover. As awards are only given to plaintiffs whose countries are members of the liability
club, plaintiffs will induce their countries to join. 10 Countries abstaining from joining a
mutual liability fund would remain politically vulnerable to being sued directly through their
own court system (e.g., the USA) or in other international fora of the UN system (Sprinz
2005; Ochs and Sprinz 2008).
What should the liability fund actually fund? Since mitigation is the central action
variable to reduce one’s contributions to the liability fund, only adaptation and compensation
for residual damage remain as potential purposes. In effect, adaptation and compensation for
damages not avoided are essentially two different forms of compensation related to damages.
Funding for adaptation is transferred in anticipation of damages, compensation (in the narrow
sense) is awarded ex post. The plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for damages
proportional to the aggregate emission share of countries covered by the liability fund, and
they could use it for adaptation measures or outright compensation. This, however, assumes
that we have infinite time to spare when making awards. Given reasonable anticipation,
funds sent by countries covered by the liability fund to potential plaintiffs, e.g., for adaptation
measures, should be considered prepayments under a potential settlement. To make sure that
resources are left for ex post compensation for climate impacts not avoided, at least 50% of
the liability fund should be held back for ex post adjudication to avoid that plaintiffs do not
sue a fund that already exhausted its resources. This rule also limits the temptation to buy
political allegiance under the guise of climate adaptation.
4 Challenges to the Architecture
Readers may consider this architecture to be insufficient to assure that the world will avoid
dangerous climate change. This may indeed be the case, yet many alternative architectures
share this fate (Aldy and Stavins 2007). Rather than consider complex schemes, I propose
Shaker architecture. The proposed liability fund does not rely on elaborate interstate
negotiations, yet is fully upscalable to universal membership. The liability architecture
requires at least one frontrunner who is willing to expose itself to limited liability, but the
architecture is indifferent about the identity of the frontrunner. Under ideal circumstances,
such as perfect anticipation and procedures, the architecture proposed achieves full
compliance with an ambitious interpretation of Article 2 and need not make awards:
Countries would make appropriate emission reductions and avoid liability. If the outcomes
are less benign, damaged parties are left with a good chance for actual compensation.
The architecture proposed so far should be augmented by a range of finer points to
understand its basic working and make it robust against some likely challenges. These points
are addressed in a question and answer format.
Who Will Serve as The Plaintiff?
The law normally operates either by (i) perfect adherence by parties covered under the law or
(ii) the courts dealing with infringements on the law. Since there is little expectation that
countries are currently on the way to universal implementation of an ambitious interpretation
of Article 2 UNFCCC, it is not far-fetched to expect that some actor will seek redress for
climate-induced damages. But who shall be entitled to claim damages?
9
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I suggest that any person should be able to make a case for compensation, provided
some minimum criteria are met for the sincerity of the case. A pre-screening procedure of
the climate court should weed out frivolous cases in order to avoid clogging the judicial
system. While anyone or groups of persons or entities (incl. countries and groups of
countries) can sue and potentially win cases, awards should be reserved for persons or entities
in member countries of the liability fund. Persons or entities in the frontrunner country are
equally entitled to sue and receive awards.
This procedure allows the climate courts to start considering questions of cause and
effects – which are likely to take more than a decade. The requirement for plaintiff’s country
being a club member of the liability fund provides incentives for plaintiffs to induce their
country or countries to join the liability fund system.11 As a result, the liability fund system
is likely to grow beyond a committed frontrunner.
What Happens If There are Different Interpretations of Article 2 UNFCCC?
Assume a world without universal agreement on the meaning of Article 2 UNFCCC with
respect to a zero liability benchmark. Would there be scope for multiple liability funds?
Given our current understanding of the climate system and our future preferences, we
are unlikely to arrive at a universally agreed upon interpretation of Article 2 UNFCCC now
or in the foreseeable future. But this does not have to be harmful. Our world has different
product standards, lives with different laws, and has different economic, political, or social
ambitions. Thus, we should expect that more than one liability fund emerges. Let them
compete! Some countries may prefer a 350 ppm equivalent goal (Hansen et al. 2008)
whereas others may prefer a 450 or 550 ppm equivalent goal. Member countries would selfselect into liability funds with different ambitions, may become members of multiple funding
systems, and can engage in merger and acquisition agreements between liability funds. Will
the “law of the least ambitious program” - the survival of the fund with the least ambitious
interpretation of Article 2 UNFCCC - become observed reality (Underdal 1980, 1998; Hovi
and Sprinz 2006)?
The outcome depends on the position of the most ambitious party that creates a
specific liability fund. If it is of sufficient size, it may attract particularly climate-vulnerable
parties to join it. Domestic budgetary oversight or competing claims for funds by domestic
constituents will quickly limit costly membership in too many liability clubs. But what
happens if the most ambitious fund opts for a very unenthusiastic goal, such as 1,000 ppm
carbon equivalent goal? If the most climate-friendly country is very unambitious, then there
may be no need to care for long-term climate-related damages. To instill more optimism, a
liability fund could also be created by interested private persons or private entities (such as
charitable foundations), and countries could join private frontrunners. Given the current
realities in world politics, it is very likely that at least some financial, societal, or sovereign
actor is willing to purse a somewhat ambitious interpretation of Article 2 UNFCCC.
What Happens If a Country Leaves The Liability Fund?
Some countries may be willing to join the fund early on in the expectation that high damages
and small premiums will benefit it in the early phase of the fund’s life, but that GHGintensive development plans provide incentives to leave the liability fund after the first
awards. These expectations may indeed be realistic. What can be done to keep countries
from exploiting the liability fund by way of the timing of membership?
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Membership in a law-abiding system that takes decades to grant awards can be
expected to have norm-establishing and socializing functions. But even if it does not, there is
no need to make awards in the form of one-time payments. Ex post compensation can be
awarded similar to an infinite interest payment for bonds, thereby lengthening the horizon of
a party that may otherwise cancel its membership. But even if a party leaves liability fund A
to join fund B or to leave the liability system completely, there is scope to limit the gaming of
membership: Cancel all undisbursed payments to the party leaving the liability fund, reduce
the coverage of the overall fund by using the proportionality rule, and make renewed
membership conditional upon immediately paying up for previously uncompensated
obligations for emissions. The latter mechanism serves as a membership fee that is not
charged on permanent members. During periods of non-membership or membership in less
ambitious liability funds, countries would become politically vulnerable. Conversely, if they
abandon less demanding liability funds in favor of more demanding liability funds, they
become less politically exposed.
What is The Role of International Agreement?
No international agreement is needed. The liability system relies on a frontrunner to come
into existence. The only guidance needed is Article 2 UNFCCC, i.e., prevention of
dangerous climate change, and nearly all countries have already subscribed to this norm.
Potential merger and acquisition (M & A) among rival liability systems may necessitate
standard commercial negotiations among M & A partners – besides due diligence. While
unified international standards may solve coordination problems, a variety of liability funds
may help solve the participation problem.
What is The Role of Science?
There is considerable scope for the role of science, and a liability system actually serves as a
test of the credibility of science. In this context, science is understood to be all knowledge
generating systems that links causes (emissions) and effects (climate damages), quantifies the
effects, and parcels the effects out to relevant causal mechanisms. Without these three
aspects of knowledge, the liability system cannot work. Fundamentally, the judicial system
will adjudicate climate cases similar to the case of smoking and health- related research, i.e.,
 whether GHG emissions will lead to adverse effects,
 how and in which measurement units damages will be calculated, and
 which part of the assessed damages in a particular case (e.g., storm-related destruction
of a large forest) can be attributed to anthropogenic climate change and which part
shall be attributed to other causes (see Jaeger et al. 2008).
Those parts of damages which cannot credibly be linked to anthropogenic GHG emissions
should be settled through means other than the climate liability fund.
The fact that science often does not speak with one voice should not pose a special
problem. There are competing theories of why individuals undertake crimes, and the courts
were and remain able to adjudicate cases of murder despite changes in science and its
fashions. There is no reason for climate change to pose a new challenge to lawyers. The
complexity involved may suggest that climate courts should be able to draw on specialized
expertise, but the same is true for any other novel category of court cases.
In many respects, a liability system is a vote of the confidence by lawyers on the
science of climate change. Two aspects matter in this context: means and variance. If
confidence is below the threshold needed for the award of compensation through the climate
courts, then the mean award should be zero. Beyond the threshold of confidence, the awards
should be positive. The more exact the knowledge provided by the scientific sector, the
lower the variance to be considered in the awards. At the upper end of confidence, we could
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have awards with zero variance. Zero variance is unlikely to be accomplished in the
foreseeable future, but advances of science should allow the variance to be narrowed over
time.
Why is a Frontrunner Needed?
A frontrunner of non-trivial size is needed to establish the liability fund. Ideally, the largest
cumulative emitter should serve as the founder of the liability fund as it assures potential
plaintiffs a sizeable enough award to be worth its country’s membership as well as the pursuit
of a court case. For practical reasons, the founder or founding group should ideally cover
10% or more of cumulative emissions. The USA, China, and the EU qualify for such a role.
The EU appears to be the most suitable candidate at this point in time, but any other coalition
with an ambitious interpretation of Article 2 UNFCCC is welcome.12
How Can The Credibility of The Liability System be Assured?
There is no guarantee that the liability system will come into effect, and there is no guarantee
that the system – once erected – will remain credible. To limit the first challenge, a credible
frontrunner has to be found who pursues the project as a private good even while creating
global public benefits. The second challenge can be addressed by a Political Climate
Exchange.
The Council of the EU has decided in March 2007 to pursue an unconditional
emission reduction of 20% of GHGs by 2020 as compared to 1990, irrespective of the
ambition of other countries.13 Current efforts at creating a climate and renewable energy
program are meant to add credibility to this political goal. Why the EU is willing to advance
an ambitious goal until 2020 and pursue halving its emissions by the middle of this century
remains somewhat clouded. The EU may test its authority as an aggregate vis-à-vis its
member states, may be willing to show world leadership on an issue it cares for while having
a reasonable chance to implement its past promises under the Kyoto Protocol (European
Environment Agency 2007), or may have other reasons for pursuing its ambitions. To make
the degree of credibility of the frontrunner’s resolve transparent and to assess the credibility
of the liability system over time, it would be desirable to create a Political Climate Exchange
(PCX).
The PCX would trade assets similar to those found on the Iowa Electronic Markets.14
Rather than offering bets on who the next US president will be or which monetary policy
decision the US Federal Reserve Board will take in the near future, the PCX could offer
future trades with different maturities whether the frontrunner will comply with its announced
goal. Prices of 100 units would signal 100% trustworthiness, a price of 0 units would signal
complete untrustworthiness. As long as sufficient liquidity is guaranteed via market makers,
strategic interventions by influential actors curbed, and insider trading avoided, the PCX
could signal the resolve of the frontrunner. In addition, this system could later be applied to
the liability system at large. The point is to make transparent to all interested parties whether
a liability system and the policies of frontrunners are credible and when crises of trust ensue.
Ratings of sovereign bonds by rating agencies fulfill the same function – with all the known
imperfections. In essence, information markets would substitute for political access to
12
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decision-makers by the few. The liability fund should be audited by at least three accounting
firms to limit conflicts of interest, with rotation of auditors after 5 or 10 years. The audits
should be made available to the public as well as the responses by the PCX’s management.
How Can The Architecture be Made Universal?
The architecture is universal and fully upscalable. The liability fund, once erected, can grow
with the help of new members. Plaintiff’s countries have to become club members before
awards can be disbursed, thereby inducing growth in membership. The fund is upscalable to
complete membership of the UN membership system, and in this case, the awards would
cover nearly all anthropogenic emissions. As membership grows, a governance system has to
be created. It should resemble those of stock exchanges, not that of the UN system. In effect,
the credibility of the management of the liability fund would be reflected in the PCX quotes.
As there is no necessity to have just one liability system, I would expect competing systems
to emerge, with some of them offering gold standards and others only silver or bronze
standards for management and their ambitions to curb climate change. Their respective price
quotes should reflect the differences in products offered.
How Can We Deal with Parties Claiming Repeat Damages?
Climate change is an enduring challenge, not a one-time problem. The liability fund is
created with a perspective towards long-term operation. It is funded on the basis of
cumulative emissions over time, and it shall make awards for cumulative anthropogenic
climate damages. Assume in a thought experiment that the same cumulative emissions
trigger damage X at time t0 and a different damage at t1. An insurance would normally be
entitled to cancel an insurance plan after settling a claim for t0. Given that we know
considerably little about cumulative climate damages and substantial inertia in the climate
system (even if we reduced GHG emissions to zero overnight), liability should cover
damages. Given that the liability fund cannot exclude cumulative damages by design, it
should be allowed to make deductibles to limit damages at t0 and at t1 at the latest. In effect,
the climate courts could stipulate that some part of the award at t0 has to go to adaptation
measures to limit the damages at t1. Insurance for earthquakes, such as the California
Earthquake Authority, mandates deductibles to align the interest of the insured with that of
the earthquake fund and avoid moral hazard by the insured. Adaptation funding granted in
advance of settlements could be transformed into prepayments for later awards. Thus, there
would be a proper nexus between adaptation funding for vulnerable areas and ex post
compensation for unavoided damages, using the former as prepayment towards the latter.
Is a Liability Fund Politically Realistic?
Whether a sovereign entity (or any other credible actor) is willing to bind itself for centuries
to come remains an open question. States are organizations build originally for eternity with
long-term dependence of the rulers on the ruled or its selectorate, i.e., those factually keeping
rulers in power or replacing them with alternative rulers (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). By
this benchmark and several millennia of experience with political organization, cautious
optimism is warranted. Nothing qualitatively new is required of countries, private actors or
other actors in the creation of a long-term liability system.
What are The Ulterior Motives for a Climate Liability Fund?
In essence, selfishness on behalf of the plaintiffs and limited altruism if not selfishness on the
part of the frontrunner are needed to create a global public good. While human organization
can always lead to undesired and counterintuitive consequences (e.g., liability for
gynecologists may lead to a reduction in medical assistance to those wishing to deliver
318

babies), it is conceivable that a climate-related liability system will encourage strong
mitigation and reserve a minor role for litigation. In this case, the expectations mechanism
would have achieved the desired goal. In the case of a substantial role for liability, making
excessive awards would certainly run the system bankrupt. This would be properly picked up
by the PCX. Judges aware of such a possibility and with a mind on their future employment
are likely to keep an eye on the tradeoff between actual damages, putative fines, and the
liquidity of the liability fund. And even if such a system were to undergo bankruptcy,
members of a successor liability system could treat past contributions as a prepayment to a
successor liability fund. At best, selfishness would propel strong mitigation while insuring
damaged parties that they will not be left alone if mitigation is less than perfect.
5 The Case for Decentralized Responses
Carbon-labeling of foods is emerging, organic food has acquired substantial market share in
several countries despite unproven health effects and a premium on prices, and some
industries consider carbon neutrality. Even a whole industrialized country such as Norway
has proposed to become carbon-neutral by 2050. 15 Thus, there is enthusiasm for a more
climate-friendly future, and we have some reason for cautious optimism. An ambitious
“global deal” appears unlikely to emerge in the near future due to a variety of simultaneous
challenges. Instead, a simple, decentralized system of liability funds could take over some of
the challenge to avoid dangerous climate change.
Long-term climate policy needs a reminder why it is useful and for whom. Once
financial power is given to those facing damages, the emissions side will be reminded of its
exposure. A liability system by itself is unlikely to deliver avoidance of dangerous climate
change, but it can
 establish a well-known social mechanism of compensation for damages based on the
polluter-pays principle,
 it is fully adjustable to various levels of the maturity of science,
 the architecture outlined here does not require international agreement,
 invites the damaged to become part of a permanent liability club while erstwhile
recipients may become net contributors later,
 signals powerful incentives to mitigate,
 it furthers the rule of law in all member countries as well as among sub-national and
trans-national plaintiffs, and
 we have considerable experience with most of the components needed.
The system outlined here does not require new preferences, a new world order, global
agreement, a green consciousness, political correctness, or other characteristics. It simply
requires appropriate allocation of property rights, business sense, legal experience, and a
politically courageous frontrunner. Keep it simple, and let a frontrunner step forward!
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Figure 1: CO2 Shares of Major Emitters (1990-2005)
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Figure 2: Share of CO2 Emissions (1990-2005)
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Do All Roads Lead to Copenhagen?
The Case of China’s Participation in The Post-2012 Climate Change Regime
Dr. Ho-Ching Lee1
Abstract
Climate change is a global challenge and requires a global solution. In late 2007,
governments adopted the Bali Roadmap, launching negotiations toward a new global climate
agreement. Among nations with large CO2 emissions, only China, sustains a rapid economic
growth dependent on the expanded use of carbon-intensive coal. The role of China in postKyoto climate negotiations is therefore critical to the international effort to combat climate
change and global warming.
In fact, China ratified the UNFCCC in January 1993 and was among the first ten
countries to become Convention Parties. Over the years, China has been actively participating
in climate change regime and has taken a multiple-track approach in climate change
negotiations, including the UN Convention/Protocol hard law path, the APP partnership,
multilateral and bilateral climate cooperation agreements, G8 and APEC processes and more
recently, the US-led Major Economies Meetings.
China’s FCCC/Kyoto Protocol participation draws largely from the previous
experience of participating in the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete ozone layer.
To China, participating in climate change negotiations is a legitimate access to
assistance and technology. Institutionally, China’s led agency in climate change affairs has
been shifted from China Meteorological Administration (science), Ministry of Environmental
Protection (environment) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (diplomacy) and National
Development and Reform Commission (economic interests).
Internationally, China’s multiple-track approach further raises its profile and boost
negotiations for the post-2012 regime both inside and outside the UN process. The question
that what does China want from the post-Kyoto climate policy depends entirely on how
urgent China perceives climate change to be, and how badly it wants the world to agree a
solution to the problem.
Introduction
Global environmental and ecological problems have been around for centuries. Among them,
climate change has recently entered the center stage of global agenda. It is global in scale,
including regional and local impacts that lead to melting glaciers, sea level rise, abrupt
weather, and weather extremes. Human activities; mainly burning of fuels, and land use
practices are increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and causing
warming of the climate system. It is evident in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007)
that global warming is “unequivocal” in global average air and ocean temperatures. Eleven of
the last twelve years (1995-2006) rank among the twelve warmest years since 1850. More
specifically, the average temperature of the Earth's surface has increased by 0.74 degree
Celsius over the past century, from 1906 to 2005, and is expected to further rise by 1.1 to 6.4
degrees Celsius by the end of the 21st century.
This human-induced global warming is a global challenge and needs to be addressed
by globally coordinated policies. Under the United Nations (UN) mechanism, the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), and the Kyoto Protocol have been signed in 1992
and 1997 respectively as legal instruments. Based on the ozone negotiations, climate
negotiations take a convention/protocol approach by setting up a general framework first and
1
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calling for specific emission reduction targets. The Kyoto Protocol places a heavier burden on
developed nations under the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.”
Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol requires the industrialized states (primarily OECD countries
and economies in transition) to reduce their emissions 5.2% in average as compared to 1990
levels by the 2008-2012 commitment period.
This group of countries, also called Annex I countries, must first take domestic
actions against climate change. At the same time, the Protocol allows them a certain degree
of flexibility in meeting their emission reduction targets through three market-based
mechanisms. Emission Trading (ET) is known as the carbon market, and the Joint
Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) are project-based flexible
mechanisms which feed the carbon market. JI enables industrialized states to carry out joint
projects with other developed countries (usually countries with economies in transition);
while the CDM involves investment in emission reduction projects in developing countries.
Since the beginning of 2006, the estimated potential of emission reductions delivered
to the CDM pipeline has grown rapidly to 2.9 billion tones of carbon dioxide equivalent, or
the combined emissions of Australia, Germany and the United Kingdom. Overall, based on
the
essential
CDM
statistics
provided
by
the
UNFCCC
web
page
(http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html), about 1,665 CDM projects have been registered
as of June 2009, with around 4,200 more in the project pipeline.
Unlike the Annex I countries under the Protocol, China and other developing states
(also called Non-Annex I countries) are not currently committed to reduce emissions by the
2008-2012 period. In terms of emissions statistics taken from the position paper titled
“China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change,” from 1904 to 2004, carbon
dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning in China made up only 8 percent of the world's
total over the same period, and cumulative emissions per capita ranked 92nd in the world.
China's carbon dioxide emissions from energy consumption in 2004 totaled 5.07 billion tons.
However, according to a report conducted by the Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency, China overtook the US in 2006 as the world's biggest emitter of carbon
dioxide and the greenhouse gas blamed for the bulk of global warming. A similar report was
released in 2008 by UC-Berkeley showing that China overtook the United States as the
leading emitter of carbon dioxide about a year ago. Its emissions are now increasing about 10
times faster than in the United States. The current high level of emissions, negative impacts
of climate change, a growing concern for environmental improvement, the business
opportunities from finance, and technology are major forces at play in shaping China’s
climate change positions.
Over the years, China and other developing states have been evolved into a voting
bloc, expressing specific interests, positions, and ideas. Recognized as the Group of 77 (G77,
in fact consisting of over 130 member states now), China and G77 have led in linking
environmental protection and economic development, stressing the environmental
degradation caused by poverty. The right to development, ongoing industrialization process,
rapid increase of energy consumption, and the heavy dependence on coal make it rather
difficult for China to reduce emission reductions.
From Bali, Poznan to Copenhagen
In December 2007, at the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP 13) to FCCC held in Bali,
Indonesia, governments adopted Bali Road Map towards a new agreement to replace the
Kyoto Protocol after it expires in 2012. Throughout the COP 13, divisions between the UA
and the EU, along with developed and developing states over the need for binding targets
from the Non-Annex I countries almost collapsed the negotiation. India, backed by China and
other G77 members, asked that mitigation actions by developing states be linked to financial
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assistance, technology transfer and capacity building, a move opposed by the US. As the
conference dragged on an extra day, there was a dramatic twist.
The Papua New Guinean delegate directly asked the US delegation that “the world is
waiting for the US to lead but for some reason if you are not willing to lead, leaving it to the
rest of us. Please, get out of the way.” The US delegation leader then took the floor, and in an
unexpected U-turn, stated that the US would indeed join the global consensus. After a
moment of shock, the convention hall erupted in applause, and finally, the Bali Road Map
was adopted, setting an ambitious goal of achieving a new global climate agreement in
December 2009 at the COP 15 in Copenhagen.
The midpoint conference, or the COP 14, was held in Poznan in December 2008.
Governments were taking stock of the progress made since Bali, discussing various proposals
that had been proposed and adopted work plans for 2009. On a more political level, Poznan is
the final round of positioning by governments before heading into a period of intense
negotiations. In general, there are four key issues (or building blocks) to be addressed:
mitigation, adaptation, finance, and technology. Among these, some of the most pressing
issues include: the emission reduction targets to be adopted by developed countries; the type
of mitigation actions to be taken by developing countries, particularly China, India, and other
major emerging economies; and the types and level of support to be provided to developing
countries for both mitigation and adaptation.
Throughout climate change negotiations, China has taken actions to address climate
change with the following principles:
1. Sustainable Development
For China, climate change can only be addressed within the framework of sustainable
development. In this sense, climate change is not only a scientific debate, but also a
development issue.
2. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
The Article 3.1 of the FCCC is the cornerstone of climate change negotiations for China.
Both developed and developing countries are sharing these responsibilities, but the
developed countries should take the lead in emission reductions. The Bali Action Plan
also calls for “a shared vision” for long-term cooperative action, but China continues to
maintain the legal distinction between Annex I and Non-Annex I countries by stressing
this principle.
3. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies
China thinks that “deceleration is a long and arduous challenge, while adaptation is a
more present and imminent task.” At this time, adaptation is necessary, inevitable, and
currently taking place. Both mitigation (domestic emission reductions from the sources)
and adaptation to climate change go hand in hand in China.
4. Access to Finance and Technology
Taking part in the Kyoto Protocol provides access to financial assistance and technology
transfer from the developed countries. China has become the largest recipient country in
CDM projects. At the COP 14, China called for a Multilateral Technology Acquisition
Fund and the financing for adaptation to be “predictable and stable, new and additional,
and adequate and timely.” The Kyoto approach offers a special channel to accelerate the
development of renewable energy.
Internationally, US climate change policies and actions will have impacts on Chinese
responses. The US withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol when the Bush Administration turned
its back on emission reduction target of 7%. From 2001-2008, the largest cumulative
emitter—US was absent from compliance under Kyoto regime. Without the US at the table
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and prepared to negotiate, a new international agreement is very unlikely. Due to the change
of Administration, President Obama now engages more actively in climate negotiations and
calls for a federal cap-and-trade system to reduce emissions to 1990 levels in 2020, and
another 80% by 2050.
What roles will the US and China play in reaching a new global agreement? What are
realistic expectations for Copenhagen in 2009? For the US, any binding new international
agreement must be ratified by the Senate. It would be important for the Obama
Administration to consult closely with the Congress in shaping its negotiating positions. And
for China, as the spokesperson for the developing bloc, committing to a specific target in
Copenhagen would be difficult. A more realistic outcome may be an agreement on the basic
architecture of the post-2012 climate change framework with binding economy-wide targets
for developed countries; policy commitments for the major emerging economies (such as
China); and support mechanisms for technology, finance, and adaptation capacity-building in
developing countries.
China’s Action to Address Climate Change
China has actively taken part in the FCCC and Kyoto Protocol. In line with the reporting
requirement, China has completed and submitted its national inventories of greenhouse gases.
A National Plan for Coping with Climate Change was released by the Chinese government in
June 2007. Furthermore, the 11th Five Year Plan sets up the mandatory goals to achieve 20%
energy efficiency improvement by 2010 from 2005 baseline and 10% key pollutant
reductions. On the development of renewables, a target is set to raise the percentage of
renewable energy in primary energy supply to 10% by 2010. So far, China has not yet taken
any binding emission reduction targets and may not take any reduction targets for the next
round of negotiations.
As a power on the rise, China has taken a multi-track approach in climate
negotiations. The most important legal instruments addressing climate change would be the
FCCC and Kyoto Protocol under the United Nations framework. They have laid the legal
foundation for further mitigation and adaptation plans. They have also encompassed some
highly technical negotiations over mechanisms for locating funds from carbon trading to
mitigation projects, and over reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation.
The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) is another
ongoing track addressing global climate regime. It is an innovative new effort to accelerate
the development and deployment of clean energy technologies. The APP is currently made of
seven partner countries: Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Korea, and the United States.
These seven countries have agreed to work together along with private sector partners to meet
goals for energy security, national air pollution reduction, and climate change in ways that
promote sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction. The Partnership focuses on
expanding investment and trade in cleaner energy technologies, goods, and services in key
market sectors. The Partners have approved eight public-private sector task forces covering:
aluminum, building and appliances, cement, cleaner fossil energy, coal mining, power
generation transmission, renewable energy, and distributed generation and steel. Overall, the
seven partner countries collectively account for more than half of the world's economy,
population and energy use, and they produce about 65 percent of the world's coal, 62 percent
of the world's cement, 52 percent of world's aluminum, and more than 60 percent of the
world's steel.
For the past few years, climate change has been placed up-high on the G8, AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), East Asia Summit (EAS), and Boao Forum for Asia
sessions. At the same time, endorsed by G8 leaders, a US-led effort—Major Economic
Meeting (MEM) is now shaping up as an alternative negotiation track to address climate
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change. Representing the FCCC secretariat, MEM is made of 17 major economies: Annex I
countries including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, UK, EU, Japan, Russia, US
and Non-Annex I countries such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea and
South Africa. The MEM is significant in the fact that in 2005 it is accounted for 87% of
world GDP, 64% of world population, 80% of world primary energy consumption, 79% of
world carbon emissions from the fossil fuel combustion, and 73% of world greenhouse
emissions. The US repeatedly claims that MEM process is intended to support and contribute
to the FCCC negotiations. In reality, it stresses business and energy opportunities and tends to
neglect to push for any emission reduction targets.
In China, institutional building to tackle climate change started in 1980s when climate
change science began to take off. The lead agency at that time was the Chinese
Meteorological Administration (CMA), where science initiated policy debates. When climate
change became a policy issue that focuses on climatic impacts, the lead agency in the early
1990s was the National Environmental Protection Administration (NEPA) and gradually
turned into Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) with the national focal point established
there. NEPA is now upgraded to the Ministry of Environmental Protection and serves as lead
agency for ozone protection, desertification, and Ramsar Convention. Later on, when carbon
market and CDM was more emerging and developed, and the Kyoto Protocol was put in
place and entered into force in 2005. The National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) also took over.
The NDRC is a huge ministry-level agency in charge of promoting the strategy of
sustainable development and undertaking comprehensive coordination of energy saving and
emission reductions. In terms of strategic planning, the NDRC also makes plans for resource
conservation, ecological and environmental protection, promotion of environment-friendly
industries, and clean production promotion. Moreover, NDRC takes the lead with related
ministries in attending international negotiations of climate change; to undertake relevant
work in regard to the fulfillment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change at a national level.
To summarize, the Chinese government set up a special institution to address climate
change in 1990. The National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC) was
also established in 1998. To raise profile, the National Leading Group to Address Climate
Change, headed by the premier and made of 18 public agencies, was set up in 2007 to assure
the overall coordination. The member agencies have been increased to 20 in 2008, and the
NDRC started serving as the secretariat in this Leading Group. Taking a programmatic
approach, China issued National Climate Change Programme in June 2007, calling on all
regions and ministries for full implementation.
China in Post-Kyoto Regime
For the next round of climate negotiations, the pressure is mounting on both Annex I and
Non-Annex I countries to further cut down their greenhouse emissions. This pressure is
especially high for major developing economies such as China and India to fully participate
in a future international climate agreement. But at the moment, it is unclear how China could
make the best contribution and be supported in various mechanisms. Based on the project
findings from the German Environment Agency, Ecofys and the Wuppertal Institute, China’s
post-Kyoto participation can be viewed from the three principles of responsibility, capability,
and potential.
To estimate reference emissions for major developing countries, four scenarios are
outlined to analyze mitigation potentials.
1. Business-as-usual: The BAU scenario follows production, energy consumption, and
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energy efficiency trends that are based on moderate assumptions.
2. No-regret: The no-regret scenario involves emission reduction options that can be
achieved at negative or no direct costs. Measures related to energy conservation, energy
efficiency, and voluntary reductions are in this category.
3. Co-benefit: The co-benefit scenario considers options that are reasonable due to political
aims or the increased use of renewable energy at some costs.
4. Ambitious: The ambitious scenario includes reduction options that are technically
feasible, but at extranet costs. This ambitious approach can be realized if the non-market
barriers are taken away and financial incentives are provided to cover the extra net costs.
In order to meet the two degree Celsius limit, the IPCC calls for a domestic emission
reduction of at least 30% below 1990 levels by Annex I countries. Non-Annex countries like
China, currently exempt from carbon reductions, should also play a contributing part in the
future climate treaties. Highly populated, heavy dependence on coal, embedded emission for
exports, and relatively low energy efficiency enable China to have rooms to reduce
greenhouse emissions. China’s reduction potential is estimated at 8% by no-regret scenario
and 15% by co-benefit scenario below business as usual. And the three sectors with highest
reduction potential between 2005 and 2020 are power, industrial, and transportation.
Conclusion
China is now the largest emitter in the world and its emissions are rapidly increasing. Under
the Kyoto Protocol, China has no binding emission targets from 2008 to 2012. Recently, the
NDRC issued the National Climate Change Programme in 2007 and another position paper
titled “China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change” in 2008. At the same
time, institutional building to address climate change has been in place with diverse forces of
science, the environment, foreign affairs, and economic interests at play.
China has actively participated in climate negotiations, guided by the principles of
sustainable development, common but differentiated responsibility, mitigation and adaptation
strategies, and access to financial assistance and technology transfer. Taking a multi-track
approach, China has become the largest recipient country hosting CDM projects. With the
mounting pressure to commit emission reduction target at the COP 15 in Copenhagen, China
may consider pathways under the no-regret and co-benefit scenarios to further increase
energy efficiency and take voluntary measures. A realistic outcome resulting from
Copenhagen may not be a new climate treaty, but an agreement on the basic architecture of
the post-2012 climate framework.
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Looking Beyond:
Changes for Climate Change, Changes for Development
Dr. Gerald Schmidt1
Abstract
In the climate debate, there is a stalemate when the discussion revolves around other's
responsibility based on historical emissions and present (un)willingness to participate in
international treaties justified by a necessary focus on development on the one side, and an
unwillingness to act if the others do not also do so, based on concern about economic
competitiveness, on the other side. The problem arises from a view that sees it as a basic
necessity to first develop, get rich enough, and then clean up, as suggested in Kuznet's Curve,
and about relative costs of alternative energy and production, respectively. Looking towards
the future, considering the changes necessary for prevention of further climate change and/or
of adaptation, and the necessities for development that truly improves people's lives and the
future economic outlook (e.g. in a more resource-constrained world), however, there is
definite common ground. Recently, such ideas received a boost through the argument that
"green jobs" were an excellent impulse for revitalizing the US (and other) economies. Taking
the view further, either climate change or the effect of "peak oil" (or both) will require new
strategies as well: approaches more focused on human well-being and long-term economic
and ecological functioning than short-term profits. For those strategies, it will be necessary to
have government and popular support, but also possible to build support in both
industrialized and developing countries, as they offer a win-win situation. This paper will
present the ethical and practical considerations for such a "positive ecological" approach to
climate change that goes beyond the stalemate to suggestions for cooperation based on
common interests in security, environmental health, and further economic development.
Introduction
Environmental change has always been a part of the human experience. Humans did not have
the capability to change more than regional environments, over longer periods of time, and
did not usually know much of it in a conscious, reflective way, however. The way humanity
survived was simply because the people migrated or because a reduced population got
through collapse. Adaptation often took the form of religious or similarly irrational responses,
such as the European witch hunts which flared up during the peaks of the Little Ice Age (cp.
Behringer 1999). Now, for the first time, humanity is responsible for change on a global
scale, of the very climate of Earth, knows about it, and probably faces a danger to
civilization. Since the beginning of industrialization, the concentration of atmospheric carbon
has risen from 280 ppm to 360 ppm. Much is being done to analyze the state of the matter
and to model likely futures, to predict what will happen. It is quite clear, however, that there
has to be large uncertainty. After all, we are dealing with the future, and with the highly
complex system of the Earth's atmosphere. One impact of climate change that is to be seen
already is this: the need to reduce emissions in order to mitigate (further) change is
recognized internationally, but its most important implication seems to be that it threatens
economic growth. The main question, therefore, has become how to deal, and maybe even
more importantly, how to garner enough support for the necessary measures. Unfortunately,
this impact is a symptom of the underlying problem rather than a sign of progress. When
climate change is discussed only as an environmental issue, the separation between human
affairs such as economics and Earth's ecological functioning remains unquestioned.
1

Lecturer, German Studies Department, Xiangtan University, Xiangtan, Hunan, 411105, China, email:
gerald@positive-ecology.org

330

Economic costs of measures aimed at reducing emissions stand on one side along with the
threat to development and/or affluence, on the other side stands the counterweight of
potential environmental change and associated danger. Issues of culture and of ecology, let
alone their relationship, are hidden and take a backseat to more apparent political wrangling
over the formulation and targets of treaties. Considering such undercurrents opens up
possibilities, however. It may be a boon to science, which still needs further integration
between different disciplines rather than ever closer – and oftentimes myopic – looks at ever
more specialized sub-fields. It may be a way to change from taking economic growth as the
only indicator of development, progress, and well-being to realizing that there is more
diversity than this measure, and these concepts, imply. And ultimately, the connection
between ecology and human life is the major question of our times. The issue is not just
climate change, certainly not emission reductions, it is coming to understand and work with
the fact that human life is dependent on and an integral part of the ecological processes of life
on Earth, and at a point where we need to realize that there is no other way than to work with,
rather than against, these processes if humanity is to survive in decent conditions and to make
further progress. There are bad news and good in this: looking towards ecology, the challenge
is even greater than emissions reduction; but considering the connection between ecology and
human needs, in the end, there are possibilities for breaking the stalemate and realizing winwin-situations.
Diplomatic Chess
Government action, stipulated in international treaties, is afforded great importance in the
fight against climate change. Presently, on the road to a follow-up accord to the Kyoto
protocol, climate talks seem to be entering a new stage. There are signs that countries which
were formerly reluctant to participate meaningfully, such as the USA and China, are open to
dialogue.
Still, many arguments put forward follow a well-established pattern: In 1992, at the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, then-president of the USA
George H. W. Bush declined involvement, declaring that "the American way of life is not up
for negotiation." Whether it meant comparative affluence or chances for "making it," it
resonated with a large part of the population even while the environmental movement is a
strong actor on the American political scene. With the current president Barack Obama, a
new willingness to participate in multilateral agreements in general, and treaties to combat
global climate change in particular, is to be found. A cap-and-trade scheme, for example, is
making its way through the political process and actually seems to have chances of being
passed into law. Yet, the recession presently seems more effective in reducing emissions than
other measures (emissions from fuel burning in the USA, according to the DOE, are down
2.8%, electricity generation in China is also down, according to Richard K. Morse and Gang
He at the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development of Stanford University); and
getting back to high levels of consumption is the main "solution" to the recession that is being
proposed. The cap and trade mechanism has good chances because it is politically feasible,
allowing for emission permits to be handed out. At the same time, there are initiatives
towards "green-collar jobs" as ideal revitalization of the economy, alternative energy and a
smart grid as necessary preconditions for future growth, and even to re-interpreting the very
"American Dream." Not least – and this may have become a strong current (at least of
popular imagination) – the recession has led to a rediscovery of such qualities as thrift and
resourcefulness as prototypical American traits. Recession or not, economic competitiveness
has been a main driver of US standing and diplomacy; the American Dream is mainly one of
individual economic success. In domestic politics, participation in international treaties can
only garner enough support if other countries (read: economic competitors) also take part.
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American lifestyles are highly consumptive, using much more energy than Europeans living
in similar affluence. So, they could be changed to reduce consumption, reduce carbon
emissions, without losses in quality of life. Still, the political necessity of presenting that
there will not be a negative impact only on the US whereas others don’t have to act or even
to participate in international treaties has to be taken into consideration. (Even if it is ironic,
considering the actions of the last administration, that the USA should be so focused on a
kind of multilateralism in this regard.) As the greatest rising competitor, China plays the key
role in this matter. As long as China does not accept to overall emissions reductions, the
argument is that whatever reduction the US achieved would be negated by the emissions from
China, plus have a negative effect on the US economy. Therefore, a new climate change
treaty without China accepting emissions reductions would not have a viable chance of being
accepted by Congress.
China has also been signaling openness to participating in international treaties, but is
similarly concerned about any measures' effect on economic growth. Therefore, a contractual
obligation to achieve a reduction in carbon emissions has so far been resisted. In China, it is
still (taken as) a matter of course that economic growth is equivalent to development. The
poverty rate was, thanks to this kind of development, reduced from 64% in 1978 to 10% in
2004. By many measures, it is still a third-world country, however. Therefore, the focus on
further development is understandable. On the other hand, its rapid economic growth has led
China to become the largest emitter of CO2 (as well as the third-largest national economy) in
the world, and therefore it is argued that it should take its responsibility. Two aggravations
are in play, however: For one, the argument of responsibility is used in such a way that it
evokes images of China's weakness opposite Western powers; a very sensitive issue. China is
asked to take measures. These may be seen to be commensurate with its standing at a general
level, it may even be good for the country ultimately. Yet, it is conveniently overlooked that
per capita emissions in China are still far lower than those of Europe, let alone the USA,
some 15% of emissions are caused producing goods for other countries (Guan et al. 2009),
and the standard of living is still sharply lower. Taking a theoretical, absolute, global fairness
– equal rights to equal emissions for every human being – as measure, it is easily seen that
the citizens of industrialized countries, and particularly the USA, would have to reduce their
emissions greatly whereas citizens of developing countries such as China have a right to
higher emissions. From the Chinese side, it is also argued that the higher Western standard of
living was achieved using cheap fossil fuels and causing by far the greatest share of the
increase in greenhouse gases in the process, taking this as basis of a call to industrialized
countries for shouldering their historical responsibility for climate change. By and large just
asking for China to develop differently while the developed countries themselves, in spite of
their advanced economies and affluence, have a hard time changing is – understandably – not
taken as the equal partnership that the international treaties (and negotiations) seem to imply.
Still, it might seem as if things were going reasonably well, considering that there are
moves towards a successor treaty to Kyoto in which the USA as well as China will
participate, even though this is such a complicated issue. To break through such stalemates
and truly tackle the problem requires a deeper look and could profit from an approach
founded on realities, however.
Failures of Understanding
In fact, climate change is an even more complicated matter, and the complication starts with
the focus being on the wrong approach: The approach that has become accepted as seemingly
obvious measure is the reduction of emissions. It is what is politically feasible to get into
treaties, the best that can be done now. However, taking atmospheric concentration of carbon
prior to industrialization as yardstick, we have surpassed levels which are probably safe and
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would need to, at the very least, halt carbon emissions. Therefore, either carbon sequestration
and storage would have to be implemented or alternative energy would have to replace fossil
fuel use. This is still misunderstanding the facts, however, as fossil fuels are also at the base
of many plastics, and even the food produced by industrial agriculture. In this regard, we are
experiencing a fundamental misunderstanding of reality.
As E. O. Wilson pointed out In "Consilience" (1998), economics is not really based
on a view of the real world which would be clear about the economy being but a subsystem
of Earth's ecology rather than the environment being an afterthought to economics.
"Virtualism" (Carrier & Miller 1998) went even farther in this regard, arguing that economics
had become less of a scientific attempt at understanding the world rather than a model of
how the world should be and to which it is meant to eventually be made to conform. The idea
was not only that the market knew best, but even seemed to be that human beings who did
not act like the economists' model homo economicus were not being rational, not being as
they should be. The present recession has brought into the mainstream the critique of
(neoliberal) capitalism that was, not so long ago, the domain of only a few discontents; the
hike in crude oil prices up to nearly 140 dollars a barrel had similarly given sudden credence
to the observation of peak oil. Still, mainstream economics continues to measure the wealth
of nations and seemingly even the happiness of their people through GDP. No matter how
incomes are distributed among people, no matter how much negative impact economic
processes have on the environment and the people or, for that matter, how much cultural and
biological diversity a country has, they are not counted. It only gets worse because economic
growth is given the highest importance whereas environmental protection including climate
change is seen as a comparative luxury. However, there is also the perspective that the poor
depend even more strongly on the health of the soil, air, and water of their immediate
surroundings than the better-off; and ecosystem services can be replaced by technology only
to some extent and at high cost. These shortcomings are well recognized in the circles of
ecological economists, for example. Yet, as Wilson also explains, economics still holds such
great importance because politicians can only turn to its practitioners if they want to find
ideas for growth and the jobs and decent standard of living which economic growth is seen to
imply. Thus, issues like this are most useful in illustrating the failure of environmental
communication's focus on apocalyptic warnings to also understand (a) fundamental reality, in
this case of psychology and diplomacy.
Environmentalism not only fails to provide any such input. It has developed an
unfortunate tendency to revel in dire warnings. As a result, as early as the 1970s, Wiebe
(1973) pointed out that people were getting overwhelmed by the tide of information on
environmental problems which they could do very little about, resulting in a feeling of "wellinformed futility." With climate change, this problem has only become worse: first of all, it is
an issue that is commonly misunderstood. Journalists' reporting on climate change changes
with the weather (Shanahan 2000); scientific models predicting the likelihood and extent of
potential problems such as sea-level rise get mixed in with fictitious renderings á la "The Day
after Tomorrow." And eventually, the cause of the problem are just normal ways of life. In
fact, it is normal ways of life for the comparatively affluent people in industrialized countries,
and decent standards of living which are the aim of development in underdeveloped
countries. Thus, even while it is well understood that the world cannot follow in the footsteps
of Americans not just because of concerns over climate change, but because achieving such a
lifestyle for everyone would require more resources than our one planet Earth has to offer,
there are few alternative and promising ideas and examples of how to live better lives in the
mainstream. This way, the main motivation to do anything against climate change is the
prevention of possible future problems which may or may not occur, through measures that
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are (seemingly) certain to be deleterious to development, standards of living, and economic
standing of nations.
At the root of both the diplomatic stalemate and the lack of radical measures is the
fear that economic growth would be negatively affected by (strong) measures to combat
climate change. The recession is making steps such as the procurement of venture capital for
alternative energy even more difficult, and government support as part of stimulus packages
is not as strong as it could have been. At the same time, as pointed out above, there are hopes
that a greening of the economy would provide impulses to the economy as well as put it onto
more stable footing. These are promising developments, but it behooves science to look
deeper, both at the miasma of possible futures, and at the hard facts of human life. One
approach that has largely been overlooked but is receiving increasing attention is to focus,
simply put, on reality: the ecological functioning is the basis of life on earth, economics but a
subsystem of ecology and human life. This is a lesson that, in many regards, still needs to be
learned by economists and politicians alike. Yet, if people and governments are to be
motivated to do something about the mismatches between economics – simply put, life – and
its ecological underpinnings, then it is not enough to present ever more images of
environmental apocalypse, whether they come from science with the best of intentions or
environmental activists with the strongest of agendas. Rather, the suggested actions must be
meaningful in the context of human needs and political necessities. Increasingly, they must
also present hopeful prospects in the face of uncertain futures.
Futures, Needs, Necessities
It seems to be too much of a matter of course, so it is not usually mentioned. Still, just why
climate change is such a peculiarly difficult issue is easily explained considering that two of
the most complex systems interact here: climate and human society. Many if not most of the
mechanisms at work in both the Earth system and human minds and societies are only poorly
understood. "It depends" oftentimes seems to be the only law of human nature; past climates
can be inferred rather well, but models of future climate are necessarily imperfect. And as
Niels Bohr reportedly pointed out, predictions are notoriously difficult, especially about the
future. At the same time, however, our understanding of the basics of both is good enough for
practical matters.
At present, the future is looking rather bleak. Most projections of climate change
point to increasing extreme weather events, sea level rise, declining glaciers resulting in
decreased river flow, changing (or even collapsing) ecosystems and associated species loss,
food scarcity, and more. The more we know, the more dire the projections have become. And
the less people seem to listen, the more apocalyptic the reports and campaign statements have
turned. However, the strength of the apocalyptic visions hides an opportunity for
environmental communication, the possibility that there are multiply functional solutions
which will serve different ends at once. There are many such opportunities, however.
In the arena of alternative energies, for example, the main discussion centers around
the relative costs of different kinds of energy production. The accounting is that which has
been established through times in which cheap oil was the normality, however, and there is a
range of externalities – not the least of which are the costs of climate change – which are not
figured into current prices. Therefore, the discussion of cost is flawed. One does have to live
with this skewed pricing for the near future, but there are other aspects to consider. Higher
gas mileage of automobiles, higher efficiency of municipal and industrial energy use, for
example, are not just measures to help with the reduction of emissions as a part of climate
change treaty measures. They also reduce air pollution, can reduce costs, and provide an
impetus to create better, more competitive, technologies and products. This is particularly
interesting as the "multiply functionality" of such solutions extends to different possible
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futures. In the case of energy, for example, it works both towards climate change mitigation,
as (pre-)adaptation to a world changed by climate change and/or peak oil, and is a factor in
the international security landscape (more on this below).
Popular (scientific) writings have given a lot of attention to the convergence of
catastrophes (e.g. Kunstler 2005) and recent developments impacting on the future (e.g. Klare
2002, Heinberg 2005): climate change in its many (potential) manifestations, peak oil,
continuing population growth, ongoing environmental destruction. It may be a sign of
humanity's growing up that the naïve techno-utopias of the 1950's have all but disappeared,
but some remnants of techno-optimism are still to be found. Not least, they surface with the
argument that there were no need for measures against climate change at present because we
would invent technologies to protect if and when they became necessary (and currently
proposed measures against climate change would be costly and used money which could be
allocated better). Positive visions of the future do also exist (e.g. "Re-Localization" or the
Venus Project). They have a tendency to be either naively bucolic in their assumption that
people would return to the land, be happy, and produce enough, seemingly forgetting about
the wish for trade and the mismatch between population sizes and regional carrying
capacities. Or, in their desire to present an ideal future, the vision would need ideal people,
too, who serve their roles with little of the messiness – in other words, creative diversity –
that is to be found in reality. It takes a similarly messy – creative, diverse – range of
opportunities as the future, in spite of all the predictions and models, is still open, and both it
and people are going to continue to be diverse, requiring and wanting different ways of life,
dependent on the individual and local (social, political, cultural as well as ecological)
circumstances.
Potential measures not just against climate change but also for a promising future
would also be "multiply desirable choices" (Kaplan 2000). That is, in serving different ends,
they also serve different needs or are desirable for different groups of stakeholders for
different reasons. As complicated as human behavior can be, human needs and desires are
universal. We seek satisfaction of our basic needs, and some satisfaction of our desires. These
range from the well-recognized basic needs such as food and shelter, by way of security, to a
need for a feeling of self-determination, i.e. a measure of control about one's life. Action to
prevent problems is a human capability, but problematic even when the choices are relatively
clear (witness the debts which are oftentimes run up on credit cards). More commonly, action
will be taken to overcome problems as they arise. Climate change is a faraway issue that is
still hard to grasp in any meaningful way, so more likely to be avoided than taken on if the
arguments are only for future problems. Therefore it is necessary to show how climate
change is not just about the future climate, the economy, or similarly abstract and far-away
concerns, but about nation's standing, development, the satisfaction of human needs and life
chances in the present and (near) future. The more this can also be made to be experienced
and told as a good story, rather than remain abstract, the better the chances of garnering
support for measures.
Environmental Health: The Case of Food
Health is not just the absence of disease in a person. First of all, it is defined as a more
encompassing feeling of well-being, and it is intimately related with the condition of the
environment. Good health depends, for example, on the absence of harmful pollutants. As
ecosystem health, one can also talk about the "stable" state of ecosystems – i.e., the normal
conditions and range of change within which the ecosystem is resilient against changes such
as those of climatic variability and continues to function. Putting humans at the center, food
is the ideal illustration of the complex relationships between factors of ecology, including the
impact of climate change, and human ways of life and how they impact the Earth system.
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Food is also an ideal case for how present economics and policy tend to overlook ecological
and cultural relationships through which change would be good for "people and planet." It
also shows how environmental activism tends to overlook chances for motivating by
speaking to human needs and desires. And of course, food is one of the most basic needs, as
well as one of the greatest pleasures – but increasingly, with the "obesity epidemic" and
concerns over food scarcity, also a major cause of concern.
What governments need to consider are food security and public health; people want
enough and preferably enjoyable food. The usual argument is that the market should be
allowed to do its working, but agriculture is one of the most "un-free" markets, heavily
influenced by subsidies. This, at least, is well recognized even if it does not look as if deep
change is to be expected. Policies designed to keep at least some food production in place and
internationally competitive work against that. Moreover, it is argued that a still-growing
world population meant that food production would have to be further intensified, and that
only industrial agriculture could provide enough. It has not only been shown that
organic/sustainable agriculture can produce similar output, e.g. through Rodale's Farming
Systems Trials (Pimentel et al. 2005), however. Improved agricultural practices could also
recapture at least 50% of the carbon that has been lost from soils while enhancing food
security (Lal 2004). One also sees that the single-minded focus on productivity, achieved
through input of irrigation water if necessary, fertilizer and pesticides for certain, comes at a
high social and environmental cost whereas there could be a "real green revolution" that is
better for farmers and environments (Parrot & Marsden 2002). It is too simple to vilify the
green revolution, however. Many problems arise from improper use of technology; and it
would be unwise not even to consider the advances that modern plant breeding has been
making. Yet, there is a fundamental mismatch between agri-culture that is a part of life and
meant to provide for a community, working with ecological processes to achieve a good
harvest, and an industrial agri-business that aims to make a profit at every step, controlling
food production from seed to supermarket.
In particular when considering the challenges that climate change is likely to bring,
the different orientations are highly influential: industrial agriculture aims to maximize
profits through a supposed efficiency that tries to control the conditions of production. Rather
than supporting soil fertility, for example, mineral fertilizer is employed. The result
(especially when also used not quite properly) is reactive nitrogen that is detrimental to
ecosystems and human health (Galloway et al. 2003), and a loss of soil carbon which has
been contributing to climate change. It is also a part of this technology of production that
single high-yield varieties are employed. Given the right growing conditions – irrigation,
fertilizer, pesticides – these produce very well. Under more difficult conditions, however,
intercropping of different, locally-adapted varieties/landraces is likely to produce a harvest in
all but the worst situations; organic agriculture has been shown to be able to produce higher
yields than conventional agriculture under extreme conditions (Lotter, Seidel, Liebhart 2003).
Given that such less-than-ideal conditions are likely to occur more often in a world the
climate of which has been changing, approaches less focused on profitability/production
alone and more on resilience and adaptability are sorely needed.
A consideration is also that of health in the more usual sense. Agriculture does not
just provide calories, nutrition is a major factor for human well-being. This is commonly
missing in the argument of a growing population needing a further intensification of food
production. Much of the needed increase in production comes from changes in diets as
populations – such as those of China – become comparatively richer and increase their
consumption of meat. The connection to climate change, here, is not just provided through
the interaction between increased use of petrochemicals in intensifying production and
increasing emissions. Also, livestock contributes to climate change through the carbon
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released from animals. This has received a lot of attention as a study found that 18% of total
contributions of greenhouse gases came from the raising of livestock, more than the
contribution of transport (FAO 2006; plus, there are other negative effects on the
environment). First of all, however, it makes a difference whether these "emissions" come
from carbon – plant material – produced with petrochemicals. In this case, carbon is added to
the atmosphere which did not use to be there during the last millennia, raising the total level.
Livestock raised in more traditional ways, such as grass-fed beef, on the other hand, "emits"
only carbon which is already circulating between atmosphere and land/plants. Moreover, if
human health is considered, such traditional ways of raising animals tends to be better
(except on the basis of profitability, the way this is usually measured). Culture is also a (often
overlooked) issue at work here. Meat consumption has been held in high esteem, but that
does not mean that it is adamant to change. Healthier and at the same time more climateconscious ways of eating could gain support through public education somewhat quickly. At
least it would appear so if they appealed to the sense of purpose and pleasure that food can
provide more strongly, and sounded less like sanctimonious speeches moralizing about meat
and responsibility. After all, some food choices around the world have been changing rather
quickly – on the one hand, towards fast food, on the other hand, towards "Slow Food."
Ecological Security: The Case of Energy
A common warning about climate change is the impact it could have on entire regions and
their populations. Increasingly, environmental issues emerge as the major drivers of the
security landscape (cp. Pirages & DeGeest 2003). Environmental collapse could lead to mass
migration – and actually, Myers (2001) estimates that there were 25 million "environmental
refugees" worldwide in 1995 already. The ultimate reasons for their displacement are
environmental problems such as flood, drought, desertification, or soil erosion, i.e. conditions
which, it is widely feared, will be exacerbated by climate change (cp. the IPCC Reports, for
example). Furthermore, changing weather patterns are near certain to disrupt agriculture
severely, imperiling a food supply that already seems hard-pressed to produce enough for a
large, and still-growing, world population. (There are actually qualifications to this statement
as the effects of culture, for example, are usually taken as a completely independent, not
changeable factor.)
Understandably, there is no positive side to this issue in and of itself. Mitigation of
further climate change and measures to adapt would have the good effect of (hopefully)
preventing such extreme social disruptions; finding any truly positive side to it is all but
impossible, however. One aspect is noteworthy, nonetheless: Even within all the political
wrangling about the proper phrasing of climate change treaties, countries would be united in
not wanting such extreme problems to materialize. Many warnings sound the alarm that the
environment is not just an issue for rich countries and people to worry about in their spare
time, but rather a matter of life and death and a (inter)national security threat. What one has
to notice is that such extreme predictions – even if there are already climate refugees – don't
have to be a constant barrage of increasing urgency in order to motivate people and
politicians. Rather, they approach the effect of thoughts about death ("mortality salience"),
which causes people to think and act more conservatively, even less future-oriented (cp.
Schimel et al. 1999). The Stern Review (Stern 2006), for example, is almost strictly
economic, but in going into detail and arguing forcefully about the negative effect climate
change will have on economic growth as well as the economics of adaptation measures, it has
been highly influential. When and where threats to security could be avoided through
multiply-functional solutions which, at the same time at which they combat climate change
effects also serve to provide economic or other advantage, however, warnings and visions can
come together in ways which are motivating. Some of these aspects, as they pertain to
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alternative energy, have been mentioned already. However, as many people have become
aware of thanks to the Iraq War, the dependence of industrialized and developing countries
alike on fossil fuel resources which are getting scarcer and which are located in only a few
regions of the world is a possible danger to national and international security. And in most
of the discussions surrounding that, it is mainly considered how the Middle East is not quite
as friendly towards the US as they might like from a region they depend on, or how the
waterways through which China also gets its oil from this same region are controlled by the
US navy. The possibility that the extreme weather events predicted from climate change
would cause disruption are not usually paid attention when discussing whether or not to
invest in alternative energy. Even in more local situations within regions, even within and
between the USA and Canada, however, there have been examples of how severe weather
(and other problems) cause blackouts. Europe has seen heat waves which led to thousands of
deaths, and caused disruptions to the energy infrastructure, too, as nuclear power plants, for
example, had to shut down because the river water used for cooling had become too warm for
it to be used. "Soft" energy paths have been suggested for decades; increasingly it can be seen
that localization and diversification, for example, would make energy provision – and with it,
probably the world – more secure (cf. Li 2005) and more affluent, as well as be a measure
against climate change and other environmental problems.
Agency, Work and Competitiveness
The climate change challenge to the economy offers itself to a "marketing perspective for
environmentalism" (as suggested by Gail Whiteman, 1999, for example). Progress falters
because of concern over the economy, and this voice has been strong since the beginning not
just of the debate on climate change, but even of environmentalism. From another
perspective, however, it is a chance for entrepreneurial approaches which could re-invigorate
the economy and fulfill the human need to feel agency. What is needed is a different way of
producing energy, creating goods, and even, to some extent, of making money. At the very
least, stability rather than the quick buck would have to be the orientation – and it is a goal
that has received a new ring of promise after the greed and financial games that led to the
present recession. With alternative energies, for example, the popular image is that of Silicon
Valley at the beginning of the computer revolution. Interestingly, not only the USA's culture
of entrepreneurialism seems well-suited to take on this challenge, and with a little more
support – which is growing – taking it on in order to make money and do good before
problems such as climate change force change upon us. China is in a situation where it has
long been necessary to find chances for development through creative solutions using the
possibilities at hand which could likely be translated into a movement towards energy
independence and other forms of sustainable development. Given the need for employment,
the possibilities that "green-collar jobs" in retrofitting for less energy use and the like offer
are increasingly promising. It is not only employment alone that counts. It is one of our basic
needs that we have to feel that we are somewhat in control over our lives. The rise in
popularity that cooking and gardening has been experiencing is probably due, at least in part,
to the effect it has on such feelings of agency (in addition to the pleasure of producing food,
knowing where it comes from, and – as is more important in a place like China, where such
small-scale agriculture is still widespread – saving some money while providing food that is
as safe as the grower can make it be). Again, the changes that are necessary to combat or
adapt to climate change and work towards a wider transformation to sustainability, in
technology, economy, and private life, can be interpreted only as problematic and dangerous,
or could be presented as a challenge to which everybody can contribute in meaningful ways.
Competence, especially at activities which are of positive influence to life, provides intrinsic
satisfaction, and the behaviors that help to protect the future would be especially valuable in
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this regard (De Young 2000). Energy and food continue to be the best examples, as both are
not only large, abstract systems seemingly removed from daily life choices, but in fact
intimately connected with what we do each day. Food choices and habits which impact
energy use can be changed by individuals, and are a contribution to both how these sectors
work, and how well we live our lives. Of course, contributions will differ from individual to
individual, and larger changes are necessary as well. Most importantly, however, such
approaches could be used by governments in order to improve their citizens' well-being and
economic conditions, or independently of such support through NGO campaigns, as they
have been.
The Social Capital of Nations
Within countries, the people, their education, and reactions to future challenges are a great,
and rather undervalued, capital. Along with economic and military strength, countries
increasingly hold a political position that is also based on the perception other countries'
citizens have of them, a social capital. In the present climate talks "on the road to
Copenhagen," the images that countries want to project of themselves could hold increasing
importance. The USA under the new administration of Barack Obama obviously want to
present themselves as a partner in multilateral (or at the very least, with the talk about a "G2"
of the USA and China, bilateral) relations. China, too, has been showing its reappearance on
the world stage rather more strongly than ever before. Domestic issues are still, when in
doubt, more important than the world's view, but China certainly does want to be seen as an
equal partner. Consequently, neither of those countries would want to give the appearance
that they are blocking the negotiations for a successor treaty of the Kyoto protocol. More
importantly, if a race towards alternative energies and the like were started, it would not only
change the economy towards sustainability. More importantly in the short term, it would
likely become a process of a "race to the top" in which countries had to participate if they are
not to be seen as backwards and lose out on economic competitiveness.
Conclusion
Looking at the challenge of climate change from different perspective, especially centering
on human needs and political necessities, the discourse can quite easily be changed. Many
groups are working on that, which makes it all the more unfortunate that science – not only
but particularly as far as can be seen from reports – is focused much more strongly on ever
closer details rather than on connecting insights from different of its branches and translating
them into suggestions and practices which are meaningful to entrepreneurs, politicians and
the public. Much more, both research and practical implementation, has to be done to achieve
progress both in the discourse on climate change and in sustainability practice. Whether
modeling impending climate catastrophes and hoping their prediction will spur into action, or
marketing the economic potential of a transformation of society to sustainability, one thing is
abundantly clear: Politics are a major influence on the economy and, maybe less so, on
society, not least due to government spending. In shaping infrastructure projects, government
expenses, and policy shaping the conditions under which companies operate, climate change
treaties in which countries agree to emissions reductions hold great influence. Ultimately,
however, it is not just on politics to work towards a transformation to sustainability, it is how
we live and how we make a living that will decide whether climate change – and all the other
challenges we face – will be a catastrophe or a chance to find ways of satisfying human
needs, as universal as they are and as different as different people want them to be realized, in
ways which make it possible for all of humanity to live good lives. Waiting for politics to put
change into law is equally as misguided as thinking that it is the role of science only to
provide ever better information; it takes a new drive towards wisdom.
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Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate:
China and International Climate Policy Beyond Kyoto
Dr. jur. Christoph Holtwisch, M.Env.Sc.1
Abstract
The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate [APP] of Australia, China,
India, Japan, South Korea, USA and their new partner Canada is a new phenomenon in
international climate policy and open for enlargement by other interested states. This nonlegally binding sustainable development Partnership connects climate protection and energy
security for the first time in an international agreement. As a potential framework for the
other 'parallel tracks' to the UN climate regime of Framework Convention on Climate Change
[FCCC] and Kyoto Protocol [KP], the APP – which is still by far underfinanced – at its core
is a political agreement for the development and transfer of environmentally-sound
technologies. The Partnership intends only relative emission reductions and contains no
binding emission reduction commitments.
Officially, the APP is consistent with the principles of the FCCC and intended to
complement but not replace the KP. Nevertheless, the APP is only one of the partnerships
embodied already in the FCCC technology framework and, therefore, no complement. The
APP was intended as an opposing model against the KP and will have to clarify its position
for the future. A fruitful cooperation or at least a peaceful coexistence with the UN climate
regime is important because every technology-orientated approach needs market incentives.
Any international Post-2012 climate change regime will have to combine the as yet
competing approaches of market pull (KP) and technology push (APP). Integrating also
climate change and energy security concerns is especially important for Asia as a region with
a strong economic growth and the APP is a forerunner in this. China plays an especially
important role, of course.
The third ministerial meeting of the APP will take place in China in 2009.
1. Introduction
The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate [APP] is a relatively new
phenomenon in international climate policy. In its own view, the Partnership is a grouping of
key nations (or: players) to address various serious and long-term challenges, including
anthropogenic climate change and energy security. It contains the first connection of the two
important aims of climate protection and energy security in an international agreement and
focuses on the Asia-Pacific region. The Partnership founding partners of Australia, China,
India, Japan, South Korea, and the USA and their new partner Canada represent more than
half the world's economy and population, energy consumption and global greenhouse gas
emissions. For that reason, this 'coalition of the emitting' is and will be an essential factor in
international climate policy. For China, it is an important part of its climate policy within the
wider strategy of 'peaceful development'.
2. Development and Enlargement
After secret negotiations, the APP was announced on 28th of July 2005 at an ASEAN
regional forum in Vientiane, Laos, at which time a Vision Statement was released. The
official creation of the Partnership occurred at an inaugural ministerial meeting on 12th of
January 2006 in Sydney, Australia. Here, the APP Charter was launched, accompanied by a
Communiqué and a Work Plan. The Vision Statement is now an integral part of the Charter.
1
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The first meeting of the Policy and Implementation Committee [PIC] of the
Partnership took place from 18th to 21st of April 2006 in Berkeley, California, in the USA.
This first meeting produced Guidelines for the Task Forces of the Partnership and for their
Action Plans. At the second PIC meeting, held in Jeju, Korea, from 11th to 13th of October
2006, additional Guidelines for flagship projects were made. The Action Plans developed by
the Task Forces were also accepted at this time by the PIC. On 4th of April 2007, further
Guidance to the Task Forces and a Procedure for Adding New Projects to the Partnership
were published. The third PIC meeting took place in Tokyo, Japan, from 19th to 20th of July
2007. It produced the Forms for Project Registration and Status Report already foreseen in
the Procedure and the Guidance. The third PIC meeting also prepared for the second
ministerial (and fourth PIC) meeting of the Partnership, which took place on 15th of October
2007 in New Delhi, India.
At the New Delhi meeting, the ministers released a second Communiqué. Therein, the
Partners state that while the climate change, clean development, and energy security
challenges they face are considerable, they have pioneered an innovative partnership focusing
on practical solutions and have accomplished much in a relatively short time. This
communiqué was accompanied by a flagship projects Brochure and the launch of an 'AsiaPacific Energy Technology Cooperation Centre'. The brochure is meant to exemplify the
different types of cooperative activities being undertaken by the Partners – these flagship
projects are selected to tell and illustrate the broader story of the whole APP. The centre is
expected to provide benefit to the Partnership by enhancing the sharing, dissemination of
energy efficiency knowledge, and best practices that exist in the governments and industries
of the Partner countries, through workshops, train-the-trainer programs and an information
database.
The enlargement of the APP with the addition of Canada was also announced at the
second ministerial meeting in New Delhi. The ministers decided to meet again in 2009 in
China, with the PIC continuing with its work in the meantime. Its fifth meeting took place in
Seattle, USA, from 19th to 20th of May 2008; there, Canada was welcomed as the Co-chair
for the Cement Task Force. The sixth PIC meeting took place in Vancouver, Canada, from
29th to 30th of October 2008. Both meetings did not produce new important documents. The
seventh PIC meeting was held from 19th to 20th of May 2009 in Gold Coast, Australia and
was among other things intended to discuss the future of the APP. This indicates that the APP
has now finished its founding phase and – like it was stated at the fifth PIC meeting in a
secretariat paper on the future of the APP – has transitioned fully into its implementation
phase. It has officially declared that it wants to move toward the next phase in its work.
Probably later this year the ministers meeting in China will follow, as decided earlier in New
Delhi.
The Partnership is open to enlargement by further interested and like-minded
countries in the future. All current partners are Asian-Pacific states and the APP is especially
important for this world region, but – despite its name – it is not limited to it. Therefore, other
countries – even European ones (which are not looking for it) – could be members as well,
but the current members will prove potential new partners seriously if they are really likeminded because the focus is on deepening the existing Partnership now more than on
enlargement. Canada was said to share the vision of the partners and having worked
constructively with all Partners before joining the Partnership officially. Nevertheless, several
countries have stated general interest in a membership, especially New Zealand and some
ASEAN states. Therefore, an 'APP-plus' with additional partners (which rumors predicted
already for late 2007) could become real in the near future. In the meantime, interested states
could use the – weaker – options of cooperation opened by the Partnership: They could work
with the partners in the Task Forces of the APP and take part in its projects and measures.
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3. Character and Aims
The APP is no international law treaty but forms a non-legally binding political 'soft law'
regime. This is stated expressively and indicated by terms like “compact” (instead of treaty),
“partners” (rather than parties), and “nations” (instead of states). Participation in the
Partnership is, therefore, on a totally voluntary basis which renders the existing ending clause
devoid of meaning. Each partner determines absolutely individually the nature of its
participation in APP activities. Consequently, individual verification and compliance control
– which are now key aspects in international law theory and practice – do not play any role in
the Partnership; only the general progress of it as a whole shall be assessed regularly to
ensure its effectiveness (to guarantee this, the Task Forces will report regularly about their
concrete activities to the PIC). However, while the Vision Statement uses the misleading
expression “non-binding”, the Charter prefers the more accurate term “non-legally binding”
which indicates clearly that the Partnership is meant to be politically binding. Having this in
mind, the APP should not be underestimated because, in the end, political obligations are
crucial even in international law that does not contain really effective enforcement.
The APP follows the ideal of sustainable development with interlinked environmental
(climate change, air pollution), economical (economic development and growth, energy
security) and social sub-aims (development, poverty eradication, safety, health, wellbeing).
Especially important are the aspects of climate change and energy security which are
connected for the first time that clearly in an international agreement – a link that has become
more familiar nowadays. Access to a diverse range of reliable and affordable energy sources
is seen as a major determinant of energy security by the APP. Partnership members recognize
that renewable energy and nuclear power will represent an increasing share of global energy
supply, but stress that fossil fuels underpin their economies now and for the predictable
future. The continued economic use of (cleaner) fossil fuels is consequently at the core of the
APP policy. Critics, therefore, view it as a 'coal pact' only. This is too simplistic but, without
doubt, the promising but still not completely economically available 'bridge technology' of
carbon capture and storage [CCS] is one of the central technological options for the APP.
4. Potential
Instead of reducing absolute greenhouse gas emissions, the APP only intends to limit the
“greenhouse gas intensities” of economic activities which would lead only to relative
emission reductions (compared to a reference case). This political plan presents a very
important difference from the 'cap and trade' architecture of the legally binding Kyoto
Protocol [KP] to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [FCCC] with its general
aim of an absolute emission reduction commitment, and is much less ambitious than it. Even
in the best case scenario – a global use of the Partnership approach (with CCS) – absolute
greenhouse gas emissions would more or less double from now to 2050. Therefore, the
Partnership ideas are clearly not enough to respond sufficiently to climate change.
Nonetheless, they may play some role in dealing with this challenge.
The relative reduction of greenhouse gas emissions would differ between the world
regions and the economic sectors and the importance of CCS would vary between the sectors,
too. Therefore, it was absolutely reasonable to found sectoral-oriented APP Task Forces even
if there are no sectoral emission reduction commitments.
5. Purposes
The APP is meant to serve as a framework for international cooperation between its partners
– based on their respective competencies – and for the coordination of the national strategies
of the partners (with capacity-building). At its core, the Partnership is a political agreement
for the development and transfer of (existing and future) environmentally-sound technologies
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and practices. Economic freedom – with its legal and political aspects – is important for this
as an enabling environment (economic freedom leads to more energy efficiency which causes
less greenhouse gas emissions), so the Partnership contains an – yet little noticed –
institutional dimension as well. Therefore, it is – in addition to the existing and planned
national initiatives, of course – also an aim of the APP to promote (economic) freedom in
states like China and India as an enabling environment for technology transfer and climate
protection. The Task Forces are responsible for this promotion, too, but it is mainly a mission
for the PIC since this sensible topic requires a high-ranking political platform.
The technology cooperation of the APP builds on a great number of existing bi- and
multilateral political initiatives such as the G8 'Gleneagles Dialogue' and 'Plan of Action'
(2005), the 'Methane to Markets Partnership' (2004), the 'Carbon Sequestration Leadership
Forum' (2003), the 'International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy' (2002), the 'Global
Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership' (2002), the 'Generation IV International Forum' (2001),
the 'Climate Technology Initiative' (1995), the 'Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme' (1991),
and the 'Clean Coal Centre' (1975). All these initiatives are, like the APP, non-legally binding
and often US-dominated 'parallel tracks' to the traditional UN climate treaty regime. As the
new Partnership APP is not limited in terms of particular technologies, it has the potential to
build up as a future framework for these initiatives which would strengthen enormously the
political relevance of the APP.
6. Intellectual Property and Financing
The technology affected by the APP cooperation is usually intellectual property of private
companies which explains why the private sector is so important for the Partnership. These
(big) companies normally have to be interested in profit and not that much in climate
protection – which leads to the question why so many of them participate in the APP and are
willing to share their knowledge. The answer is that it may be reasonable to cooperate in this
way if it prevents the states from other measures that are assessed as more dangerous for the
economic model and success of the companies. This is especially important for the energy
production industry from fossil fuels which is increasingly seen as environmentally very
problematic; here, CCS may be an option to maintain the general business model by taking
measures of climate protection and sharing them with companies in other states.
Nevertheless, there are various ways of protecting the intellectual property of companies in
different states. Having in mind these different national laws, all matters regarding
intellectual property are to be addressed case-by-case in the APP. The draft of the
'International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology' may give some advice here.
The crucial point for the Partnership will be the financing of the technology
development and transfer. The Vision Statement of the APP called for solid financial
arrangements, but the Charter only states that each partner may – at its discretion (and
subject to its laws, regulations, and policies) – contribute funds, personnel, and other
resources to the Partnership; any costs arising from APP activities are to be borne by the
partner that incurs them, unless other arrangements are made. As a result, the financial
contributions of the (developed) partners available so far are very limited, relatively vague,
and definitely not enough for the APP to have noteworthy success. For that reason, the
inclusion of the private sector is fundamental for the Partnership activities, or, as one APP
spokesman said: “The real dollars we are looking for are the private sector dollars; we are
talking tens of billions of dollars if not hundreds of billions of dollars. If we do not get the
investment sector we cannot succeed.” Currently, it does not look as though there will be
enough financial support for the Partnership to be particularly successful, even if most of the
presentations at the second, fourth and sixth PIC meeting dealt with the problem of
insufficient financing. The second Communiqué states that in the next phase of the APP work
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the partners will continue their efforts to locate additional financial resources.
7. Work Plans and Institutions
To come up to its purposes mentioned above, the APP will develop and implement Work
Plans. These programs are the heart of the APP. They follow a 'bottom-up' approach (which
differs from the more 'top-down' concept of the UN climate regime): They want to bring
together key actors and leaders of the private sector, research communities, governments, and
– if appropriate – also developing banks, intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations. In Task Forces these actors shall develop sustainable solutions to the “shared
challenges”. Only these (future-orientated) challenges are mentioned, but not the (more pastorientated) concept of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' (that plays a very
important role in the traditional UN climate regime to justify dissimilar obligations between
developed and developing countries). The APP views itself as a genuine partnership of equals
based on mutual respect and cooperation.
The Vision Statement describes a wide field of – not concluding – sectors of
cooperation. In the short term these are energy efficiency, clean coal, integrated gasification
combined cycle, liquefied natural gas, CCS, combined heat and power, methane capture and
use, civilian nuclear power, geothermal, rural/village energy systems, advanced
transportation, building and home construction and operation, bioenergy, agriculture and
forestry, hydropower, wind power, solar power, and other renewables. Areas for mid- to
long-term cooperation may include, but not be limited to, hydrogen, nanotechnologies,
advanced biotechnologies, next-generation nuclear fission, and fusion energy. All these fields
describe technological measures for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; geoengineering to cool down the atmosphere does not play a role in the APP even if this could be
integrated into its framework as well.
The APP focuses very much on fossil fuels as a short-term field of action. For that
reason, it is seen as critical to develop, demonstrate and implement promising cleaner and
lower emissions technologies that allow for the continued economic use of fossil fuels while
addressing air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, the first Work Plan of the
Partnership focuses on power generation and distribution, as well as key industries. It is seen
as a deficit that until now no Task Force deals with nuclear energy because the strengthened
use of it is promoted by APP governments and businesses; Australia – the main exporter of
uranium – is the only partner without own nuclear power plants.
Eight temporal public-private Task Forces have been established in addition to the
permanent political PIC and its Administrative Support Group [ASG]. The US government
serves initially as this secretariat (which indicates some dominance of it); each partner has to
designate an administrative liaison as a point of contact for the ASG. All decisions or
recommendations of the PIC or the Task Forces require consensus. The eight task forces
cover cleaner fossil energy (CFE), renewable energy and distributed generation (RDG),
power generation and transmission (PGT), steel (STF), aluminium (ATF), cement (CMT),
coal mining (CM), and buildings and appliances (BATF).
8. Action Plans
The range of projects and activities foreseen in the Action Plans developed by the Task
Forces are to be untertaken by the APP partners, but no partner has any legal obligation to
join in for a concrete project; nevertheless, there exists political pressure to collaborate with
the partners, of course. The Actions Plans are intended to identify ambitious and realistic
goals as well as specific opportunities for cooperation. Each Task Force has to formulate
detailed Action Plans outlining both immediate and medium-term specific actions, including
possible flagship projects and relevant indicators of progress. The yet existing eight Action
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Plans all contain a survey of the current technological situation of the sector, technology aims
and concrete measures, projects, and activities. They contain very different numbers and
types of concrete projects, but all of them include assessment, best practise, and capacity
building measures.
The Action Plans have been accepted by the PIC in late 2006, but lots of further
projects – also cross-cutting ones – have been added to the project roster later. All the
projects are described in detail at the APP homepage (www.asiapacificpartnership.org) –
where all APP documents are available – and it is impracticable to analyse them in the
context of this paper. The complete list of projects gives an impression of the wide range of
the Partnership activities. It shows that the APP analyses different technologies from diverse
sectors, but one has to have in mind that lot of these projects are in an early or middle stage
only and often their financing in the long run seems unsure. Some of the projects have been
cancelled in the meantime.
9. APP and UN Climate Regime
The possibility of an enlargement of the APP shows its potential competition for an important
role in international climate policy which is still dominated by the traditional UN climate
regime. The regime interplay of these two regimes can be described as a recipient regime (the
UN one) which is confronted with a new tributary regime (the APP one). A positioning,
therefore, could only be done by the newer regime, the APP. The Partnership does this
explicitly and differs between the FCCC and the KP: The purposes of the APP shall be and
remain “consistent with” the principles of the FCCC and be and remain intended to
“complement but not replace” the KP. The Partnership is, indeed, consistent with the –
relatively general – FCCC principles, but its position regarding the KP is much more dubious.
If it were to act as a complement, the APP must, like the KP, go beyond what is
embodied already in the FCCC which is the joint focal point of KP and APP. For that reason,
the technology development and transfer rules of the APP must go further than the
technology-orientated norms of the FCCC, especially its technology framework created by
the relevant decisions. This is not the case because the Partnership is only one of the
technological partnerships embodied already in the FCCC technology framework. To give an
example, the FCCC has an expert group on technology transfer which develops action and
work plans. To sum up, the APP does not have potential to complement the KP content.
So what are the exact intents of the APP – is the Partnership intended to replace the
KP instead? Some statements made by its representatives and also the timing of its meetings
– often a few months before the FCCC/KP meetings – indicate this. It seems likely that the
APP was set up as a competitive regime to the KP because the KP contains legally-binding
individual emission commitments which the APP states opposed (USA and Australia, which
did not ratify the KP by then) or did not favor for the future (China, India and Korea) at the
time of founding.
China, together with other developing countries, is not obliged to limit or reduce
greenhouse gases by the KP now, but it’s still strong economic development clearly leads to
greater pressure in this regard. Therefore, China has to argue for a right to further industrial
growth combined with a climate policy that is able to help reaching a (sustainable) ’peaceful
development’. It’s ’scientific outlook on development’ calls for conservation of energy and
resources, protection of the environment, stress on infrastructure, increase of economic
performance and identification of potential development. The APP may serve as one aspect in
China’s climate policy within the wider strategy of ’peaceful development’, together with the
KP, to which China is a party as well, of course.
The opposition towards the KP meant that the USA and Australia could not use the
flexible mechanisms of the KP which allow additional technology transfer to developing
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countries (clean development mechanism) and transformation states (joint implementation).
Therefore, for the USA and Australia, the APP was an alternative also in this regard, while
for the other – developing – partners it basically allowed even more technology transfer.
Japan simply widens its political options with a membership in both clubs. Overall then, the
APP was primarily intended to be an opposing model against the KP – so far, it was
constructed in many ways as a replacement of the KP.
The situation is a bit more complicated now. After the time of founding, Canada
joined the APP club (after stating that it will not meet its KP target and wants to focus more
on technological solutions), but Australia changed its position with the KP ratification of its
new government. By now, the APP definitely has to clarify, both internally and externally,
the role it wants to play in any international climate policy future.
As the APP is dominated by the USA, this probably will not happen before further
declarations of its new government, but President Barack Obama seems to be more interested
in an UN-dominated international climate policy than former President George W. Bush. His
concrete plans are not clear yet but he has started to be much more cooperative in the
processes leading to progress in the UN regime and he has invited 16 mayor economies to a
’Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate’ in April this year in Washington D.C. The
White House said in a statement this summit "will facilitate a candid dialogue among key
developed and developing countries, [and] help generate the political leadership necessary to
achieve a successful outcome at the UN climate change negotiations." This indicates some
difference to similar earlier talks organized by the Bush administration which had a focus on
progress outside the UN regime. Therefore, the APP could be less opposing to the KP than in
the past and much more complementary in the future.
The KP in its present form will expire in 2012. This leads to the question of whether
the APP could be integrated into the steadily developing traditional UN climate regime after
that. Because of some then probably still existing opposition towards the KP approach, such
integration is conceivable only under the FCCC framework. Since the creation of the APP,
the FCCC stressed its openness towards technology-orientated concepts, and the importance
of these were also mentioned – for example – at the G8 summits of Heiligendamm, Germany
(June 2007), and Toyako, Japan (July 2008). In addition to that, the processes hopefully
leading to progress in Copenhagen, Denmark, under the FCCC and the KP on ’Long-term
Cooperative Action’ and ’Further Commitments’ show a great openness for a much stronger
focus on technology as regards both mitigation and adaptation measures. This has been
shown – for example – in the first Bonn climate change negotiation session in March of this
year.
Nevertheless, a formal integration of the APP via a new technology protocol or a
second technology decision is very unlikely because the first option would lead to a legallybinding APP (against the declared will of its partners) and the – non-legally binding –
alternative would install parallel procedures and institutions to the existing FCCC technology
framework (which would undermine it against the will of the other FCCC parties). But
maybe the APP will influence the further development of this framework. As a result, in the
short run, only a non-formal integration is a realistic option which could lead to a fragmented
but synergic 'orchestra of treaties' with a fruitful cooperation between the traditional UN
climate regime and the APP. To avoid the destructive potential of the APP, a peaceful
coexistence with the traditional UN climate regime is necessary at least. It would be in
China's interest to argue for a stronger coexistence of the two regimes in international climate
policy.
Such a cooperation or coexistence is important because every technology-orientated
approach needs market incentives for the development and transfer of technology. It may be
an 'inconvenient truth', but these can be created only by external emission commitments (or
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other market mechanisms). Any international Post-2012 climate change regime has to deal
with the difficult task of combining the as yet competing approaches of market pull (KP) and
technology push (APP). Technology is an important – but only one – component in a
portfolio of measures against climate change. Integrating also climate change and energy
security concerns is especially important for Asia – with China in the center – as a region
with a strong economic growth and the APP is a forerunner in this. All this will be by far the
largest and hardest task that environmental policy has ever faced and very difficult for the
policymakers of the Post-2012 climate change regime, but, nonetheless, we should be
optimists like Sir Nicholas Stern, the economist who published a famous review report on
climate change: He imagines a “real festival of technology, fired by constantly stricter
commitments”.
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Figure: Institutions of the APP
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China’s Dilemma in Climate Change Mitigation:
The Energy Problem
Bo Miao & Graeme Lang1
Abstract
The vulnerability of China to the adverse impacts of rising global warming is outlined,
including projected impacts on coastlines, agriculture, water supply, land degradation, and
public health, since these are important reasons why China, partly for reasons of national
security, is increasingly addressing the climate change problem in national and international
discussions. This paper then profiles China’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and illustrates
how the pressure from the international community, especially that from the US, would impel
China to make more substantial contribution to global climate effort. After examining
China’s coal-dominated energy mix, we review the current approaches undertaken by China
to combat climate change. They are essentially programs that aim to increase energy
efficiency and deploy alternative energies, thus reducing energy costs and bringing about
ancillary climate benefits. China’s active participation in the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) is then discussed. We show that it appears to be impossible, with current or currently
developing technologies such as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), to produce the 80%
reductions in GHG emissions which scientists recommend over the next four decades. What
other measures might be feasible for China to make more substantial contributions to global
climate-change-mitigation efforts? China’s dilemma is the need to sustain a developing
economy which depends crucially on GHG-emitting processes. It appears to be impossible to
do this without some radical restructuring of economic activity, since it seems that it cannot
be done by some combination of greater energy-efficiency and substituting fossil fuels by
renewables or nuclear power. An alternative over the longer term is to promote relocalization
of production and exchange using local and regional renewable resources. There are many
towns and cities in the world in which groups are planning and beginning to implement such
changes. In fact, China is almost uniquely well-qualified to take this approach, and indeed,
could become a leader in such innovations and such technologies. In the longer term, it is
very much in China’s national interest to follow this path.
* We would like to acknowledge research support from City University of Hong Kong.
(Project # 961055: Environmental Best Practice: a Comparative Study)
Introduction
China’s importance in the international climate change regime cannot be underestimated. As
one of the largest GHG emitters, and maybe the largest one though Chinese senior officials
have repeatedly rejected such claims, it is a must for the international community to engage
China effectively in any coordinated effort to combat global warming. Unlike any other
conventional air pollution that is either local or regional, climate change is global and
everyone has a stake. All nations will be affected to various degrees by the adverse impacts
of the most far-reaching environmental problem that human society has faced since the end of
the last ice age. China is not immune to such adverse impacts, though it may not be hit as
heavily as some low-lying island countries. China’s own research has pointed out that China
is one of the most vulnerable nations to the potential risks in climate change (NDRC, 2007).
It is therefore in China’s own interest to work with other major emitters to moderate the rapid
growth of GHG.
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However, it would be unrealistic to expect China to undertake the same emissions
reduction commitments as other developed economies. China only accounts for a small
portion of the GHG that have accumulated in the atmosphere in the past two hundred years. It
has every reason to ask the developed nations who have historically emitted large volumes of
GHG and currently have much higher per capita emissions to bear primary responsibility and
take the lead in any mitigation action. The US, as the largest historical GHG emitter, has been
refusing to undertake any mandatory responsibility to cut its emissions, and China has used
US recalcitrance as an excuse to shun any binding duties. This scenario is very likely to
change since the new US President Barrack Obama has explicitly expressed strong interests
in making more substantial contribution to combat climate change, and the adoption of a
mandatory cap-and-trade GHG emissions program is under heated discussion in the
Congress. Once US is on board, China will be under greater pressure to make more
constructive climate action. The latest visits by the Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton
and the House speaker Nancy Pelosi both highlight the importance of climate change
collaboration between these two largest emitters. The latest news is that these two nations are
negotiating a deal, a kind of joint agreement, in regard to a schedule for emissions reductions
and overall climate policy, and this will be a big step as the world moves closer to the
Copenhagen negotiations (Dyer, 2009).
The Chinese government is not blind to the potential costs that climate change could
cause for its cities, its agriculture, and the sustainability of some regions of the country. It is
promoting a series of energy-oriented policies and measures such as energy efficiency and
renewables programs that would also generate ancillary climate benefits. The Central
Government claims that it has effectively reduced 835 million tons of CO2 equivalent by
energy conservation and promotion of alternative energies in 2006 and 2007 (State Council,
2008). But China’s aggregate GHG emission has continued to grow rapidly in the past few
years, with no sign of slowing down. The dilemma is, with China’s heavy dependence on
coal to fuel the burgeoning economy, can China effectively mitigate the GHG emissions
while sustaining development and eradicating poverty?
In order to answer this question, this paper is divided into four sections. Section 1 will
address the question of why China should care about climate change. The vulnerability of
China to the adverse impacts of rising global warming is outlined, including projected
impacts on coastlines, agriculture, water supply, land degradation, and public health. It is
pointed out that it is in China’s own interest to work with other nations to prevent the
catastrophic results of climate change from happening. Request from the international
community, especially that from the US, would also play an important role in impelling
China to make more substantial contribution to global climate efforts. China’s GHG
emissions profile is also described in order to provide a better understanding of the nature of
such international calls.
Section 2 reviews China’s action against climate change. It first examines China’s
coal-dominated energy mix, showing that coal will continue to power China for a long period
of time and the CCS technology would not be commercially viable within foreseeable future.
It then discusses the energy efficiency and renewables programs that are promoted by the
Central Government with the purpose of addressing issues like energy security but also
produce remarkable climate benefits. As the largest host country for CDM, China’s active
participation in this flexible mechanism offered by Kyoto Protocol is also reviewed.
After acknowledging that current climate-change-mitigation approaches are
meaningful but far from adequate, section 3 explores what other measures might be feasible
for China to significantly mitigate its GHG emissions. It is suggested that an alternative over
the longer term is to promote relocalization of production and exchange using local and
regional renewable resources. The essence of relocalization and initiatives taken by many
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towns and cities overseas were briefly examined. The section also discusses China’s
advantages in marching on this path, especially those in the agriculture. The last section
provides some concluding remarks.
Section 1: Climate Change: Why Should China Care About It?
1.1. Reason I: Vulnerability of China
Experience tells that one will not act unless it is in its own interest to do so. The grave longterm challenges that are posed by climate change have drawn increasing attention from all
nations, including China. As one of the major greenhouse gas emitters, Chinese policymakers
are not blind to the adverse effects that could be caused by the continuing concentration of
greenhouse gas in the atmosphere. In 2007, the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) published China’s National Climate Change Programme,
acknowledging that China is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change, which
has already had certain impacts on it in various ways. “Vulnerability” could be understood as
the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with adverse effects of
climate change (IPCC, 2001). Indeed, China is climatically vulnerable in two senses:
On the one hand, the current and likely adverse impacts of climate change on China
are huge and could be even worse than many expect should the development pattern fail to be
significantly changed. The following description of those adverse impacts is primarily drawn
from China’s National Climate Change Programme (NDRC, 2007, pp.16-19) and China’s
Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (State Council, 2008).
First, China’s agriculture and livestock industries have experienced certain changes
with regard to the rising temperature, mainly shown by the 2-to-4-day advancement of spring
phenophase since the 1980’s. Declining crop yields are a risk. Rice production is sensitive to
increased temperatures, and thus can be affected by climate change. Forests and other natural
ecosystems in areas where average temperatures are increasing would also be affected. The
frequency and intensity of forest fires and of insect and disease outbreaks in forests are likely
to increase as a result of climate change.
It is expected that future climate change would also lead to expanding deserts and
shrinking grassland in some arid regions in western parts of China. Desertification is already
a serious problem for the country, and the resulting loss of grazing land and farmland, 1along
with the inevitable dust storms, all of which bring huge costs for the country, could be
worsened by global warming.
Second, global warming would challenge China’s water resources and distribution.
One of the biggest longer-term impacts would be the melting of glaciers on the Tibetan
plateau, because runoff from these glaciers provides the water for some of the greatest rivers
in East and Southeast Asia, including the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers in China. Vast areas of
agricultural production depend on the flow of water from these glaciers, that is, from winter
snow-pack which melts through the spring and summer of each year. If global warming leads
to earlier runoff from snow-pack, the summer flow from glaciers can be greatly reduced, as is
apparently already occurring in the western U.S. Water supply for agriculture, industry, and
domestic uses in northern and central China would be threatened, even if precipitation
increases in parts of southern China. This is of course a long-term projection. But the glacier
area in north-western China has apparently already shrunk by 21% according to some
accounts, and the thickness of frozen earth in Qinghai-Tibet Plateau has declined in recent
years. A decreasing trend in runoff has been observed during the past 40 years in China’s six
main rivers.

353

In early 2009, China experienced the most severe drought in some northern regions in
the past fifty years and significant losses were reported. Some northern river basins,
particularly the Haihe-Luanhe River basin, are clearly very vulnerable to climate change.
Third, the accelerating trend of sea level rise along the Chinese coast in the past 50
years is clear evidence of the impacts of climate change upon coastal environment. China is
not as exposed to rising sea levels as some other countries such as Bangladesh, but some of
China’s richest agricultural regions, such as the Pearl River Delta, are close to sea level and
could experience decreased production as saltwater intrusions onto land and into river deltas
increases. Coastal erosion, seawater intrusion, mangrove and coral reef degradation are
observable and expected to further deteriorate. Some major cities such as Hong Kong,
Guangzhou, Xiamen, and Shanghai would also be affected by sea-level rises. The worst-case
scenarios for sea-level rise (e.g. from melting of the Greenland Icecap) would force the
abandonment of some of these cities. But less extreme and currently more probable scenarios
of sea-level rise would also produce heavy costs for cities and for coastal agriculture. Global
warming will also evidently increase the severity of extreme and costly weather events such
as typhoons and storm surges, to which China is especially vulnerable because of its long
coastline and exposure to storms moving toward the coast from the south-western Pacific
oceans.
Fourth, climate change would also increase the intensity and frequency of heat waves,
which have been devastating already to populations in Europe and Australia, and would also
facilitate the northward spread of diseases such as malaria and dengue fever from Southeast
Asia into southern and central China.
On the other hand, China currently lacks the personnel, technical and financial
resources to deal with these kinds of impacts caused by climate change and therefore might
suffer great losses in the future, both in urban and rural areas.
These climate change-related impacts could be even worse should China, along with
other major economies, fail to change significantly their development pattern and effectively
control their greenhouse gas emissions.
1.2. Reason II: Pressure From The International Community
Meanwhile, the international community’s calls for China to undertake meaningful action to
control its greenhouse gas emissions have never ceased since the day climate change became
an issue. In order to understand the nature of such calls, it is necessary to first take a look at
China’s GHG emissions scenario.
The emission of China’s greenhouse gas has certain interesting features. Although
China historically only accounted for a relatively lower percentage (7.3% from 1850−2000)
in globally cumulative greenhouse gas emissions, it has kept increasing its share in the last
decade up to 14.8% in 2003 and became the second largest annual emitter in absolute terms
in that year, where GDP and total population are the decisive determinants. The rising trend
has continued and it is claimed by many researchers that the annual greenhouse gas emissions
in China have already surpassed those of the US and that China has already became the
world’s largest emitter (IEA, 2007; see Figure 2). Furthermore, given China’s continuously
soaring energy-related CO2 emissions, what could be expected in the coming decades is
continuing increases in greenhouse gas (Figure 1).

354

Figure 1: China’s greenhouse gas trends and projections; Figure 2: Top carbon dioxide emitters

Source: Pew Centre, 20072

Source: Shi, 2009

However, in sharp contrast to the enormous overall amounts, China’s greenhouse gas
emissions, in per capita terms, depict a strikingly different picture, in which China only ranks
97th globally in 2004, just slightly higher than the average for developing countries but below
the world average (NDRC, 2007, p.6). A recent report states that China’s per capita emissions
are 78 percent lower than that of the US, although China’s per capita emissions are growing
at a rate four to six times as fast as those of the US (Asia Society & Pew Centre, 2009, p.19).
Along with the sharp increase in overall greenhouse gas emissions in the past a few years, it
is reported that China’s per capita emissions are approaching the world average (Figure 3; see
also Tu, 2009, p.12).
Figure 3: Per capita greenhouse gas emissions in 2004
Figure 4: Per capita greenhouse gas emissions of US and China

Source: Pew Centre, 20073

Source: Shi, 2009.

It is also interesting to observe the decrease of China’s carbon intensity − the level of
CO2 emissions per unit of economic output. Carbon intensity not only serves as a strong
determinant of a country’s overall emissions, but also reflects the energy intensity and fuel
mix within carbon-related industries (Baumert et al., 2004, p.4). China has offered a striking
case in this regard. As of 2004, China’s carbon intensity was above the world average, and
above the average for developing countries (Figure 5). But China’s carbon intensity
evidently fell 47%, while GDP grew 162% from 1990 to 2000 (both much as a result of
privatisation and introduction of market reform). In comparison, between 1990 and 2000, the
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greenhouse gas intensity of the US economy declined by 17.5% (Robert & Kyle, 2003).
International Energy Agency (IEA) also confirms that China’s emission intensity in 2004
continued to decline.
Figure 5: Greenhouse gas intensity (2004)

Source: Pew Centre, 20074

However, some less optimistic predictions with regard to China’s decreasing trend of
carbon intensity exist, such as “It remains to be seen whether these trends are anomalous
one-time shifts reflecting particular circumstance … the opening of China’s economy to
market forces … or whether they suggest the potential for a longer-term decoupling of
economic and emissions growth” (Baumert et al., 2004, p.6). It is argued by some observers
that carbon intensity of China may not be able to continue to decline due to the rapid growth
in industrial demand, its heavy dependence on coal and the increasing constraint on securing
oil from overseas (Garnaut et al., 2008, p.3). Some even claimed that ‘China’s trend of
decreasing energy intensity reversed between 2002 and 2005 with energy growth surpassing
economic growth…China is now four times as energy intensive as the US and nine times less
efficient than Japan’ (Asia Society & Pew Centre, 2009, p.19). This claim is not invalid
given that China indeed invested more on heavy industry since 2001 in order to maintain the
two-digit growth rate. There also exist arguments that Beijing’s impressive greenhouse gas
reduction achievements in late 1990s is largely due to an embarrassing underreporting of coal
statistics (Tu, 2009, p.13). However, despite all these arguments, it is safe to say that the
Beijing government has remarkably reduced its energy intensity and has thereby produced
climate benefits.
Indeed, although China’s low per capita GHG emissions can still provide some
support in international climate negotiations, the soaring growth rate in its absolute emissions
has made it spotlight in any climate talks. The debate with regard to China’s climate
responsibility has become even more heated since China recently replaced the US as the
largest greenhouse gas emitter.
While developed economies such as European Union have been trying to introduce
various incentive programs to get China more actively involved in climate-change-mitigation
action, the play between China and the US over the international climate change regime
deserves special attention.
During the eight years of the Bush regime, China used US inaction as an excuse to
shun constructive greenhouse gas mitigation efforts, and the U.S. used Chinese inaction for
the same purpose. Neither of these two largest greenhouse gas emitters undertook any
mandatory obligations to set a limit on or reduce its emissions under the Kyoto Protocol.
Nevertheless, there are new trends in the climate strategy of the US. In 2009, a number of
senate bills were under active discussion in the Congress, and it is likely that a mandatory
emissions control scheme will be put in place in the US no later than 2010, under which the
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global politics of climate change will be thoroughly transformed (Clauseen, 2007). Driven by
concerns about the negative economic effects such as losing competitive advantage to those
without the same emissions controls as the early-movers, in particular China, the US will
have strong incentives to drag China into the global climate effort and insist that China fulfil
its share of responsibility as well.
The cover that China has been hiding behind will be eliminated once the US takes the
lead and commits itself to mandatory emission reductions, which would probably come true
since the new president, Barrack Obama, has expressed strong interests in combating climate
change. It is reported that the President ‘…has pledged to bring emissions down to 1990
levels by 2020 and endorsed a bill that would cut emissions by 17 per cent from 2005 levels
in 2020 - a reduction of 5 per cent from 1990 levels, according to EU calculations’
(Bloomberg, 2009). The Energy and Commerce Committee in the House just passed the
Waxman- Markey bill, a climate and energy bill that incorporates the establishment of a
nation-wide emissions trading scheme, the use of renewable energy and the long-term target
of reducing GHG emissions. While it is a long process before such bill can turn into law, the
passage has illustrated to some extent the legislature’s determination to set mandatory limits
on US’s GHG emissions. In addition, a number of states have participated in regional
initiatives such as Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and Western Climate Initiative that set
up cap-and-trade systems to control their GHG emissions.
Experience has proved that when the US is prepared to lead, others, too, will often be
far better able to muster the necessary political will (Clauseen, 2007). The recent call for joint
efforts to curb greenhouse gas between the US and China by Secretary of the State Hilary
Rodham Clinton when she visited China in February 2009 may indicate the Obama
administration’s hope to make climate change the centerpiece of a broader, more vigorous
engagement with China. 5 Even the outspoken China critic and US House Speaker Nancy
Pelosi puts climate change on top of agenda and steers away from human rights in her latest
visit to China (SCMP, 2009). All of the five members of the delegation led by her are
members of the House Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming. In
fact, there are news claiming that China and the U.S. are apparently negotiating 'deal', a kind
of joint agreement, in regard to a schedule for emissions reductions and overall climate policy
(Dyer, 2009). US Energy Secretary Steven Chu recently said that the US may accept targets
for cutting its greenhouse gases in an international treaty, even if China does not (Bloomberg,
2009). Observers also state that the cooperation between China and US on energy and climate
change would produce mutual benefits for both parties (Asia Society & Pew Centre, 2009).
In the future climate framework, whether multilateral or otherwise, while China may
not be required to take on quantified greenhouse gas emissions limits as the developed
countries do, it might have to demonstrate its sincerity in contributing its fair share to the
international climate efforts by making some forms of binding commitments. In fact, the Bali
Roadmap which was passed in 2008 by the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change conference has already called for ‘measurable, reportable and verifiable
nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions’ from developing countries
including China. It is expected that the 2009 Copenhagen conference will witness more
climate progress from both US and China.
Indeed, it is a fact that China’s greenhouse gas emissions, even with tremendous
uncertainties in national-level projections, will continue to rise sharply due to the growth of
its economy, population and energy consumption and heavy reliance on coal. Under these
circumstances, it will eventually become a must for China to put in place concrete action in
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response to the international community’s request, particularly that from the US, for its more
meaningful participation in climate-change-mitigation efforts (Cao, 2008).
Section 2: China’s Action Against Climate Change
Climate change is not a new concept for the Beijing government but it has developed slowly.
China has not yet established an orchestrated national climate regime that provides effective
regulatory mechanism, though it did set up some climate committees and published a series
of white papers about climate (State Council, 2008). As will be discussed later, apart from the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the current climate change-mitigation policies in
China are energy efficiency and renewable programs, which are essentially energy-orientedand-targeted but produce ancillary climate benefits. Most of the GHG emissions in China
take the form of CO2. It is reported that the share of CO2 in China’s total greenhouse gas
emissions is 83% in 2004 (NDRC, 2007, p.6). As emitting CO2 in China is primarily a
byproduct of energy production and China’s emissions are dominated by heavy industry, it
would be useful to first outline China’s energy profile in order to obtain a better
understanding of China’s action against climate change.
2.1. Energy Profile: Coal-Dominant Energy Mix
As a country rich in coal—nearly 13 percent of all the known mineable coal still in
the ground is in this country—it is natural to find that China’s primary energy mix is
dominated by this carbon-intensive fossil fuel (British Petroleum, 2006). In 2005, coal
contributed more than 69% of China’s energy use (Figure 6) including approximately 80
percent of its electricity generation, while oil accounted for around 20%, natural gas less than
3%, hydro, nuclear and others together approximately 7%.(China’s Statistical Yearbook,
2006).
Figure 6: China’s energy supply by fuel (2005)

Source: China Statistical Yearbook

In addition, China has recently witnessed a fast growth of coal power plants. In 2006
and 2007 alone, approximately 170 gigawatts (GW) of new coal power capacity were
installed in China, equivalent of about two large coal power plants per week. There are
currently more coal-fired power plants in China than in the US, the UK, and India combined
(Asia Society & Pew Centre, 2009, p.20). In fact, burning coal is the largest contributor to
CO2, not only because it dwarfs the consumption of natural gas and oil in absolute terms, but
because coal combustion emits almost twice as much CO2 per unit of energy as does the
combustion of natural gas, whereas the amount from crude oil combustion falls between coal
and natural gas.
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The implication of China’s heavy reliance on coal for its energy supply is two-fold:
first, the operations of desulphurisation equipment or other in-use coal cleaning technologies
that reduce traditional air pollutants such as SO2 did little to mitigate the emission of CO2. It
indicates that when coal consumption expands, which is inevitable under its current policy
scenario, it will be equally inevitable for China to emit more greenhouse gas. Second, as coal
is more carbon-intensive than other fossil fuels, China’s CO2 emission intensity of energy
consumption is and will continue to be relatively high. As a result, China’s per capita CO2
emissions will approach the world average at a fast pace while other major emitters, such as
OECD countries, are more diversified in energy supply and rely less on coal.
The coal-dominant energy mix is unlikely to be significantly changed in the near
term, which is absolutely unavoidable in a country that is developing rapidly and is so heavily
dependent on coal as the fuel to light up the cities, run the trains, and so on. For alternatives
to coal, China is having a difficult time in increasing domestic oil production, and securing
oil supply from overseas is not always easy (Lang and Miao, 2008). The current global
economic turndown may offer China some opportunities in pursuing more overseas oil
reserves. It is reported that ‘…China has committed more than US$50 billion to loans-for-oil
agreements with Russia, Kazakhstan, Venezuela and Brazil since February’ (Richardson,
2009). Should these deals be finalized, China would be able to obtain more than one third of
4.1 million barrels it currently imports a day.
Studies also show that China’s gas production is increasing but not fast enough to
satisfy demand growth (Rosen & House, 2007). In effect, although China has discovered new
gas fields in Sichuan and Erdos Basin and made enormous efforts to obtain gas from
countries such as Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia and central Asia, it is believed that it
would be a daunting task to meet the forecast four-fold increase in demand which is largely
driven by the fast-growing chemicals industry and an urbanization-led need for clean
household heating and cooking fuel (Downs, 2006).
It is a fact that this most carbon-intensive fossil fuel will continue to engine China’s
burgeoning economy at least in the short to medium term. The Chinese government is not
blind to the air pollution caused by burning coal. It formulates a series of polices to retire old,
outdated coal power plants and replace them with new, more efficient ones. It is reported that
‘…China has since become the major world market for advanced coal-fired power plants
with high-specification emission control systems’ (IEA, 2009). With the installation of more
efficient coal power plants such as the one recently build in Tianjin that uses extremely hot
steam, it is likely for China to greatly increase the average efficiency of its coal-fired fleet
and accordingly reduce the emission of CO2 per unit of electricity it generates. Experts
expect that the application of newest technology would produce a cut of more than one third
of the CO2 emissions compared to the weakest one (Bradsher, 2009a). It is also predicted that
China may increase the average efficiency from 32 percent in 2005 to around 40 percent by
2030 by installing more supercritical units (Asia Society & Pew Centre, 2009, p.28).
However, it should be noted that only 60% of the newly built coal-fired power plants
use advance technologies that improve their efficiency, and the numerous inefficient power
plants that China built in the past decade will remain in operation for a long period of time.
The overall amount of CO2 emissions from China’s heavy reliance on coal is bound to
increase rapidly. The question is, can China continue its reliance on coal in a carbonconstrained world? Or put another way, can China successfully deploy low-emissions or
zero-emissions coal technology, such as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) to help abate the
GHG emissions from coal-fired power plants?
CCS is a technology that captures CO2 either before combustion or after combustion,
compresses the captured CO2 and transports it through pipelines for storage in deep,
underground geological formations such as depleted oil fields (Asia Society & Pew Centre,
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2009, p.29). The CCS is promising in controlling CO2 emissions because should it be
adopted, a coal-fired power plant will virtually emit zero greenhouse gases. The CCS
technologies have been widely researched by many nations, but many of them are still at very
early stage and there are only a few small-scale demonstration projects. China is also
devoting resources to the CCS research with other international partners. In collaboration
with the Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization
(CSIRO), Huaneng Power Group (China’s largest electricity generator) started running a
3,000-ton post-combustion carbon capture pilot project near Beijing in 2008 (IEA, 2009,
p.106). The CO2 captured is not stored but used for beverage production. Other proposed
demonstration projects including GreenGen (a 400-megawatt IGCC plant with CCS to be
added by 2020) and Near Zero Emission Coal are also under planning (Asia Society & Pew
Centre, 2009, p.29).
The major hurdle for wide application of CCS is cost. It is estimated that the
electricity produced by a coal power plants that uses CCS would be 75% to 100% more
expensive than the electricity produced by conventional coal power plant (IEA, 2009, p.106).
The concern of ‘energy penalty’ of running the capture equipment should not be ignored,
either (Asia Society & Pew Centre, 2009, p.30). With current CCS technology, the energy
that is required for capture is significant and may reduce a plant’s combustion efficiency by
roughly one third. While transportation from power plant to storage site is a further costly
complication for carbon sequestration, the storage of the captured CO2 is another problem.
While some initial assessment of China’s storage capacity has been conducted, it is too early
to conclude that China would be able to store the CO2 generated by its enormous amount of
coal-fired power plants. Indeed, the volume of CO2 currently generated by combustion of
coal, when compressed for storage, would be much larger than any current storage sites,
which in any case are usually very far from existing or planned power plants. The magnitude
of the CO2 emitted by all China’s coal power plants would undoubtedly make the
transportation and storage a daunting task.
Neither can the risk involved in the potential leakage of stored CO2 be
underestimated—the leaked CO2 could be lethal. Insurance companies would not act unless
scientific research can convincingly ensure that leakage would not be a problem; and without
the financial assurance from the insurance companies, it is hardly possible to expect any
large-scale CCS project which normally demands huge amounts of investment to kick off. In
addition, some researchers have argued that burying carbon dioxide from coal-power plants
could increase the emissions of other pollutants such as NOx and SO2, casting some shadow
on this highly-acclaimed technology (Barry, 2008).
Indeed, whereas the international community has admitted that technologies such as
CCS are key to the continual use of coal, it is widely agreed that large-scale promotion of
CCS would not be commercially viable until 2030. It is a fact that China is actively
participating in the research and development of this clean coal technology, but it is
unrealistic to expect that China would adopt a technology which is not yet in commercial use
in the developed economies.
2.2. Promoting Renewable Energy
No matter how efficient it is, burning fossil fuels still emits GHG. It is suggested by many
that the real solution for combating climate change would be a complete shift to renewable
energy such as hydro, wind, solar, biomass, tidal, etc. As the renewables are virtually zerocarbon emitting, powering the world by them would absolutely alleviate the concern about
the continuing concentration of GHG in the atmosphere, though other concerns may arise
along with their wide use.
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While obtaining 17 percent of its electricity and 7 percent of the primary energy from
renewable sources in 2008, the central government in Beijing is making efforts to further
diversify the supply with hydro, nuclear and other renewable power. It announces a target of
16% of primary energy from renewable energies and 20% of electricity capacity by 2020. In
order to achieve the target, the Beijing government has put in place a series of policies and
measures that provide various forms of incentives to enterprises (Asia Society & Pew Centre,
2009, p.37). However, the development of non-carbon emitting energies in China is
complicated.
Hydropower is currently the primary source of China’s renewable electricity. The
production of hydropower increased by 10.8% in 2007 and provided for more than 6% of
China’s overall energy need in that year. Much of the increase was contributed by the Three
Gorges Dam that was newly put to use and expected to provide China with 18,000 megawatts
of energy, more than ten percent of China’s total electricity needs. The benefits and damages
that would come along with this large-scale campaign have been well documented. Whether
this project would be an economic success or an ecological disaster remains an open
question, but the fact that it has received considerable domestic as well as international
criticism has cast some shadow on its future (Boland, 1998 and Heggelund, 2004).
Meanwhile, it is not rare to see strong political resistance, mainly from the displaced people
and environmental groups, to new major hydropower projects such as those planned to be
build on Nu River and Mekong River. The Central Government’s decision to postpone those
constructions until the controversy was settled and the environmental concern properly
addressed has indicated the government’s cautious attitude toward massive hydropower
programs.
The latest news is that MEP has suspended two new large dam constructions on upper
Yangtze River as the companies started construction without passing environmental impact
assessment.6 These two dams are part of the ambitious program of building 12 hydropower
projects along the Jinsha River that flows from Qinghai province to Yunnan and Sichuan
provinces, which would altogether produce an equivalent amount of electricity to the Three
Gorges Dam when completed. However, voices like such construction would severely
damage the local biodiversity have never ceased since the construction plan was proposed. In
addition, the declining water resources would also take a toll on the development of
hydroelectric facilities.
In regard to nuclear power, China has recently expressed strong interests in
accelerating the build-up of nuclear plants. 7 It is reported that China plans to build eight
nuclear plants from 2009 to 2011 with a total capacity of more than 10 GW, exceeding the
overall capacity in all the past years.8 The first inland nuclear plant is to be located in Hebei
province and expects to commence construction in early 2009. 9 Despite the continuing
opposition to building nuclear plants by many environmentalist groups (e.g. Greenpeace),
some analysts in China and overseas argue that China can and should try to reduce coal
consumption through replacing some electricity production from coal with electricity

6

‘MEP suspended the application from Huadian and Huaneng electricity group’, New Beijing Report, 12 June
2009, Available HTTP: <http://news.163.com/09/0612/02/5BIV63C2000120GR.html >(assessed 15 June 2009).
7
‘The Third-generation Nuclear Power Plants is to be laid out in China’, Phoenix Finance, 2 September 2008.
Available HTTP: <http://finance.ifeng.com/zq/hybg/200809/0902_932_757826.shtml> (accessed 23 February
2009)
8
‘China will promote the self-development of nuclear power plant’, Caijing, 19 February 2009. Available
HTTP: < http://www.caijing.com.cn/2009-02-19/110071355.html> (accessed 24 February 2009).
9
‘China expects to build the first inland nuclear plant in 2009’, Xinhua Net, 7 December 2007, Available HTTP:
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-12/07/content_10469198.htm> (accessed 23 February 2009).
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production by nuclear power in the medium term.10 The Daya Bay nuclear power plant has
been supplying about 30% of the power to one of Hong Kong’s two major electrical utilities
without problems for more than a decade. The argument of these analysts is that the risks and
likely damage from substantial global warming are orders of magnitude greater than the risks
of accidents and the problems of storage of waste associated with nuclear power plants such
as the one at Daya Bay. Concerns such as China’s coal reserve is finite and might not be able
to eternally sustain the booming economy also partly encourage China to pursue further the
development of nuclear power.
It is also possible that with new technology such as the ‘pebble bed’ reactor, which is
currently being tested in China, the country may be able to reduce risks and costs involved in
building and operating nuclear power plants.11 It is therefore more likely for China to promote
the use of this “clean” power on a larger scale and help reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
On the other hand, we cannot be blind to the potential risks in nuclear power. It may
be too early to conclude that China has obtained nuclear technologies that are mature enough
in all aspects to support extensive construction of nuclear power plants and that a boom in
construction of nuclear power plants will occur. It is fair to say that although the central
government has indicated its support for China’s nuclear power development and some
technological progress has been achieved, it still remains to be seen how those policies and
measures will actually play out.
The development of other renewable energy is also encouraging. Wind power is
becoming cost-competitive in certain areas and China has become one of the world’s largest
markets for wind turbines along with US and Spain. At the end of 2007, China's installed
base of wind power totaled just over 6 gigawatts (GW), making China the fifth largest
producer of wind power, after Germany, the U.S., Spain and India. As a consequence of the
rapid build-out of wind power projects in China, in April 2008 the National Development and
Reform Commission revised its 11th Five Year Plan Period plan for wind power
development from 5 GW to 10 GW by 2010. Wind power industry statistics show that by the
end of 2008 China's total installed base of wind power production will have already reached
13 GW, two years ahead of the revised plan. Some experts are estimating that by 2010, the
total installed capacity for wind power generation in China will reach 20 GW and that by
2020 China's installed base of wind power will total 100 GW.12
Meanwhile, solar-water-heating is widely used by Chinese families due to the
relatively low costs. China is also the world’s largest producer of photovoltaic (PV) cells. As
solar-generating electricity is generally ten times more expensive than that from traditional
coal-fired power plants, 98% of China’s photovoltaic cells are exported overseas (Xin, 2009).
The current economic turndown is giving most of China’s PV a hard time as the demand
from overseas market is shrinking dramatically. The Ministry of Finance issued Application
Guidelines for Demonstration Projects of Solar Photovoltaic Building on 20 April, 2009 and
provides a maximum subsidy of 20 RMB per installed watt for eligible applicants (Ministry
of Finance, 2009). Since the current installation cost for PV cells in China is roughly 24
RMB/watt, the demonstration projects can significantly reduce the installation cost to as low
as 4 RMB/watt with the maximum subsidy. It is estimated that the electricity price from these
10
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projects would therefore even have a slight competitive advantage over electricity from other
sources (Xin, 2009).
Figure 7: China’s wind power capacity and increasing trend from 2001-2008

Source: Huajing Shidian Research Centre, 2008（ Column: installed capacity in MW; Curve:
growth rate)13

Indeed, the rapid development of renewable energy, including building more nuclear
plants and wind farms, would provide more electricity from non-coal sources and help abate
China’s greenhouse gas emissions in absolute terms. Nevertheless, there is bound to be a long
way to go before renewable energy can make a significant dent in China’s rising overall
power demand given the aggregate amount of energy that are needed to fuel China’s booming
economy (Lang and Miao, 2008). For now, it is implausible to expect that they would reduce
substantially the consumption of coal and other fossil fuels, and lead us into a carbon-free
world at anywhere near current rates of energy consumption. But in the medium to long term,
renewable energy could help China address the great dilemma caused by the heavy
dependence on coal and the urgent need to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.
2.3. Improving Energy Efficiency and Conservation
Another important energy policy that would produce significant climate benefits is the
government’s attempt to reduce energy consumption through greater efficiency and
conservation. China sets an ambitious goal of cutting energy intensity (energy consumption
per unit of GDP) by 20% below 2005 levels by 2010. It is estimated that a 20 percent energy
intensity improvement can translate into an annual reduction of over 1.5 billion tons of CO2
by 2010, making this largely local-pollution and energy-security-oriented effort one of the
most significant carbon mitigation initiatives in the world (Lin, 2008).
The pillar project of achieving the 20 percent reduction target is the Top 1000
Enterprises Program (including 1008 enterprises actually), which was launched by the
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2006 and aims to improve the
energy efficiency in China’s 1000 largest enterprises that devour one third of the country’s
primary energy. It is expected that these 1,008 energy-consuming enterprises will achieve an
overall reduction of 450 million tons of CO2 by 2010. Even for a large emitter such as China,
this amount of reduction is not small, if we take into account the reduction target of 300
13
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million tons of CO2e put forward by EU in their Kyoto commitment. It should be noted that
local governments are also required to develop similar programs with an additional 100,000
smaller firms in order to achieve the 20% reduction national goal by 2010.
Meanwhile, in an announcement made in early 2007, NDRC was making efforts to
retire a wide range of inefficient industrial plants. China is also improving the fuel economy
standards for passenger vehicles fleets. The current standards are more stringent than those in
Australia, the US and Canada (although less stringent than those in Japan and the EU). What
is more important is that China revised the Energy Conservation Law in 2008, putting
forward new and more stringent efficiency standards for buildings, industries and appliances.
However, these energy-oriented policies do not always perform as planned. It is
reported by NDRC that 7.8 percent of the 1008 enterprises failed to meet their energy saving
targets in 2007 (Xinhua Net, 2008). If we take into account local officials’ conventional
practice of massaging the data, chances are good to have a less aspiring percentage of
compliance. China also failed to meet the energy intensity reduction target both in 2006 and
2007, though 2008 stands a relatively good chance to meet the target. Reasons for that are
complicated: first, the target set by the central government is deemed as, though laudable, too
ambitious; second, it takes considerable time for industry to invest in energy-saving facilities
and change their business-as-usual behavior. It also takes time for the investment to produce
actual energy-saving results; third, it is not easy for China to shift away from a heavyindustry-led consumption which is relatively energy intensive, as capital has been locked in
on the basis of expected returns; fourth, the order to shut down small energy inefficient firms
was not fully obeyed by local officials; and fifth, the financial costs of improving energy
efficiency are rarely small in amount for selected firms, who cannot always obtain adequate
financial assistance from the government. The prospect for China achieving the 20%
reduction goal appears dim.
Aside from targeting large stationary enterprises, transportation is another sector that
China can make great improvement in both ensuring energy security and combating climate
change. The most significant case is the development of electric vehicles.
Unlike the hybrid car that still consumes oil and emits GHG, electric car produces no
emission at the tailpipe, and in most models, it does not even has a tailpipe, making it
virtually zero-carbon emitting. Many have expressed interest in developing electric vehicles
including China. The Central Government recently put forward the goal of becoming a world
leader in electric car by 2012 with the purpose of creating jobs, reducing urban pollution and
decreasing oil dependence (Bradsher, 2009b). In order to achieve the goal, the government
has allocated large amount of funds to the electric car research. It also runs a pilot program in
13 cities which offers a subsidy of up to $ 8,800 to each electric car that joins the taxi fleet or
is purchased by the local government agencies (Bradsher, 2009b). Complimentary
infrastructure such as charging station for electric cars is also under construction in Beijing,
Tianjin and Shanghai. It is reported that China aims to boost its production of hybrid or
electric vehicles from 2,100 in 2008 to 500,000 by 2011 (Bradsher, 2009b).
In fact, some companies in China, like Shenzhen-based BYD Auto, China's Tianjin
Qingyuan Electric Vehicle Company and Hafei Auto Group, have successfully developed
several electric car models and passed strict safety test. But how to commercialize them in the
market remains an open question in China as it does in other countries—even with the
government’s subsidy, the retail price of these electric cars are still much more expensive
than the gasoline-engine counterparts. Other concerns about its development in China also
exist. For instance, the demand for electricity in China is so huge that it may leave little room
to provide sufficient amount of electricity to recharge the battery for the large scale
promotion of electric cars.
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Electric vehicles also have an eco-label—the Well-to-Wheel CO2 emissions of
electric vehicles is always lower than those of conventional cars. The question is, as electric
cars replace the burning of gasoline and diesel fuel by the burning of coal to produce
electricity, will there be great ‘emission saving’ for China?
The answer is closely related to the emission intensity of China’s existing electricity
infrastructure. As previously discussed, 80 percent of China’s electricity is produced by coal,
and it could be expected that most of the electricity that will be used to recharge the battery
for electric cars would be provided by coal-fired power plants. Bearing in mind the fact that
many of China’s coal power plants are still inefficient, using electricity coming from carbonintensive fossil fuels would negate to a great extent the climatic benefits brought by the
efficiency advantages of electric vehicles. A McKinsey & Company report states that
‘…given China’s reliance on coal-fired plants for electricity, electric vehicles today only
have a 19 percent carbon abatement potential over current internal combustion engine
technologies.’ (Gao, et al. 2008).
However, electric cars could produce better environmental benefits if more renewable
energy is introduced to the grid. By diversifying the energy source to fuel cars, China would
be able to achieve as much as 49 percent carbon abatement potential (Gao, et al. 2008).
However, it is a long way for China to realize the high carbon abatement potential since its
coal-dominant energy mix would not be significantly changed in the foreseeable future.
Indeed, these energy-oriented polices do not aim directly to reduce China’s GHG
emissions, but they have produced remarkable climate benefits in the absence of a concerted
national climate policy providing effective regulatory mechanism. The Chinese government
claims that by energy conserving and using renewable energy, China reduced 835 million
tons of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2006 and 2007 (State Council, 2008). These climate
change mitigation-related policies and measures are important in China’s efforts to cut GHG
emissions. It should be noted that China has also launched a campaign of nation-wide treeplanting and reforestation and enhanced ecology restoration and protection, which also cut
the emission of CO2. And we should bear in mind that the effective control on the growth
rate of population through family planning has contributed greatly to the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions.
2.4. Participation in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
Apart from these climate-related energy policies, China also gets involved in the global
climate change regime by its active participation in the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM). With the Kyoto protocol’s entry into force in 2005, China has been actively making
use of CDM—an international emission-reduction-credit system offered by the Protocol to
produce mutual economic benefits for both the investing and host countries. It is reported that
China is by far the largest source of CDM credits, accounting for more than 40% of those
generated to date. China even has a larger share (55.38%) in the expected average annual
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from registered projects by host party (Figure 8,
UNFCCC, 2009, up to 21/02/2009)14
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Figure 8: Percentage of Clean Development Mechanism host countries

Source: UNFCCC, as of 21/02/2009

Within the CDM credits already obtained, most of which came from destruction of
trifluoromethane (HFC23), representing roughly 90% of all the issued CERs. Other key
project types involve the capture of methane from landfills and nitrous oxide (N2O)—both
are potent greenhouse gas. An increasing number of renewable energy and energy efficiency
projects is getting registered in the past two years and is expected to represent a larger share
in China’s CDM projects.
It is claimed by some researchers that China’s dominance in the carbon trading
market is partly due to its entrepreneurship in developing CDM projects and also to its
relatively low risk investment environment, compared to other host countries.15 Indeed, China
did spot the commercial opportunity embedded in the CDM and made institutional
arrangements to smooth the way for its introduction to China. For instance, the central
government established the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change in 1998
and clearly stipulated it as the review and coordination agency for CDM projects in 2003. An
Office of National Coordination Committee on Climate Change was also created as the
executive body to deal with CDM issue (located within National Development and Reform
Commission).
As early as 2005, National Development and Reform Commission, along with some
other ministries, issued Measures for Operation and Management of Clean Development
Mechanism in China, which provides policy framework as well as detailed instructions for
industry to effectively participate in CDM. It is reported that the CDM office has provided
clear guidance on eligibility, application and approving procedures, and benefits sharing for
registering as a CDM project. And thus potential applicants are better equipped to make a
successful registration. The establishment of three carbon trading centers in Beijing, Tianjin
and Shanghai in 2008 also provides trading platforms for the carbon credit transactions. All
these institutional arrangements have effectively created a friendly investment environment
for both overseas investors and domestic enterprises. The CDM project boom then came as
no surprise.
Indeed, it is true that the enormous amount of revenues that could be generated from
CDM projects is the major motivation for both the Chinese government and private industry.
Although the government takes a large share of the revenue (65% in HFC23 projects and
35% in other types of projects), the enterprise’s enthusiasm for reaping the windfall profits
15
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from CDM projects still remains great. The revenues taken by the government are used to set
up an environmental fund that supports energy saving and deployment of renewables. It is
noteworthy that the promotion of CDM projects will help enhance the environmental
capacity-building and institutional development. For instance, it is imperative for the host
country to establish credible emissions baselines so that the reduction credits created under
the projects can be reliably measured and verified. In order to realize the mutual benefits of
the CDM projects, there is every reason to expect China and the investing countries to exert
real efforts to meet the baseline-setting standards.
However, there also exist barriers for the development of CDM in China. For
instance, it took a long time for the Executive Board (EB) to pass a methodology for
assessing a new type of CDM projects. Therefore, only a small number of CDM projects that
registered with NDRC could eventually be approved by the Executive Board and create
financial benefits for the host enterprises. Most other registered projects will be refused and
have no way to recover their financial costs—which are not always small. How to ensure
enterprises are not intimidated by the potential loss of their initial investments still remains an
issue unsolved. In addition, since most applicants in China normally lack expertise to
participate in CDM, they are often placed in a disadvantageous position when negotiating
with foreign investors who are usually better equipped with relevant knowledge. As a result,
the contract price for Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) tends to be relatively low and
core mitigation technology transfer rarely takes place (Teng, etc. 2008).
It should also be noted that there are costs involved in international climate change
cooperation and the costs may be huge for China. While the CDM projects generate financial
income for both industry and government in a short term, they may exhaust the lowest-cost
carbon mitigation options currently available in China. In a long term, China may be left with
fewer economically affordable mitigation options when it has to shoulder carbon reduction
responsibilities in the future.
Despite the potential risks in CDM, the Chinese government has reiterated its support
for the continual application of CDM after 2012 while arguing for more technology transfer
from the developed countries (State Council, 2008).
To sum up, China’s greenhouse gas emissions will continue to soar as a result of its
economic boom and its continual reliance on coal. Since the adverse effects of climate
change are beyond discussion, moderating its greenhouse gas emissions will be a daunting,
but laudable task for the Beijing government. The energy efficiency and renewables
programs are meaningful but far from adequate. As discussed above, it appears to be
impossible, with current or currently developing technologies such as CCS, to produce the
80% reductions in GHG emissions which scientists recommend over the next four decades.
What other measures might be feasible for China to make more substantial contributions to
global climate-change-mitigation efforts?
Section 3: Relocalization: Some Preliminary Considerations
China’s dilemma is the need to sustain a developing economy which depends crucially on
GHG-emitting processes. It appears to be impossible to do this without some radical
restructuring of economic activity, since it seems that it cannot be done by some combination
of greater energy-efficiency and substituting fossil fuels by renewables or nuclear power. An
alternative over the longer term is to promote relocalization of production and exchange
using local and regional renewable resources.
One possible definition of relocalization is: the process by which a region, county,
city or even neighborhood frees itself from an overdependence on the global economy and
invests its own resources to produce a significant portion of the goods, services, food and
energy it consumes from its local endowment of financial, natural and human capital
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(Talberth et al, 2006). It can be seen that the idea of relocalization covers a wide range of
functions and changes, from food supply, transportation, urban planning, to the energy
restructuring.
There are many towns and cities in the western world in which groups are planning
and beginning to implement such changes. For instance, the Transition Town Initiative,
which originates from a small town in England, has now “gone viral” in England and beyond
(Hopkins, 2008). The focus of transitioning one’s community centers on rebuilding local
resilience which refers to ‘an ecosystem’s ability to roll with external shocks and attempted
enforced changes. In the context of communities and settlements, it refers to their ability to
not collapse at first sight of oil or food shortages, and to their ability to respond with
adaptability to disturbance’ (Hopkins, 2008, p.54). The transitioning also aims to address the
question: ‘…for all those aspects of life that this community needs in order to sustain itself
and thrive, how do we significantly increase resilience (to mitigate the effects of peak oil) and
drastically reduce carbon emissions (to mitigate the effects of climate change’ (Hopkins,
2008, p.56).
It is claimed that the resulting coordinated range of projects across all these aspects of
life could lead to a collectively designed energy descent pathway which means the transition
from a high fossil fuel-use economy to a more frugal one (Odum and Odum, 2001).
Although ‘relocalization’ may not explicitly be put forward as the target, some cities
and towns have already established task forces to address climate change issues, sometimes
together with other pressing concerns such as energy security and peak oil, assess their
vulnerability to the adverse impacts of climate change, and to plan their moves to types of
urban economies that minimize the consumption of fossil fuel (Lang and Miao, 2008). Some
of these initiatives focus on ‘energy efficiency’ or energy-supply-volatility, and some also
explicitly link the problems of global warming and other concerns such as peak-oil, intending
to address both by major reductions in the consumption of fossil fuels. These reductions
would be achieved by some combination of greater efficiency, better design of buildings and
appliances, reduced consumption, and relocalization in the supply of food, goods, and energy.
Some cities have produced a lot of local activity, a planned sequence of changes in
transportation and regulation, and early support for local food production. No city overseas
has come close to achieving a transition to an economy that relocalizes all aspects of life. But
many of these cities provide useful models of some of the activities and plans that will be
needed.
Of course, the social and ecological conditions in Chinese cities are quite different
from most of these overseas communities. Planning must take account of local conditions.
The political conditions are also quite different, and civil-society groups have played a major
role in many of the overseas ‘transition’ initiatives, while such civil-society groups are much
less vigorous in China for a variety of reasons. But there is no doubt that if citizens in
China’s cities can be engaged by local government agencies in collaborative discussions
about transitions to sustainable urban life, that there are large resources of expertise which
can be mobilized for such discussions and planning.
It is particularly notable that many Chinese cities are surrounded by agricultural
districts in which agricultural knowledge and skills are still strong. It is crucial to preserve
these rural districts, since their food production will be essential in the future for the life of
the local cities. It is also important to maximize food production within cities. Again, China’s
cities are probably more well-prepared to promote intra-city food production than most
overseas cities. But the importance of intra-city food production must be recognized, and
plans developed for progressive expansion of such production.
Finally, the transportation systems and the related planning of residential districts, and
the question of sustainable populations and population densities in cities, need much more
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attention from citizens and planners. Cities must not be allowed to sprawl outwards into rural
agricultural districts, with accompanying demands for energy-intensive transportation.
In fact, China is almost uniquely well-qualified to take this approach, and indeed,
could become a leader in such innovations and such technologies. In the longer term, it is
very much in China’s national interest to follow this path.
Conclusion:
Climate change is becoming more and more important in China’s political agenda. The
vulnerability of itself to the adverse impacts of climate change, coupled with the increasing
pressure from the international community, will impel Chinese policy makers to take climate
change seriously. However, China’s GHG emissions will continue to rise rapidly as it will
rely heavily on coal, the most carbon-intensive fossil fuel, to engine the economy for a long
period of time. And although China is installing more high efficient coal units, a high
efficient coal-fired power plant emits twice as much CO2 as that of a gas power plant. The
absolute increase of GHG emissions is likely to strain China’s development in a coalconstraint world.
Meanwhile, China has improved greatly energy efficiency in the past few years and
set up ambitious target of boosting the supply of renewable energies such as hydro, solar,
winder and even nuclear power. The Beijing government is trying to reduce China’s
dependence on fossil fuels, in particular imported oil, by diversifying the energy sources.
Whereas climate-change-mitigation is obviously not the concern that bred these energyoriented policies, they have produced remarkable climate benefits. However, although the
development of these programs is encouraging, they are far from adequate given the absolute
amount of primary energy that is needed to maintain the high growth rate of China’s GDP.
Fossil fuel, especially coal, will still remain as the dominate source. In addition, there is no
timeframe to put the CCS into large-scale commercial use and the carbon abatement potential
of electric car in China is limited as most of the electricity for recharge would come from
coal-fired power plants.
It would not be easy for China to address the dilemma of sustaining a developing
economy which depends crucially on GHG-emitting processes. Fundamental changes are
needed, and relocalization is an interesting option. Many overseas towns and cities have
provided various models to reduce their dependence on fossil fuels by relocalizing many
aspects of life, including food supply, energy structure, transportation, urban planning, etc.
China may not yet have faced the same level of energy problems as those in the developed
nations do in many of the regions, and it is uniquely well-positioned to make such transition
since many Chinese cities still have intensive agriculture right up to the edges of the cities,
and even within some cities. China is also capable of producing innovative designs in urban
development and redevelopment to minimize transportation costs and promote much greater
energy efficiency. The various kinds of so-called ‘eco-cities’ initiatives in China, and the
growing interest in what has been called the ‘circular economy’ (recycling, re-using materials
and goods, minimizing waste), will contribute to these innovative solutions.
It is a must for China to continue to lift more people out of poverty in a much less
carbon-intensive way given the magnitude of the problem of global warming. The
Communist Party’s political legitimacy also rests upon this. The task to deal with climate
change while sustaining economic development is unprecedented; and China is bound to be
an important player in making the transition to a low-carbon or zero-carbon economy.
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China's Renewable Energy Policy: From Project-based to Strategic Policy Making:
Cases of Wind and Solar
Veronica Pei-Fei Chang1, Hans Bruyninckx2
Abstract
China is challenged by the imbalance between rapid economic growth and lacking
environmental protection. Economic growth and increasingly intensive use of energy are
certainly the main causes of environmental degradation in China. However, the central state
tries to find a way out of the energy-environment dilemma. In 2005, the Chinese president
Hu Jin-Tao emphasized that renewable energy was “an indispensable measure to deal with
the increasingly serious issues of energy and environment”. The following year, China's
Renewable Energy Law took effect, indicating a turning point in the energy policy.
This paper investigates China’s wind and solar energy, because they both reflect
proactive policies and major changes in China’s energy policy. We will discuss the
trajectories that are leading from a past policy which was based on more ad hoc and projects,
to an increased institutionalization of renewable energy as a strategic choice in China’s
energy mix.
Introduction
Since the 1979 economic reform, China went through a major shift in its system of
production and consumption.3 Industrial production has boomed, making China the ‘factory
of the world’. Improved living standards in urban areas have created a large middle class of
urban consumers. This fundamental shift requires massive amounts of (new) energy. China’s
reliance on mainly coal and to a lesser extend oil to meet its energy demand, explains why the
country has recently surpassed the US as the biggest carbon dioxide (CO2) emitter, and thus
the largest contributor to global warming in the world. 4 The international community is
calling on China (and other rapidly expanding economies such as India, Brazil, Mexico, …)
to take up responsibility by committing to energy efficiency and CO2 reduction targets under
the successor agreement of Kyoto, which will be negotiated in Copenhagen in December
2009. The Chinese national policy is responding by promoting renewable energy, including
wind and solar, which will be our focus in this paper.
We will first briefly discuss China’s increasing energy demand. The paper then maps
out the evolution of both wind and solar energy policies, with an emphasis on the driving
factors for change. We conclude with a comparison of both policy reforms. The paper
focuses on internal driving forces of both wind and solar policies and less on external factors.
China’s Increased Energy Demand and Problematic Energy Supply
The root causes of China’s spectacular increase in energy use, leading to a heavy reliance on
coal and oil, are economic expansion, urbanization and increased domestic consumption of
consumer goods and energy. Since the 1979 economic reforms, China’s GDP has increased
by about a factor 5, with another quadrupling predicted by 2050. Ever since the mid-1990s
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China has seen an average growth of 10% in GDP annually. In 1999 the World Bank
categorized China from ‘low income’ to ‘lower middle-income’ country, which indicated
great economic progress. According to the International Energy Outlook the GDP of China is
indeed growing by about 9.6% per year, yet energy and electricity demand is reaching 11%
and 15% annual growth rates respectively. This means that at this moment economic growth
is accompanied by increased energy intensity of the production apparatus.5
While most attention has been given to China’s role as a major export country to
explain its economic growth and the spectacular increase in energy demand, internal shifts in
urbanization and consumption are also of importance. China’s urban population has increased
in a unprecedented fashion to about 600 million urban citizens. While many of them are still
living in poor conditions (compared to the Western world), a domestic middle class,
possessing improved purchasing power has emerged. Several hundred million Chinese
urbanites today have moved beyond the basic needs.6 Their urban life style is based on the
consumption of modern goods and services, the ownership of private cars, larger housing
accommodation, etc. The result is a much increased use of energy for domestic purposes.
Coal is the main energy supply for economic growth in China. About 70% of the
domestic energy mix consists of coal.7 The low cost and domestic availability of coal are the
main reasons for its wide use by industrial sectors for steam and direct heat. It is also the key
source for electricity production. In addition, the consumption of coal is estimated to increase
with another 13% to 18% in the next 20 years.8 The other 30% of China’s energy mix consist
of oil 24%; natural gas, 3%; hydro, 2%; and, nuclear, 1%.9 The relative part of oil, which is
mainly used for transport and for derivates used in the chemical industry and agriculture, is
expected to increase, which means a serious increase in oil imports. China’s consumption of
oil is bigger than its oil production and the gap is widening.10 China is now the second largest
oil consumer in the world next to the US, and oil use will increase by 80% by 2020 if current
trends persist. China’s increased dependence on foreign oil has been discussed in many fora
in the last couple of years. It is putting extra stress on oil markets and reason for geo-political
concerns in sensitive regions such as Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa. In addition,
China’s strategy for foreign supply of oil (e.g. relations with Sudan and Nigeria) is not met
with great enthusiasm in the international community. It estimated that by 2020 China would
import 80% of its oil and that by 2025 the amount would reach over 14 million barrels per
day.11 Given the size of the country and the economy, China has thus become a major player
on global oil markets, next to the US.
It is fair to say that energy supply is considered as a, if not the, key challenge for
China’s sustained economic growth. In a country where further economic development
domestically includes getting large masses of people out of poverty, this is not considered a
luxury problem, but an essential element of national social development. Until now the
increased supply has come from the rapid and massive building of more coal centrals,
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imports of oil and increased use of gas. In addition, China has the most elaborate national
program for the building of new nuclear power plants.12
Besides direct economic consequences on the supply and demand side of the energy
market, the current dependence on fossil fuels also has significant and increasingly serious
environmental and health consequences. Firstly, heavy reliance on coal is a major cause of air
pollution in China.13 Burning coal releases sulfur, which causes acid rain-which has affected
30% of land areas nationwide- and contributes to global atmospheric pollution. . Secondly,
the use of coal is the major cause of CO2 emissions, making China a major contributor to
GHG emissions. China’s per capita emissions were still low 10 years ago; however, they
have increased so much that something needs to be done, especially in (the southeast)
industrial and urban regions. Thirdly, scholars have pointed out that fact that serious air
pollution is leading to deterioration of public health.14
China’s Response: Renewable Energy (RE)
Given the challenge of energy supply, and the consequences of inefficient energy use, the
Chinese authorities have also begun to develop a national policy on alternative energy
sources. These include the increased use of natural gas, hydro electricity and nuclear energy.
However, all of those have their own problems: natural gas is largely dependent on import
and is still carbon based, and in addition has already led to security debates due to tensions
with western minority tribes; hydro projects remain controversial and difficult to realize (cf.
Three Gorges Dam); and, nuclear energy also remains controversial, although China is
probably developing the most ambitious expansive policy trajectory for the moment. 15, Given
these circumstances, China has decided that a significant evolution in the direction of RE is
necessary to secure future energy supply and to deal with problems of pollution and global
warming.
China’s RE demand is expected to grow rapidly in the coming decades. 16 The
capacity of wind and solar up to 2005 was 760 MW and 60 MW respectively. 17 As the
government is aiming for 15% consumption of renewable electricity in 2020, capacity is
expected to reach 30,000 MW of wind farms and 1,000 MW of solar power.18 This will result
in a huge market for renewable energy. In the following paragraphs we provide a short
overview of those energy sources which are considered to be renewable by the Chinese
government, namely (small) hydro, biomass, wind and solar.
(Small) Hydro
The 2006 Renewable Energy Law (cf. below) defines small hydro power as renewable. Also,
the Ministry of Water Resources is advocating clean energy production by conducting
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projects on small hydro power plants. 19 Apart from the controversial Three Gorges dam,
other hydro-electricity operations are under way. There are 25 hydro power plant projects in
the Yellow River basin; they will provide 15800 MW. Four hundred small hydro plants have
already been established in rural areas and hold an installed capacity of 79000 MW. 20
Although hydro-electricity is recognized as a form of renewable energy, critical issues
remain, as environmental and social externalities are often rather important21: local wildlife
habitat or historic heritage destruction; relocation of inhabitants; loss of cropland; etc. 22
Despite the favourable legal recognition, there is a lack of mature policy for promotion, such
as uncertain price mechanisms and subsidies, low integration between the national grid and
(local) producers, etc.23
Biomass
From a policy perspective, there seems to be no concrete policy for the large-scale use of
biomass as an energy source at this stage.24 In 2008, China’s biomass capacity reached 2GW.
However, due to food security concerns, the Chinese government does not encourage
biomass use and has limited consumption.25 A general fear is that the use of biomass may be
in competition with increased demands for agricultural crops and thus leading to competition
over land as a scarce resource and high food prices, thus affecting food economics. The poor
would suffer the most form this evolution, as they will have more difficulties to afford highpriced crops. The possible growing gap between rich and poor may lead to other problems,
such as social tension or rural-to-urban migration for better employment.26
Wind and solar
In comparison to the above mentioned energy resources, wind and solar energy have major
advantages. They share the following similarities. First, both are clean energy sources
because they do not lead to serious pollution problems. They can help reduce CO2 emissions,
harm to public health, and contribute to keep development and environment in balance.27
Second, China can increase self-dependency by exploring wind and solar energy, thus
reducing reliance on foreign imports. 28 Third, developing both energies does not require
large-scale resettlements as is the case for hydro and natural gas.
China has very good conditions for developing wind and solar energy. Many of
China’s largest cities are located close to coastal areas, where it is possible to establish off19
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shore wind farms.29 The potential for additional wind power development in China is high
compared to the installed capacity. 30 Regarding solar resources, China’s rich solar power
reserve almost meets the amount of the US and exceeds the amount in Europe and Japan. The
current installed capacity equals the power supply of nearly 30 large scale coal power stations
and remains rather limited. 31 Solar power development has the potential to increase; the
resources are distributed around the north-west areas where they have big advantage for
setting up large scale photovoltaic (PV) power station, because of huge availability of space
in combination with abundant sunshine (more than 2000hrs annually).32 Experts recommend
further development of large PV power plants in the future.33
China’s Wind Energy Policy: From Projects to Strategic Policy
The Chinese government policy on wind energy is like ‘crossing a river by feeling rocks’,
which indicates that trial and errors are an integral part of its development as a new energy
source.34 To provide systematic understanding we divide China’s wind policy development
into several stages35; this helps finding factors influencing wind policy changes. In general
we notice two evolutions: one is from ad hoc or project based policy to strategic policy
making, the other is the shift from fragmentation towards coordination.36 Both evolutions are
interrelated.37
The Early Stages (1986-1993)
In the 1980s, the State Council issued “Several Recommendations on Promoting the
Development of Rural Energy,” which emphasized the development of RE, including wind
energy technology to meet rural energy demands. China has developed wind energy since
1985, in a steady yet slow fashion. 38 This was partly due to the lack of a stable market
environment nor funding available. 39 Overall, the energy policy focused on the centrally
29
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planned electricity sector, with the Ministry of Electric Power (MOEP) as the main
institutional actor, and coal and oil as the major sources for electricity production.40
Wind energy was first mentioned in the 7th five-year plan (1986-1990), which began
grid connected wind energy development. The early stage of development was mostly
supported by foreign government loans and imports.41 For example, 55 Kw wind turbines
produced by the Danish producer Vestas were installed in the Rongsheng Province.42 In the
past, private investors were not allowed to participate in energy sectors; it was not until 1987
that the monopoly was abolished. 43 From then on, sub-national government, state-owned
enterprises (SOE), and even foreign companies were allowed to build and own power
producing facilities.44 .
However, challenges remained in private investments.45 Firstly, there was no market
incentive, because the Kwh prices for wind energy were twice as high as those of coal, which
was largely subsidized by the government. Secondly, there was lack of knowledge about the
local use of grid-connected turbines. Thus, investors were not sure whether electricity could
be sold in secured amount. Thirdly, regarding the bureaucratic structure; there was no
specific bureaucracy solely responsible for promoting RE. Given the central role of state
institutions in China, this was a serious problem.
The 8th five-year plan (1991-1995) saw progress in research and development on RE.
For example, in the early 90s, the Chinese Academy of Meteorological Science conducted the
first investigation on wind resources nationwide. It concluded that China had a potential of
253 GW.46 In fact, this evaluation suggested that the total electricity output could be more
than the total electricity capacity installed in traditional energy at that time. 47 Yet, wind
development was slow during the 1986-1993 period with an installed capacity of less than 15
MW in 1993. 48 The focus on basic conditions or wind potential could not conceal
insufficient technology, a weak and fragmented bureaucracy and a reliance on imports of
turbines. This resulted in a small role for wind energy in the national energy strategy. 49
Whatever wind energy existed in this period was planned in a rather ad hoc fashion and not
part of a national strategic policy choice in the direction of RE.
However, this period also signifies the start of new ideas about finding solutions to
the energy supply problems. Chinese high level policy-makers became aware that coal had a
devastating impact on the environment and human health during the 1990s. By the early
1990s China had also become a party to international agreements such as the Montreal and
the Kyoto Protocols, which urged China to collect data and establish coordinating
institutions, which contributed to the later development of more strategic environmental and
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energy policies (including RE policy).50 China also took advantage to ask for funding from
international organizations such as the World Bank (WB), the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), as well as technology transfer
from Japan and the US. Because of international cooperation and exposure to international
experiences, Chinese planning commissions learned the importance of RE policy alternatives
and gradually accumulated know-how to formulate an energy strategy which incorporated
RE.51
From Projects to Programs (1994-1999): First Cohesive Wind Energy Policy in 1994:
In 1994, the “Recommendations on the Construction and Management of Wind Farms” were
issued to establish a firm foundation for wind power in China. The first cohesive wind energy
policy was also proposed in the same year by the Ministry of Electric Power (MOEP) entitled
“Strategic Development Plan for Generation of Wind Energy in China 2000- 2020”. The
policy aimed to reach 1000MW installed capacity by 2000, through instruments such as
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and a fixed tariff. PPA means investors had assurance
that the government would buy all electricity at a fixed price.52 The fixed tariff refers to the
government buying electricity from investors at a fixed price, plus an additional 15% profit to
make sure investors would not lose money and to reduce investment risks. 53 This policy was
“enormously helpful in promoting wind power development in China”54 as installed capacity
soared annually with an average of 43MW per year from 1995 to 1998; a big progress
compared to 1.6 MW annual growth in previous years.55
Several large(r)-scale programs contributed to the early growth of wind energy in
China. In 1996, the State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) allocated one
billion Yuan to launch the ‘Ride the Wind (chengfeng) Program’, which was an industry
oriented policy approach. It intended to boost local technology development and production
capacity, by stating that 60 to 80% of the wind turbines should be domestically produced,
through joint ventures or international cooperation, hoping to achieve 400 MW installed
capacity by 2010.56 One thing that deserves attention was that the goal of development was
reduced from 1000 MW to 300-400MW, because policy makers were aware of the failure to
achieve previous targets because of their unrealistic nature.57 The Chinese government later
offered higher grid-connection tariffs for renewable energy, attracting more foreign and
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domestic market entry. 58 Two implementation challenges can be identified. Firstly, tax
reduction inequality. Even though the import tax on turbines was reduced from 12% to tax
exemption; tax for critical components (such as bearings) remained rather high, thus
frustrated investors and led to resistance.59 Secondly, although the Guangzhou Institute of
Energy Conversion confirmed that China had ‘mastered’ the production of key components
of wind generators, 60 in practice, Chinese turbines were of poor quality and not durable
enough. The overall result was not satisfactory, with lots of money invested in poor
operational reliability.61 These problems and challenges led to wind projects being cancelled,
and previous targets not being met.62
During the same time period The State Planning Commission (SPC) proposed another
strategy in the “Program for Development of New and Renewable Energy Sources in China:
1996-2010”; it was under supervision of the SPC, the State Economic and Trade Commission
(SETC) and the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC)63 In 1999, the Chinese
government issued relevant policy recommendations to remove operational barriers to
renewable energy development. 64 One major obstacle was still the cost of wind turbine
installations, including high prices for imported equipment, high transaction costs, and local
services expenses. A number of implementation problems hampered the program. First, there
was no strong legal status for PPA. Private investors produced electricity at a higher price
than coal plants, and saw themselves facing local distributors (under local governments), who
refused to buy wind electricity at a high price, which was a violation of PPA agreements. The
lack of enforcement, let alone penalties to force local distributors to purchase the electricity at
a higher price led to investment loss.65 Secondly, poor coordination existed between higher
level energy authorities. There were three major authorities in charge of renewable energy
technology and equipment production:66 The SPC approved large-scale projects and local
manufacturing. The SETC was responsible for domestic enterprises and technology
development; the SSTC for R&D and technology transfer from abroad. However, there was
no clearly defined division of labor among the three authorities. Rather, there was a power
struggle between them to fight for control and funding, which led to lack of coordination and
fragmented authority, and in the end negative impact on the development of the wind energy
sector. 67 Third, with wind energy producers and distributors in reality under the same
government unit, or under the system of state monopoly over the electricity sector (also
typical, by the way, for European countries before the liberalization of the electricity
58
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markets), relevant regulations were likely to be ignored.68 The 1997 reform, for example,
established the China State Power Corporation (CSPC), which was defined as an SOE to
increase transparency and create an investor-friendly environment. The problem was that the
CSPC was in charge of both transmission and generation of electricity; because of costsaving concerns, the CSPC tended to opt for coal-fired electricity, yet there was no authority
to force it to increase wind energy production.69
In conclusion, the 1994-1999 time period saw gradual progress of wind energy
development, based on a change from ad hoc installation to a more programmatic approach.
The installed capacity increased over ten times with over 200MW installed, compared to less
than 15 MW before.70 Through the Chengfeng Program which was targeting local industry
and market development, market actors were encouraged to participate. Yet, progress was
very slow. One of the reasons was a lack of domestic production capacity for wind turbines,
with 95-97% of the installed turbines being imported.71 In addition, implementation struggled
because of lack of legal sanctions against violation of the PPA principle, lack of coordination
and constant power struggles among government agencies. Such low state capacity and
fragmented structure fell short of coherent policy. Most of all, the key problem was the Kwh
price of wind remained higher than that of coal. As a consequence wind energy was not
considered a potential alternative at this stage.72.
Coordination Taking Shape (2000-2006): From Program to Strategic Policy Objective
The 2000-2006 period was marked by several important initiatives to reform the institutional,
economic and legal context of the wind energy sector. We will discuss them in the following
paragraphs.
A. Institutional Reform: The Establishment of the Energy Bureau (EB)
To improve coordination, which seems to be one of the major obstacles in effective
implementation in the energy sector from past experience, 73 the Chinese government
intervened by reforming the existing EB under the NDRC in 2005, as a unified institution for
policy administration and implementation. 74 In the past, the EB was under the State
Development and Reform Commission (SDRC), the former body of the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)--China’s top economic planning body.75 The
EB was rather weak in coordinating the price system due to lack of authority and sufficient
resources.76 The reform of the EB was considered to be moving towards centralization and an
indicator of the central state intervention.
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The State Energy Office (SEO) was established also in 2005 mainly in charge of
policy-making. The office reports directly to the Energy Elite Group (or National Energy
Leadership Group), which consist of Premier Wen Jiabao, Vice Premiers Huang Ju and Zeng
Peiyan, high-level representatives from the SEPA (now Ministry of Environmental
Protection), as well as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This signified the importance
attributed to the issue of energy supply and energy security at the highest political level.77 In
short, the SEO and the EB were reorganized for different functions. The SEO was responsible
for policy-making; the EB for implementation. The reason for this separation of tasks, is to
avoid corruption. With 11 trillion Yuan (US$1.33 trillion) allocated to the energy sector, a
single unified agency would be exposed to accusations of corruption and conflicts of interest.
In addition, under the NDRC various institutes, among them the Energy Research
Institute, which includes the Renewable Energy Research Center operate in this field. The
center composes a group of research fellows, who are responsible for not only research and
advice to the central government but also participate in policy making, such as drafting the
Renewable Energy Law, as well as relevant policy and legal documents.78
B. Decentralization: Separate Power Production and Delivery
In order to stimulate effective implementation and to address the problem of having producer
and distributor being the same state actor, the government decentralized the CSPC by
separating power generation and transmission. 79 For example, power production was
decentralized into several SOEs: the Huaneng Group, the Huadian Corporation, the China
Datang Corporation, the Guodian Corporation, and the China Power Investment Group.
Transmission (grid companies) was decentralized into the State Grid Corporation of China
and the China Southern Power Grid Corporation.80
C. The Concession Program
The NDRC began issuing wind energy concessions in 2003 for government-selected sites
through a competitive bidding process for potential developers, aiming to lower wind energy
prices through competition. The overall purpose was to develop wind power at the lowest
cost possible, bring down high wind power tariffs, and reflect true prices through a bidding
process, yet retain control over developments.81 This implied that the government was trying
to move towards a large scale, market-driven development base, with less uncertainty and
more possibilities to strengthen the institutional capacity in wind energy.82
In order to be a legitimate bidder, projects had to be between 50-100 MW in size with
50% of the wind turbines locally manufactured (later 70% in 2005).83 A wind resource site is
chosen by the government before biddings, road access and grid connection are provided later
to winners. 84 The instruments used to combat high prices were the Renewable Portfolio
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Standard (RPS) for power producer and the PPA for power delivery. In China, RPS is labeled
as Mandatory Market Share (MMS), meaning a quota obligation to take up a certain
percentage of RE in power output.85 For example, large SOEs with projects of over 5 GW
total installed capacity, must include a 5% wind power share. PPA is a must buy system for
power grid companies to secure stable demand as mentioned earlier.86
Some scholars labeled it as “a government tendering system,” with the government
selecting wind developers based on low price and local content through a bidding process,
together with agreements to purchase power on fixed-terms. 87 Problematic in this system
could be underbidding and the use of low quality technology to cut the price. Quality
concerns also exist regarding this program. Bidding results shows that power developers are
mostly the five SOE from the 2000 reform. Foreign developers can hardly win bidding due to
high prices. Spanish and German developers, for example, tendered with prices 50-70%
higher than those of the SOE winning bidders.88 The price was decreased from average 0.75
Yuan/kWh to 0.373-0.519 Yuan/kWh in 2006.89 With price being the determining criterium,
those who offer the lowest price, yet poor quality could win the bidding. In case real output is
less than the promised or installed capacity or less than the mandatory RPS percentage, the
concession program does not seem to have a strong compliance or sanctioning mechanism. A
second issue concerns the feed-in tariff, which is considered essential by scholars. 90 The
concession program does not include a feed-in tariff. Instead, a project based PPA was used.
However, there seems to be no sanction against PPA violation. In addition, it appears difficult
to implement the PPA effectively, because of institutional uncertainty in the electric power
structure; this is confirmed by Ms. Ma Lingjuan, deputy executive director of China RE
entrepreneurs club, who said that the compulsory system of MMS and PPA are merely policy
mechanisms yet not often implemented in reality.91
In the end, it is important to recognize that the concession program did not completely
reduce the price disadvantage of wind power. Wind energy is still higher in price than fossil
fuel based electricity. Raufer and Wang believe that a supporting policy (such as price based
policy) is needed to complement the concession program.92
D. The Renewable Energy Law (REL)
By far the most influential step was the formulation of a REL at the highest legislative level.
In 2003, the Government began to formulate the “Promotion Law for Renewable Energy
Development and Utilization.” The goal of this law was to “confirm the role of renewable
energy in China’s national energy strategy, create a market base and remove barriers to
market development, as well as a social atmosphere conducive to renewable energy.”93 The
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Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) passed the Law on February
28, 2005 after which it became effective in 2006.94
It is a sort of framework law, which lays the foundation for the further development of
renewable energy production in China for decades to come. Politically it is the expression of
the commitment to make RE a strategic part of China’s overall energy policy and the
recognition that in order to fulfill future environmental and climate change targets and
commitments, RE production will have to be an essential part of the energy supply system.
The framework law indicates government willingness to develop renewable energy on a long
term basis: increasing the RE percentage in the total energy mix; help industrial and
technological development; focus on market development.95 Overall, a national MMS of 15%
RE of total gross energy production. The law requires a certain percentage of non-hydro
renewable power production: “Power generators with self-owned installed capacity of over 5
GW will be required to have a non-hydro renewable energy installed power capacity (selfowned) that accounts for 3 percent of their total capacity by 2010 and for over 8 percent of
their total self-owned capacity by 2020. (section 5 (1))”96. This indicates an approach to opt
for low carbon emission energy resources. During the period of 1994-1999 the PPA had no
legal ground, violators faced no sanctions. With the REL as a new legal basis, scholars
believe that the PPA in the concession model will work more effectively.97
Next to the REL, a system of RE policy making (development, strategy, guarantee
measures) including financial mechanisms (public cost sharing by citizens), etc., was
developed to make sure that the law would lead to the desired policy objectives.98 The NDRC
is responsible for detailed implementation (including authorization), with the EB representing
the central unified institution for coordination. According to some critical voices, it is still
necessary to establish an institution solely responsible for wind energy.99
E. The 70% Local Content Rule
Before 2005, the major challenge of wind power development was that most wind turbines
and generators relied mainly on foreign imports, which was expensive and thus investment
costs were high.100 To reduce the burden of investment, the Chinese government, especially
the National State Council, proposed a decision on July 4th 2005 that 70% of the wind
turbines should be produced locally.101 The intention was to stimulate technology transfer to
local wind turbine manufacturers and reduce production costs 102 A condition is that the
bidding company was to guarantee a collaboration with a wind generator/turbine producer,
who guarantees to provide 70% local made wind generators. 103 This rule is controversial

94

China Energy Group Retrieved from http://china.lbl.gov/china_renewable-wind.html
“The
REL
of
the
PRC”
(2005)
Beijing
Review,
(29)
Retrieved
from
http://www.martinot.info/China_Re_Law_Beijing_Review.pdf.
96
Non-authorized English translation of the “Trial Measures for Pricing and Cost Sharing Management for
Renewable Energy Power” provisions of the Renewable Energy Law. http:// www.martinot.info.
97
Lema Adrian and Ruby Kristian (2007), “Between Fragmented Authoritarianism and Policy Coordination:
Creating a Chinese Market for Wind Energy” Energy Policy, 35 (7):3889
98
Interview with the Energy Research Institute, NDRC, May 26, 2009.
99
Raufer R. and Wang Shujuan (2007) “Navigating the Policy Path for Support of Wind Power in China”
China Environment Series (6):47
100
Zhong Shiming, Gao Liang (2006), Times for Renewable Energy are Coming—Brief Introduction on Wind
Energy Generation. Conference paper for Renewable Energy Development, Jiangsu Province, China.
101
Pan Jiahua and Zhu Xianli (2006) “Energy and Sustainable Development in China: Sustainable Energy
Watch 2005-06”. Helio International p.45. www.ndrc.gov.cn
102
Ibid
103
Zhong Shiming, Gao Liang (2006), Times for renewable energy are coming—brief introduction on wind
energy generation, conference paper for Renewable Energy Development, Jiangsu Province, China.
95

383

under WTO regulation as it is considered a form of protectionism.104 This point is made by
other industries and wind energy activists, arguing that this requirement is higher than the
40% local content demand in the car sector. 105 Another issue is the quality of locally
produced turbines. Poor quality results in production losses (repair costs) which in turn leads
to investment loss.106 In an interview with Reuters, Shi Pengfei, the vice-president of the
China Wind Energy Association, believes that policy change is necessary to deal with poor
quality to prevent damage to the Chinese wind turbine manufacturers.107
The Maturing Period
All indicators point towards a further development of wind energy in China. Raufer R. and
Wang (2007) foresee that wind development will move towards larger scale projects,
probably from currently 50 MW to over 150 MW, with larger projects possibly promoted by
the central government.108 This tendency is confirmed by the Director of the Energy Research
Institute at the NDRC 109 The concession program will probably be expanded including risk
assessments of bidders. In addition, the role of the provincial governments will become more
important. Raufer R. and Wang (2007) further assume that green certificates (quantity-based
approach) will enter the process, to encourage mass production and help moving towards a
market-oriented system.110
All of these possibilities are contingent upon further policy development. Based on
the REL, new implementation specificities can be issued, including specific objectives for
wind energy development. A promising scenario envisioned by Raufer R. and Wang (2007)
is that a stable market for wind energy will come into existence. Wind turbine technology
will greatly progress; institutions promoting wind energy will be established. Green
certificate approaches will be operated and a market will be established for Renewable
Energy Credit (REC) to become trading commodities, which seems to be the ultimate goal
for wind energy development.111
Solar Energy Policy: Still The Underdog?
We will provide an analogous account of solar energy, meaning a historic approach with
attention for the main changes in the policies. When we say solar energy, we refer in first
instance to the use of PV cells. In China, the most well known use of solar power is probably
the solar water heater, but given the totally different nature of this application of solar energy,
we do not take this as an example of the type of policy choices and changes we are aiming to
understand. From the start it has to be clear that the solar sector is much less developed than
the wind energy sector at this moment. There are two key reasons for this. First, the
technology of solar energy is less advanced in terms of energy efficiency. Second, the price
of solar energy remains significantly higher than that of wind energy on the domestic market.
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This has created the peculiar following situation: China is by now the largest producer in the
world of PV panels, yet the overwhelming majority is exported to Europe and to a lesser
extend the US.
The Initial Period (1986-1993): Small Scale, Local Approach
From the 1950s to the 1970s China’s interest in solar energy was mainly driven by possible
applications in its space or satellite program. Terrestrial use of solar cells began in 1973, but
the PV market development was very slow.112 Solar energy was first mentioned in both the
6th and 7th five-year plans (1981-1985; 1986-1990) in which the government supported PV
use in rural areas (disconnected from the grid; local solution) and specific industries.
However, it seems that concrete projects on solar energy did not begin until the late 1990s.
Small PV Market (1994-1999): The Brightness Project
In September 1996, the World Solar Peak Conference in Zimbabwe proposed the Brightness
Program for regions suffering from power shortage; the Chinese government echoed the idea
and launched a national Brightness Project Implementation Plan in 1998. 113 The overall
objective was to provide sufficient electricity to 23 million people in remote regions by 2010,
including Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, and Xingjiang; the program aimed to favor lowincome households, and to provide 100 watt capacity per person.114 Given that many poor
households could not afford even the smallest investment to obtain the technology, the
government funded the program with around 36 billion Yuan. Once the program was
implemented it was to provide around 260000 Kwh of green electricity annually, reduce 15.4
tons of carbon dioxide, and 1991 tons of nitrogen emission.115 The first phase lasted for 5
years and aimed to provide power supply to 8 million people.
The advantage was that it supported poor households with access to electricity. After
the first stage, what was left to be done included using hybrid systems that consisted of both
wind generators and solar PV to provide further electricity in the Inner Mongolia, Tibet and
Gansu provinces116.
More Programmatic Focus on Rural Use ( 2000-2006)
In this period China further emphasized the rural use of solar energy. In the following
paragraphs we illustrate this approach by giving the most noteworthy examples.
A. Renewable Energy Development Project (REDP)
A representative case was the Renewable Energy Development Project (2001-2006) funded
by the WB and the Global Environment Facility (GEF).117 The aim was to provide power
with wind/PV hybrid systems to remote areas, such as Qinghai, Gansu, Inner Mongolia,
Xingjiang, Tibet, and Western Sichuan. Also to reduce the cost of PV systems and improve
their quality. Further, the program was supposed to support the development of PV market in
rural areas. 118 Apart from central government (NDRC) intervention, other actors such as
private enterprises, joint ventures, and SOEs were welcomed to participate. The project
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helped stimulate PV industry of China, especially in the module manufacturing aspect.119
According to the REDP management office, which is under the NDRC, there are now over 20
PV module producers with annual output of 100 MW, compared to only 7 PV module
producers in1997 with annual output of 2-3MW.120
B. Rural subsidies: Township Electrification Program (Song Dian Dao Xiang 2001-2005
Assistance from the REDP had influenced subsequent projects, one of them was the
Township Electrification Program. With assistance from the UNDP and GEF, the project was
lauded by the then State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC; former body of the
NDRC) and completed in 2005.121 Apart from foreign assistance, there was funding granted
by both central and local government around 3 billion Yuan altogether.122
Different from the REDP which focused on stimulating PV module production, the
Township Electrification Program concentrated on maintaining installed technology of PV
panels and establishing more PV power plants.123 The project provided solar electricity to 700
villages, about 300,000 households and one million people in western provinces. With a total
installed capacity of 15,537 KWH, the project was the world’s largest, using a combined
wind-solar power stations to provide electricity to rural area.124
The prospect of all these projects was overshadowed by the high production cost,
which remained a major obstacle in solar energy policy. The PV electricity price could not
be compared with that of coal, because the latter was mostly subsidized by the government.
The market price for PV products was still unstable.125 To save costs, producers were inclined
to use cheaper yet lower quality materials, resulting in a very short life expectancy of
products. The problem was revealed by local pilot project operations. Unless the government
established a pricing system for PV electricity production and linked cost with profits, the
market would not have further developed, so it was believed.126 Yet others were holding a
more optimistic view.127 Wang Wenjing, a solar energy expert at the Chinese Academy of
Sciences, assumed that solar subsidies were feasible in the next couple of years. "The lack of
government policy is constraining the use of solar energy…If the government would just
come out with a policy, I'm certain China could very quickly become the world's largest user
of solar energy.”128 This spelled out the policy challenge for the next period.
The 11th Five year plan (2006-2010) and beyond: a more strategic move forward?
The 11th Five Year Plan formulated the goal to provide 250 MW of PV electricity to 2 million
households, as well as 50 MW of rooftop through rooftop applications and 20 MW power
plants in the Gobi desert.129 This indicated the government’s continuous efforts in promoting
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solar energy and its move to a more strategic approach as RE was considered in 2006 to be a
central element of energy supply for the future, the fight against global warming and in
addition an instrument in the fight against air pollution. The priority remained on remote
areas with a further expansion of standalone technology and connections to the local grid in
the rural use. But not only rural areas are benefiting from policy initiatives. The Shanghai
100000 Solar PV Roof Plan (2006-2010) foresees to install 100,000 PV panels on roofs of
local buildings with an estimated total installed capacity of 400 MW.130
Currently, solar energy investors point out that a major challenge is the lack of
government for R&D for technological improvements. Consequently, production costs are
transferred to users, and high costs discourage the general public to install solar PV
systems.131 Market creation and further investments in technology might be stimulated by
government projects. More state institutions or SOE buildings will install PV panels as a way
to promote solar. If there is a strong government policy, the market could grow fast after
2010, with a downward pressure on the price per Kwh.132 As mention earlier, wind power
development is more mature than that of solar. Local government has autonomy to approve
wind projects under 50 MW, while solar projects remain centrally controlled. For example,
the NDRC has most influence to the industry.133
The REL
The REL provides guidelines for grid (art. 14; art.19; art. 20) and off-grid PV (art. 15; art. 22)
power systems.134 Two important approaches which influence the solar policy are the MMS
and cost-sharing (art.9; art. 12) systems, but in reality, these guidelines and approaches do not
seem to be effective.135 Firstly, the problem of high cost mentioned above remains the major
obstacle; the industry hopes that the problem can be reduced through bidding system. So far
(until 2009), there are only three projects operated through bidding system. Secondly, there
is lack of large-scale PV power development; no PV power systems are granted permission
from grid companies to be connected to the grid. 136 A recent project in Gansu province this
year seems to demonstrate possibility to combat the problems, thanks to the REL. It is by far
the largest solar project with 10 MW capacity, compared to previous two bidding projects in
Inner Mongolia of 205 kw and Shanghai Chongmingdao of 1MW. 137 The winner in the
Gansu project offers the lowest price of 0.69 Yuan/Kwh, which is probably the lowest price
ever so far; There is intense competition in the industry as most investors both home and
abroad are eyeing on this opportunity.138
More long term objectives (2020 and beyond) foresee the growth of the solar market
in grid-connected PV development and a further spreading of the technology, especially in
those areas with large solar potential. It is hoped that most villages in western provinces can
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have grid-connection by 2020. 139 According to the current policy development, the
accumulated installed capacity should reach to 10000 MW by 2020. 140
In conclusion of this part, we can state that the promotion of solar energy in China is
based on the fact that it is carbon dioxide free, and would add to the diversification of the
energy supply. In addition it is by definition a domestic resources, thus also contributing to a
lower dependence on foreign energy and energy security. Solar energy is now included in the
REL, five-year plans, mid-to-long term plans, which indicates that the Chinese government is
convinced more than ever of the prospect of solar energy and that there is a strong will to
develop it on a long term basis through policy programs. The downside is that the industry is
facing limited supply of raw materials for producing PV panels(such as polysilicon) and
materials to produce wafers, which does give it an aspect of foreign dependence.141
Comparing Wind and Solar Policy Changes
Both wind and solar energy are today being regarded as essential components of China’s
future energy policy. This is a long way from the ad hoc or project based approach at the
beginning of the 1980s and into the 1990s. Given the pressures of energy security,
environmental protection and climate change and in the context of a booming demand for
energy, China’s choice for RE is future oriented and in line with the overall national goal of
sustained and sustainable development as was formulated by the highest political and state
authorities on several occasions.
Both policies demonstrate a number of similarities in their policy development
(Table1). First, they have both followed the trajectory from project base, over program driven
and finally reached the strategic policy stage. They are both explicitly mentioned in the REL
and considered strategic energy sectors (next to hydro and nuclear power) as non-carbon
based energy sources. Second, we have witnessed an evolution towards a more coordinated
policy at the level of central state institutions. The NDRC is playing a crucial role in this as a
government agency with high authority and power in laying out China’s development path.
Third, although a more coordinated central approach is a sign of centralization, there is also a
move towards decentralization. Provinces, regions and cities have increased leverage in how
the renewable energy policy will be implemented. This form of decentralization is part of a
larger division of tasks between state institutions, with the central government providing
policy frameworks and local actors being more responsible for implementation, which takes
into account the more local context. Fourth, in both wind and solar energy the market is being
introduced as an organizing principle. Market actors, both SOEs and private domestic and
international companies have entered the energy production and distribution market because
of favourable legislation and a beneficial opportunity structure, created through different
instruments. This also means that the price per Kwh is becoming more important and
competition between RE and other energy sources has increased.
There are also a number of differences. First, at this moment the spreading of wind
energy is much more rapid as the technology is more mature, the price per Kwh more
competitive and the scale of installations more in line with a connection to the grid. Solar
remains expensive compared to wind. A second difference is that solar seems to have its
biggest application until now in rural and remote areas. Often non-grid connected and used as
a means to bring electricity to small communities or even individual households. Wind
energy is much more connected to the national grid. Third in terms of regulations, there are
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differences between wind and solar. Essentially wind energy works with tax incentives and
solar with a feed in tariff. Fourth, wind energy is slowly getting a domestic production
capacity (often in joint venture with West-European companies) based on the rule that
mandates 70% of the installations to be ‘made in China’. Solar energy is very different, with
China already being the largest producer of PV panels in the world. But, the production is
almost completely exported, mainly to Europe.
Table 1. Overview of solar and wind energy policies comparison.
Compiled based on sources from China Renewable Energy Industry Association (2007) China Solar PV
Report, China Environmental Science Press; NREL, UNEP

Policies
Feed-in tariffs
Direct subsidies
MMS/ RPS

Solar energy
Yes, but no fixed price
Project specific
Over 3% of non-hydro RE
output by 2020;
8% for power generators
over 50GW
PV/wind requirement in no
RPS
Green
certificates no
mechanism
Tax incentives
no
Local content
90-98% export oriented
Specific Institution for No
solar/wind
Structural reform needed
National policy targets
Low

Wind energy
no
Project specific
Over 3% of non-hydro RE
output by 2020;
8% for power generators
over 50GW
no
no
yes
70%
No
Structural reform needed
high

Conclusion
To answer the question “why does China’s (renewable) energy policy change”, this paper has
touched upon both internal and external factors. Internal factors are mainly economic growth,
consumerism, and urbanization all of which have rapidly increased the demand for energy.
China wants to be energy independent without relying on other countries. A major part of the
solution will be RE development because it contributes to sustainable economic development.
The soaring demand for energy use is driving China to seek diverse energy resources,
including clean energy like wind and solar. However, wind and solar energy developments
are fighting against the dominance of coal use, a source that is abundantly available and
relatively cheap.
External factors include the pressures on China regarding climate change policies and
thus CO2 emissions, the global competitions for scarce energy resources, and a set of
environmental problems related to the current energy system (coal based) but with
transboundary repercussions, such as SO2.
To answer the “how does China’s (renewable) energy policy change” question, the
paper concludes that internally, China has been focusing on development since the 80s, and
the 90s saw the dawn of renewable energy taken into account in policy strategies or outlines,
(ex. the Energy Conservation Law in 1997). The wind and solar policy evolutions and
changes demonstrate that the REL seems to be a major turning point from coal-based to RE
policy, incorporating environmental concern to institutional policy framework. Externally,
China’s increasing engagement in international organizations and activities is forcing the
country to conduct changes to adopt new principles (ex. sustainable development concept),
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approaches such as more participation of multi-national corporations (MNC), academics, less
central intervention, etc.
The paper has provided an overview to both wind and solar policies, and map out
influencing factors mainly from internal aspects. Further study can include external
influencing factors for comprehensive analysis. Another approach for further research is to
establish a conceptual-theoretical framework to analyze the changing role of the central state
and the influence of market actors’ participation (ex. private, SOEs and academics) in both
wind and solar policies.
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Modeling China’s Climate Change Policy in The Post-2012 framework:
On The Perspective of Reputation
Edward Xuedong Wang1
Abstract
The post-2012 world Climate Change scenario would heavily depend on China’s next steps
on Climate Change Policy. The world could not coordinate their policies to slow global
warming without China’s participation. However, China, the world’s largest GHG emitter
with the rising energy demand, is reluctant to change its high-carbon economic development
models by sticking to the concept of Climate Injustice. The Economic Cost and Climate
Injustice are two major concerns Chinese government faces. This raises the issue of which
approach would be most likely to stimulate and persuade China to take appropriate actions in
the post-2012 climate regime.
This paper seeks to provide a tentative answer to this question. It compares quantityoriented mechanisms like the Kyoto Protocol with the price-type control mechanisms such
as internationally harmonized carbon taxes. It concludes that the price-type approach
incorporating the perspective of state reputation could visualize the possibility that China
would take new Climate Policy and low-carbon economic development models. It argues that
the sticks-type policies are most unlikely to push China to take actions or adopt measures
because China’s growing economic and military power, rising political influence, and
increasing involvement in regional and international institutions have fundamentally affected
the world system. However, since China builds up its reputation by focusing on the
multilateral commitments, the reputation-based price-type control mechanism could be the
Pareto Improvement that encourages China to contribute its fair share to the global climate
effort.
The pace and face of globalization in the 21 century will be critically influenced by
whether or not some specific issues that call for collective action by countries are properly
addressed. One of these big questions is to address the problem of global warming. The post2012 world climate change scenario would heavily depend on China’s next steps on climate
change policy partly because China, the world’s largest GHG emitter with the rising energy
demand, is reluctant to change its high-carbon economic development models by sticking to
the concept of climate injustice.
In this paper, I try to analyze the probability that China’ government would accept
some substantial GHG emission cut in the near future on the perspective of state reputation:
is it possible that China would take any substantial quantified emissions cut? If so, how could
that be? I consider these questions in this article. The first section describes the statistics of
China's growing greenhouse gas emissions. The next section describes China’s government's
unwillingness to accept any binding international commitments to reduce the emissions
substantially. The subsequent section describes the fundamental reason behind that. I then
describe the reputation-based price-type control mechanism that would be the tentative
approach to that issue. I close this paper with a summary of the major issues.
1. Introduction: China’s Fact Sheet
Climate change issue is a global concern to all the countries across the world. There is
overwhelming scientific consensus that human-induced climate change poses grave economic
and environmental risks. Driven primarily by a century and half of rising fossil fuel
1
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combustion, CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere had reached 379 parts per million by
2005, 35% higher than pre-industrial level (“4th Assessment Report, Working Group I,
Summary for Policy makers,” IPCC, 2007). Average global temperatures have risen by 0.76
degree Celsius since the late 1800s, and the effects are evident in extreme weather events,
changed weather patterns, floods, droughts, glacial and Arctic ice melt, rising sea levels, and
reduced biodiversity (IPCC, 2007). Scientists have studied extensively the global warming
issue, which holds that the accumulation of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases
(GHG) is expected to produce the significant climate changes over the 21st century.
Addressing growing concerns about climate change requires a broad understanding of its
social, economic, developmental, scientific, political and environmental aspects. Increase in
temperature as a result if increasing emissions of greenhouse gases will have serious impacts
on our economic well-being and on the ecosystems on which the health of our planet
depends.
Minimizing these risks required that global GHG emission decline dramatically over
the coming decades. In its causes and potential consequences, climate change has
implications for every inhabitant of every nation on earth. Yet the power to mobilize an
effective response rests largely with a handful of nations. As the largest developing country,
one of the largest energy consumers, and one of the largest greenhouse gases producers,
China’s attitude toward this issue would be very important.
As awareness of Kyoto’s complete inadequacy has increased, calls for participation
by developing countries have grown louder and more frequent. Accomplishing this goal will
be feasible only after China takes concerted and sustained action, because China began the
largest greenhouse gases emitter since 2007. So, Global pressure on China is mounting to
take on some obligations to reduce GHG emissions from the use of coal, oil, and gas, which
cause climate change, or global warming. But, as a developing country, China is actually
excluded from any quantitative obligations to reduce emissions. Some think this approach is
probably a fundamental mistake to the world map (Nordhaus, 2007). Before discussing
different approaches, it will be useful to sketch the scientific statistics on China’s contribution
on global warming. The Chinese plan to deal with global warming emissions includes
decreasing relative reliance on coal, developing renewable energy sources, a nationwide tree
planting campaign, population control, and other regulatory and public education measures.
The problem, of course, is that in absolute terms, the Chinese economy is huge. Nominally,
China now has the fourth largest economy in the world, after the U.S., Japan and Germany.
After adjusting for China's deliberately undervalued currency, China is the second largest
economy in the world, roughly eighty percent as big as the U.S. economy.
Furthermore, China is already attracting international attention for its rapidly growing
contribution to climate change. According to a 2007 report from the Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency, it has already surpassed the United States as the world’s
largest contributor of carbon dioxide. Fatih Birol, the chief economist of the international
Energy Agency, even warned that in 25 years China would emit twice as much carbon
dioxide as all the OECD countries. 2
The trend of climate change in China is generally consistent with that of global
climate change. According to the Initial National Communication on Climate Change of the
People’s Republic of China, China’s total GHG emissions in 1994 are 4,060 million tons of
CO2 equivalent (3,650 million tons of net emissions), of which 3,070 million tons of CO2,
730 million tons of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e) of CH4 and 260 million tCO2e of N2O.
According to tentative estimates by experts from China, China’s total GHG emission in 2004
is about 6,100 tCO2e (5,600 million tons of net emissions), of which 5,050 million tons of
2
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CO2, 720 million tCO2e of CH4 and 330 million tCO2e of N2O. From 1994 to 2004, the
annual average growth rate of GHG emissions is around 4%, and the share of CO2 in total
GHG emissions increased from 76% to 83% (China’s National Climate change Program,
2007).
China’s historical GHG emissions are very low and per capita emissions have been
below the world average. According to the study carried out by the World Resource Institute
(WRI), China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion were 79 Mt in 1950, contributing
only 1.13% of the world total at that time; cumulative emissions of CO2 from fossil fuel
combustion accounted for only 9.33% of the world total during the period of 1950~2002, and
the cumulative CO2 emissions per capita are 61.7 tons over the same period, ranking the
92nd in the world. Statistics from the International Energy Agency (IEA) indicates that per
capita CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion were 3.65 tons in 2004 in China,
equivalent to only 87% of the world average and 33% of the level in Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Along with the steady social
and economic development, the emission intensity defined as the CO2 emission per unit of
GDP declined generally. According to IEA, China’s emission intensity falls to 2.76
kgCO2/US$ (constant 2000 U.S. dollar) in 2004, as compared to 5.47 kgCO2/US$ in 1990, a
49.5% decrease. For the same period, emission intensity of the world average dropped only
12.6% and that of the OECD countries dropped 16.1% (China’s National Climate change
Program, 2007).
2. China’s Climate Change Policy
As we know, China faces substantial challenges in mitigating its increasing contribution to
global greenhouse gas emissions, which will require a much higher level of effort than what
may be achieved by measures already in place. However, China is openly or in private hostile
to the idea of talking about post-2012 policy commitments. While the prospect of a long-term
meaningful post-2012 global climate pact depends on China’s participation in the near future.
China is facing two types of pressures: international ones and domestic ones. Internationally,
the large increases in GHG emission with the great economic growth in recent years have
pushed up China on the stage across the world. Domestically, cost increases include rising
wages, higher land lease fees, cuts in VAT export rebates, and imposition of export taxes on
energy intensive products.
China’s climate strategy remains centered on its energy development strategy as
driven by its overall economic development goals. Although attention to climate change has
recently increased among China’s leadership, climate change has not surpassed economic
development as a policy priority (Lewis, Joanna, 2007). By now, there are no indications that
international pressures are significantly affecting China’s government ‘s fundamental attitude
towards quantified GHG emission cut by now. Chinese government has published its first
national climate change program. In that program, China thinks the climate change issue
ultimately is “the issue of development” (China’s National Climate change Program, 2007).
China insists that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of GHG has
originated from developed countries, while the per capita emissions in developing countries
are still relatively low and their share will grow to meet their social and development needs.
As a developing party to the UNFCCC, China takes “fully into account that economic and
social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities.” (China’s
National Climate change Program, 2007)
Improving energy efficiency remains high on the agenda. To help China meets the
challenging targets to improve energy efficiency and reduce pollution, the government is
working on adjusting the performance evaluation system for local government officials and
SOE top management, including the performance in environment protection and energy
393

efficiency as criteria (Xinhua, July 31, 2007). The government is taking additional initiatives
in setting standards, trying to close down inefficient power plants and steel and cement plants
(see May 2007 Quarterly Update, p.14). The government is reluctant to use price increases at
times of high inflation. Nonetheless, such considerations should probably not block needed
price adjustments because, in the long run, price adjustments towards levels that reflect
economic scarcity and social costs and benefits have a positive impact on resource allocation
and economic efficiency, and will help in the efforts to reduce energy intensity (The World
Bank quarterly, September 2007).
The Chinese claim to place great importance to the issue of climate change, but as a
"developing country," they will only address climate change within the overall context of
"national sustainable development strategy." The report estimated that global warming
emissions in China have doubled between 1994 and 2004 from 3 trillion to 6 trillion tons of
CO2 equivalent. However, they view these emissions in per capita terms, by which measure
they are very low. Their immense population provides them the cover they need to avoid any
mandatory emission caps.
During the Bali island conference, December 7th, 2007, China’s delegation insisted
that “any future arrangement on climate change should continue to follow the principles of
common but differentiated responsibilities established in the Convention, addressing climate
change within the framework of sustainable development, equal treatment of mitigation and
adaptation, and effectively solve the problem of financing and technology which the
developing country parties are most concerned.” And “The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol
is the ROAD, and the Montreal action plan is the MAP.” (China’s Statement on the Agenda
Item of Enhancing Implementation of the Convention, 2007) China thinks the Developed
Countries should at least reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 25%-40% by 2020
compared to 1990 levels.
On May 20, 2009, China issues the white paper to state its attitude and position on the
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. In that, China urges that all the developed
countries to implement the Bali roadmap. Taking the Principle of Common but Differentiated
Responsibilities, China thinks that developed countries shall take responsibility for their
historical cumulative emissions and current high per capita emissions to change their
unsustainable way of life and to substantially reduce their emissions and, at the same time, to
provide financial support and transfer technology to developing countries. At the same time,
developing countries will, in pursuing economic development and poverty eradication, take
proactive measures to adapt to and mitigate climate change (Implementation of the Bali
roadmap: China’s Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, 2009).
In short, the world's biggest contributor to global warming is in denial about the
problem, unwilling to make serious changes out of fear of harming its economies. China’s
climate change policy heavily relies on the advancement of science and technology instead of
modification of development model.
3. The Reason Behind China’s Policy
Global warming is a member of a special type of economic activity known as global public
goods. These are economic or other activities whose impacts are indivisible and whose
influences are felt around the world rather than affecting one nation, town, or family. There
are at least two kind of public goods: some activities called focal public goods in which good
policies appear obvious or consensual to most people; for example, it does not take much
persuasion to convince people that a reasonable standard is zero AIDS, zero smallpox, zero
swine flu. By contrast, with economic public goods, it is difficult to determine and reach
agreement on efficient policies because they involve estimating and balancing costs and
benefits where neither is easy to measure and both involve major distributional concerns.
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Global warming is a kind of economic public goods that involve huge numbers of economic
agents in a large number of countries, in which the costs and benefits of action do not indicate
any obvious focal policy or technological fix. (Nordhaus, 2007).
First of all, the question of climate change must be of concern to local, national and
international communities for purely prudential reasons: sharp changes in wealth, the
exacerbation of extreme poverty, and severe food insecurity can all be expected to breed
tension and armed conflict. Who will bear the burdens of that change? Who will be better off
and who worse off?
The development history and trend of various countries has revealed the obvious
positive correlations between per capita CO2 emissions, per capita commercial energy
consumption and the economic development level. In other words, with current level of
science and technology, to reach the same level as the industrialized countries, it is inevitable
that per capita energy consumption and CO2 emissions will reach a fairly high level. In the
history of the world, there is no precedent in that a high per capita GDP goes with absolutely
low per capita energy consumption. The Montreal Protocol worked very well when rich
countries agreed to include a significant financial transfer mechanism in the global treaty.
But, this kind of compensatory justice lesson is probably not transferable to the climate
change because that the ozone depletion issue required side payments if $1-2 billion, while
the stabilization of climate could cost rich countries hundreds of billions of dollars. (Roberts,
J. Timmons, & Parks, Bradley C., 2007).
Secondly, the global warming is all about inequality (Roberts, J. Timmons, & Parks,
Bradley C., 2007). China thinks the inequality is not only in which countries suffer its effect
most,, but also in which countries created the problem in the first place. In this regard,
China’s reluctance to commit to scheduled reductions in GHG emissions is not simply a
function of high discount rate and the weak technical and administrative abilities, but, more
fundamentally, is the result of a cumulative equity problems rooted in the conception of
global in equality.
Global warming is a global public good, the key environmental issue is global
emissions, and the key economic issue is how to balance costs and benefits of global
emissions reductions. Climate change depends only upon total GHG emissions and the time
path of emissions, not on the geographic location of emissions. Moreover, the impacts depend
primarily upon cumulative emissions that remain in the atmosphere, not on the annual flow of
emissions.
China’s basic rule of climate change is as easy as the kindergarten ethics that those
who created a mess should be responsible for cleaning their share of the mess. But, this rule
works as a double-blade sword which points to China itself at well as to the developed
countries at the same time. China’s attitude on this issue strongly influenced the G-77
position, which nearly entirely ignored the contingent form the small island states in that
China focuses on the adaptation of climate change instead of mitigation of global warming.
The small island states believe a fair agreement on climate change would immediately
stabilize the climate, forestall the complete destruction of island nations and cultures, and
address their basic economic needs and extraordinary vulnerability to climate-related stress
and natural disasters.
China insists that its GHG emission is survival one instead of luxury one. China
favors the per capita approach in which each person on Earth is given an equal right to the
ability of the atmosphere to absorb carbon. Under this proposal, China would be given
significant room to grow and emit because its per capita consumption of fossil fuels is
significantly lower than the world average level. At the same time, China also favors the
proposal of historical responsibility that would take into account the amount of damage done
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by countries in the past to the atmosphere’s ability to absorb more GHG. And demands the
developed countries to pay the carbon debt.
If the current protocol is extended at the current reduction rates, models indicate that
it will have little impact on global climate change (Nordhaus, 2007). Experts think that
increases in future emissions will primarily take place in the developing world because the
high rates of population and economic growth there. As a matter of fact, China’s rise will
inevitably come out with growing energy consumption and CO2 emissions. China made it
clear that among others, the fundamental political question is who will be responsible for the
bulk of future global greenhouse gas emissions. Almost all the countries agree that the
current accumulated stock of CO2 in the atmosphere is largely the responsibility of rich,
industrialized countries. Why should South Korea, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and other
states be off the hook if their per capita emissions and growth rates are much larger than that
of China? If we do not address this issue in a multilateral framework, there could be problems
ahead.
In short, global warming issue is something like the tragedy of commons; to this kind
of question, neither science nor economics can provide a ‘‘correct’’ answer to the question of
how to share the burden of reducing emissions.
4. Reputation-Based Price-Type Control Mechanism: Tentative Approach
The Economic Cost and Climate Injustice are two major concerns Chinese government
faces. This raises the issue of which approaches would be most likely to stimulate and
persuade China to take appropriate actions in the post-2012 climate regime.
To the first question, experts urge that high-income countries should provide financial
and technical assistance to low-income countries to induce developing countries’
participation. Some experts don’t think it in the same way. In his paper “To Tax or Not to
Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming”, economist William D. Nordhaus
compares quantity-oriented mechanisms like the Kyoto Protocol with price-type control
mechanisms such as internationally harmonized carbon taxes. His analysis focuses on such
issues as the relationship to ultimate targets, performance under conditions of uncertainty,
volatility of induced carbon prices, the inefficiencies of taxation and regulation, potential for
corruption and accounting finagling, and ease of implementation. He concludes that pricetype approaches such as carbon taxes have major advantages for slowing global warming
(Nordhaus, 2007). In the end, he suggests that price-type approaches such as HCTs are more
efficient instruments than quantity approaches like those found in the Kyoto Protocol. Under
the tax approach, countries set market penalties on GHG emissions at levels that are
equalized across different regions and industries. The tax would start relatively low and then,
unless the outlook changes for better or worse, rise steadily over time to reflect the increasing
prospective damages from global warming.
To the second question, a more logic way should be found. All the countries want to
pay as little as possible, and are unlikely to participate voluntarily unless they have a positive
net benefit or face the high pressure. The absence of socially shared understanding of fairness
and justice can reinforce zero-sum worldviews and causal beliefs, erode conditions of mutual
trust, promote risk aversion, and foster retaliatory attitudes.
As Garrett Hardin (Sankar, Ulaganathan, 2001) pointed out that there is no technical
solution to the problem of tragedy of commons, if the world countries continue to look for
solutions in the area of science and technology only, the result will be to worsen the situation.
It is crucial to have a mechanism whereby countries ‘‘graduate’’ into a set of obligations that
are commensurate with their abilities to pay—in a way that is similar to the ‘‘ability to pay’’
principle of an income tax system. Part of the challenge is designing a fair graduation
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procedure; another part is overcoming the Westphalia dilemma of inducing countries to
participate when graduation day comes.
The issue of global climate change, which itself is characterized by tremendous
inequality in vulnerability, responsibility, and mitigation, can therefore not be viewed
analyzed, or responded to in isolation from the larger crisis of global inequality. Any
effective post-Kyoto climate treaty will have to address credibility, compensatory justice, the
strategic leverage of major global environmental actors, and national development profiles,
which bear heavily on states’ willingness and ability to ratify these treaties. (Roberts, J.
Timmons, & Parks, Bradley C., 2007).
Climate change is a high profile issue because GHG emissions currently arise from
virtually all aspects of the global economy. International regulations of GHG emissions thus
impinges on sovereignty which states are reluctant to concede, as evidenced by protracted
debates on the need for legally binding reductions targets, the legal personality of the COP,
majority-voting decision-making and procedures for determining non-compliance. (Farhana
Yamin and Joanna Depledge, 2004, p 3.)
The increasingly large role of China in the global economy means that international
pressure become more and more sensitive to China’s growth and its prospects. Indeed, this
influence may in part be self-fulfilling, with markets responding to changes in expectations
about China’s growth prospects even beyond what would be reasonable on the basis of
China’s weight in the world economy. By contrast, China has the technical, financial, and
administrative capacity than those least developed countries (LDC). 3 Then comes the
question: is it possible that China would take any policy to build up its good reputation?
Since the end of the cold war, China has markedly deepened the extent of its
participation in international institutions with great speed. But the most significant thing is
that China has initiated a clustered series of costly and risky endeavors that benefited the
welfare of target states. What are the dominant causes and the prime goal of China’s foreign
strategy by institutional engagement? All the independent states are motivated more by their
own conceptions of self-interest than by devotion to the common good if any. With the deep
involvement in the globalization, China has changed its world picture, and holds that a new
world war will be unlikely in the foreseeable future. Knowing the cost of getting rid of the
network of interdependence, the realistic China wants to bring about a fairly long period of
peace in the world and a favorable climate in areas around itself. China has made it clear
several times that no matter how the international situation changes, it will keep pursuing the
independent foreign policy of peace on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence. Thus, it goes logically that the socialized China has an incentive to reassure
others. China tries to promote trust by adopting a new reassurance strategy, which can be
called institutional engagement (Wang, 2007).
China’s position in the international climate negotiations has rarely deviated from the
rest of the developing world, as collectively articulated by the Group of 77 (G-77), a group of
130 (formerly 77) developing countries. Recently, the financial incentives for emissions
reductions provided by the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has also
helped shape China’s views on the international climate regime (Lewis, Joanna, 2007). Thus,
Developing-country solidarity has been used as a strategy since the early days to influence
climate change negotiations. But, with the growing economic differentiation and often
disparate climate policy interests within them, the developing world is getting more and more
diversified on their perspectives on the historical responsibility of GHG and emitting rights
per capita. For example, some international group states like the members in SIDS hold
strongly different point of view from those leading developing countries like China and India.
3

See appendix III.
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Put in another way, China will face increasing international pressure in the
future to devote more commitment to climate change, both due to its emergence as the
largest successor on the background of global financial crisis and as international
attention to climate change is elevated by government leaders and heads of state in
high-profile forums around the world.
To sum up, the world is beginning to consider the structure of climate-change
policies for the period after 2008–2012. Some countries are adopting their own
climate-change policies containing some mixture of emissions limits and technology
standards. But China made it clear that it will not take any emissions cut in the near
future. International structure will provide higher pressure to force China to take
action.
5. Conclusion
China’s rapid development and economic miracle would become an environmental
disaster if China’s energy use is still especially unclean and inefficient, which brings
consequences for the country and world. As China’s current emissions and
populations grow faster than the ones in developed countries, any comprehensive
treaty in the 21st century will be futile without China’s cooperation. The Economic
Cost and Climate Injustice are two major concerns Chinese government faces. This
raises the issue of which approach would be most likely to stimulate and persuade
China to take appropriate actions in the post-2012 climate regime. The price-type
approach incorporating the perspective of state reputation could visualize the
possibility that China would take new Climate Policy and low-carbon economic
development models. It argues that the sticks-type policies are most unlikely to push
China to take actions or adopt measures because China’s growing economic and
military power, rising political influence, and increasing involvement in regional and
international institutions have fundamentally affected the world system. However,
since China builds up its reputation by focusing on the multilateral commitments, the
reputation-based price-type control mechanism could be the Pareto Improvement
that encourages China to contribute its fair share to the global climate effort.

Appendix I: Cumulative CO2 emissions (1990-2005), (SEI, 2007)
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Appendix II: National “Obligation Wedges”, (SEI,2007)

Appendix III: Chinese participation in a GDRs World, (SEI,2007)
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Are There Policy Tunnels for China to Follow?
Jan Kunnas1 and Timo Myllyntaus2
Abstract
According to the controversial “environmental Kuznets curve” –hypothesis (EKC), some
pollution would follow an inverted U-curve related to incomes, increasing at low income
levels and decreasing at high income levels. Mohan Munasinghe argues (in a
gerschenkronian way): “that developing countries could learn from past experiences of the
industrialized world by adopting measures which would permit them to ´tunnel´ through the
EKC, providing a possibility to avoid the most serious damage to the environment by
avoiding the peak before a downturn of the emissions...” In our presentation, which is based
on a comparison of Denmark’s, Finland’s, Sweden’s and Switzerland’s carbon dioxide
emissions; we will examine China´s possibility to tunnel through its emissions of carbon
dioxide.
With cumulative carbon dioxide emissions over the period 1870–2003 half that of
Denmark’s or two thirds of Finland's or Sweden’s, Switzerland seems, at a first glance, to be
a fine example of a munasinghean policy tunnel. Switzerland’s carbon dioxide emissions per
capita were, however, in 2003 around 30 thirty per cent higher than global average and up to
fifty per cent higher than those of China. As, in fact all industrialized countries are emitting
carbon dioxide in quantities which can be considered well beyond their fair share of what can
be considered as a sustainable global emissions level, there is at present no examples for
developing countries to follow in order to tunnel through. Thus, our paper supports unilateral
cuts in greenhouse gases, such as those agreed during the Spring Council meeting of EU
heads of government in March 2007.
The attractiveness of the Swiss model depends also whether nuclear energy is
considered desirable. The Chinese Three Gorges Dam – project, displacing over a million
people, also shows that even hydro power can create large problems. If China would consume
as much electricity per capita as Switzerland and produce it with the same means, this would
require around sixty three gorges dams with an capacity of 85 TWh/a and six hundred
medium sized nuclear power plants producing 7 TWh/a. In other words, China would need to
build more new nuclear power plants than is at present in the world in total. It is also
questionable whether a Swiss development path is possible worldwide, as its low energy
consumption is due to a production of highly specialized and expensive products. At least it is
not achievable with present consumption patterns in developed countries.
1. Introduction
In the early 1990s, Gene M. Grossman and Alan B. Krueger (1992), Nemat Shafik and
Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay (1992), Theodore Panayotou (1993), Thomas M. Selden and
Daqing Song (1994) proposed that some pollution would follow an inverted U-curve related
to incomes, increasing at low income levels and decreasing at high income levels. Such a
relation was named “environmental Kuznets curve” (EKC), after the similar theory of income
distribution proposed by Simon Kuznets (1955). According to Anton Naiman and Geoff
Antrobus (2005): “The main divergence in the EKC literature is between optimists, who take
the EKC as implying that economic growth is ultimately good for the environment; and
critics, who point to a number to a number of flaws evident in deriving the EKC or advocate
caution in interpreting its causes and implications.”
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Figure 1. Tunnelling through the environmental Kuznets curve using sustainable strategies.
Based on M. Munasinghe, Is environmental degradation and inevitable consequence of economic growth:
tunnelling through the environmental Kuznets curve. Ecological Economics, vol. 29 (1999) 89-109.

Figure 1 illustrates the assumed relationship between Gross domestic product per
capita and environmental degradation, pollution or resource depletion. Point A illustrates a
pre-industrial economy with a low level of per capita income, where one might expect rather
pristine environmental conditions relatively unaffected by economic activities. Along with
industrialization and economic growth increasing use of natural resources and emission of
pollutants causes increasing environmental degradation. After a peak in environmental
degradation (B), the declining part of the curve is finally reached. In the final stage
complementary reasons, like a growing ability and willingness to pay for a better
environment, cleaner technologies and a shift to information and service-based activities are
expected to result in reduced environmental degradation. (Munasinghe 1995 & 1999.)
Kunnas and Myllyntaus (2007) add that the severity of environmental degradation might
itself create a turning point for the emissions.
Mohan Munasinghe (1999) argues: “that developing countries could learn from past
experiences of the industrialized world by adopting measures which would permit them to
´tunnel´ [C—D] through the EKC, providing a possibility to avoid the most serious damage
to the environment by avoiding the peak before a downturn of the emissions...” We will
examine this argument at the end of this paper.
We start our paper by comparing Denmark’s, Finland’s, Sweden’s and Switzerland’s
carbon dioxide emissions for the period 1870 to 2003 using our own emission calculations
(Kunnas and Myllyntaus 2007 & 2008) . These emission estimates are compared to the
widely used estimates compiled by the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center
(CDIAC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Marland et al. 2005). We put forward some
explanations for possible differences in these different estimations and attempt to evaluate
whether differences are substantial. In the second part of this article we use the same
emission data to examine the relevance of the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis in the
case of carbon dioxide emissions. Our particular concern is how the cumulative character of
carbon dioxide emissions affects the validity of the hypothesis. We also check whether the
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differences between the emission estimates presented in the first part of the article are
substantial enough to alternate the outcome. Then we can finally close our paper with a
critical examination of Munsinghe´s policy tunnel; Are there policy tunnels for China to
follow?

2 Annual Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Carbon Efficiency
We start our paper by comparing Denmark’s, Finland’s, Sweden’s and Switzerland’s carbon
dioxide emissions for the period 1870 to 2003 using our own emission calculations (Kunnas
and Myllyntaus 2007 & 2008) . The rational for choosing these four countries is similar high
dependence on energy imports and industrial exports, while their economies transformed
from agrarian to industrial and finally service-oriented within fairly short time spans. In
addition, these countries resemble each other because of their similar corporatist
democracies, comparable welfare states with high GDP per capita (21 000 – 23 000 $ per
capita purchasing power parity in the year 2003) and a fairly small population (5-9 million
inhabitants).
We are comparing our emission calculations to the estimates for the same countries
made by Gregg Marland, Tom Boden and Robert J. Andres (2005), at the Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Centre (CDIAC) of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This
comprehensive database on global, regional, and national CO2 emissions has been widely
used due to its easy availability and regular updates. Its calculation methods have been
presented in the Tellus-journal (Andres et al. 1999 & Marland and Rotty 1984). Usually the
figures from the database are used as such without critical evaluation about the validity of the
data. We put forward some explanations for possible differences in these estimations and
attempt to evaluate whether differences are substantial.
To make the emissions in different countries comparable despite the different size of
population, we present the emissions in per capita terms. Figure 2 indicates that Sweden and
Denmark had a very similar development of carbon dioxide emissions per capita until the
mid-1970s, after which Sweden’s emissions dropped fast. Finland had the slowest emissions
growth until the end of the Second World War. Since then Finland switched from fuel wood
to fossil fuels and that made the country’s emissions to grow exceptionally fast.
Consequently, its emissions per capita passed those of Switzerland by the mid 1960s, those of
Sweden by the end of the 1970s and recently also those of Denmark.
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Figure 2. Carbon dioxide emissions per capita in Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland, 1870—
2003
Sources: Kunnas and Myllyntaus 2007 & 2008; UNFCCC 2006; Johansen 1985; Det Statistiske
department 1915 – 1976; Etemad & Luciani 1991; Danish Energy Agency 2002; Kander 2002; Mitchell
1992; Conseil Suisse de l'Energie 2001.

In 1870 Finland had the second largest carbon dioxide emissions per capita, of the
countries in the sample, with 700 kg per capita. It was surpassed only by Denmark’s 770 kg
per capita. Sweden’s 280 kg per capita and Switzerland’s 300 kg per capita was less than half
of Finland’s emissions. Finland’s relatively high emissions per capita at the beginning of the
time series, although it had the smallest gross domestic product 1 100 Geary-Khamis dollars
per capita in 1870, compared to 1 700 - 2 100 $ for the other countries in the sample, is
explained by burning cultivation of peatlands. Consequently, it also explains Finland's flat
emission development path at the end of 19th century and early 20th as the withering away of
burning cultivation of peatlands counteracted increasing use coals and petroleum products
(Kunnas 2005). Our sources for the other countries do not include this peat consuming
cultivation practise. Its inclusion might increase 19th century emissions substantially for, at
least, Sweden and Denmark. Such calculations are though not available.
Figure 2 is drawn based on our calculations, but if the CDIAC data was used, it would
not make substantial differences in the shapes of the curves, except for Finland where our
calculations shows 5-30 fold higher emissions in the 19th century. The main reason for this
considerable difference is the above mentioned burning cultivation of peatlands, which is not
included in the CDIAC calculations. While burning cultivation of peatlands were declining in
the beginning of the 20th century and coming to an end by 1940, also the difference between
our calculations and the estimates by Marland et al. indicates a clear convergence.
From 1870 to 1913 Sweden's and Switzerland’s carbon dioxide emissions grew at an
annual rate of almost 5 percent, while Denmark’s annual growth rate was 3 percent. Finland’s
emissions, on contrary, grew at only a half percent a year. Thus by 1890 both Sweden's and
Switzerland’s emissions surpassed Finland’s and at the eve of the Second World War their
emissions were more or less on the same level than those of Denmark.
Christian Pfister (1998) has described a shift from the moderate use of energy to the
extensive use of fossil fuels and a simultaneous change from sustainability to mass
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consumption as the “syndrome of the 1950s.” Our sample gives only partial support for this
notion. On one hand, Finland's growth of carbon dioxide emissions soared from a mediocre
0.4 percent per year in the period 1870 to 1950 to 5.2 percent in the 1950s and Switzerland’s
emission growth doubled from 2.1 percent to 4.5 percent. On the other hand Sweden's carbon
dioxide emissions had only a small increase in the growth speed, from 2.6 percent a year in
the period 1870 to 1950 to 3.4 percent in the 1950s and Denmark’s emission growth halved
from 2.3 percent to 1.2 percent. Rather we could speak of a “syndrome of the 1960s” – In the
1960s Sweden's carbon dioxide emissions annually grew 6.1 percent, Denmark’s 6.4 percent,
Switzerland's 5.5 percent and Finland's 10.6 percent!
Interestingly this phenomenal growth slowed substantially down in all of the countries
in the sample except for Finland already in the beginning of the seventies before the oil
crises. Finally the oil crises slowed also Finland's emission growth, but it was the only
country in the sample with growing emissions in the 1970s. From 1970 to 1979 Finland's
carbon dioxide emissions grew 2.7 percent a year, while Sweden’s emissions diminished 1.4
percent, Denmark’s diminished 1.3 and Switzerland’s diminished 0.2 percent a year.
Finland's faster emissions growth than the two other Nordic countries in the sample
gets an explanation, when we compare the carbon efficiency of the countries. From the
Figure 3 below, we can see, that in the beginning of the 1950s, Finland's carbon dioxide
emissions per unit of GDP, were only half of that of Sweden and Denmark, although already
substantially larger than those of Switzerland. Thus the faster emission growth than the other
Nordic countries continuing until the oil crisis can be considered as a catch up.
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Figure 3 Emissions of carbon dioxide per 1990 Geary-Khamis dollar of GDP in Finland, Denmark,
Sweden and Switzerland, 1870 to 2003
Sources: Figure 2 & Maddison 2007

Switzerland’s development in carbon efficiency in the late 19th century and early 20th
century mirrors Finland's, as Switzerland had increasing carbon dioxide emissions per unit of
GDP until 1913 and thereafter decreasing unit emissions until 1945. It was among the first
countries in mainland Europe to industrialize in the beginning of the 19th century. Initially its
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industrialization was coal driven, but at the end of 19th century it started to utilize its
hydropower resources. Thus in 1882 water power represented almost 70 per cent of installed
power capacity in Swiss factories (Paquier 1998a: 387). In 1888, 66 per cent of the primary
energy used by industry was derived from water power, by 1911 its share had increased to 76
percent, and in 1929 it was as much as 92 per cent (Paquier 1998b: 735). Its industry also
took a completely different trajectory from the start with a concentration on highly
specialized and expensive products. According to one study of pre-war export trade
established the average value of a ton of Swiss exports at 1 500 francs compared to 140
francs for a ton of German exports. From 1913 to 1924 Switzerland’s three most important
export products were watches and clocks, silk fabrics, and machinery and motor cars (Jones
1926). In 2004 the three most important industries produced chemicals, machinery and
electronics, and instruments and watches (Swiss Federal Statistical Office 2005).
Since the first oil crisis to 2003 all of the countries in the sample, have had a more or
less constant increase in the carbon dioxide efficiency of the economy as a whole measured
by kg of carbon dioxide emitted per $ of GDP. Though only in the case of Sweden, the
efficiency growth have been enough to counteract the continuing GDP growth and turning the
emissions to a considerable decrease. From 1973 to 2003 Sweden’s carbon dioxide emissions
per capita declined 2.7 percent a year, while the emission path was more or less flat in the
other countries.
3 Environmental Kuznets Curve and Cumulative Emissions
By replacing the time dimension on the x-axis with the gross domestic product, we can
compare emissions per capita at different levels of Gross Domestic Product. At a GDP level
between 2000 and 5000 Geary-Khamis dollars per capita, Finland’s emissions per unit of
GDP are at the same level as in Switzerland. At the level of GDP per capita around 6000 $,
Finland catches up with Sweden, and at 8000 $ with Denmark.
Finland’s relatively low carbon emissions dollar of GDP compared to the other Nordic
countries in the sample, between 2000 and 5000 dollars per capita, is due to the fact that its
initial GDP growth was mostly based on wood and water power. An increased industrial use
of wood was possible due to an improvement in space heating efficiency due to new stove
technology tripling the average thermal efficiency, and a fading slash-and-burn-cultivation
(Myllyntaus and Mattila 2002, Kunnas 2005).
Sweden had even more abundant wood and water resources, but it also had some
domestic coal resources. In contrast, Denmark had less wood resources because it land
territory was a smaller and it was more densely populated, and a low elevation feeding the
rivers. As a result, it had to fuel its economic growth by imports of coal and liquid fuels from
the start.3

3

Nowadays Finland have a forest land area of 22 500 hectares (73.9 % of land area), Sweden 27 528 ha (66.9,
Switzerland 1 221 ha (30.9 %) and Denmark 500 ha (11,8 %). (FAO 2006.)
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Figure 4. Carbon dioxide emissions per capita related to income level of a fixed price level in Denmark,
Finland, Sweden and Switzerland, 1870 – 2003
Sources: Figure 2 & Maddison 2007

The environmental Kuznets-curve hypothesis proposes that some pollution or measures
of resource use or environmental degradation would follow an inverted U-curve related to
incomes, increasing at low income levels and decreasing at high income levels. All off the
countries in the sample have a stagnation of emissions growth at high income levels, but only
Sweden’s emissions turn to a substantial decline at high income levels in accordance with the
hypothesis.
At an income level of 18 000 $ Swedish emission drops to the same level as
Switzerland’s, or around 60% of Finland's and Denmark’s. The main reason for the
downward turn in Swedish emissions is nuclear power, and it can be argued, similarly to
Gilbert Plass who were among the first scientist raising alarm of climate change, whether this
is a genuine environmental improvement or transition from one environmental problem to
another. In 1956 he wrote: “It is interesting that two of the most important methods available
at the present time for generating large amounts of power have serious disadvantages when
used over long time intervals. The burning of fossil fuels increases the temperature of the
earth from the carbon dioxide effect; the use of nuclear reactors increases the radioactivity of
the earth. It is difficult to say which of these effects would be the less objectionable after
several centuries of operation.”
So far we have, however, only considered emissions for a single year although carbon
dioxide emissions are cumulating to the atmosphere. Since the beginning of industrialization
to present the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has been increasing from
about 280 to 380 parts per million. There is now a clear scientific consensus that the
increasing atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases resulting
mainly from human activities are causing global mean surface temperatures to rise. This
again is predicted to cause among other things rising ocean levels, the extinction of animal
and plant species and increasing extreme weather conditions (IPCC 2007).
When we, instead of annual emissions, take a look at cumulative emissions per capita
from 1870 to present, the outcome, as presented in Table 1, is much different. Switzerland
with its linear emission-income relation has the clearly smallest cumulative emissions;
followed by Finland which emission development path does not either have a downward
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slope at high income levels as suggested by the EKC-hypothesis. Sweden had the second
largest cumulative emissions after Denmark, despite its emissions follow an inverted U-curve
as proposed by the environmental Kuznets-curve –hypothesis. Our conclusion is thus that in
the case of carbon dioxide emissions and other cumulative pollutants, focusing on yearly
emissions can be utterly misleading.
We can also see that from a cumulative perspective, Finland’s manifold emissions in
our calculations compared to Marland et al. (2005) in the late 19th century are irrelevantly
small, as they are mainly related to the increase in emissions caused by the later phases of
industrialisation in the 20th century. Emissions of pre-industrial and early industrial periods
have a minor significance compared to those of the past sixty years.4
Table 1.
Cumulative carbon dioxide emissions per capita in Denmark, Finland, Sweden and
Switzerland, 1870 – 2003 (1000 kg)

Denmark

Sweden

Finland

Switzerland

Kunnas & Myllyntaus

626

485

453

313

Marland et al.

615

451

422

310

Sources: See Figure 2 & Marland et al. (2005)

Over the past 200 years the oceans absorbed about a half of the total carbon dioxide
emissions from fossil fuels and cement manufacturing (Sabine et al. 2004). This buffer has,
however not been a free lunch. When carbon dioxide dissolves in seawater it forms a weak
acid called carbonic acid. Because of this chemical process the average pH of the oceans has
decreased by 0.1 unit from pre-industrial levels, and an exponential decrease of nearly 0.8 pH
unit is forecasted by 2300. Experimental evidence indicates that this could have major effects
on calcifying marine biota, such as calcareous plankton and coral reef communities. (The
Royal Society 2005, Caldeira and Wickett (2003, Orr et al. 2005)) Thus the absorption of
carbon dioxide has not been a genuine environmental improvement, and has therefore not
been considered in this paper.
4. Policy Tunnels or Just Levelled Slopes
Now we can finally return to Mohan Munsinghe´s (1999) argument: “that developing
countries could learn from past experiences of the industrialized world by adopting measures
which would permit them to ´tunnel´ through the EKC…” Graphically Munasinghe´s
argument goes that developing countries could go through a policy tunnel (C–D) to point D, a
society combining high per capita income with low levels of environmental degradation,
without passing through point B associated with a high peak in environmental degradation.
This new point should preferably be under some safe limit beyond which environmental
damage could become irreversible.

4

Mark T. Heil and Thomas M. Selden (2001) calculated, based on an earlier Oak Ridge database, that the
cumulative worldwide emissions for the period 1881 to 1990 equaled 212 billions tons of carbon, while their
projection for the period 1991 to 2100 with equal duration was approximately 1500 billion tons of carbon.
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With cumulative emissions half that of Denmark’s or two thirds of Finland's or
Sweden’s, Switzerland seems, at a first glance, to be a fine example of a policy tunnel,
tunnelling through the environmental Kuznets –curve Switzerland’s (and Sweden’s) carbon
dioxide emissions per capita were, however, in 2003 around thirty per cent higher than global
average and up to fifty per cent higher than those of China (Marland et al 2005).
This can be compared to EU's goal of keeping the rise in global temperatures to below
2°C compared to pre-industrial level, which would require global emissions to be reduced by
up to 50% compared to 1990 by 2050 (Commission of the European Communities 2007).
Thus neither Switzerland or Sweden are on the point D, but rather on point E, below the
highest point of environmental degradation, but still way over the safe limit. As the per capita
emissions of carbon dioxide are above the global average in all 27 high-income OECD
countries, they provide no examples for China to follow in order to tunnel through. Their
example allows so far only levelling the slope to point E.5
The attractiveness of the Swiss model depends also whether nuclear energy is
considered desirable. The Chinese Three Gorges Dam –project, displacing over a million
people, also shows that even hydro power can create large problems (Heggelund 2006). If
China would consume as much electricity per capita as Switzerland and produce it with the
same means, this would require around sixty three gorges dams with an capacity of 85 TWh/a
and six hundred medium sized nuclear power plants producing 7 TWh/a. In other words,
China would need to build more new nuclear power plants than is at present in the world in
total; In August 2007 there was a total amount of 439 nuclear reactors in operation worldwide
(IAEA 2007). It also questionable whether a Swiss development path is possible worldwide,
as its low energy consumption is due to a production of highly specialized and expensive
products. At least it is not achievable with present consumption patterns in developed
countries.
All energy forms have ecological consequences, although their impacts vary to a great
extent. Therefore we support Gunter Schaumann´s (2007) notion that from an ecological view,
5

For a more hopeful story see: Brajer, Mead, and Xiao (2007).
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the reduction of the “energy consumption” is the priority goal, and the reduction of carbondioxide emissions again only a partial goal. If the present day developing countries could
repeat Finland's “energy less” growth which continued until the First World War, this could
buy us time, during which the developed countries would lower they energy consumption and
develop as environmental friendly means as possible to provide the remaining needs for
energy, there would be a genuine chance for developing countries to tunnel through the
environmental Kuznets curve straight to a sustainable emission level.
The accomplishment of this goal requires technology transfer to developing countries.
This should, however, not focus on high-tech only; it should be remembered that Finland's
initial energy less growth was achieved by a technology which can be considered quite
primitive from present day perspective, although it was revolutionary indeed at the time being.
The suitability of a technology is more important than how advanced it is (Kunnas 2006).
Unilateral measures to curb climate change could provide an example for later comers
to follow, allowing them to tunnel through the peak emissions. Thus, our paper supports
unilateral cuts in greenhouse gases, such as those agreed during the Spring Council meeting
of EU heads of government in March 2007. In the case of ozone depleting substances the
United States took the lead without waiting for actions by the European Community, the
forerunner of the European Union. Thus it managed by its own example overcome the
scepticism and opposition of regulatory measures by EC, which eventually followed the
example (Sunstein 2007). This time it is perhaps the European Union’s turn to take the lead.
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Predictability and China’s Legally Binding Goal of CO2 Emissions in The Copenhagen
Negotiation
Yuan Xu1
Abstract
Two facts define China’s status in the global efforts of CO2 mitigation: China has overtaken
the United States as the world’s largest CO2 emitter. And as a developing country with low
per capita emissions, China will grow into a much bigger one. Accordingly, in the coming
Copenhagen negotiation, whether China will accept a legally binding goal is of great
importance. China’s CO2 emissions in the past three decades are analyzed in this paper to
distinguish two prominent features: abrupt changes and cycles. Abrupt changes break the past
trend and make projections into the future unreliable. China has experienced two abrupt
changes of CO2 emissions since 1998 – one downward and one upward. A likely future one
will seriously compromise the application of an absolute CO2 goal to China. On the other
hand, stable cycles characterized China’s CO2 emissions, but the 10-yr period does not
overlap with the 5-yr commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Intensity goals can much
better address these two concerns. A future abrupt change of baseline CO2 emissions intensity
is less likely and no cycles are apparent. China has adopted intensity goals in its domestic
efforts of energy conservation and environmental protection. A CO2 emissions intensity goal
is also being considered, which indicates that intensity goals could have a better chance in
persuading China to negotiate a legally binding goal in the Copenhagen negotiation.
1. Introduction
China did not get a legally binding goal in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. With rapid economic
growth, China’s share in the world’s total CO2 emissions has risen from 10.6% in 1990 to
20.6% in 2006.2 China’s future will be even more important than its present status: during
2005-2030, China’s incremental energy-related CO2 emissions could be responsible for over
two fifth of the world’s. 3 Upon the negotiation in Copenhagen for a post-Kyoto CO2
mitigation regime, how to effectively incorporate China becomes one of the most critical
factors that will decide the success of the negotiation and subsequent implementation.
Intensity goals have long been suggested to accommodate economic growth
especially in developing countries and induce them to accept legally binding goals.4 Under a
cap-and-trade scheme, intensity goals can also reduce the uncertainty of CO2 permit price.5
However, the merits of intensity goals were generally discussed among many countries with
less attention to a specific country, particularly China with rapidly growing importance and
some distinct features of uncertainty. Accordingly, for China in the coming Copenhagen
negotiation, intensity goals may not have been fully appreciated.
This paper analyzes in detail China’s CO2 emissions in the past three decades and
especially since 1998 to compare intensity and absolute goals. Predictability is the focused
perspective. Section 2 addresses two abrupt changes associated with China’s CO2 emission
since 1998. Section 3 further analyzes the consequence of the abrupt changes on projecting
China’s CO2 emissions. Intensity goals are compared with absolute goals facing the
1

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 08544; USA,
email: yuanxu@princeton.edu
2
Energy Information Administration (EIA), "Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government,"
Washington, D.C. 2008.
3
International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2007. Paris, France, 2007.
4
J. A. Frankel, "Growth Baselines: reducing emissions and increasing investment in developing countries,"
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 1999.
5
F. Jotzo and J. C. V. Pezzey, "Optimal intensity targets for greenhouse gas emissions trading under
uncertainty," Environmental & Resource Economics, vol. 38, pp. 259-284, Oct 2007.

413

uncertainty of a future abrupt change. Section 4 studies the clear cycles expressed in the
annual growth rates of China’s CO2 emissions. Section 5 introduces the application of
intensity goals in China. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Abrupt Changes of China’s CO2 Emissions
A key issue in goal setting is to forecast baseline emissions in the year intended for goal
attainment. Goals can be constructed around the baseline plus some designated reduction
efforts. Obviously, goals are for the future and the baseline is estimated ex ante. However,
due to the inherent uncertainty in predicting the future, the ex ante baseline may differ greatly
from the ex post one analyzed afterwards without much of the proceeding uncertainty. If the
ex post baseline is much lower than the goal, a problem of “hot air” will be created. In the
scenario, China will have many extra CO2 permits to sell and considering China’s huge size,
the oversupply of CO2 permits could lead to the collapse of international CO2 prices and
undermine effective CO2 mitigation. On the other hand, if the ex post baseline is much higher
than the goal, China will either resort to methods with high mitigation costs or purchase CO2
permits in the international market. The excessive financial burden will trouble not only
China, but also other countries that plan to purchase CO2 permits at a lower price. The
investment from the business world on CO2 mitigation can also be hampered facing a
significantly uncertain future CO2 price. In short, because of China’s large and rapidly
growing share in the world’s CO2 emissions, its uncertainty can greatly affect the world.
China has clearly demonstrated its potential of making surprises in CO2 emissions. An
effective negotiation in Copenhagen requires an acceptable way to China to address the
uncertainty if a legally binding goal is wanted from China. The Kyoto Protocol was
negotiated in 1997, more than a decade before its commitment period starting in 2008. A
short interval as it is for many countries, China experienced abrupt changes at both directions
of CO2 emissions change (Fig. 1). If a new treaty for 2013 and beyond is successfully
negotiated in Copenhagen, the interval will be three years. But even three years can be long
enough for China to witness unexpected changes of CO2 emissions. Not only a goal for China
will be difficult to negotiate under the huge uncertainty, but also China’s willingness to start
negotiation could be compromised. Facing particularly the surprisingly high growth of CO2
emissions since 2002 (Fig. 1) and serious problems in environmental policy implementation,
China may not be confident to achieve a legally binding goal of CO2 emissions, and thus not
willing to negotiate one.
China’s CO2 emissions in the past decade looked like riding a roller coaster – coming
down and going up at dazzling speeds that surprised both the world and China itself. In the
three years from 1998 to 2000, though the economic growth rates were slower than the
average since 1980, China’s economy still expanded 25.7%.6 The CO2 emissions, however,
shrank by 5.3%.7 It was out of the world’s expectation: for example, in the reference scenario
of the International Energy Outlook 1998, EIA (Energy Information Administration)
projected that China would emit 3,586 Tg of CO2 in 2000,8 but the actual emissions were
2.967 Tg9, 17.3% lower than the value projected only two years in advance. In the subsequent
years, China surprised the world again but in another direction. China’s CO2 emissions in
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2006 were 103% higher than those in 2000 to reach 6,018 Tg10, surpassing the reference
scenario’s expectation in the International Energy Outlook 2004 for the year of 2020 – 5,693
Tg.11
China was not less surprised. Though China did not make official projection on its
CO2 emissions, its goal of SO2 emissions could act as a surrogate. For the 9th Five-Year Plan
(1996-2000), China established a goal to control its SO2 emissions in 2000 within 3.8%
above those in 1995.12 But the actual SO2 emissions went down by 16%.13 China’s ambition
for the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) grew into a 10% reduction goal of SO2 emissions14,
but the actual emissions in 2005 exceeded by 28% of those in 2000.15 Because China did not
start large deployment of SO2 scrubbers – a crucial technology to reduce SO2 emissions at
large point sources – until the 11th Five-Year Plan,16 the goals for the 9th and 10th Five-Year
Plans could partly reflect the corresponding baseline emission scenarios plus certain
reduction efforts. Clearly, the evolution of China’s SO2 emissions went out of the expectation
of China itself. Because of the close relationship between SO2 and CO2 emissions due to their
common major sources in coal consumption, it is fair to say that China was surprised by its
CO2 emissions.
In other words, China experienced two abrupt changes in the past decade alone, and
the most difficult part of prediction is abrupt changes. Neither the international institutions
nor China itself foresaw the trend.
The abrupt change is even more obvious in comparison with other countries (Fig. 1). If
the trend during 1980 – 1997 remained unchanged, China’s CO2 emissions would still
significantly trail the U.S.’ in 2006. The unexpected lower growth during 1998 – 2001
delayed China by about three to four years to catch up with the EU-15 (Fig. 1). But the later
surprising comeback made China surpass the United States by at least a decade earlier (Fig.
1).
3. Projection of China’s CO2 Emissions
With active efforts in energy conservation, China has already reversed the increasing trend of
energy intensity and achieved 10.1% reduction during 2006-2008. 17 CO2 intensity should
follow a similar trend. To project China’s future baseline emissions, serious questions will
be: whether another abrupt change is coming and whether China’s CO2 emissions trend can
stabilize again? Or whether we can design a goal for China with a fairly good knowledge of
its uncertainty?
Before approaching the questions, an analysis on the past projections is valuable.
World Energy Outlook (WEO) of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and International
10
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Energy Outlook (IEO) of the Energy Information Administration (EIA) make annual
projection of CO2 emissions for the world and major countries. The reference scenarios can
be viewed as a projection following the present policy and technology path, as a result, the
baseline emissions.
An immediate characteristic of Fig. 2 is that EIA and IEA’s projections for the year of
2020 receive close influence from the trends proceeding the baseline years. For example, in
WEO 2002 with the baseline year of 2000, IEA projected China’s CO2 emissions to reach
5,393 Tg in 2020 (Fig. 2). The equivalent growth rate in every five years would be 15.3%,
corresponding to the actual 2.2% increase during 1996-2000. WEO 2008 changed the
baseline year to 2006, which witnessed 93.6% growth of CO2 emissions in the proceeding
five years. Accordingly, the equivalent growth rate from the baseline year to 2020 was
adjusted upward to 22.7% per five years. Furthermore, the more meaningful impact seen in
Fig. 2 for designing China’s future goal is the projected CO2 emissions in 2020, which was
85% higher in WEO 2008 than that in WEO 2002. As a comparison, the difference of the two
projected China’s emissions for 2020 is equivalent to about 16% of the world’s emissions in
2006 – 29,195 Tg.18 EIA’s projections had essentially the same impression. It is not difficult
to imagine that China’s CO2 emissions goal for 2020 would differ much if it were negotiated
in 2002 instead of 2008.
Another message from Fig. 2 is that neither the pleasing low nor the worrying high
growth of CO2 emissions respectively proceeding the years of 2000 and 2006 were believed
to be sustainable. Instead, intermediate growth rates were taken. As illustrated above, though
the growth rates went up sharply by 91.4% (from 2.2% to 93.6%) comparing the 5-yr periods
ending in 2000 and 2006, the projected rates only increased by 7.3% (from 15.3% to 22.7%).
Then the projection indicates another abrupt change somewhere in the near future to greatly
decelerate China’s recent rapid growth close to the 5-yr growth rate during 1981-1997 –
25.2%.19 Such abrupt change is probable from the experience of Japan. During 1960-1973,
Japan had a comparable growth of CO2 emissions (Fig. 3) to China’s during 2002-2006 (Fig.
4). Their CO2 emissions intensity both went up (Fig. 3 & 4). Afterwards, Japan witnessed an
abrupt change and its CO2 emissions almost stabilized in absolute terms (Fig. 3).
If the coming of such an abrupt change is of less doubt, when and at what stabilized
growth rates will be of great uncertainty. China could have been fundamentally changed and
the past growth rates lost their value of reference. Even though China is working hard in
energy conservation, a significantly faster baseline emission trend might still be unavoidable
in the near future than that during 1980-1997. In another scenario, China could resemble
Japan’s path since 1990s (Fig. 3) and further decouple the growth of GDP and CO2
emissions.
Intensity goals are a better choice facing abrupt changes like China’s. CO2 emissions
intensity also had an abrupt change in 2002 from a continuous decrease to an increase
inexperienced since 1980 (Fig. 4). But the abrupt change of CO2 emissions during 1998-2001
was barely seen (Fig. 4). Furthermore, though we may also witness another abrupt change of
CO2 emissions intensity in the future, the uncertainty of its stabilized rates will be much
smaller than that for CO2 emissions, as demonstrated in Japan’s case (Fig. 3). To recognize
China’s active efforts in energy conservation and renewable energies in the past several
years, a baseline growth rate of 0% is a legitimate assumption for its CO2 emissions intensity.
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4. Cycles of China’s CO2 Emissions
Even if only considering the variability of China’s CO2 emissions over years, the goal
scheme in the Kyoto Protocol is not appropriate. As displayed in Fig. 4, China’s economy
and CO2 emissions have clear cycles. Even the two abrupt changes of CO2 emissions did not
break the 10-yr cycle period. Though the commitment period in the Kyoto Protocol (20082013) will likely fall into the decreasing branch of a cycle, a serious probability exists that the
commitment period could lie on the peak or the trough of a cycle, which would present
different baselines. If a negotiation on China’s goal still focuses on CO2 emissions, the stable
cycle and its greater magnitude will disable the commitment period of five years. In order to
smooth the peak and trough of a cycle, the commitment period should be last 10 years.
Additional mechanism like “banking” can leave the optimization decision to China on
allocating emission quota over those years.
In contrast, CO2 emissions intensity did not show any significant cycle (Fig. 4). Such
smoother change over years could facilitate the design of China’s goal and the length of a
commitment could be more flexible.
5. China’s Application of Intensity Goals
Goals are important tools for the Chinese central government to communicate and implement
its policies throughout the governmental system and the Chinese society. Five-Year Plans lie
in the central stage. In the area of energy and the environment, both intensity goals and
absolute goals have been applied.
In the National 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), China enacted an intensity goal on
energy conservation to reduce energy intensity (energy consumption per unit of GDP) by
20%.20 The background was the increasing energy intensity during 2003-2005,21 a brand-new
experience for the Chinese government since the economic reform started. In the context, an
intensity goal was favored to seriously work for energy conservation while not worrying too
much about the uncertainty of economic growth.
Two goals on pollutant emissions also entered the National 11th Five-Year Plan: 10%
reduction of SO2 and COD (Chemical Oxygen Demand) emissions.22 Though expressed in
relative terms, these are absolute goals: as long as the emission levels in the anchor year
(2005) are determined, an emission cap for the attainment year (2010) will be clearly defined.
A similar goal of SO2 emissions was also established for the 9th and 10th Five-Year Plans23.
However, China’s energy consumption growth decelerated in the 9th Five-Year Plan and
accelerated in the 10th, which almost single-handedly decided the fates of the goals: a great
success in the 9th and a colossal failure in the 10th. The history should have taught the Chinese
government an important lesson in goal setting facing vast uncertainty.
On the other hand, in the 11th Five-Year Plan, the reduction of SO2 emissions in the
power sector follows an intensity goal based on grams of SO2 emissions per kWh of
electricity generated from coal power plants. China planned to bring down the intensity from
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6.4 grams/kWh in 2005 to 2.7 grams/kWh in 201024. It disclosed the necessary ambition to
achieve the 10% reduction of overall SO2 emissions.
Though China has not yet declared any national goal on CO2 emissions, a strong
preference to intensity goals have been expressed. In a recent report, the Chinese Academy of
Sciences – a key think tank for the Chinese government – advocated reducing China’s CO2
intensity (CO2 emissions per unit of GDP) by 50% in 2020 from the level in 2005. 25
According to the former chairman of the Environmental and Resources Protection Committee
of the National People’s Congress, China is officially considering a CO2 intensity goal in the
12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015).26
To sum up, China has been educated the disadvantages of absolute goals. Intensity
goals are gaining ground in energy conservation and CO2 emissions.
6. Conclusion
China and the world are heading toward negotiating a new climate treaty in Copenhagen in
the end of 2009. However, China’s role has not been very clear, particularly between
following the Kyoto Protocol without a legally binding goal and joining the industrialized
countries to negotiate one. As the largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world, China’s
attitude and deed can greatly boost or compromise the success of the new treaty.
Though intensity goals have been suggested to better involve developing countries
and accommodate economic growth, China’s specific and somewhat uncommon
characteristics have not been analyzed in detail to appreciate intensity goals more. This paper
mainly focuses on the importance of predictability in designing a CO2 goal, particularly
concerning abrupt changes and cycles.
Abrupt changes make China’s CO2 emission unpredictable. Since 1998, China has
experienced two abrupt changes. The first one was during 1998-2001 when the trend of CO2
emissions bent downward significantly. Two important institutions – EIA and IEA – had their
projected emissions seriously higher than the actual values. The second abrupt change was
more worrying for the world, which led China’s CO2 emissions to almost double during
2002-2006. The projections had to be adjusted upward every year by a large margin to
recognize the surge. Furthermore, because the growth rate of nearly doubling per five years is
hardly sustainable, a slow-down or probably another abrupt change is expected. But when
and at what level are unknown.
On the other hand, China’s CO2 emissions have the annual growth rates follow pretty
stable cycles with the period of about 10 years. Though the magnitude was getting stronger in
the recent decade, the periods can roughly represent a predictable part of China’s CO2
emissions.
Absolute goals behave very poorly facing abrupt changes, which raises significant
concern over an expected one in the future. Abrupt changes can cause problems of “hot air”
when actual CO2 emissions are unexpectedly low, and excessive demand of CO2 permits
when CO2 emissions are unexpectedly high. The five-year commitment period in the Kyoto
Protocol added more risk to China because it does not overlap with China’s stable cycles.
Both factors suggest that the goal scheme in the Kyoto Protocol should not be followed for
China.
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Intensity goals can much better address the two factors. An abrupt change of CO2
emissions growth rates in the future is less likely to sway CO2 emissions intensity
significantly away from its trend. This paper recommends adopting a 0% change as the
baseline to design China’s intensity goals. In addition, China’s CO2 emissions intensity did
not display any notable cycles in the annual change rates. No restriction, as a result, is
necessary to synchronize the length of a commitment period with the cycles.
China experienced great uncertainty in its SO2 emissions goals in the 9th and 10th
Five-Year Plans. Such uncertainty discouraged real efforts of pollutant mitigation. In the 11th
Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), China has adopted intensity goals domestically in energy
conservation. SO2 emissions control in the power sector also applied another type of intensity
goals based on electricity generated. A CO2 intensity goal is incubating in China too, which
could be written into the 12th Five-Year Plan. All these makes a legally binding goal built on
CO2 emissions intensity more acceptable to China in the Copenhagen negotiation.
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Climate Change in Hong Kong:
Observations and Projections
E W L Ginn, T C Lee and K Y Chan1
Abstract
The Hong Kong Observatory has been making meteorological observations at its
headquarters in Tsim Sha Tsui since 1884. Analysis of the extensive past records reveals that
the temperature rise in Hong Kong during the past 125 years is in accord with the global
rising trend. In last few decades anthropogenic influences, especially urbanization, have
contributed significantly to the accelerated rising trend. A similar increasing trend is also
observed for rainfall but the trend after 1947 is not statistically significant. Other observations
such as increasing cloud amounts, decreasing total global solar radiation and rising sea level
are all consistent with the global trend. Studies of past occurrences of extreme temperature
and rainfall have recently been carried out. It is observed that cold episodes have become
rarer while very hot days and heavy rain events are becoming more frequent. The
corresponding return periods of heavy rain and very hot days are decreasing while those of
very cold days are increasing. The Observatory also makes use of the data from the latest
assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and employs statistical
downscaling techniques to carry out projections of temperature and precipitation in the 21st
century. In gist, the findings are that the rise in temperature will be slightly higher than the
global mean in the 21st century. There will also be a significant decrease in the number of
cold days and an increase in the number of very hot days and hot nights. The annual rainfall
in Hong Kong is also expected to rise by the end of the 21st century, so is the year-to-year
variability.
1. Introduction
The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) states that warming of the climate system is unequivocal. There are evidences of
increasing global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice
and rising global mean sea level. Most of the observed increase in global average
temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in
anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations. Besides the shifting of the mean climate,
global warming may also alter the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events (such as
heavy rain, drought, heat waves, cold spells, etc.) in some regions, leading to significant
socio-economical impacts (IPCC, 2007: 2-17).
For the Guangdong province in southern China, under the background of global
climate change, there was an increase in the average temperature in the last 50 years and
flooding and droughts have also become more frequent (Guangdong Meteorological Bureau,
2007; Chen et al, 2007). Significant changes in the climate were also observed in Hong
Kong over the last century (Leung et al, 2004), including the increase in average
temperatures and total rainfall, the decrease in total global solar radiation and the rise of sea
level. Apart from global warming, these changes in the climate of Hong Kong could also be
partly attributed to the rapid urbanization and increase in population in the past half century
(Lam, 2006, Wu et al, 2008).
In this paper, the observed changes in different meteorological elements of Hong
Kong are reviewed and updated in Section 2. The future projections of the temperatures and
1
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rainfall in Hong Kong in the 21st century using the latest available IPCC model data are
presented in Section 3. Section 4 contains a summary of the conclusions. For the trend
analysis discussed in this paper, the two tailed t-test was applied to test the statistical
significance of the trends at 5% significance level (Karl et al., 1993; Easterling et al., 1997;
Storch and Zwiers, 1999).
2. Observed Climate Changes in Hong Kong
2.1. Temperature
At the Hong Kong Observatory Headquarters, temperature readings are available since 1885,
apart from a break during the World War II from 1940 to 1946. Analysis of the annual mean
temperature data showed that there was an average rise of 0.12°C per decade from 1885 to
2008 (Figure 1). The rate of increase in average temperature became faster in the latter half
of the 20th century. In post-war years from 1947 to 2008, the average rise amounted to
0.16°C per decade, accelerating to 0.27°C per decade during 1979-2008. Such an increasing
trend is in line with that observed for southern China in the last 50 years, about 0.21oC per
decade (Guangdong Meteorological Bureau, 2007). 1998 is the year with the highest global
mean surface temperature since 1850 and among the 10 warmest years, all occurred after
1990 (WMO, 2009). For Hong Kong, 1998 is also the year with the highest mean
temperature and 9 out of the 10 warmest years occurred after 1990.
Apart from the effect of global warming, the rise in the temperature at the Hong Kong
Observatory Headquarters could also be attributed partly to the rapid urbanization in recent
decades. The Hong Kong Observatory Headquarters is located at the heart of urban Kowloon.
Buildings and other concrete surfaces in the urban areas retain the heat produced by incoming
solar radiation during daytime and release the heat in the form of long-wave radiation at night.
High-rise buildings also block the sky view and inhibit the transfer of long-wave radiation to
the atmosphere (Kalande and Oke, 1980; Oke,1982; Grimmond, 2007; Wu et al, 2008). This
results in a slower fall of temperatures at night and a higher minimum temperature than when
buildings are absent. Moreover, the anthropogenic heat emission by buildings, air
conditioning, transportation and industries also contribute to the rise in urban temperatures.
Comparing the temperature rising trend between the Observatory Headquarters and Ta Kwu
Ling, a rural station in the northern part of Hong Kong, urbanization is perhaps the major
contributor to the accelerated temperature rising trend at the Observatory in the last two
decades.
Research indicates that the urbanization effect affects the daily minimum temperature
more than the daily maximum temperature (Karl et al., 1993, Zhou et al, 2004). In Hong
Kong, the mean daily minimum temperature at the HKO Headquarters has been rising
steadily throughout recent years (Figure 2). This resulted in an increasing trend in the
number of hot nights (daily minimum temperature 28.0oC) and a decreasing trend in the
number of cold days (daily minimum temperature
12.0oC). The daily maximum
temperature has also been rising but the trend was not significant. It is also interesting to note
that the rate of increase in the mean minimum temperature in the post-war years was largest
in winter, followed by autumn, spring and then summer (Figures 3(a)-3(d)).
2.2. Rainfall
The annual rainfall recorded at the Hong Kong Observatory from 1885 to 2008 also showed a
long term increasing trend, at a rate of about 25mm per decade but the trend after 1947 is not
statistically significant. This annual rainfall rising trend was small when compared to the
year-to-year fluctuations. The strength of El-Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and the
winter monsoon in the preceding winter were important factors affecting the interannual
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variability of the rainfall (Chang and Yeung, 2003). There were also discernable inter-decadal
changes.
Recent studies on regional variation of rainfall trends in Hong Kong during the last 50
years (Sun and Evans, 2002; Mok et al, 2006) have found that the apparent increases in
annual rainfall were concentrated in the central part of Hong Kong. The rate was higher over
the urban areas than those of the New Territories, offshore islands and high grounds. It was
postulated that these differential increases were unlikely to be a direct result of global climate
change but might be due to the effects of urbanization. The higher temperature in urban areas
provides a convective background while the increase in concentration of aerosols from urban
activities also favours the formation and development of rain-bearing clouds. Chow (1986)
also found that rainfall recorded during the rainy season of Shanghai was increasing faster in
urban areas compared to rural areas.
2.3. Wind speed
Dense developments in the urban area increase the roughness of the surface underlying the
atmosphere and exert a drag on the low-level air flow. The tendency therefore is for wind
speed near the ground decreasing in the long run. Figure 4 shows the time series of wind
speed between 1968 and 2008 measured at King’s Park at the heart of the urban area and
Waglan Island, a remote offshore island in the southeastern flank of Hong Kong. For
technical reasons and in order to compare like with like, the data points represent the annual
average of 10-minute wind speed readings taken twice daily, at 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. Hong Kong
time.
Since Waglan Island is positioned well away from anthropogenic influences, the wind
observations there are indicative of the background climate without the impact of
urbanization. No significant long-term trend in the wind speed could be detected at Waglan
Island. However, at King’s Park which is situated on a knoll surrounded by dense built-up
areas of nearby Yaumatei, Mongkok, and Homantin, there has been a steady decrease in the
wind speed.
Since the anemometer at King’s Park meteorological station was re-located to another
location with a higher elevation in the station compound in 1996, two segments of the time
series are shown in the figure for wind speeds of King’s Park. Despite the relocation, the
sustained decrease in wind speed remains evident. It is clear that urbanization in the broad
vicinity of King’s Park has reduced the wind speed in the boundary layer of the atmosphere
around the station.
2.4. Cloud Amount, Solar Radiation and Evaporation
An increase in cloud amount can cause a decrease in diurnal temperature range by reducing
the incoming solar radiation during day time and trapping of long-wave radiation at night.
The diurnal temperature range has decreased since the 1950s worldwide and the coincidental
increases in total cloud cover are often cited as a likely cause for the observed decrease in
diurnal temperature range (Leung et al. 2004). In Hong Kong, cloud amount is reported in
oktas hourly by trained observers at the Hong Kong Observatory Headquarters. The daily
mean cloud amount is taken as the average value of the observed hourly cloud amount in a
day. Based on these daily mean cloud amounts, annual mean values were calculated.
Regression result indicates that the annual mean cloud amount has been increasing at a rate of
1.2% per decade in the period 1961 to 2008 (Figure 5). One potential cause for the increase in
cloud amount over Hong Kong could be the likely increase in the concentration of
condensation nuclei in the air that favoured the formation of clouds, which is known to be
associated with urbanization and human activities in the region.
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Both the increase in the concentration of suspended particulates and the increase in
cloud amount would reduce the amount of solar radiation reaching the surface. At King's
Park, the amount of solar radiation reaching Hong Kong is recorded continuously by thermoelectric pyranometers. Between 1964 and 2008, there has been a clear, broad falling trend.
For the whole period, regression result indicates that the annual mean daily global solar
radiation decreased at a linear rate of 0.74 MJm-2 per decade (Figure 6).
Evaporation measurements are made daily at King’s Park using evaporation pans with
evaporation surface 0.18 m above ground. In general, the amount of evaporation depends on
the amount of solar radiation received, the relative humidity as well as the wind speed.
Accompanying the decrease in solar radiation and wind speed, the annual total evaporation
recorded at King’s Park also decreased at a rate of 142mm per decade, according to a
regression fit for the period from 1961 to 2008 (Figure 7).
2.5. Visibility
One visible aspect of climate change in Hong Kong is the turbidity in the sky which the local
public and visitors are increasingly concerned about. Particulates suspended in the
atmosphere are the primary cause for the reduction in the visibility. Suspended particulates in
the atmosphere normally consist of a mixture of sulphates, nitrates, carbonaceous particles,
sea salt and mineral dusts. They may be purely dust and natural (e.g. loess from northern
China). They could also be anthropogenic particulates formed from combustion products (e.g.
vehicle exhaust, power generation and various domestic activities) through photochemical
processes.
The number of hours of reduced visibility below 8 km observed at the Hong Kong
Observatory Headquarters each year was counted, with cases of visibility impairment that
was concurrent with reports of fog, mist and rain or associated with high relative humidity
(95% or more) excluded. The visibility observed at the Hong Kong Observatory
Headquarters from 1968 to 2008 has a deteriorating trend (Figure 8). There is a rising trend
between 1968 and 1987 of +53 hours per decade but the trend is not statistically significant.
From then onwards, there has been a dramatic rise in the frequency of reduced visibility. The
occurrence of reduced visibility has increased to a rate of about +554 hours per decade during
the period 1988 to 2008, a tenfold increase compared to the previous figure.
2.6. Sea Level Rise
On decadal and longer time scales, global sea level changes is due to two major processes,
mostly related to recent climate change that alter the volume of water in the global ocean.
The first is the thermal expansion of water in a warming climate, and the addition of water
from land reservoirs such as melting glacier and ice sheets. In Hong Kong, the tide gauge
station at North Point during 1954-1985, followed by a replacement station nearby at Quarry
Bay, since 1986 have recorded the sea level of the Victoria Harbour for more than 50 years.
As shown in Figure 9, the mean sea level in the Victoria Harbour has risen at an average rate
of 2.4mm per year during the period 1954 to 2008 which is similar to the sea-level variations
at other tide gauge stations in the South China Sea (Ding et al, 2004).
2.7. Severe Weather Events
2.7.1. Heavy Rain and Thunderstorms
The frequency of occurrence of heavy rain events has increased slightly after the World War
II. The annual number of heavy rain days (days with hourly rainfall greater than 30 mm)
increased at a rate of 0.45 days per decade from 1947 to 2008 (Figure 10).
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In Hong Kong, thunderstorms commonly occur between April and September.
Thunderstorms are reported by observers at the Hong Kong Observatory Headquarters. The
number of days with thunderstorms reported each year was examined. The annual number of
days with thunderstorms showed an increasing trend of about 1.9 days per decade during the
period 1947 to 2008 (Figure 11), in line with that for heavy rain days. Urbanization effect
might have been a cause for the increase in thunderstorm days. The additional heating could
have helped to trigger the formation of deep convection (Dixon and Mote, 2003).
2.7.2. Tropical Cyclones
In western North Pacific and the South China Sea (area 0-45oN, 100-180oE), the total number
of tropical cyclones decreased from about 35 in the 1960s to about 27 after 2000. Closer to
Hong Kong, the annual number of tropical cyclones making landfall along the south China
coast within 300 km of the Observatory Headquarters in the past 40 years or so (1961–2008)
has decreased from about 3 tropical cyclones in the 1960s to about 2.5 between 1990 and
2008, but the rate of change is not statistically significant (Figure 12). The number of
typhoons, i.e. tropical cyclones with a maximum sustained surface winds of 118 kilometers
per hour (32.7 meters per second) or more near its centre, landfalling within 300 kilometers
of Hong Kong remained unchanged at around one typhoon per year during the period 19612008.
On the inter-annual time scale, the most prominent influence on tropical cyclone
activity is that due to the most predominant 3 to 4 year cycle associated with El Nino and La
Nina events (Wang and Li, 2007). Generally speaking, the number of tropical cyclones
affecting Hong Kong is fewer in El Nino years than La Nina years. The reasons for fewer
tropical cyclones to affect the south China coast in El Nino years especially in late typhoon
season (September to November) are an eastward shift in the mean tropical cyclone genesis
positions in these years, and a weaker than normal subtropical ridge over the western North
Pacific which steers tropical cyclones more to the northwest than to the west away from the
South China Sea (Leung and Leung, 2002; Wu et al., 2003).
2.7.3. Extreme Temperatures and Rainfall
In a recent study (Wong et al. 2009) past trends of the occurrences of extreme temperature
and rainfall events in Hong Kong from 1885 to 2008 were examined using extreme indices
including both local indices and a subset of the extreme indices developed by the Expert
Team on Climate Change Detection, Monitoring and Indices (ETCCDMI) and relevant to
Hong Kong. Results showed that the extreme daily minimum and maximum temperatures as
well as the warm spell duration index in Hong Kong exhibited statistically significant long
term rising trends while the cold spell duration index had a statistically significant decreasing
trend. The annual highest temperature and lowest temperature had statistically significant
rising trend at a rate of about 0.1oC per decade.
Regarding rainfall, the frequency of occurrence of extreme hourly, 2-hourly and 3hourly rainfall amounts increased significantly. The annual total precipitation due to events
exceeding the daily 95th percentile of the climatological normal (1971-2000) increased by
22.4 mm per decade in the same period, indicating that the contribution of heavy rain to the
annual rainfall amount was increasing with time (Figure 13). On the other hand, the
maximum length of dry spell in the summer months from April to September increased at a
rate of 0.3 days per decade from 1885 to 2008.
Moreover, in a study by Wong and Mok (2009), the analysis of the long term trends
of the variation of probability of occurrence of extreme weather events using the timedependent Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distribution method (Coles, 2001; Kharin and
Zwiers 2005; Feng et al 2007) showed that the return period for a minimum temperature
426

4oC had dramatically lengthened from 6 years in 1900 to 163 years in 2000. On the other
hand, the return periods for a maximum temperature 35oC shortened significantly from 32
years in 1900 to 4.5 years in 2000. The return periods for 1, 2 and 3-hourly rainfall has
decreased significantly from 1885 to 2008. The return period for 1-hourly rainfall 100 mm
had shortened from 37 years in 1900 to 18 years in 2000.
3. Future Projections
The study of temperature and rainfall projections for Hong Kong by the Hong Kong
Observatory utilized the results of the global climate model projections included in IPCC’s
assessment reports. These projections are simulated using global climate models under
different greenhouse gas (GHG) emission scenarios (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). The GHG
emission scenarios used in the computer simulations reflect the various assumptions made by
experts on the future population, economy, technology, energy and land use patterns of the
world. They range from sustainable scenarios involving reductions in GHG emissions to
rapid economic growth and fossil fuel intensive scenarios. Projections of the temperature
trends and rainfall changes in Hong Kong in the 21st century are made using the results of the
global climate models simulations together with observed temperatures and rainfall in Hong
Kong and southern China through statistical downscaling techniques.
3.1. Temperature Projection
As urbanization is an additional important contributor to the rising temperature of cities, the
temperature projection also takes into account the urbanization effect in Hong Kong (Leung
et al, 2007). In the lower-bound situation, the level of urbanization is frozen at the current
level; in the upper-bound situation, urbanization effect grows at a constant rate based the
historical trend in the last century. Together with the GHG emission scenarios, three sets of
results are presented and labeled as:
(a)
(b)
(c)

"middle-of-the-road" - average of the scenarios as well as of the two situations
regarding urbanization;
"low-end" - low emission scenario and urbanization frozen at the current level;
"high-end" - high emission scenario and continued urbanization.

It is expected that the average annual temperature of Hong Kong will continue to rise
in the 21st century. Against the 1980-1999 average of 23.1oC, the annual mean temperature
in Hong Kong in the decade 2090-2099 is expected to rise by 4.8oC according to the middleof-the-road projection. The corresponding low-end and high-end values are 3.0 and 6.8oC
respectively (Figure 14). This is slightly higher than the projected rise in global mean
temperature in 2090-2099 (likely range from 1.8 to 4.0oC) as estimated in the Fourth
Assessment Report of IPCC (IPCC, 2007: 2-17).
As for extreme weather, the study shows that the annual number of hot nights (days
with a minimum temperature of 28 oC or above) and very hot days (days with a maximum
temperature of 33oC or above) in summer will increase. On the other hand, the annual
number of cold days in winter (days with a minimum temperature of 12 oC or below) will
continue to drop. The annual number of hot nights in summer is expected to increase from an
average of 15 nights in 1980-1999 to 41 nights in 2090-2099 (middle-of-the-road projection).
The corresponding low-end and high-end estimates are 30 and 54 nights respectively.
The annual number of very hot days in summer is expected to increase from the 1980-1999
average of 7 days to 15 days in 2090-2099 (middle-of-the-road projection). The
corresponding low-end and high-end estimates are 12 and 19 days respectively. The average
annual number of cold days in winter is expected to drop below one by the decade 2030-39
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(middle-of-the-road projection). The corresponding low-end and high-end estimates are
2040-2049 and 2020-2029 respectively. The average annual number of cold days at the end
of the last century (1980-1999) was 14 days.
3.2. Rainfall Projections
Under the influence of global climate change, the average annual rainfall in Hong Kong will
increase during the latter half of the 21st century (Lee et al, 2009). The projected negative
rainfall anomaly in Hong Kong before the 2040s (Figure 15) may, to a certain extent, reflect a
possible decadal change in the rainfall of Hong Kong. This is consistent with past trend
(Figure 16, 1950-2008) and captured by the model projections (Figure 15, 2010-2039)
Model simulations also suggest that this could possibly be the result of a stronger than normal
sub-tropical ridge during the rainy season of dry years within this period. Figure 17 shows an
example of the stronger than normal sub-tropical ridge at 500 hPa level in 2018, a year with
below normal annual rainfall as simulated by the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory
GFCM20 model.
The second half of the ensemble mean projections, commencing 2040 till the end of
the century, are likely to be dominated by global warming with more moisture available in
the troposphere as a result large scale warming, which tends to enhance precipitation. The
steadily increase in positive rainfall anomaly over southern China in the latter part of the 21st
century could be due to the combined effect of the strengthening of the East Asian Summer
Monsoon and the increase in the low level moisture supply (Figure 18).
It is expected that, in the last 10 years of this century (2090-2099), the average annual
rainfall recorded at the Hong Kong Observatory Headquarters will reach 2572 mm, 248 mm
(11%) higher than the 1980-1999 average of 2324 mm (Figure 15).
Apart from the increase in the average annual rainfall in the latter half of the 21st
century, the year-to-year variability in rainfall would also increase. The number of extremely
wet years will increase significantly from 2 during the period 1885-2000 to 10 in the 21st
century (2001-2100) and the corresponding figure for extremely dry year is also expected to
increase from 2 to 4. Here, the extremely wet and extremely dry year refer to a year with the
annual rainfall at the Hong Kong Observatory Headquarters above 3187 mm and below 1282
mm respectively.
In the 21st century, the number of days with heavy rain is also likely to increase.
During the last 30 years of this century, that is 2070-2099, the average number of days in a
year with hourly rainfall at the Hong Kong Observatory Headquarters exceeding 30 mm
would be about 6.5 days, about 1 day more than the 1980-1999 average of 5.8 days.
3.3. Mean Sea Level
According to IPCC AR4, the projected sea level rise in the South China Sea including Hong
Kong is likely to be similar to the global average by the end of the 21st century. The report
projects a total sea level rise of 18 cm to 59 cm (Figure 19) for the region.
4. Conclusions
The analysis of temperature records shows that Hong Kong has been warming up during the
past 124 years (1885-2008), in line with the global warming trend. This is also consistent
with the warming trend in southern China in the past 50 years. The warming trend in Hong
Kong can be attributed to the global warming and local urbanization. The reduction in
visibility, increase in cloud amount, decrease in global solar radiation, reduction of urban
wind speed in Hong Kong might also be related to high density urban development. Also, the
annual rainfall and the frequency of occurrence of heavy rain events have increased during
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the period 1885-2008 whereas the number of tropical cyclones affecting Hong Kong has
slightly decreased during the period 1961 to 2008.
The projections of temperature and rainfall in the 21st century reveal that the average
temperature in Hong Kong will continue to rise in the 21st century. There will also be a
significant decrease in the number of cold days and an increase in the number of very hot
days and hot nights. The annual rainfall in Hong Kong is also expected to rise by the end of
the 21st century and the year-to-year rainfall variability would increase with more extremely
wet and dry years.
Engineers, town planners and other users are interested in frequency of occurrence of
extreme events and future changes in return periods of various extreme events. The
Observatory will embark on follow-up studies on the frequency of occurrence of extreme
events in Hong Kong in the 21st century using IPCC AR4 high temporal resolution projection
data and also making use of data to be available for the IPCC 5th Assessment Report (AR5) to
update the projections for Hong Kong.
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Figure 1 Annual mean temperature recorded at the Hong Kong Observatory
Headquarters (1885-2008). Data are not available from 1940 to 1946.
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Figure 2 Annual mean daily maximum and minimum recorded at the Hong Kong
Observatory Headquarters (1947-2008).
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Figure 3(a) Mean maximum, mean and mean minimum temperatures recorded at the
Hong Kong Observatory Headquarters in winter (December to February) from 1947 to
2008.
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Figure 3(b) Mean maximum, mean and mean minimum temperatures recorded at the
Hong Kong Observatory Headquarters in spring (March to May) from 1947 to 2008.
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Figure 3(c) Mean maximum, mean and mean minimum temperatures recorded at the
Hong Kong Observatory Headquarters in summer (June to August) from 1947 to 2008.
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Figure 3(d) Mean maximum, mean and mean minimum temperatures recorded at the
Hong Kong Observatory Headquarters in autumn (September to November) from 1947
to 2008.
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Figure 4 Annual average of 12-hourly 10-minute mean wind speed of King's Park and
Waglan Island from 1968 to 2008.
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Figure 5 Annual mean cloud amount in Hong Kong from 1961 to 2008.
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Figure 6 Annual mean daily global solar radiation recorded at King’s Park from 1964
to 2008.
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Figure 7 Annual total evaporation recorded at King’s Park from 1961 to 2008.
1800

1988-2008
+554 hours/decade

1500

Number of hours

1200

900

1968-1987
+53 hours/decade

600

300

0
1968

1973

1978

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

2008

Year (1968 – 2008)

Figure 8 Annual total number of hours with visibility at the Hong Kong Observatory
Headquarters below 8 km from 1968 to 2008 (relative humidity below 95 % and not
counting rain, mist or fog).
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Figure 9 Annual Mean Sea Level at North Point / Quarry Bay.
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Figure 10 Number of heavy rain days (days with hourly rainfall > 30 mm) recorded at
Hong Kong Observatory Headquarters (1947-2008).
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Figure 11 Annual number of thunderstorm day as observed at Hong Kong Observatory
Headquarters from 1947 to 2008.
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Figure 12 Annual number of tropical cyclones making landfall along the south China
coast within 300 km of Hong Kong from 1961 to 2008.
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Figure 13 The annual total precipitation due to rainfall events exceeding the daily 95th
percentile of the climatological normal (1971-2000) from 1885 to 2008.
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Figure 14 Past and projected annual mean temperature anomaly for Hong Kong
(relative to the average of 1980-99).
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Figure 15 Past and projected change in annual rainfall for Hong Kong
(relative to the average of 1980-99)

Figure 16 Time series of the annual rainfall anomaly (with reference to the 1971-2000
average) in Hong Kong from 1950 to 2008. Bold line represents the 9-year running
average.
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Figure 17 Mean 500 hPa GPH upper-air chart of the GFDL model (GFCM20) under B1
scenario in July 2018, a year with below normal annual rainfall projection (1105.6 mm).

Figure 18 Time-latitude profile of average change in moisture transport at 850 hPa level
(Kg m-1s-1hPa-1) for June-August over the region from 110-120oE from 2010 to 2099
(relative to the average of 1980-1999).
(Extracted from Sun and Ding, 2009).
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Figure 19 Projected sea-level rise for the 21st century. The projected range of global
averaged sea-level rise from the IPCC 2001 Assessment Report for the period 1990 to
2100 is shown by the lines and shading. The updated AR4 IPCC projections made are
shown by the bars plotted at 2095. The dark blue bar is the range of model projections
(90% confidence limits) and the light blue bar has the upper range extended to allow for
the potential but poorly quantified additional contribution from a dynamic response of
the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets to global warming.
(From UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library, extracted & prepared from
IPCC, 2007).
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The Integrated Impacts of Climate Change, Water Availability and Socio-Economic
Development on China’s Food Production
Wei Xiong1, 2, Declan Conway3, Erda Lin 1, 2,Yinlong Xu1, 2, Hui Ju 1, 2, Jinhe Jiang 4, Ian
Holman5, Yan Li6.
Abstract
Food production in China is a fundamental component of the national economy and driver of
agricultural policy. Sustaining and increasing output to meet growing demand faces
significant challenges including, climate change, increasing population, agricultural land loss,
and competing demands for water. The integrated impacts of climate change, water
availability, and other socioeconomic pressures on China’s food production are poorly
understood. By linking crop and water simulation models and two scenarios of climate and
socioeconomic change (downscaled from IPCC SRES A2 and B2) we demonstrate that under
these scenarios out to 2050 the absolute effects of climate change alone are modest and the
interactive effects of other drivers are negative, leading to overall changes in total production.
Outcomes are highly dependent on socioeconomic development pathways and the effects of
CO2 fertilization on crop yields which may almost wholly offset the decreases in production.
We find that water availability plays a significant limiting role on potential cereal production.
Per capita cereal production falls in all cases, by up to 40% of the current baseline. These
results are likely to be optimistic because the CO2 crop yield response function is highly
uncertain and the effects of extreme events on crop growth and water availability are likely to
be underestimated.
1. Introduction
Food production in China is a fundamental component of the national economy and driver of
agricultural policy. Its global importance is measured by the fact that Chinese agriculture
supports staple food supply for most of its population (~20% of global population) and
produces 30, 15, and 17% of global production of rice, wheat and maize, respectively (as of
2003; Winters and Yusef, 2007). Sustaining and increasing this output to meet growing
demand faces significant challenges including, land degradation, maintaining yield gains
through agricultural technology, changing patterns of food consumption, increasing
population, pressure to use agricultural land for other purposes, and competing demands for
water currently used for irrigation (Gale, 2002; Zhao et al., 2008). In the face of these
challenges there is increasing concern about the impacts of future climate change, and
interaction of climate change, water availability, land use change, and socio-economic
development on food security (Gregory and Ingram, 2000; Parry, 2001; Rosegrant and Cline,
2003; Gregory et al., 2005; IPCC, 2007).
The interactions between climate change, crop production, land use and water
availability have been largely neglected until recently (Betts, 2005). The drivers of
agricultural responses to climate change are direct biophysical effects and their mediation
through socio-economic processes. The relentless pressure of increasing population and per
1
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capita food consumption on land and water use are major factors in determining the
characteristics of future scenarios of food security and are likely to be key factors in
increasing the risk of famine in the future (Slingo et al., 2005). Recent studies have used a
variety of models and climate scenarios to analyze the integrated impacts of climate change
on food production. Several integrated assessments have incorporated water availability (e.g.
Rosenberg et al., 2003; Tao et al., 2003a, 2003b; Rosenzweig et al., 2004) and others have
considered different socio-economic development pathways (e.g. Parry et al., 2004; Fischer
et al., 2005). Although most of the integrated assessments have been done in developed
countries (e.g. Lorenzoni et al., 2000; Izaurralde et al., 2003; Holman et al., 2005, 2008; etc.),
results for China have been referred to in global studies such as Parry et al. (2005). They
simulated modest changes in China’s national potential grain yield by the 2080s (range of
0%~2.5%) which would be indistinguishable from the effects of background climate
variability.
This paper sets out a framework to assess the direct effects of climate change (using
high resolution regional scenarios) on cereal crop yields (using detailed simulation of rice,
maize and wheat) and the indirect effects of changes in water availability (as it affects
irrigation water supply). Other factors considered include the direct effects of CO2
fertilization and changes in arable land and demand for water due to population increase and
economic development based on socio-economic scenarios (downscaled from the IPCC
SRES, Gaffin et al., 2004). Changes in crop yields and water availability are presented and,
using areas of crops sown across China, converted into estimates of cereal production,
expressed as a national total or per capita. The analysis explores projections by up to 2050
using two emissions scenarios (A2 and B2), with and without the direct effects of CO2.
Results are presented in a stepwise manner to demonstrate the relative impacts of climate
change and other drivers on cereal production. Our objective is to quantify the influence of
different drivers of change on future cereal production in China.
2. Methodology
Climate impacts were simulated using process-based models with high resolution climate
scenarios. In brief, the overall process can be described in five steps. First, climate change
and SES were constructed for China; second, crop models and a hydrological model were
used to simulate the impacts of climate change on crop production and water availability;
third, total national rainfed and irrigated cereal production was calculated; and finally, the
effects of the drivers were combined and compared.
We considered the effects and interactions of climate, CO2 fertilization, water
availability and land use change in relation to their impacts on China’s staple cereal
production by up to 2050. To do this the socio-economic storylines for China were combined
with the results obtained from a high resolution regional climate models - PRECIS, and the
CERES crop model and VIC hydrological model. As before limited the analysis to two of the
emission scenarios for greenhouse gases developed by the intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, A2: medium-high emissions from a continuously increasing global
population, B2 scenario: medium-low emissions and lower population growth. A step-wise
approach was employed to generate the direct effects of climate change on yields of cereal
crops (rice, maize and wheat) and the indirect effects of changes in water availability (as it
affects the supply of irrigation water). Within this framework factors such as the effects of
CO2 fertilization, changes in arable land and demand for water due to population increase and
economic development were also considered. From the areas of the crops sown across China,
we converted these changes into estimates of cereal production or per capita based on
population growth from the two emission scenarios (Xiong et al., 2008a).
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2.1. Climate Change Scenarios for China
Regional climate scenarios were generated using a high resolution (~50 km grid interval)
atmospheric regional model (PRECIS – Providing Regional Climates for Impacts Studies,
Jones et al., 2004; Xu, 2004; Zhang et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2007). PRECIS takes the output of
the global model HadAM3H at its lateral boundaries, and thereby inherits the large-scale
characteristics of HadAM3H. Validation of PRECIS’ performance in simulating China’s
climate is described in Xu et al. (2007). Two scenarios of CO2 concentrations (based on the
IPCC SRES A2 and B2 storylines) were used with PRECIS to simulate changes in daily
temperature, radiation, and precipitation. A2 represents medium-high emissions and B2
medium-low, together they encompass a wide range of future emissions pathways
(Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000). PRECIS simulated future annual values of temperature, and
precipitation from 2011 to 2100 for the A2 and B2 emission scenarios are presented in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1 Average annual surface air temperature (a, corresponding CO2 concentrations are also given as
right axis), precipitation (b) for 1961-2100 under SRES A2 and B2 emissions scenarios simulated by
PRECIS.

2.2. Socio-economic scenarios for China
To be consistent with the high resolution climate scenarios available from PRECIS we
developed socio-economic scenarios (SES) at provincial level for A2 and B2 out to 2050.
The methods are based broadly around those used in Nakicenovic and Swart (2000) and
Gaffin et al. (2004) and guided by relevant literature on agricultural and other trends in China
(e.g. Yang, 2000; Liu et al., 2005; Zhao et al., 2008). The IPCC SRES B2 storyline fits
broadly with China’s national social and economic development plans over the medium to
long term and is taken here as an optimistic or desired socio-economic scenario. The ‘A2
family’ represents the higher range of likely CO2 emissions under the development of
business as usual, and is chosen here to represent an environmentally pessimistic
development pathway.
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Table 2.
China: population and GDP projections in the two SES, plus the general characteristics of the scenarios
2000

2005

GDP (100 M RMB at comparable
99,200 156,000
price in 2000)
Pop. (billion persons)
1.27
1.31
GDP per capita (USD in 2000,
950
1,700
100USD = 828RMB))
3
Water demand (Gm /year)
550
563
AW
378
362
IW
114
131
DW
58
69
MW
0
1
Arable land (1000 hectares)
128,250 121,500

Characteristics

A2

B2

2020

2050

2020

2050

301,000

837,000

481,000

1,450,000

1.53

1.94

1.44

1.51

2,400

5,200

4,050

11,650

616
747
619
691
329
290
341
308
173
262
166
214
96
158
93
129
18
37
19
40
113,950
107,700
121,500
117,550
Rapid regional economicLocal
emphasis
and
growth, Materialist; low GDPenvironmental
priority;
growth rate; high populationmoderate GDP growth rate
growth; rapid decrease ofand
population
growth;
arable land; and rapid growthconservation of arable land;
of water demand.
and steady growth of water
demand.

Figures are rounded to nearest thousand (50 for per capita GDP).

2.3. The Crop and Hydrological Models
Three CERES crop models (Ritchie et al., 1989; Ritchie et al., 1998; Jones et al., 2003) were
modified to simulate yields and potential irrigation demand across China at the same
resolution as the regional climate model (50km × 50km): Rice, maize and wheat. Full details
of the models are presented in Xiong et al. (2007a, b) and details of recent improvements in
their calibration and validation in Xiong et al. (2008b, c). The simulated yields are assumed
to represent observed yields obtained in the field assuming technological levels from 2000.
Crops are simulated for rainfed and irrigated conditions using areas of crops sown across
China based on the distribution in 2000 (obtained from county census data).
For irrigated crops water is applied periodically throughout the growing season and the
total irrigation water requirement for each grid and crop is obtained by multiplying by the
total irrigation area (Ju et al., 2005). Crop response to CO2 is based on results from FACE
experiments from (Kimball et al., 2002); a 850 ppm CO2 concentration causes a roughly 40%
increase in photosynthesis for wheat and rice, and 15% for maize. Higher CO2 levels tend to
decrease the evapotranspiration rates of crops and improve their water use efficiency.
The Variable Infiltration Capacity (VIC) hydrologic model was used in this study to
simulate water yield (surface flow + groundwater flow + lateral flow – loss from
evapotranspiration) for the whole of China. VIC (version, VIC-3L) (Liang et al., 1994; 1996)
is a distributed, physically based hydrologic model that balances surface energy and water
over a grid cell. VIC has been successfully applied to assess the impacts of climate change
(Christensen et al., 2004; Wood et al., 2004; Vicuna et al., 2007). For this study, we ran the
model at 50km×50km grid resolution over China. The main data inputs required by VIC are
vegetation, soil and weather data and we used a similar procedure as Su and Xie (2003) and
Xie et al. (2004) to generate the inputs.
Previous studies have validated VIC simulations of runoff for the whole of China and
streamflow simulation in some catchments (e.g. Su and Xie, 2003). In order to improve the
robustness of the model application, six parameters of the VIC model (the infiltration
parameter, the thicknesses of first and second soil layers and three base flow related
parameters - the maximum subsurface flow, the fraction of maximum subsurface flow in the
second soil layer, and the faction of maximum soil moisture in the second layer) were
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calibrated for 60 catchments (covering 39% of China’s territory) to minimize the difference
between the simulated and observed daily water balances. For catchments without observed
streamflow data, the parameters were used from the nearest neighbour based on polygon
centroids. Daily water yield was calculated from each grid cell and annual total water yield
series were calculated for ten main river basins in China. These volumes were used to provide
estimates of annual renewable internal water resources in each basin.
2.4. Calculation of Agricultural Water Available, Arable Land, and National Cereal
Production
Water available for agriculture (WAAi) in province i was calculated as (1)
⎛ n
⎞
(1)
WAAi = ⎜⎜ ∑ (WRI j × R j × Pij )⎟⎟ × ( AWi ( AWi + DWi + IWi + MWi ))
j
=1
⎝
⎠
Where Rj is the water exploitation proportion in basin j (an average value of the observed
exploitation proportion for each basin from 1994 to 2005 which is assumed to remain
constant in the future), Pij represents the proportion of water used in province i that comes
from basin j (based on the average value from historical data for 1994 to 2005). For any given
grid k in i province, the Available Irrigation Water, AIWk is computed as (2)
AIWk = WAAi × (IAk IAi )
(2)
Where IAk is the irrigation area in grid k and IAk is total irrigation area in k province.
The balance between AIW and potential crop irrigation demand in each grid cell was
used to limit irrigation and estimate the irrigated area of each crop at the grid cell. Because
most of the rice planted in China is irrigated paddy rice, we assumed that rice takes highest
priority for water withdrawal, with the objective of irrigating as much of the present area of
rice as available water permits. The remaining water was allocated to maize and wheat.
Estimates of national total cereal production incorporated scenarios of land use change
based on the SES. The future area of crop land in each grid was calculated as a function of
current arable land, multiplied by projected arable land conversion rate. The conversion rate
was set to the rate of the province in which the grid lies. These estimates, together with an
assumption of constant patterns of crop-planting and crop mix were used to calculate total
production, by multiplying the area of irrigated or rainfed crops by the yield per unit of land
area.
3. Results
3.1.Impacts of Climate Change on Grain Production
In 2000, the total cereal production in China was 395.7 million metric tones (MT), with
189.8, 99.6 and 106.2 MT for rice, wheat, and maize, respectively (FAOSTAT). The
corresponding planting acreages for the three crops were 30.3, 26.7, and 23.1 million ha. The
projected cereal production for the current conditions was 429.8 MT (rice, wheat and maize
comprise 216.6, 104.6, and 108.6 MT, respectively, without limitation from water). Over
70% of production comes from irrigated grain crops which includes irrigated wheat/maize
and paddy rice.
Figure 2a shows that without CO2 fertilization effect climate change decreases irrigated
cereal production in China under B2, but increases it slightly under A2. The rainfed cereal
production exhibits decreasing trend in the future. The production of rice increases a little
under the A2, but decreases under B2. Wheat production increases in all cases and maize
decreases in all. CO2 fertilization effect cause increases in production in all cases, particularly
for irrigated crop under A2. The largest change occurs for wheat, and the smallest for maize.
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The differences between the effects of A2 and B2 are modest, within roughly 10%, and very
small between the rainfed production (<2%).
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Fig. 2 Changes in rainfed and irrigated cereal production up to 2050 for China due exclusively to climate
change, with assumptions of unchanged cultivation areas and maximum irrigation area as 2000. Only
three primary cereal crops (wheat, rice, and maize) are included. a) without CO2 fertilization effect. b)
with CO2 fertilization effect.

Spatial patterns of change in total cereal production (compared to average of 19611990) of 2031-2050 exhibit marked differences across China (Fig 3). Without CO2
fertilization effect, production decreases in most of areas except northernmost part of the
northeast China (Fig3 a-b). When considering the CO2 fertilization effect, production
increases generally expect central and southern parts of northeast China and parts of central
and southern China (Fig3 c-d). The general pattern shows increases in the northeast and
north and decreases in the central, eastern and southern provinces. The increases in
northeastern and northern parts are ascribed to enhanced production due to warming, e.g. the
increased yield of rice in northeast China and increased wheat in north China. Additional,
PRECIS climate change scenarios project increased precipitation in northern China, which to
some extent promote the yield of rainfed crop in this part.
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Fig. 3 Percent changes of China’s cereal production due to climate change. a) ~ b) denote the results
without the CO2 fertilization effects, and c) ~d) with.

3.2.Integrated Impacts of Climate Change, Water Availability and Socio-Economic
Development on Crop Production
Besides climate, water availability and land use change are the two key drivers for China’s
grain production. Figure 4 shows the changes in rainfed and irrigated cereal production in
China under different combinations of drivers. For total cereal production, it decreases under
both A2 and B2 if without the consideration of CO2 fertilization effect, with significant
decrease with A2 and moderate with B2. These increases are largely ascribed to the
decreases in water availability and arable land conversion, particularly under combination of
A2 climate change and socio-economic development scenarios. The changes in total
production are generally small under B2, but still with minus signs in the future. With the
CO2 fertilization effect, the total cereal production shows moderate decreases under A2 and
slightly but insignificant increases under B2 in the future. Separated to rainfed and irrigated
production, remarkable changes are exhibited in the future under both cases of with (Fig 4 b)
and without (Fig 4 a) CO2 fertilization effect. Rainfed production increases under all cases,
and irrigated production decreases. The main reasons for these changes are the decreasing
water availability for agriculture due to increased water shares by other sectors, e.g. industry
and domestic. Land use change causes relatively small decreases in production, compared to
attribution of water availability, particularly under the sustainable development pathway B2,
in which the policies related to arable land loss control are assumed to be implemented in the
future.
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Fig. 4 Changes in rainfed and irrigated cereal production up to 2050 for China under the combinations of
climate change and socio-economic development scenarios. Only three primary cereal crops (wheat, rice,
and maize) are included. a) without CO2 fertilization effect. b) with CO2 fertilization effect.

In the absence of climate change, future socio-economic developments may have
significant impacts on national total water demand (TWD), the structure of water
requirements by sector, and the availability of water for agriculture. Socioeconomic
development following the A2 pathway leads to a 11% increase in the 2020s, and a 30%
increase in the period of 2031-2050 (B2 produces smaller increases). However, due to
increasing competition for water from other non-agricultural uses, these increases in TWDs
convert to decreases of agricultural available water for both A2 and B2. Climate change may
significantly impact total water availability through increases in renewable internal water
resources and crop irrigation demand, but these impacts are inevitably uncertain due to the
uncertainties of the climate models. As different climate models simulate different responses
to emissions of greenhouse gases (particularly the response of precipitation), Xiong et al.
(2008a) compared PRECIS results with those of 17 other climate models and suggested that
PRECIS produces warming similar to the all-model average for China, but predicts wetter
conditions than the all-model average. This implies that the projected effects on water
availability and irrigation demand caused by climate change might be optimistic.
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3.3.China’s Food Security in the Future
Production per capita can be used an indicator of food security and driver of agricultural
policy in the context of national priorities for self sufficiency in staple food production (e.g.
Xiong et al., 2007a). Figure 5 shows production per capita without taking into account
international trade for selected combinations of drivers. Excluded the impacts of climate
change, socio-economic development (SES, including water availability and land use change)
causes declines in production per capita in long term under both A2 and B2. The production
fells below 300 kg in 2035 with A2 and in 2040 with B2, indicating an insufficient food
supply in securing basic food demand of community. Climate change poses significant
impacts on production per capita, but with different direction under different scenarios. A2
climate change deteriorates the food supply in the future, resulted in a further decline in
production, with ranges between -1%~ -10%. B2 climate change increases the production,
with promotion between 2% to 20%. CO2 fertilization effect offsets the negative impacts
caused by climate change and socio-economic development, leading to highest productions
per capita for combinations of both A2 an B2.
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Fig. 5. Changes in per capita grain production under the combinations of diver of A2 and B2, other
grains except rice, wheat and maize are included in the estimation, and assumed no change in the future.
SES: socio-economic development, CC: Climate change, CO2: CO2 fertilization effect. Data from 1981 to
2004 is extracted from FAO. Dotted lines denote the assumed threshold of production per capita to
secure basic food demand (below) and economic sustainable development.

IPCC SRES scenario B2 describes a medium prosperity society, governance is more
inward looking rather than global, cultural pluralism is strong along with environmental
protection (Gaffin et al., 2004), which is a mid-range estimate and consistent with the
anticipation of China’s population and GDP. With B2, temperature increases by up to 2.0 ,
and greenhouse gas concentrations rise up to 561 ppm. Considering technology progress and
international food trade, climate change would not significantly threat national food security
whether CO2 fertilization is considered or not. A2 implies a world of lower economic
development and weak globalization, with high population growth (Gaffin et al., 2004),
which represents the upper range of climate change and is different from reality. Under A2,
temperature increases by up to 3.9 , and greenhouse gas concentrations rise to 721 ppm.
Even considering CO2 effects the grain supply would only meet basic demand for human
consumption; without CO2 effects, basic demand would not be meet, which could threat
national food security from the 2030s onwards.
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4. Discussion
We have presented the first detailed attempt in China to link the interactions of climate
change, crop production, water availability and socio-economic development. Our results
highlight in terms of cereal production, key challenges and sensitivities, however, it is
important to examine the main uncertainties and assumptions and their relative significance
to the results.
4.1 Key Uncertainties and Assumptions
The main scientific uncertainties: Standard concentration scenarios for A2 and B2 (based
on emissions pathways) were used to drive PRECIS and these do not account for possible
acceleration of the CO2 concentrations due to climate–carbon cycle feedbacks (Meehl et al.,
2007). This means that A2 and B2 SES might not necessarily be associated with their
corresponding climate scenarios. Differences in the spatial patterns and magnitude of future
precipitation between climate models have a large bearing on future yields of rainfed crops
and irrigation water availability. Differences in the daily characteristics of climate variables
and differences between ensemble experiments will also influence the overall results.
The effects of CO2 on crop yields are critical to the overall results, but they remain
highly uncertain (Long et al., 2005, 2006). CERES simulates the effects of CO2 on
photosynthesis and on crop water use efficiency broadly in line with current experimental and
modeling results. Given present state of knowledge it is not possible to attribute different
levels of confidence to results either with or without CO2 effects and therefore we present
both with equal weight with the expectation that the reality should lie within this range and
not beyond it (Lin et al., 2005).
The significance of extreme events: China’s vulnerability to climatic hazards is high;
because of its size and geographical extent it experiences many types of hazard and because
of its transitional economy, production and employment in sectors such as agriculture remain
very important, such that millions of livelihoods are exposed to climate related risks. The
annual average crop area affected by meteorological hazards is around 50 million ha and
economic losses amount to over 200 billion RMB per annum (Wang, 2007). Drought in
2004-2006 in Ningxia (Northwest China) led to crop failure, increased need for local people
to purchase water and significant economic impacts (Yue et al., 2008). China’s high exposure
and sensitivity were clearly highlighted by the events during January and February 2008
when unusually low temperatures and heavy snowfalls (the heaviest in ~50 years) in southern
China brought massive disruption to transport networks during the peak travel period of the
Spring Festival. By mid-February the impacts had spread to 21 provinces, caused 129 deaths,
destroyed crop harvests across 1.68 M ha, and led to direct economic losses of 152 billion
RMB (Wang, 2008).
Climate models, either global or regional, are unlikely to capture fully the spatial and
temporal detail of many extreme events across China. This is due to the imperfect
understanding of their physical causes and limitations related to model structure. Crop
models may also fail to simulate the total impact of events such as temperature peaks and soil
moisture deficits during critical stages in crop growth cycles.
Assumptions related to the impacts modeling: The simulation of crop production did not
incorporate the effects of changes in distribution and impact of pests and diseases, changes in
management practice, crop variety and type, and the multiple cropping index. Farmers were
assumed to apply optimum inputs. Water management and efficiency of use were also
assumed to continue at current levels and the observed planting and irrigation area were used
to calculate future potential production. Water use did not consider non-grain production and
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livestock requirements, both of which are growing rapidly in China, the ratio of arable
farming output value to total agricultural output value fell from 89% (1949) to 49.7% (2005,
Zhao, et al., 2008). Also, whilst agricultural water availability was constrained within the
simulations, it was assumed that all of the agricultural water is available at the correct times
for irrigation. Decreasing groundwater levels due to abstractions for irrigation and urban
water use (e.g. North China Plain) and declining soil fertility were not incorporated in the
modelling work.
Assumptions in the SES: We downscaled IPCC SRES storylines to China and sub-national
scales, however, large uncertainties exist in the SRES SES and it is quite possible that China
will follow different pathways to the world and Asia. Indeed, the A2 population is much
higher than other projections and given current national policies on population probably
unrealistic. Farmers and agricultural policies will respond to many signals and drivers but we
have made no assumptions in the SES about their roles in affecting production. The SES does
not incorporate incremental responses or anticipatory actions in response to change as it
occurs; i.e. there are no feedbacks in the scenarios: they are not co-evolutionary. Our results
do not include the effects of extreme events and adaptation related to agronomic practices.
We have made no assumptions about the role of crop prices and international trade in
affecting production and incremental responses/anticipatory actions in response to changes as
it occurs (i.e. there are no feedbacks in the scenarios). Other important trends not included
here are rapid changes in food consumption patterns in China. For example, average per
capita meat consumption increased from 8.2 kg to 25.3 kg between 1978 and 2000 (Zhao et
al., 2008).
4.2. The Wider Implications of the Results
To provide some traction to the results of this impact analysis we set the results in the context
of maintaining national food (staple grains) sufficiency in China. This is an important current
policy goal for China and is likely to remain a major influence on agricultural policy and
practice over the timescales considered in our study. Nevertheless, this production oriented
policy goal ignores issues of sustainability, such as land degradation and over-application of
inputs, all of which need to be addressed to maintain and increase future production.
In relation to climate change the results demonstrate the importance of improving our
understanding of the effects of CO2 fertilization in real world situations. Water availability is
a critical factor for agricultural production in China and so effective linkages between
agriculture and water management/policy will be vital for successful adaptation. Improved
projections of future water availability will require better surface and groundwater modeling
and simulation of soil moisture dynamics and evapotranspiration.
5. Conclusions
The effects and interactions of multiple drivers of change (climate, CO2 fertilization, water
availability, population and land use change) have been considered in relation to their impacts
on staple cereal production by up to 2050. Two standard IPCC SRES emission scenarios and
SES storylines provided the quantitative inputs and qualitative context for the future drivers
of change and adaptation scenarios. The main conclusions are as follows. By up to 2050
climate change alone produced small to moderate effects on China’s potential cereal
production. The combined effects of CO2 fertilization and climate change produced increases
in cereal production with both A2 and B2 climate scenarios. The increases were larger with
A2. Water availability acted as a significant limitation to national production in the future
with or without CO2 fertilization effects. A decrease in water availability for agriculture
reduced the irrigated cereal production in all cases, particularly under A2. The absolute
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effects of climate change were modest relative to the other drivers. The interactive effects of
all drivers together led to significant decreases in total production. In most cases production
per capita was projected to decrease, particularly the cases with A2 population, but the
decreases were significantly different between combinations of drivers and population
scenarios. Outcomes were highly dependent on socio-economic development pathways and
their underlying assumptions and the effects of CO2 fertilization which, assuming sustained
positive effects, offset most of the negative effects of the other drivers.
The results demonstrate the importance of integrating climate change with other socioeconomic drivers of change in order to generate a system understanding of how climate and
socio-economic drivers affect cereal production in China. Other studies that incorporate
multiple drivers of change also obtain similar results: increasing demand due to economic
and demographic growth leads to large changes in per capita food and water availability,
often outweighing climatically-induced changes (Conway et al., 1996; Vörösmarty et al.,
2000; Alcamo et al., 2007). Future development pathways will play the major role in
determining which of our scenarios is most accurate. Critical scientific uncertainties exist
around the future effects of CO2 fertilization and differences between GCM results. The
relative magnitude and direction of change in the results are therefore more important than
the absolute values. Access to additional climate model scenarios and consideration of ranges
across the major uncertainties and assumptions would generate a more complete
representation of future conditions. We believe, however, that this would be unlikely to alter
our overall conclusion that, inter alia, climate change represents a potentially major additional
stress on China’s future agricultural production. This conclusion reinforces the need for
China to achieve sustainable agricultural production and support adaptive management and
appropriate investment levels in agricultural technology.
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Abstract
This study addresses how climate affects the livelihoods of people living in agricultural
communities in Ningxia, one of the five autonomous regions in China. The analysis formed
part of a vulnerability assessment to contribute to the development of an adaptation strategy
for the region. Data were collected through questionnaires and focus group discussions in
nine villages, three located in each of three different agro-ecosystems in the region. The
survey results showed that drought has been a major hazard impacting rural livelihoods.
Farmers in all three agro-ecosystems showed differing levels of vulnerability; susceptibility
was higher, for instance, in the middle arid and southern rainfed mountainous areas, due to
farmers’ greater exposure to climatic hazards and because a greater proportion of income
originates from farming activities. Recent climate variability had affected many aspects of
farmers’ livelihoods but it was not the only challenge they had faced.
The perennially dry climate is a significant limiting factor for agricultural production
in the region, greatly exacerbated by periodic reductions in moisture due to drought.
Unsurprisingly, farmers have developed and continue to use a wide range of measures to
retain and enhance soil moisture and to maintain agricultural production in this harsh
environment: adaptation is an inherent feature of their behaviour, but their capacity to act is
determined by a range of factors. When questioned on the constraints they faced respondents
cited most often lack of money, water shortage and agricultural inputs. Because of the close
alignment at the community and household level between adaptation and more generic
individual and institutional aims for development there exists good potential to incorporate
adaptation objectives and measures into mainstream development plans and poverty
alleviation programmes.
Introduction
Climate change is the core of global change, and has attracted broad attention from the
international community. The latest research findings published by WGI in the Fourth IPCC
Assessment Report show that, in the past 100 years (1906-2005), the global surface
temperature has increased by 0.74°C ±0.18°C. In the 21st century, both the frequency and
intensity of high temperature, heat wave, extreme drought, and intense rainfall events will see
an increase in trend.5 Climate change will vary across regions, and may lead to the change of
many meteorological elements such as rainfall and temperature, rise in sea level, and
increased frequency and intensity of extreme events, such as droughts. These changes not
only affect natural and human systems independently, but also integrate with other major
factors to change ecosystems and production, diversity, and functionalities of livelihoods.6 In
this context, climate change can produce direct or indirect impacts on livelihoods, though
different in magnitude.
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In an academic context and for the purpose of this study, a livelihood is the financial
means whereby one lives. It is comprised of capacity, assets, and activities.7 Of these, assets
are the core element, either in the form of natural capital, financial capital, material capital,
human capital, or social capital. A livelihood touches every aspect of people’s life and
production activities. In this sense, it can be the combination of all the resources people are
using and their activities to live.8 Livelihood related studies fall into two categories: those
focusing on the theoretical study of livelihoods, and those focusing on the multidisciplinary
study of livelihoods. The theoretical study of livelihood in itself includes study of definitions
of livelihood9, analytical frameworks for livelihoods10, and livelihood systems11. A
multidisciplinary study of livelihoods tend to focus more on the vulnerability and poverty
aspects of livelihoods12, often including other related topics such as land, forest, ecology, and
economy13, with only limited studies on the relationship between livelihoods and climate.
These studies focused on the vulnerability of livelihood.14
Previous studies in this area have barely touched on the impacts of climate change on
livelihoods, or at most dealt with the subject from a macro point of view, sometimes implicit
in the analysis, rarely explicit. In a report on climate change and poverty, written by a number
of international organizations under the co-sponsorship of the African Development Bank and
Asian Development Bank15, the impacts of climate change on the livelihoods of the poor
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have been elaborated. The report believes that the impacts of climate change on the
livelihoods of the poor, both direct and indirect, have found their main expression through
ecosystems, water resources, agriculture, food safety, and human health. This is because
climate change affects the natural environment (natural resources), social and cultural sectors,
and socio-economic environment where humans are living16. Climate change may also affect
the distribution and flow of resources and capitals, and affects the management of resources.
Such changes may impose major impacts on the resources people are using, and on their
activities to live; or their livelihoods.
This paper assesses the impacts and responses to climate variability and change in the
context of rural livelihoods, based on rainfall and temperature data from 23 weather stations
in Ningxia from 1961 to 2004 and livelihood surveys in 9 selected sites. Three different
regional scale agro-ecosystems are selected for analysis. The survey includes the impacts of
climate change on the accessibility to drinking and irrigation water, grain production,
cropping composition and sowing area, and farmers’ income. It deals, in a substantive manner,
with a number of related topics, including different capitals necessary for sustainable
livelihoods, activities for making a living, and rural people’s capacity. By using a livelihood
survey as part of the study of climate change impacts the aim is to provide detailed context
for the impacts analysis and framework for regional adaptation. The objectives are to better
understand rural people’s exposure and vulnerability to climate (and other) challenges and the
local institutions’ capacity to cope with and adapt to the types of changes suggested by the
impacts analysis.
Basic Facts about the Region
Physically located in the northwest part of China (104°17’E -107°39’E and 35°14’N39°23’N), Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region is one of the five autonomous regions in China.
Under the influence of a temperate semi-humid and arid and semi-arid climate, the inland
region enjoys a long duration of sunshine at its high altitude, though suffers from strong solar
radiation, lower-than-normal air temperatures, active evaporation, large spatial and temporal
variations of rainfall, and an uneven distribution of light, heat, and water resources. The
region is lacking in water resources. Per capita water resource is only one tenth of the
national average. The Yellow River is a major water source accessible to the region.
Ningxia can be grouped into three agro-ecosystems, in line with climatic conditions,
distribution of farming and animal raising activities, the ecological environment, and
traditional customs (Fig. 1):
1) The northern irrigation area, using water diverted from the Yellow River, with an averaged
annual rainfall of <250mm. Intercropping is the major planting system. The main crops in
this area are corn, spring wheat, paddy rice, and potato. Some areas in the northern tip of the
region do not grow paddy rice. Cattle, sheep, pig, and chicken are the major livestock raised
in the region;
2) The middle arid area, with an average annual rainfall between 250-400mm. The dry land
only allows corn, spring wheat, potato, and some cattle and sheep husbandry;
3) The southern rainfed mountainous area, with an average annual rainfall above 400mm. The
Guyuan district dominates, where neither irrigation nor intercropping is practiced. Potato is
the major crop grown over a large area. This is the only district in the three areas cultivating
winter wheat. Some villages in the southern rainfed mountainous area grow silkworms as a
special industry. Cattle, sheep, pig, and chicken are the major livestock.
16
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Each sub-region has specific vulnerabilities and risks related to climate change and
therefore we identify priorities for action at the regional and sub-regional levels.
Left: Ningxia in China. Right: Ningxia’s precipitation and temperature. Below: survey sites in Ningxia
Ningxia is located in North-West China
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Data and Methodology
Rainfall and air temperature data collected from 23 weather stations in Ningxia from 1961 to
2004. In this study, approaches generally described as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)
are used to understand farmers’ situations through informal interviews with selected residents
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in the target areas.17 Semi-structured interviews are also used in the study, along with
questionnaires. Questionnaires are designed to explore the impacts of climate change on
different agro-ecosystems in Ningxia. Both the survey sites and questionnaire contents are
selected and defined under the guidance of local and technical experts. Climate data and
survey results are analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively.
Nine villages are selected in three different agro-ecosystems, in line with the
following criteria:
1) Distance to urban areas, and accessibility to resources and other services;
2) The specific crops farmers are dependent on;
3) Levels of wealth.
At least 30 households are selected in a random manner from each target village, with
the distribution of 10 wealthy households, 10 medium wealthy households, and 10 poverty
households. The survey is designed to collect the following information: background
information about respondents, their farming (and other) activities, experiences of recent
climate change and associated impacts, adaptation measures and associated costs,
opportunities and barriers to adaptation and farmers’ expectations of existing and potential
government support. The survey and associated data entry were completed between March
2007 and November 2007. 289 households were interviewed, with all questionnaires returned
valid.
Climate Variability and Drought in Ningxia
Rainfall
The average annual rainfall (from 23 weather stations) in Fig. 2 shows that Ningxia has
experienced a very slight declining trend in rainfall during 1960-2006. 1964 was the wettest
year, and 1982 the driest. The rainfall trends during the period 1960-2006 can be summarized
into four phases:
•
•
•

The region experienced an increasing trend from the early 1960s to the mid-1960s,
A declining trend from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s.
From 1980 to 1982 recorded the least rainfall, but recovered after 1982 into the early
1990s.
• The inter-annual variation of rainfall tends to be smaller after 1990.
Another marked feature of the series is the three dry years, from 2004-2006, before
and during this survey took place (see section 3.2). It is likely therefore that the respondents’
perception of recent climate variability and extremes may be strongly influenced by this
recent extreme dry period. In 2005 the average rainfall in Ningxia was abnormally low at
only 202mm, making it the second lowest year over the period (in 1982 it was 192mm).
Different areas exhibit large differences in variability and trend. All three agroecosystems in Ningxia have shown a noticeable declining trend in average annual rainfall,
though different in magnitude. Drying conditions are strongest in the southern region. In
terms of the magnitude of variations, both the southern region and middle area have
registered large inter-annual variability, with the least variability for the northern irrigation
region.

17
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Figure 12: Annual rainfall from 23 sites across Ningxia
450.0

Precipitation(mm)

400.0
350.0
300.0
250.0
200.0
150.0
y = -0.3091x + 269.87

average annual precipitation

20
05

20
02

19
99

19
96

19
93

19
90

19
87

19
84

19
81

19
78

19
75

19
72

19
69

19
66

19
63

19
60

100.0

Year

linear trend

Temperature
According to the latest findings of WGI in the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report, in the past
100 years (1906-2005), the global surface temperature has risen by 0.74°C±0.18°C, with a
noticeable global warming trend1. China is no exception, with a warming trend on the ground
in Ningxia. In the first 35 years or so from 1951 to 1983, Ningxia recorded stable annual
mean temperatures (Fig. 3), with a fairly marked warming trend from around 1984 onwards,
peaking in 1998.
Figure 2: Annual mean temperature in Ningxia18
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An analysis of variations of annual mean temperature in the three agro-ecosystems
from 1961 to 2004 shows the following: all three areas show behaviour very similar to that of
18
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the whole region with recent warming, though slightly different in magnitude. The middle
arid area in Ningxia shows the largest increase of temperature.
Occurrence of Drought in Ningxia
Droughts represent a serious threat to farming and animal raising activities across the region.
Statistical data on hazards from 1978 to 1999 show that drought accounts for 33% of the total
events in Ningxia, and is the number one meteorological disaster in the region. Numerous
factors can cause drought, depending on how it is defined; however rainfall is generally the
critical factor. We have developed the indexes for droughts, heavy droughts, and drought
disasters for the period of 1961-2004 based on the drought indicators defined by the former
Central Meteorological Administration (Table 1), and the method used by W.L. Ma19 for
analysing droughts in Ningxia.
Table 1: Drought Indicator

Droughts
3 months in a row
2 months in a row
1 month in a row

Precipitation anomaly (%)
Droughts
-25 ~ -50
-50 ~ -80
≤ -80 (May-August)

Heavy droughts
-50 ~ -80
≤ -80

The results from W.L. Ma and a comparison with the real situation in Ningxia show that
droughts with an indicator larger than 0.30 can appear in any year. In this context, we analyse
the variations of droughts in Ningxia using the P indicator standard (Table 2).
Table 2: Drought grading and indexing
Grade
Magnitude
Impacts on farming activities
Serious damage to agricultural production, injuries
5
Heavy
and fatalities, serious property losses, extensive
disaster area, and extensive decimation of crops
Some damage to agricultural production, some
4
Medium
property losses, limited disaster area and
decimation of crops
Some impacts on agricultural production, with
3
Light
some property losses, and limited damage
No large impacts on agricultural production, with
2
Limited
limited property losses and limited damage
1
None
Basically no impacts on agricultural production

Droughts index
P≥0.70

0.50≤P≤0.70
0.30≤P≤0.50
0.10≤P≤0.30
P<0.10

The variation in the 3-year drought disaster indexes for the period of 1961-2004 shows an
ascending trend, with a similar ascending trend for the extremes, though a shortened cycle for
such extremes, indicating that the reduced rainfall has escalated (Fig.4).

19
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Figure 3: Drought indices over time, for Ningxia
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A Focus on the Drought of 2004-2006
The total rainfall in Ningxia from December 2004 to November 2005 ranged from 57mm to
688mm across 23 weather stations. The rainfall in southern Ningxia ranged from 376mm to
688mm, which was about 10% lower than the long-term average in the area. Within southern
Ningxia the severity of the drought varied: in Xiji and Liupan Mountain rainfall was close to
the long-term average; and in Longde and Jingyuan it was roughly 10-20% greater than the
average.
The 2005 drought in other parts of Ningxia was more severe, with rainfall ranging
from 57mm to 287mm; roughly 20%-70% lower than the long-term average, indicating that
drought and severe drought occurred in most parts of the Yellow River irrigation region and
the central arid zone. For some parts of Ningxia this was the driest year in the meteorological
records. It is difficult to plant crops in summer and in autumn at Haiyuan, Yanchi and
Tongxin, for example. In the central arid zone, 289,000 hectares of crops were damaged by
drought; there was not enough water for people and livestock and grass yield decreased
significantly. According to the Civil Affairs Department the direct economic loss caused by
the drought was 1.27 billion RMB in Ningxia.20
Impacts of Recent Climate Variability and Extremes on Rural Livelihoods
In the period from March to September 2007, we visited 289 farmer households in 9
administrative villages, covering five cities in Ningxia (Yinchuan, Shizuishan, Wuzhong,
Zhongwei, and Guyuan). We visited 95 households in the northern irrigation area, 101
households in the middle arid area, and 93 households in the southern rainfed mountainous
area.
The survey has unveiled the following basic information about the respondents:
1) Distribution of Hui and Han ethnic groups: Han dominates the northern irrigation area and
the southern rainfed mountainous area, while Hui dominate the middle arid area (except
Yanchi County). All households visited are Hui people in the southern rainfed mountainous
area, except one in the southern tip of Jinyuan County;
2) Age groups: differed site by site. In the northern irrigation area, most people interviewed
are under the age of 44 (for example, in Helan), and in the middle arid area, the age group of
45-49 prevails;
20
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3) Education: per capita education received goes down along with the increase of age, in the
following order: 5.8 year/person for the northern irrigation area, > 4.2 year/person for the
middle arid area, > 3.6 year/person for the southern rainfed mountainous area.
Impacts of Climate Change on Farmers’ Livelihood
The following sections present the results of the questionnaire survey and semi-structured
interviews. The main themes are ordered as follows; farmers’ experiences of recent climate
variability, the impacts on their livelihoods (across a range of different activities and assets),
their coping and adaptation measures related to climate variability and extremes, their
constraints and their views on the role of government to support or enable these activities.
Farmers’ Understanding of Recent Climate Variability and Change
In all three agro-ecosystems investigated, most people interviewed believe they have less
rainfall than a decade ago. Data published by the Water Resources Bulletin 2006 show that in
2006 the region had an averaged annual rainfall of 249mm, or 14% less than normal21, or
36.8mm less than 1996. However, the regional rainfall series shows that it is the last three
years that have been much drier than usual and this is likely to be what many people are
noticing/reporting. Most people in the middle arid and southern rainfed mountainous areas
believe that they have seen more droughts in the last decade. In the northern irrigation region,
80% of the respondents believe that they have had some increase in drought frequency. The
survey results also show that drought is a major hazard impacting rural livelihoods in Ningxia
(Fig.5).
Of all three agro-ecosystems surveyed, drought is the most recognized meteorological
disaster, especially in the middle arid area and southern rainfed mountainous area. 90% of the
respondents believe that drought is the most damaging of hazards, followed by wind and sand,
and high temperature ranking second and third place in the northern irrigation area and
middle arid area respectively. In the southern rainfed mountainous area, frost and hail sit in
second and third place, respectively. This is mainly because of a damaging frost event for
potatoes that occurred in 2006 in the southern rainfed mountainous area. Furthermore, the
southern rainfed mountainous area has seen more damaging hailstorms than both the northern
irrigation and middle arid areas.
People in the northern irrigation area also believe that both dry hot wind and frost are
severe in the area, with more concern about frost expressed in the middle arid area. This is
probably due to the type of crops grown and particular extreme events in recent years. For
example, spring wheat, which is vulnerable to dry hot winds is a major crop in the northern
irrigation area.. On the contrary, in the middle arid area, spring wheat is only grown in
Tongxing County. Haiyuan also grows spring wheat. Unfortunately, severe droughts in recent
years have forced farmers off the arable land.
As a result, the impact of dry hot wind on wheat was less expressed in the
investigation. In addition, people in the middle arid area feel less strongly about frost,
compared with their counterparts in the northern irrigation area. A possible reason is that
since 2002, Xuanhe and Helan in Zhongwei, and most of Huinong have experienced frosts
each year, though differing in magnitude. People are impressed with its damaging effect on
farming activities.
In the middle arid area, people grow fewer crops because of droughts, with little
attention paid to what has happened in the fields. The limited occurrence of frost is also a
reason for indifference. Furthermore, people in the southern area do not think much of high
21
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temperatures, winds and sands, which are to a large extent associated with the occurrence of
droughts.
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Figure 4: The main meteorological hazards impacting agriculture

Major Impacts on Farmers’ Livelihoods
The impacts of recent climate variability differ across the three agro-ecosystems in Ningxia.
Overall, the northern irrigation area has fewer impacts, with more impacts felt in both the
middle arid and southern rainfed mountainous areas, though these differ in magnitude. Recent
climate variability has touched many aspects of farmers’ livelihoods.
Impacts on Drinking and Irrigation Water
Variation of averaged annual rainfall recorded by 23 weather stations in Ningxia shows a very
slight negative trend (Fig 2). An analysis of drought occurrence also shows an increased
frequency of droughts. Variation of rainfall and droughts directly affects people’s
accessibility to both drinking and irrigation water. At the local scale the northern irrigation
area is guaranteed its drinking water (excepting upstream or basin scale changes). Farmers
have access to both tap water and well water. Relatively affluent water resources leave people
with little awareness of the issue of accessibility to drinking water (Table 3). However, 68%
of the respondents in Huinong believe that it is becoming more difficult to obtain drinking
water as the result of reduced rainfall, though their drinking water is basically guaranteed.
Irrigation water has been reduced in terms of both irrigation frequency and quantity, as the
result of reduced rainfall and increased droughts. Survey results have fully confirmed the
concern. For example, of the three surveyed villages in the northern irrigation area, 40% of
the respondents believe that it is becoming more difficult to obtain water for irrigation, as the
result of reduced rainfall, droughts, rationed supply of Yellow River water, and increased
water tariffs (Table 4).
The middle arid area records significant effects of climate variability. In both Tongxin
and Yanchi, drinking water is secured for most people and animals, though people in some
localities have to buy water when droughts hit. The farmers who depend on rainwater
collection cellars in Haochuan of Huaiyuan have to buy water in the drought period. At least
94% of the respondents in the middle arid area believe that it has become increasingly
difficult to acquire needed drinking water. At least 90% of the respondents in the middle arid
area confirmed the increasing difficulty of acquiring irrigation water, though Tongxin is the
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only site provided with irrigation in the area. Overall, impacts of recent climate variability on
drinking and irrigation water have been felt most in the middle arid area.
In the southern rainfed mountainous area, Jinyuan County has well water for both
humans and animals, while in Pengyang County, rain and snow are the main source of water,
though some farmers have to buy water. Xiji County has more water resources, though
buying water is also common, with well water and rain/snow water as supplements. Farmers
in both Pengyang County and Xiji County are more affected by recent variability, compared
with their counterparts in the middle arid area. Almost every respondent (100%) in Pengyang
County felt so (Table 3). 97% of the respondents in Jinyuan County have seen no change in
the accessibility to drinking water. This is mainly due to the higher rainfall around Liupan
Mountain and the surplus ground water in the County. Well water is a major water source for
farmers. Droughts have led to a reduced water level, with less groundwater available to
farmers, though water needs are basically met. In addition, the southern region practices
farming activities mainly dependent on natural precipitation, rather than irrigation (Table 4).
Table 3: Results of questions about access to drinking water. (Question: How do you obtain drinking
water for you and your family? Does the availability of drinking water vary from year to year?)

Water
resource

Survey sites

Acquisition of drinking water

Northern
area
irrigation
Middle arid area
Southern rainfed mountainous area

1=easier

2=more
difficult

3=no change

4=unclear

Tap water

3%

68%

0

29%

Ligang of Helan

Well water

0

3%

6%

91%

Xuanhe
Zhongwei

Well water

32%

0

3%

65%

Hexi of Tongxin

River water

0

3%

83%

14%

Dashuikeng
Yanchi

of

Well water

0

21%

79%

0

Haochuan
Haiyuan

of

Bought water

0

94%

6%

0

Xinmin
Jingyuan

of

Well water

0

3%

97%

0

Caomiao
Pengyang

of

Rainwater
collection

0

100%

0

0

Bought water

0

94%

6%

0

Huinong
Shizuishan

Erfuying of
Xiji

of

of
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Table 4: Accessibility of irrigation water. (Question: Does the availability for irrigation water vary from
year to year?)

Accessibility to irrigation water

Investigation site
Northern
Middle
irrigation area area
Southern
arid
mountainous
area

1= change

2= no change

3= unclear

Huinong of Shizuishan

40%

10%

50%

Ligang of Helan

58%

9%

33%

Xuanhe of Zhongwei

62%

19%

19%

Hexi of Tongxin

94%

3%

3%

Dashuikeng of Yanchi

No irrigation

Haochuan of Haiyuan

No irrigation

Xinmin of Jingyuan

No irrigation

Caomiao of Pengyang

No irrigation

Erfuying of Xiji

No irrigation

Impacts on Grain Production
Survey results show that reduced rainfall and increased occurrence of droughts have
jeopardized farmers’ grain production activities greatly, though different in magnitude by area
(Fig. 6). Reduced rainfall and increased droughts in recent years have affected the grain
production in the localities, with the least impact felt in the northern irrigation area. At least
90% of those investigated have marked “having enough food to eat” and “no impacts”,
indicating that the impact of droughts has not yet reached the point of threatening farmers’
food security, though droughts have somewhat affected grain production in the locality.
Figure 5: Impacts of drought on grain production. Note: N is northern irrigation area; M is middle arid
zone, S is southern mountainous area
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All three survey villages in the southern rainfed mountainous area have at least 40%
of their respondents who marked “insufficient food”, indicating that some impacts of recent
climate variability have been felt on the local grain production, which in turn have affected
local farmers’ food demand, though most farmers have some harvest.
In the middle arid area, all four options (no yield, insufficient food, sufficient food, no
impact) were selected by the respondents in Tongxin, while 95% of the respondents in both
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Yanchi and Haiyuan selected ‘no-yield’. The relatively even distribution of selected options
in Tongxin is associated with the fact that the village has irrigation, so the impacts on grain
production are mainly determined by the area of cropland and rationed water for irrigation.
Field investigations in Yanchi and Huaiyuan show that reduced rainfall, especially in
Haochuan of Haiyuan for five years in a row, produced major impacts on local grain
production. The increased frequency and intensity of droughts has forced farmers out of
arable farming. As a result, the subsidy from “Grain for Green” Programme has become an
important income source for the survival of most farmers.
An integrated analysis of the impacts of reduced rainfall and increased droughts on
farmers’ grain production (Fig. 7) has shown that all three areas have seen grain production
affected, though different in magnitude. The northern irrigation area is least affected. The
southern area has a magnitude of impact felt between the northern irrigation area and middle
arid area. The middle arid area has been seriously affected. 60% of the respondents selected
the option of “no yield”, which is consistent with the conclusions drawn by WGII in the
Fourth IPCC Assessment Report that the increased frequency of droughts has imposed
negative impacts on farming activities22. As a result, the negative impact of reduced rainfall
and increased droughts on the middle arid area has become a serious issue of food security,
which calls for prompt measures from the government. It should be a top priority for
government in formulating its policies and action plans.

Southern mountainous area
Middle arid area
No major effect

Northern irrigation area
Enough food

Insufficient food

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

No harvest

Percentage

Figure 6: Impacts of drought on grain production (Question: What was the effect of the most serious
drought on your family?)

Impacts on Cropping Composition and Sowing Area
At least 50% of the respondents in both the northern irrigation area and the middle arid area
believe that drought is a major factor contributing to a change in cropping composition and
sowing area in the last decade. Farmers are inclined to choose a crop that is more adaptive,
multi-functional, and high yielding with better economic returns, such as corn, potato,
Chinese Wolfberry, and sunflowers. In the middle arid area, both weather and climate
(decreased rainfall and increased droughts) are believed to be the main reason for the change
22
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in cropping composition and sowing area, topping other factors, such as change of
marketplace and distribution of irrigation water (Fig. 8). The salinisation and alkalinity of
croplands, indirectly caused by the raised groundwater level as the result of construction of
the Qixing Water Canal, is another
major factor.
Figure 7: Causes of changes in crop composition (Question: What are your reasons for changing the crop
composition?)
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(d) The three agro-ecosystems in Ningxia

For the southern rainfed mountainous area, at least 60% of the respondents in Xiji
County believe that they have changed their cropping composition. The same number of
people in Jinyuan and Pengyang counties say that they have not changed cropping
composition. This is a result of complicated reasons, though climate, policy, and market are
the major influence factors (Fig. 8). Currently, rainfall conditions allow normal farming
activities. As a result, people do record a large variation in cropping composition, except
where the ”Grain for Green” Programme has reduced the arable area. In Xiji, growing potato
is encouraged by the local government for its high market price. The drought resistance of
potato and its promising market price are the two major reasons for converting wheat and
soybeans to potato.
While witnessing changes in cropping composition, people have also seen changes in
sowing area, though different in magnitude. The change in sowing area corresponds with the
change of crop type, in a direction for more advantageous crops. The reason is the same:
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climate variability and change is the key element, along with other lesser factors, such as
change of market price and policy guidance. For example, Haiyuan has experienced a
reduced rainfall in recent years, from 453mm in 2003 to 247mm in 2004, a decrease of
206mm. The reduced rainfall has also resulted in frequent occurrences of droughts with
heavy damage. The local government has introduced watermelon as an adaptation to climate
change. Covered with small stones to retain soil moisture, planting watermelon is drought
resistant and a water saving practice. Growing watermelon in the locality creates a niche
industry with a promising market perspective.
Impacts of Climate Variability on Income
Drought is shown to have a direct impact on the acquisition of drinking and irrigation water,
affecting farmers’ daily life and farming activities, which in turn affects farmers’ income.
Survey results have shown different income patterns for the farmers in the three different
areas (Fig. 9). Farmers in the northern irrigation area earn their income mainly from growing
cereals, working in the urban areas, local businesses, or from raising domestic animals, with
limited income from growing cash crops. Farmers in the middle arid area make their income
mainly from working in the urban areas, raising domestic animals, subsidies, and growing
cash crops, except for Tongxin County where growing grain crops is an important income
source because water is available. Farmers in the southern rainfed mountainous area earn
their income mainly from subsidies, working in the urban areas, growing cereals and cash
crops, with limited income from raising domestic animals and doing business.
Figure 8: Income sources (Question: Which of these contribute to your income? Note: this was a multiplechoice question.)
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(c) The southern rainfed mountainous area
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An analysis of the key factors affecting farmers’ income (Fig. 10) reveals that both
hazards (mainly meteorological ones) and diseases are the major factors affecting farmers’
income. The fundamental causes, such as reduced rainfall and increased occurrences of
droughts, have produced a large impact on local farming activities, resulted in water shortage,
which in turn affects farmers’ life.
Figure 9: Major factors affecting farmers' agricultural incomes (Question: Which factor has had an
impact on your family's agricultural income over the last 10 years?)
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In addition, production expenditure, resources, and agricultural policies are the other
factors mentioned by the respondents. Of these, the impact of production expenditure on
income is felt most strongly in the northern irrigation area, which is associated with local
farming and animal raising activities.
Farmer Adaptations to Climate, Climate Variability and Change
Measures to Cope With the Dry Climate, Drought and Maintenance of Soil Moisture
The perennially dry climate and limited availability of soil moisture undermines agricultural
production in the region. This is greatly exacerbated by periodic reductions in moisture,
related to the occurrence of droughts. Unsurprisingly, farmers use a wide range of measures
to retain and enhance soil moisture (Fig. 11).
Figure 10: Measures to retain/enhance soil moisture (Question: What measures have your family taken to
retain soil moisture?)
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As is shown in Fig. 11, harrowing, film mulching, and sand cover are the most common
measures used by farmers to maintain soil moisture. Harrowing is the most popular measure,
most used in the southern area, and in Huinong and Helan of the northern irrigation area, at a
cost between RMB35-50 per mu. The method can increases yields by around 40%. It is a
common measure used by farmers across all the sites investigated. Other measures showed
large differences by area. Film mulching is widely applied in Huinong, with a cost of RMB
90 per mu.23
Film mulching has different effects on crops, depending on the crop type. For
example, successful dehydrated vegetable production depends on film mulching, whereas
growing potato with film mulching may increase the yield by around 30% per mu.
Mulching with small stones is only applied in Haiyuan, and has become an effective
measure for coping with droughts in the locality. Growing watermelon, as an adaptation
measure, is costly, at some RMB 600 a mu, and farmers can earn net profit about 241.3 RMB
per mu.24 In this context, it needs capital support.
Rainwater Collection Measures
The three areas differ greatly in their using of rainwater collection measures. The northern
irrigation area has relatively sufficient water resources, and uses almost no rainwater
collecting measures. The middle arid area has a tradition of using the water collected by
cellars for farming and domestic purposes. Each household generally has one or two water
cellars. Costs for constructing a cellar are varied, depending on the volume, ranging between
RMB 500-1000. The cellar construction is partially financed by the local government, in the
form of cement and brick, with a 50% proprietary payment by local farmers.
In the southern rainfed mountainous area, there are no rainwater collection measures
in Jinyuan County. In Pengyang County, farmers collect rainwater using catchment areac and
water cellars, at a cost of RMB 2000 or so. The cost to build a water cellar also varies
according to the size and material used, ranging from RMB 500 to 2000. The government
provides cement for building the catchment ground and water cellar, with a 50% contribution
to the locality. In Jixi County, farmers store water using water cellars. Drinking water is
mainly from well water that has to be purchased. There is no rainwater collecting measures in
the locality. Fortunately, with the support of a national project to combat drought, for the
period of 1998-1999, farmers were encouraged to build terraced fields to collect rainwater,
with 90% of the investment coming from the government, and 10% from individual farmers.
It costs some RMB 200 to build a mu of terraced field. As the respondents mentioned, the
terraced field produces a yield higher than that produced in sloppy ground with lower soil
moisture by around 30-50%.
Water Saving Irrigation Measures
As most parts of the middle arid area do not have water available for irrigation, water saving
irrigation measures are mainly applied in the northern irrigation area, with furrow irrigation
being the most popular. Survey results show that only Huinong and Helan have taken
measures. 52% and 33% of the respondents in Huinong and Helan report that they have used
furrow irrigation in the past. Though believing it is an accepted water saving technique,
23

1Mu=0.067 ha
http://www.nxcpic.gov.cn/NewsInfoManageFPAction.do?flag=b&NEWS_ID=774
25
Man-made open-air surfaces that are designed especially for rainwater harvesting. There are various materials
that can be used on the catchment surface to reduce permeability, such as gravel-covered plastic sheeting,
concrete, asphalt fibreglass. Compacted earth is commonly used and is also the cheapest catchment surfaces.
(Tian Y, Li FM, Liu PH. (2003) Economic analysis of rainwater harvesting and irrigation methods, with an
example from China. Agricultural Water Management. 60:217-226.)
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farmers have not yet fully accepted furrow irrigation. The authorities concerned also believe
that it is difficult to disseminate the technique.
Off-Farm Income Generation
Off-farm income generation is an important income source for the local farmers (Fig. 9). All
three areas have income derived from working off-farm, with a percentage above 50%.
Labour export in Ningxia is either government encouraged or a spontaneous action by
farmers. In the middle area where the poor ecological environment dominates, both types of
labour export are evident, which probably explains why the area had the highest percentage
of respondents who marked ‘working outside’.
Except to the northern irrigation area, with has a better ecological environment,
farmers in both the southern rainfed mountainous and middle arid areas are growing crops
primarily for their own food needs, with few people able to sell their surpluses. These farmers
are more vulnerable to the increased frequency of drought and other hazards such as hail. In
this context, farmers who have the diversified income sources other than farming are less
vulnerable to climate change.
Migration
Migration is also called ‘Diaozhuang’26 in Ningxia. In the area surveyed, most residents of
Yanghetaozi Village in Tongxin County are the migrants. Their forefathers lived in a village
called “crying for water” several decades ago, which is located deep in the deep mountains,
with extremely tough living conditions. A national project to divert the water of the Yellow
River has allowed the residents of the village to move to Yanghetaozi. This is an example of
large-scale migration. Ningxia has developed much experience in moving people from poor
to better environments. However, migration needs major support of capital funds and careful
coordination and planning. The migrants in Tongxin County appear to have better livelihoods
than before and compared to nearby villages that have no irrigation. They believe migration
is a successful adaptation measure to climate hazards.
Factors Constraining Farmers’ Adaptation in Ningxia
Farmers spontaneously respond to environmental conditions and particular events. However,
many factors influence their ability to do so. Fig. 12 shows that farmers have other
difficulties other than available labour. For example, in the middle arid area, water shortages
and insufficient capital are major constraints. In the northern irrigation area, farming
activities produce major incomes for the local farmers. As a result, farmers believe that they
need more capital investment in infrastructure and in their farming activities. Due to less
available water for irrigation under drought conditions, timely irrigation cannot be ensured in
northern irrigated area. In the southern rainfed mountainous area, money and water
availability are the constraining factors. It is worth mentioning that in all three areas, 85% of
the respondents believe that money is an important factor limiting their capacity to implement
adaptation measures.

26

Diaozhuang means that farmers migrate to other villages in the growing season, returning home in the winter
with government help. The farmers settled down in the new village when they were used to local conditions.
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Figure 11: Major constraining factors (Question: What are the main barriers that prevent you from
taking adaptation measures?)
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Farmers’ Expectations for Government Support and Policies
Farmers have encountered numerous difficulties in adapting to climate variability, and in
dealing with climatic hazards. In addition to their own efforts, farmers hope that government
will play a role, with an array of expectations as shown in Fig. 13. For example, farmers in
the northern irrigation area hope that the government will provide strong support to the
construction of infrastructure, and to secure more investment for farming activities. This wish
is associated with the prevailing animal husbandry and small business activities in the locality.
Farmers in the middle arid area would like strong support from the government, mostly in the
form of cash, as farming activities in the locality have been seriously affected by droughts.
They believe that the problem cannot be solved simply by having more irrigation systems,
and by increasing investment in farming activities. They also need cash assistance from the
government. Farmers in the southern rainfed mountainous area have the same wishes as their
counterparts in the middle arid area, hoping for more money for farming activities.
Figure 113: Farmers' expectations of government (Question: What government programmes could help
you to adapt to weather-related disasters?)
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Conclusions
Meteorological observations show that since the 1950s Ningxia has experienced a warming
trend in annual mean temperature, high rainfall variability, with a major drought during 200407, and some evidence for an increase in drought frequency/severity. These events have
imposed impacts, though differing in magnitude, on all aspects of farmers’ livelihoods,
including accessibility to drinking and irrigation water, grain production, cropping
composition, sowing area, and income.
1. All three areas in Ningxia are vulnerable to current climate variability and extremes,
though differing in magnitude. The variation of rainfall and temperature, especially
reduced rainfall and frequent occurrence of meteorological hazards (e.g. frost, hail,
sandstorm), are felt across the three main agro-ecosystems of Ningxia.
2. Different areas differ in their vulnerability to the impacts of climate variability. For
example, people in the middle arid and southern rainfed mountainous areas are more
vulnerable, compared with their counterparts in the North, because irrigation in the north
reduces exposure to variability and extremes and is associated with greater background
levels of wealth and adaptive capacity.
3. Farmers who only rely more on agriculture tend to be poorer and more vulnerable than
others. This can be explained by the ecological environment and agricultural development
in the locality. For example, in both the southern and middle arid areas where natural
conditions are poor and farming practices are traditional, farming is the predominant way
in which farmers meet their food needs. Few people are able to make extra money from
farming activities. These people are more vulnerable to the frequent occurrence of
droughts and hailstorms. Haiyuan County in the Gaochuan District is a typical example.
4. Local farmers have adopted some adaptation measures, but these are not always enough;
neither to cope successfully with existing hazards, nor changes in their
frequency/magnitude in the future. The main measures adopted by farmers include soil
moisture retention, efficient irrigation, labour export, and migration. Migration is a means
to improve farmers’ living environments, while soil moisture retention, efficient irrigation,
and terraced fields are improvements in cropland management. Water cellars and
rainwater catchment areas are widely used mainly to meet farmers’ basic daily needs.
Labour export27 is an important income source for farmers. It can be seen that the
measures adapting to climate change have covered many aspects of farmers’ lives. At
present, many farmers in Ningxia are living in very marginal conditions, and adaptation
measures are constrained by a range of factors, including available water resources,
capital, and infrastructure.
5. Location (relative to urban areas), background wealth levels, and education level appear
to be key influencing factors on adaptive capacity. The northern irrigation area enjoys the
existence of Yinchuan City, the capital of the autonomous region, with convenient
accessibility, and a fast growing economy. The respondents in the northern area have an
average education level of 5.8 years above the other two areas.
Response Strategies and Suggestions
Local farmers have adopted some adaptation measures to cope with climatic variability and
extreme events. Meteorological extremes and longer term variability have affected every
aspect of farmers’ livelihoods. Their experiences and the support from local and regional
level institutions can provide insights into suitable strategies and policies to enable and
support more effectively these activities in the future. Because of the close alignment at the
community and household level between adaptation (reducing vulnerability to climate change)
27

Labour export includes hiring for other farming jobs and non-farming employment local or non-local.
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and more generic individual and institutional aims for development there exists good
potential to mainstream adaptation into development plans and poverty alleviation processes.
What are the main risks and opportunities that climate change represents to farmers in
Ningxia? What strategies are most appropriate to reduce vulnerability to these changes, at
local and regional levels?
Given the challenges, appropriate measures could consider some or all of the
following:
I. Water-Saving Agricultural Practices and Technologies
1. Soil moisture conservation and other agricultural technologies. Measures include
household-based, community-based, and government-based technologies and practices.
Hoeing, plastic film mulching, mulching with crop residues, coarse sand and gravel
mulching, field levelling, sowing in the furrow between film-covered ridges, sowing in
the holes on film-covered ridges, selection of drought resistant varieties and crops,
retaining stubble/low tillage and cellar can be adopted by individual farmers. Terracing
and contour farming to prevent water and soil erosion can be adopted by farmers with the
support of local government.
2. Carry out water saving irrigation measures. Measures include border and furrow
irrigation, surface level plastic irrigation pipe, smaller plot irrigation, deficit irrigation.
These technologies can be adopted by households. Measures can be applied by
community-based and supported by local government including underground pipe
systems, lined canals with cement, sprinkler system in southern region, root-zone drip
irrigation and under mulch irrigation.
3. Collect rainwater for supplementary irrigation. Construction of catchment areas and
cellars to collect rainwater, using collection farms can be adopted by community.
II. Adjustments to Infrastructure
1. Increase irrigation area through increase of water diversion from Yellow River to
middle arid area and promotion of west line water diversion of South-North Water
Diversion Project. It will be important to consider the wider implications of increasing
water availability in the context of Ningxia and Yellow River water allocation potentially
affecting the sustainability of supply.
III. Policy
1. Integrate climate risk reduction and planning into poverty reduction programmes.
By developing infrastructure and technologies to improve adaptive capacity, and thereby
increase resilience to climate change. These aims fit closely with Ningxia’s development
goals and therefore represent good ‘no regrets’ opportunities to mainstream adaptation
into regional development plans.
Farmers’ perceptions of the main constraints they face and their expectations of
government also vary across the region. However, they are consistent on major issues,
namely farmers in all three areas have difficulties securing capital and infrastructure.
Science and Technology advancement is a key area for promoting the development of
productivity. In addition, farmers have expressed a strong need for monetary assistance
from the government. Ongoing measures for poverty alleviation are the most appropriate
delivery system for such needs but there is an argument for ensuring that these
incorporate some level of climate risk assessment, to incorporate short-term exposure to
extremes (e.g. improved drought forecasting and response) and longer-term shifts in
climate conditions (planning for infrastructure, re-location/re-structuring of farming
activities).
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2. Continue to support ‘no regrets’ measures. Rural livelihoods in Ningxia are dynamic:
Farmers already implement a range of climate risk reduction strategies to maximize their
production in often marginal conditions, livelihoods are increasingly diverse, reducing
exposure to climate related risks. Existing strategies should be reviewed against changing
patterns of climate risk and, given other considerations, selected for support. There may
be a case for targeting specific adaptation measures at poorer and more at risk
communities.
3. Support to develop new technologies and identify additional measures to deal with
future climate change. Climate change has multi-dimensional impacts. It is necessary
for agencies to cooperate together in order to deal with climate change impacts.
Government should support research on new technology development, such as breeding
new varieties, water saving irrigation technologies, and diversifying agricultural activities.
Water resource management should support rainwater harvesting, increase of water
diversion from Yellow River to middle arid area and new water conservation measures to
increase irrigation area (given larger-scale issues of water allocation and sustainability of
supply). Ningxia Development and Reform Committee should finance the development
of new technologies and identified measures.
4. Enhance institutional awareness, capacity and cooperation. Adaptation to climate
change not only needs the concerted efforts of the international community, but also
cooperation between and within countries and institutions. At the regional level climate
adaptation will require horizontal coordination across institutions with different exposures
and responsibilities in climate sensitive areas. Examples at the local level include
coordinating agricultural support services with the meteorological bureau, at the regional
level water management will be critical and should involve long-term strategic inputs
from agriculture, water and development planning agencies. Strengthening capacity may
be a necessary condition for success.
5. Make plans for migration. The government can coordinate farmers who live in
unsuitable living places to move places with irrigation water or with more rainfall.
Migration needs major support of capital funds and careful coordination and planning by
government to avoid conflict on land and water resources.
6. Conduct training programmes to help farmers achieve skills to develop off-farm
activities (livelihood diversification). Off-farm income generation is an important
income source for the local farmers. Labour export in Ningxia is either government
encouraged or a spontaneous action by farmers. The government can organize farmers
and conduct training programs to help farmers achieve have some kind of skills. This can
benefit farmers finding off-farm jobs.
IV. Science and Technology
1. Strengthen assessments and information sharing for technical adaptations. Effective
technical adaptation measures need to be based on sound scientific assessment, and
access to required information. Special attention needs to be paid to the areas where the
impacts of climate change are greatest (in social and economic terms). In the areas where
impacts of climate change are low, efforts should be made to identify measures to protect
the existing situation, and prevent further deterioration.
2. Develop new technologies and identify new measures to adapt harsher climate
conditions in future. From the survey, we can find that even though they have taken
various countermeasures, farmers’ livelihood have been affected by extreme climate event,
climate variation and change. Current technologies and measures may not be enough to
adapt to more difficult climate conditions in the future. Further technologies, such as
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breeding drought and disease resistant varieties, and water saving technologies, need to be
developed.
The opportunities listed above need to be set in the context of existing rural
development programmes in Ningxia – local and regional expertise is essential to inform
good decision-making. Decisions about particular options need to consider a range of factors,
including considerations about the rate and magnitude of future climate change, but also other
non-climatic factors such as cost efficiency, practicality (to farmers / implementing agencies),
environmental sustainability and so on. Larger scale issues may also impinge on local level
adaptation decisions, for example, securing reliable water supply to support new irrigation
areas, land use planning in relation to land degradation (the ‘green for grain’ programme)
and longer-term decisions about the sustainability of agricultural communities in some very
marginal areas. Complementary reports from this project, such as the final regional report,
will address these issues by proposing a flexible adaptation framework for Ningxia.
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Ecological Localness and Legitimacy of Science Policy: Mapping Climate Issue in
Research over China and Taiwan
Shih-Jung Chen1
Abstract
As science increasingly plays a vital role in global environmental governance, localness has
become the focus in scientific interpretation of nature in terms of policy legitimacy and social
communication. However, localness would not germinate until the issue of global change is
linked locally, a social construction process which shapes the way of interpreting
nature/society interaction and affects local ecological cognition. Localness thus indicates not
only legitimacy but also an imperative for responsive actions in a society. It might be argued
that although political consideration, with special respect to its stance in international
negotiation, determines the extent to which national policy complies with environmental
orders set by global regimes, local relevance established in domestic knowledge
communication can facilitate policy adjustment. It is therefore crucial for further
understanding the emerging and absence of the issues evolved in research agendas. This
paper focuses on global warming issues in China and Taiwan for the purpose of mutual
reference, and analyzes how ecological localness evolved in the problematization of climate
science. Co-word analysis is employed to depict and evaluate the issue structure of the
scientific domains and to highlight the relevant local issues which might be taken up by the
local scientific community in order to fulfill its accountability as regards place-based
communication.
1. Introduction
In the face of global environmental change with a high degree of abstraction and uncertainty
as seen in the case of climate change, the relationship between science and society becomes
critical. The role of science and technology in particular attracts a great deal of concern and
attention(e.g. Haas, 1996; National Research Council, 1999; WGBU, 1996). This paper first
articulates the role of “localness” in the communication function of science and highlights the
accountability of scientific community in linking global change and local concerns. It then
reviews the overall capacity building of climate research in China and Taiwan along with
national climate policy, and analyzes empirically the extent to which they has addressed local
ecological issues. To execute the assessment, co-word analysis is employed to depict and
evaluate the issue structure of research problematization so as to draw out certain implication
and suggestions to national science policy which is deemed to be critical as regards placebased communication.
2. Scientific Information and Local References
As far as global environment issues such as climate change are concerned, it is always the
case that there is a cognitive gap between scientific interpretation of global threats and local
public perception. One of the characteristics of the global environmental movement is that the
achievement of creating a common image of earth runs parallel with many non-uniform
images of environment based on “places” which people inhabit, along with their
communities, lifestyles, and not least histories and memories (Jasanoff, 2004: 46). Scientific
information with the appearance of global scale sometimes may appear alien to direct local
concerns(Jasanoff & Martello, 2004). Contradictions in understanding between the global and
1
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local may occur, and these may even become severe when environmental issues are framed in
a series of rules and orders set down by international regimes.
Localization of global change through domestic knowledge production is especially
critical for developing countries(Jasanoff, 2004). There are at least two reasons for this.
Firstly, due to the lack of sound scientific basis, research into global change in developing
countries relies heavily on international patronages, which may lead to bias through the
neglecting of locally unique nature/society interactions. As has been indicated, environmental
research tends to miss the link between science and society owing to constraints in science
enterprise, such as the interests of funding institutions (normally in countries of the North),
the regulation of intellectual property and the specific local structures of innovation systems
(Karlsson et al., 2007; Lahsen & Nobre, 2007: 66-70). The emphasis on localness in scientific
research into global change serves a way of extending fact pursuance to include local relevant
knowledge and concerns, which in turn enables the national scientific community to fulfill
the accountability for the communication, translation, and mediation of knowledge (Cash et
al., 2003; ICSU, 2002). Localization of global change in domestic knowledge production
largely legitimizes public-funded research by introducing more focused scientific
investigations, remedying the shortcomings that developing countries are always confronted
by, such as an inadequate scientific basis, insufficient financial support, and manpower
shortages. Moreover, the results of scientific research stressing on a place-based
understanding of interactions between nature and society can enhance public communication
and policy debates on global environmental change in a local setting where actions and
responses are legitimized and hopefully resolved.
Secondly, in most countries of the South, global environmental agreements such as the
Kyoto Protocol are the object of resistance owing to economic, political and cognitive
factors. In the minds of some national policy makers and local stakeholders the impacts of
new global orders may be just as serious as the impacts of climate change, as is illustrated by
the case of the Kyoto Protocol, where the issue of global warming, focused on the reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions, is a major political issue for individual political entities,
especially in developing countries (Fogel, 2004; Pielke & Sarewitz, 2002). Challenges to the
scientific community thus arise. Science is now demanded to contribute to the most heated
agendas of global change in the domestic arena, where policy and action depend on a very
different set of concerns, such as national interests, economic problems, institutional norms,
life styles, beliefs, and so on (Mihelcic et al., 2003; Obasi, 2002: 12). Given the often statecentral and economically orientated policy disposition in developing countries, policyoriented research responding climate change is likely inclined to agendas that often center on
increasing energy efficiency, upholding industrial reconstruction, and understanding overall
impacts. Scientific information as such, which serves national needs to a significant degree, is
characterized by conservatist and often disposed to passive responses or economic
stabilization rather than active actions, since it delivers less tangible local references that can
forester communication in public debate, social learning, and crisis perception. The lack of
legitimacy and supports leads to failure or straddle in forming an active policy in responding
climate change, which inevitably needs to make changes to lifestyle that people is
accustomed to. An interpretation of nature based on the ecological localness helps to narrow
the cognitive gap and stimulate constant debates about global environmental issues on the
basis of local concerns. As has been pointed out by N. Luhmann (1989; 1995), scientific
claim turns into “meaning” only when the ecological implications of the information are
codified by the values and concerns of a given social system at a given moment. In other
words, an ecological problem has no prior norm on its own. That is, an ecological problem
becomes an ecological problem only through communicative construction and political
disposition among various social systems. Researchers in many other fields have made
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similar observations regarding the communication and dissemination of knowledge (Carley &
Newell, 1994; Knorr-Cetina, 1981). Use-inspired orientation and appropriate institutional
autonomy built in scientific conducts helps to take non-traditional themes and indigenous
knowledge into account which can widen research topics by spanning spatial scales and
diverse phenomena to address problems that are locally concerned and therefore remedy the
above mentioned unbalanced policy disposition and agendas array. The inclusion of
ecological localness into research, thus, demands the prevalent norms, institutions, and
practices in science to be transformed to arrow for greater involvement in the definition of
research agendas (Clark, 2003: 6-7; Lahsen & Nobre, 2007: 67).
The paralleling images of the global and local characterize the sophisticated social
mechanism of ecological communication between science and society. Scientific information
interwoven with placed-based ecological concerns thus is essential to the process of public
deliberation and consensus building for global environmental governance and local
initiations. Drawn on the above concerns this paper focuses on research problematization,
that is, to reveal how local ecological issues have been embedded in domestic knowledge
production regarding climate change and how the issue constellations have been evolved and
changed over time. Localness understood within the framework of the nature/society
relationship as discussed so far refers to the criterion that the problematization of scientific
research in the topic of global warming adopts issues that are locally and ecologically
relevant. China and Taiwan are taken as cases of study here for not just comparative
references but also mutual understanding and learning.
To detect ecological localness in national research, the content of scientific production
becomes the focus in this study and an aggregate approach is needed for evaluation. Since the
exact content of localness is constructed by scientific community through cumulated works of
investigation, the accountability of information delivery is imposed upon scientific
community as whole, rather than individual scientists or one particular project. As have been
mentioned, the institutional context of knowledge production plays a part in the evolution of
research poblematization. A brief description about the political and institutional context of
climate issue in China and Taiwan is worthwhile before looking into the detail of the
aggregate evaluation.
3. Context of Knowledge Production
Only considering the task of reduction of carbon dioxide emissions, both China and Taiwan
face tremendous social costs and vast economic impacts. In 2004, China produces 5007.1
million tones of carbon dioxide, ranking it as world’s second largest contributor of carbon
dioxide(UNDP, 2007: 310-311). Although the figure in terms of per head of population
remains relatively low, about a quarter of that in the US, the growing trend of carbon dioxide
emission in China is unlikely to be altered due to its heavy dependence on coal in meeting the
soaring demand of energy. A recent announcement already indicates that China has overtaken
the United States as the world's biggest producer of carbon dioxide, reaching 6,200 million
tonnes in 2006 (PBL, 2007).
As one of world’s leading countries, China has developed its own strategies in response
to climate change and new global orders. However, along the process of international
negotiation, official statements and often-expressed view of Chinese leaders emphasize that
the developed countries must take the main responsibility for past greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions while recognizing the duty to equally share the burden of environmental protection
for common resources (Harris & Yu, 2005; Heggelund, 2007). Although the above “common
but differentiated” approach is consistent with the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change, which launched the Kyoto process and recognized that economic development is
“overriding priority” for developing countries, the stance often leads to an impression that
487

China will not take on full emission reduction commitment(Heggelund, 2007). The absence
of compulsory cap on emission carbon dioxide in the newly initiated National Climate
Change Program is seen by many as certification to those criticism and skepticism. Looking
back the development of China’s climate policy, China’s fundamental position iterated by the
common but differentiated approach was gradually manifested through the 1990s. This
fundamental position certainly had affected the content of scientific investigation. What is not
clear is the extent to which localness in domestic research is constructed and defined.
When China joined the International Geosphere-Biosphere Program (IGBP) in the late
1980s, Duzheng Ye, founder of Chinese atmospheric physics, insisted Chinese research on
global change had a definite national focus(National Research Council, 1992: 23-24). That is,
“global” change, from the Chinese viewpoint, was too large a scale for their needs and
current scientific and financial capacities. Hence, from the beginning, China has concentrated
on areas that are of practical importance for China and that are at the same time scientifically
challenging. Apparently, Chinese global change research priorities focus on the question of
what is the impact of global change on China and, among others, economic impact is the
foremost concern(National Research Council, 1992: 24). Localness in this respect could be
referred to a broad scope of domestic phenomena, or maintains a narrow intent to either
pursue impact knowledge for wining academic prestige or serve industrial reconstruction by
highlighting the applied purpose. The exact content of “national focus” of China are needed
to be clarified.
Given the state-centered nature of Chinese politics, the emergence of ecological
localness in climate-related investigation therefore contains profound meaning for social
communication, and implies a relative autonomy of scientific community in defining research
agendas and influencing policy. From this view, the National Climate Change Program of
2007 to some degree marks China’s relatively active responses to climate change issues,
reflecting the reorganization of China’s top policy making structure and the recognition of
serious domestic environmental deterioration with regards global warming (Ma, 2007;
Melting Asia, 2008, June 5; NDRC, 2007). The nuance of transition underlying the new
initiative signals not only a much clearer political resolution in dealing GHG abetment but
also the cumulative performance of scientific endeavors in revealing the impacts of global
change on China.
As to Taiwan, like other newly industrialized countries, it also faces problems in curbing
the rapid increase of carbon dioxide emission. Its per capita carbon dioxide emission soars to
11.87 million tonnes in 2006, ranking Taiwan the 16th position around the world, with almost
four times higher than the global average (IEA, 2008: II.167). Considering its small size and
population, the total amount of carbon dioxide emission at 270.33 million tonnes certainly
gives Taiwan a “notoriety” in the international community.
Although Taiwan did not sign the Kyoto protocol, the government promised to work on
reducing carbon dioxide emission. In 1998, the Taiwanese government held its first National
Energy Symposium in response to the Kyoto Protocol, but unfortunately it was not until 2005
that the second conference took place. The second conference even reversed the consensus at
the first conference, which set a target of maintaining Taiwan’s carbon dioxide emission at
the level of the year 2000, approximately 223 million tons. Although the Ministry of
Economic Affairs (MOEA) in 2005 tentatively considered imposing restrictions on emissions
from Taiwan's top 200 energy consumption enterprises, including the Formosa Plastics
Group and the China Petroleum Corporation, which cut carbon dioxide emissions by 170million metric tons per year, the move was eventually abandoned and replaced with a
moderate scheme based on voluntary. The legislative progress of GHG reduction continues to
be sluggish, due to the strong resistance from industrial sectors, the performance of which is
always the top priority on the political agenda. Thus, in the past ten years, climate policy has
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been almost inactive, despite the announcement of a “no-regret policy” by the former
President Chen Shui-bian. It is interesting to note that the inertia in mitigation and adaptation
policy has been severely and continuously criticized by scientific leaders and local
environmental organization in Taiwan, albeit that their voices has been easily diluted by the
heated political conflicts between the two major parties, Kuomintang (KMT) and Democratic
Progress Party (DPP), as well as the ongoing economic downturn since year 1997 (Yue &
Sun, 2003). Does this imply that in Taiwan scientific community have gained more
autonomous in pondering and devoting the local ecological impacts of global warming? How
does the less effectiveness of scientific advices in policy can be explained?
The systematic development of Taiwanese climate change research began with the
involvement in the IGBP in 1989, and the IGBP Kuroshio-East China Sea Shelf Exchange
Processes (KEEP-I) marked the start of Taiwanese climate change research. Later research
extended to the Tropical Ocean Global Atmosphere program, the Climate and Air Quality
Taiwan Station (CATS), the World Ocean Circulation Experiment (WOCE), Past Global
Changes (PAGES), and so on. From the progress of Taiwanese research, it is clear that the
local scientific community adopted the strategy of joining various international programs in
order to develop research capacity, and it appears that research topics were discreetly chosen
in terms of geographical connections with Taiwan, for the sake of legitimacy. Considering
the still nascent stage of research capacity, this strategy is reasonable, though evidence has
shown that Taiwanese scientific endeavors in the context of international programs tend to
omit certain locally meaningful issues (Chen, 2007). Like other newly industrialized
countries, energy efficiency probably is the most focused topics in policy-orientated
investigation in Taiwan, for it perfectively fits the multiple national interests, such as
economic, security, and environmental demands, but it may not be fully equivalent to the
commitment of carbon reduction. How the ecological localness is addressed in scientific
research needs to be further examined. In the last three years, the general public perception of
climate issues has arisen dramatically in Taiwan, and KMT’s regaining power in 2008 brings
out much clearer energy saving and carbon reduction policies. The results of the policy
initiation are yet to be observed.
Assuming that the relative advances in national climate policy are associated with
scientific information in a long run, it is reasonable to infer that the localness content in
scientific investigation are accord with the tendency in political disposition. Thus, for better
articulating the evolution of research priorities, this study demarcates the observation of data
into three different time frames, respectively representing the formation of passive policy
baseline in the 1990s, recognizing local impacts after 2000, and policy transition in the last
three year. This time segmentation would also help to restrict word meaning in order to
enhance analytic precision which is useful for co-word analysis and will be discussed further
below.
4. Methodology and Data
To detect ecological localness in research at the national level, it is necessary to delineate the
issue structure of relevant scientific research. There are many ways to illustrate the evolution
of research agenda in which hieratical and ethnographic investigations are the most popular
approaches (Cooper, 2003; Kwa, 2005). Data collected from interview, observation and
documentation may reveal the nuance in the development of research priority, but in
delineating contemporary evolution of science they would find themselves difficult to make a
generalization given their heavy dependence on micro-level study. Analysis in this study
aims to delineate the aggregate structure of research issues and hence turned to collect
scientific papers published in academic journals which often represent the main body of
science in a given field and constitute a vital part of modern scientific institution. Co-word
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analysis is therefore used to construct the issue structures of scientific papers in journals. The
large number of words presents in papers’ abstracts, titles, or key words make co-word
analysis a particularly useful method to study and illustrate the issue structure of science
domain, and to identify key concepts and themes of an entire discipline. Research has showed
that co-occurrence words can be applied to mapping empirically the translation in the
dynamics of science and technology in terms of the distribution and co-occurrence of words
(Callon et al., 1986; Law & Lodge, 1984; Leydesdorff & Hellsten, 2005). Relying on words’
distribution and co-occurrence and applying network analysis techniques to identify the
embedded implications, co-word analysis arrows the investigation of research trends and
priorities in a way that would be prohibitively time consuming or subject to human
interventions with traditional tools of content analysis. The underlying logic of co-word
analysis is based on communication theory that words are embedded in sentences and texts
that provide them with meaning and special words can be regarded as carriers of meanings
between science and society (Leydesdorff, 1997; 2001; Maasen & Weingart, 1995).
Visualization and interpretation of co-word networks in the study are based on general
concepts and techniques of social network analysis (Degenne & Forsé, 1994; Scott, 1991;
Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Especial steps of analysis will be discussed below.
As regards scientific publications, data were retrieved from the online database of the
Science Citation Index (SCI) as often applied in the field of scientometircs.2 Although SCI
database mainly collects publications written in English, which probably induces omission or
biases in identifying the domestic evolution of knowledge production, articles collected from
the SCI are often rigorous enough to gain recognition from scientific community therefore
reflecting the creditable advance of scientific endeavors. By using Global Warming and
Climate Change as the target terms and refining data though country code, 183 and 2133
articles published before the end of year 2008 were extracted from the SCI database which
respectively represent the field of climate research in Taiwan and China (see Figure 1). From
those extracted items, title words rather than key words or words in the abstract are set as the
unit of analysis, since the precision of the title word in tracing topical concepts has been
asserted (Leydesdorff, 1989). According to the discussion in the previous section, climate
research as well as the content of localness in scientific problematization may be affected by
domestic political disposition. Thus, for better describe the different stage of development of
climate research in China and Taiwan and for better obtain word meanings in distinct periods
of research evolution, the selected title words are segmented into three intervals of time,
ranging the periods before 1999, between 2000-2005, and during 2006-2008. Because there
are only 13 items of Taiwanese papers published before 1999, those 13 articles are discarded
in view of the low communication function. After the data were retrieved, title words were
processed and cleaned, and a set of title words were chosen with a frequency reaching the
threshold beyond 50% of cumulative frequency of total words in each data set, with at least 2
times of occurrence (see Table 1). In the case of China, the numbers of selected words in the
three time frames are 98, 139, and 149, while the Taiwan case has only two data sets as
mentioned containing 123 and 144 selected words.
Those selected title words were then fed into Pajek software in order to map the issue
networks.3 The cosine for normalization was applied in order to obtain the vectors of the
distribution of the words in the form of a network map (Salton & McGill, 1983: 121).4

2
3

SCI Database is part of the ISI Web of Knowledge at http://portal.isiknowledge.com/.
Pajek is a free, non-commercial software popular in the network analysis community. The Pajek web page can
be found at: http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/pajek/H.
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Figure 1. Distribution of articles of climate research in China and Taiwan
Notes: (1) Data are collected from SCI.
(2) Y-axis is based on logarithmic scale.
Table 1. Title words for analysis with thresholds

Year

No of Articles Total Words

1982-1999
2000-2005
2006-2008
Taiwan 2000-2005
2006-2008

166
840
1127
80
90

China

635
1953
2630
485
554

Selected
Words
98
139
149
123
144

Cumulated Freq.
53%
51.99%
50.12%
53.11%
55.39%

5. Issue Networks of Research
As sociologists have pointed out, the advance of science is based on a set of social
institutions and norms, also referred to as “invisible colleges” (Crane, 1972; Merton, 1973).
The self-organizational aspect of science thus allows one to depict the aggregate status of
scientific production through individual publications. In this study, co-word analysis is used
to construct the issue networks of title words so as to reveal the issue configuration of
national climate research.
The main challenge of the study is to construct a unit of words that aggregately unfold
the ecological localness in research publication over times. From the original issue networks
of different time frames, the clusters of localness are extracted by employing the concept of
“k-neighbors” to select a set of vertices centered on word China and Taiwan respectively with
a direct link (1-neighbors). The clusters of localness represent title words of papers having a
co-occurrence relationship with local geographic “metaphors” and thus allow one to closely
exam the structure and evolution of research issues attending ecological localness. China and
Taiwan here are seen as metaphors, meaning “messengers of meanings” across different
subfields of climate research, and function as a punctuated tool to specify a localness cluster
in terms of their symbolically spatial references (Leydesdorff et al., 2006: 233-235). To
concentrate on “ecological” localness, the study in particular highlights the words connected
with China and Taiwan which refer to the elements of ecosystem as tangible as possible,
4
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including non-living and living components. What words can exactly be treated as having
“ecological” references is left for subjective selection due to the fact that demands of
information are determined by the lay people who search information by way of natural
language not through academic jargons(Teil & Latour, 1995). It is worth noting that words
with ecological references identified in the localness clusters are by no means subject to
unrestricted interpretations. Although the bottom-up approach of aggregation arrows the
subjective selection of words, the meanings of words however need to be judged in a
structural view instead of an individual one in that the role of words in network is constituted
by their co-occurrence relations. That is, the meaning and function of particular word in a coword network are embedded and therefore constructed by others. For example, when water
appear in a co-word network derived from article title of scientific publications, water itself
cannot be arbitrarily interpreted as a specific kind of hydrological research in relation to
climate change but in fact represents a bit of information regarding water which constitutes
issue tendency with other words and therefore indicates an element of research
problematization.
Based on the original issue networks and the clusters of localness within, the following
section takes three further steps to execute network analysis:
1. to identify the presence and absence of vertices with ecological reference in the cluster of
localness.
2. to compare the ratio of the word number of the localness clusters to the total words in the
corresponding co-word map in different time frames, so as to distinguish the changing
weight of the localness cluster against the overall research issues.
3. to compare the “relative closeness centrality” of words with ecological meanings in the
localness cluster to reveal the strength of issues that occur in research across different
time frames. The closeness centrality indicates the extent to which a vertex has central
prestige in a network by measuring its accessibility to other vertices. When comparison
across networks is needed, relative closeness centrality is applied.5
5.1 China’s Climate Research Issues
By feeding the selected title words retrieved from SCI into Pajek, the co-word network of
research issues of Chinese climate science are constructed. According to the three time
frames as mentioned, the periods before 1999, after 2006 and in-between, three issues
network are mapped, containing 98, 139, and 149 words respectively. A threshold
cosine≧0.1 is applied to produce a “restricted discourses”. Upon these original issue
networks, 1-neiborhor clusters centered on China are further extracted and form the clusters
of localness as show in Figure 2, 3, and 4, representing the three time frames respectively.
The clusters of localness visualize the issue distributions of localness in China’s climate
research.

5

The index of vertex’s closeness centrality is CC (n i ) = [

g

∑ d(n , n )]

-1
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j

, where d(ni, nj) is the graph theoretic

distance (length of shortest path) between vertices ni and nj, and g is set of all vertices; for the purpose of
comparison across networks, relative closeness centrality is used and expressed as:

C'C (n i ) = (g - 1)CC (n i ) (Wasserman & Faust, 1994: 184-185).
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Figure 2. China’s issue cluster of localness (59 words) in the period before 1999 at cosine ≧ 0.1, with
illustration of 11-core sub-cluster

Figure 3. China’s issue cluster of localness (80 words) during the period 2000-2005 at cosine ≧ 0.1, with
illustration of 7-core sub-cluster
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Figure 4 China’s issue cluster of localness (70 words) during the period 2006-2008 at cosine ≧ 0.1, with
illustration of 7-core sub-cluster

As expected, ecological references emerging in the research issues before 1999 are already
various, including Basin, Emission, Lake, Monsoon, Pollen, Rice, Sea, Soil, Summer,
Temperature, Tibet, Vegetation, Water, and Xinjiang (see Figure 2). The multiple issue
distribution is somehow consistent with the local centered approach taken by Chinese
scientific community in the initial stage of global change research in the 1990s and before.
Interestingly, words in the cluster lack strong indicators suggesting the vigorous intervention
of policy-oriented research, although this cannot infer an absolute autonomy of Chinese
scientific community, which will be further discussed below. In the second time frame,
between year 2000 and 2005, research issues embracing even much richer ecological
implications, certain amount of which are newly emerging issues, comprising Arid, Carbon,
Desert, Ecosystem, Forest, Glacial, Human, Land, Organic, Plant, Precipitation, River,
Spring, Terrestrial, and Yangtze (see Figure 3). The large number of new research agendas
with strong ecological references signifies that a variety of phenomena in relation to global
change, including the extreme disasters as seen in floods and the extensively impacts such as
dust storm, were rapidly explored by Chinese scientists with the build-up of their capacity
through 1990s. Once the research manpower and capacity were expanded after 2000,
knowledge gap was quickly filled up manifested by the increasing research agendas. This
somehow illustrates the correspondence between the growing local knowledge and the active
response regarding carbon reduction. With the increasing scientific information of climate
change for the last twenty years, scientific evidences certainly attracts public attentions and
constitutes policy learning and political pressures that push forward relevant policy actions.
The expanding trend of research topics has however relaxed in the last three years, while
the emerging issues in the localness cluster are restricted to Dust, Grassland, Plateau,
Scenario, Wheat, and Winter (see Figure 4). When examining the proportion of words in the
localness cluster to the total words in the issue network, figures indicate a declining trend
along the three time frames, running from 0.602, 0.576, to 0.469, suggesting the local-related
issue are losing its weight while the research issues continuously increase. The rather
contradictory trends demonstrate that the richness of localness in research may be attributed
to the local-oriented science policy, but not imply a mature autonomy of scientific
community. Thus, the expansion of research issues before 2005 simply represents the
extreme want of understanding of the impacts of climate change, and the decline of weight of
494

localness implies the emerging concerns in research has undergone a change and may be
reoriented to maintain other types of interests, such as scientific prestige or economic
benefits.
In recent years China has been eagerly seeking foreign partnership for collaboration in
exploiting renewable energy (Asia Society, 2009; Delman & Chen, 2008). With the
increasing strength of policy configuration in response to climate change, the state starts to
tap scientific intelligence for economic benefits. As indicated above, the exploitation of
energy efficiency may be a vital pillar for GHG cutting, but most often economic fallouts and
energy security are at stake. Thus, it becomes a challenge for China’s scientific information
dissemination to balance the shifting focus from social awareness to economic profits. The
network analysis has found that some words existing in earlier climate research, such as CO2,
Methane, Paleosol, Qinghai, and Tibet, are absent in the localness cluster after 2000. In terms
of the value of relative closeness centrality, comparison of words with tangible ecological
localness across the three time frames shows that their weights against overall research topics
are declining. Figure 5 shows the results of the comparison which are focused on words like
Basin, Lake, Monsoon, Soil, Temperature, Vegetation, and Water.
0.6
Basin

0.55

Lake
Monsoon

0.5

Soil
Temperature
Vegetation
Water

0.45

0.4
-1999

2000-2005

2006-2008

Figure 5. Comparison of relative closeness centrality of words with ecological relevance from China’s
issue cluster of localness across three time frames

5.2. Taiwan’s Climate Research Issues
Due to the small number of items found in the 1990s, Taiwan’s data in this period of time are
discarded. As has been indicated, academic leaders in Taiwan play a vital role in the
campaign of policy action in response to global warming. However, the small number of
publications strongly implies that the domestic information of science did little to facilitate
social communication of global change in Taiwan, although the scientific endeavors at the
time would certainly paved the way for the further development of Taiwanese science basis
for addressing global change in new millennium. Given the limited resources and manpower,
for small nation like Taiwan the much focused research problematization is essential to bring
out meaningful information for social communication.
Taiwan’s localness cluster in the time frame 2000-2005 contains 44 words (see Figure
6). The localness cluster shows that words codified with obvious ecological relevance are
Asian, Crop, Dust, Energy, Gas, Pacific, Power, River, Spring, Summer, Water, and Yield,
manifesting a vivid and colorful problematization in research (see Figure 6). Among them,
Energy however refers to scientific investigations targeting energy efficiency, which can be
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judged by its associated words and similarities.6 Although research on energy efficiency may
still fit to the criterion of localness, as indicated before it may facilitate technological upgrade
rather than social learning. Similar suspicion is also manifested from other aspect. When
looking back to the original issue network containing 123 words (not shown here for the
purpose of succinctness), it is found that some words did have ecological relevance but are
not included in the 44-word cluster of localness. Supposed we consider issues like Hazard,
Abatement, Precipitation, CO2, and Risk to be of importance to climatic information which
can be found in the original issue network, we may be surprised to know that those issues are
not associated with Taiwan, at least in the aggregate level. This means that some Taiwanese
scientific investigations are ecological relevant but not related to Taiwan, a spatial indicator
here. The ratio (0.357) of the node number in the localness cluster to the total amount of
nodes in the issues network also suggests a relative law proportion of local relevance in
overall research problematization. Considering the small scale of geographic features of
Taiwan Island, unlike China, the link from global change to local impacts is a substantial
challenge to scientific observation. The limited manpower and resources make a locally
centered research even more critical. Judging from these factors, it may be inferred that
Taiwan’s climate research urgently stands in need of taking ecological localness into account.

Figure 6. Taiwan’s issue cluster of localness (44 words) during the period 2000-2005 at cosine ≧ 0.1, with
illustration of 9-core sub-cluster

6

The configuration of Energy clearly refers to energy efficiency research displayed by its co-word relations and
in-between similarity as follow: Assesment-0.333-Energy, Development-0.817-Energy, Efficient-0.817-Energy,
Energy-0.418-Future, Energy-0.418-Power, Energy-0.817-Refrigerator, Eenergy-0.333-Study, Energy-0.126Taiwan.
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Figure 7. Taiwan’s issue cluster of localness (60 words) during the period 2006-2008 at cosine ≧ 0.1, with
illustration of 9-core sub-cluster
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Figure 8. Comparison of relative closeness centrality of words with ecological relevance from Taiwan’s
issue cluster of localness across two time frames

Fortunately, after a decade of struggling, and alongside heated public discourse on carbon
cutting, research issues in the past three year presented a transition of proliferation. In the 60word cluster of localness extracted from the 144-word issue network representing data
between 2006 and 2008, research priorities associated with local and ecological references
increase and even cover new issues, such as Air, Anthropogenic, Carbon, Economic,
Emission, Forest, Greenhouse, Hydrology, Hydrological, Land, Plain, Pollution, Reef,
Seasonal, Sequestration, Soil, Stream, Taipei, Temperature, Typhoon, Urban, and Watershed
(see Figure 7). These issues referring Taiwan’s diverse natural and human phenomena have
never been so saliently treated in the previous scientific productions. The proportion of words
in the 60-word cluster to the total words is 0.416, higher than the previous value at 0.357, and
suggests an increasing trend of research in addressing local relevance. This trend is
correspondent to the initiative of climate policy of KMT administration in 2008.
While the proliferation of issues in Taiwan’s climate research is evident, some issues
existing in the previous time frame however lose their momentum in attracting researchers
and disappear in the localness cluster of the last time frame, such as Crop, Dust, Pacific,
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Power, Spring, Summer, Water, and Yield. In addition, few words with ecological localness
can actually sustain across different time frames. Only Asian, Energy, Gas, and River exist in
both data. The implication and directions resulted from the large scale of replacement of
research problematization is still not clear. A further study is needed to pin down the effects.
Similarly, the uncertain trend is also showed in figure 8, presenting an inconsistent patent of
relative closeness centrality of words that survive through the two time frames. It might be
judged at this stage that Taiwanese climate research has come to a critical time to focus on
much use-inspired and action-oriented topics so as to contribute to social learning and
communication. In network analysis, a k-core partition can be applied to identify the most
efficient sub-cluster where a closer interaction among vertices are arrowed since any single
vertex within the sub-cluster has at least k neighbors. Using k-core technique, it finds that
only five words in Figure 7, including Hydrology, Hydrological, land, Urban, and
Watershed, belong to the highest 9-core sub-cluster (signified by blue color). The limited
number of words in the 9-core sub-cluster implies that the scientific community is in need of
better agendas setting both in depth and width to facilitate social communication.
6. Conclusion
This study evaluates the content of China’s and Taiwan’s climate research at an aggregate
level in order to reveal how far knowledge production has responded to locally relevant
issues. The purpose of the study echoes the recently emerging concerns about the link
between science and society, while understanding scientific activity may has multiple
functions. To evaluate the content of scientific information and to meet the challenge of
empirical study, co-word network analysis, a rather new way of text exploration of science, is
employed for a better delineation of the structure and evolution of scientific problematiation
over different time frames.
It begins by assessing the notion of ecological localness, and finds that there is a need to
evaluate the structure of scientific problemization at national lever for better understanding
current function of science in social communication. Aiming the issues of Global Warming
and Climate Change, data are retrieved from SCI and Pajek software is used to conduct and
visualize the co-word network analysis. Although having its limitations in micro-level
depiction, co-word network analysis offers a feasible approach to surmount the challenge in
apprehending main themes in an entire discipline of science, and allows one to explore the
trend of research issues in terms of a bit of information decomposed from title words of
journal articles, a developed method in science studies and information science.
The results of the study manifest that both China and Taiwan are in an increasing trend
of building their own identifiable ecological localness, although two regimes have taken
different approaches in research to address the localization of global warming. Differences
are partially determined by different political disposition and scientific institution, which is
beyond the scope of the study here. However, the co-word analysis do showed the
proliferation of ecological localness embraced in research is correspond with the
development of national policy in addressing climate change. Thus, the study empirically
validates the value of ecological localness, under the concept of which research into global
change are expected to be intertwined with meaning attachment in terms of local culture,
ecology and lifestyles, aside from economic and political preferences. Based on the scientific
information with ecological relevance, actions and policies are likely to gain legitimacy and
hopefully to be brought out in practice.
The evolution of research derived the co-word analysis reveals that China’s research
agendas contain rather rich ecologic localness from the start and especially after year 2000.
The richness and diversity of ecological localness may be attributed to its local-centered
approach in science planning and therefore contribute to the transition of national climate
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policy in general, but underneath the diversity of research agenda, “richness” itself implies
tremendous and continuous demands for more scientific information in view of China’s
extensive territory, diverse natural conditions, large population, and complex anthropogenic
impacts. Evidences derived from this study has revealed that along with China’s development
in both policy and science domain, research topics related to ecological localness have
declined its weights against overall climate science. China’s scientists now have to cope with
challenge in balancing information dissemination, a problem often seen in developing
countries that knowledge production is either distorted by policy-oriented applied research or
dominated by pure fact pursuance.
As to Taiwan, it takes almost 15 year to build up its scientific capacity and then
gradually shift its scientific priority in attending ecological localness. Although the aggregate
analysis here is unable to judge the link from the limited scientific information to policy
inertia during the 1990s, this study does show that although Taiwan has witnessed the
proliferation of research issues after year 2000, the ecological localness in research
problemization still fall short of saliency and momentum. Especially, during the recent years,
scientific endeavors in offering information with ecological localness are losing focus and
present tendencies of inconsistency and contingency, which of course will damp the function
of science in facilitating social communication. The direction and effect of these tendencies
need further investigation. Due to the small scale of geographic coverage and the economic
vulnerability, conducting and transferring useful and meaningful scientific information are
both a challenges to and accountability of Taiwanese scientific community for consolidating
the link between knowledge and action.
Based on the findings of the study, it is concluded that ecological localness may
realize its ideas more profoundly by setting itself up as one element of the constant
negotiation between nature and society, the global and the local, and the international regime
and the nation state. The assessment of China and Taiwan in this study suggests that
communication between science and society is based on the unique local setting, in which
constraints and opportunities are always mixed, and that this is particularly the case when
dealing with global environmental issues. Programmatic initiatives aside, constant scrutiny
and evaluation are necessary to create an alternative platform for communication between
nature and society, and the purpose of this study itself is simply to play a part in the
negotiation process.
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Climate Change and Heatwaves: China’s Responsibility Before The Poor Elderly
José Azoh Barry1
Abstract
OBJECTIVE: To address the extent of China’s obligation toward the elderly – a growing
segment of the population -- as more vulnerable to heat waves.
METHOD: Data handled are secondary and derived from a non-exhaustive review of a
specialized scientific literature. The search for relevant publications was conducted from a
multidisciplinary perspective.
RESULTS: Of the various sources of human influences on climate, two major ones related to
heat waves appear to be urban designs and greenhouse gas emissions. The urban heat islands
effects as local anthropogenic impacts on climate increase the need for air conditioning and
demand for power consumption which in turn, has repercussions on the global emission of
greenhouse gases. Carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases have increasingly
displayed atmospheric concentrations involved in the rise of cardiovascular and respiratory
diseases. Increases in temperature resulting from anthropogenic “negative synergies” and
vicious circles, pose a serious threat to the lives of the poor and the elderly less likely to
access acclimatization and more susceptible to heat waves-related mortality.
CONCLUSION: Indeed, China as one of the main sources of emissions of CO2 and other
greenhouse gases contributes to global warming and has obligations towards protecting the
health of its elderly and in poorer countries as well. Their resilience and adaptation to heat
waves are dependent on environmental friendly health, housing, urban and economic
development policies. A way of being pro-active rather than reactive would consist of
targeting the sources of global warming in addition to implementing rapid warning system
along with other social and health care interventions whose .effectiveness has been proved
not only in some European countries (France and Italy), but also is Shanghai, China.
Reducing the effects of urban heat islands, power stations and motor vehicles emissions
requires a genuine commitment to achieve international fairness in an aging world.
Introduction
Climate change and global warming are recurrent themes in both scientific and non-scientific
arenas associated with threats, mitigation, adaptation strategies and related calls for urgent
and effective actions. Their well documented effects are various and likely to have
differential impacts on a range of systems, with some being more or less affected than others.
Human societies are confronted with the climate change challenge, whilst having components
with differing coping capacities.
With the exception of a few countries, demographic aging is a worldwide trend.
According to the United Nations, developing countries and countries with emerging
economies have younger populations, but will experience a fastest population aging (United
Nations, 2006). China, under the confluence of a decrease in fertility and a rising longevity, is
part of them.
In China, the percentage of people aged 65 and over is increasing steadily. In 2000,
they accounted for 7% of the total population, and five years later they reached 8%. Adults
aged 60 and over are currently representing 11% of the population and are projected to reach
1
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28% by the year 2040. In absolute numbers, it implies 397 millions of Chinese elders, a
speedy aging compared to European countries and the United States of America (Zeng et al,
2009; Jackson &Howe, 2006).
It has been abundantly documented that owing to the normal process of aging, the
aged populations experience more chronic and degenerative diseases. Aside from bio-social
differentiation that put them at disadvantage, climate change may contribute to jeopardize
them especially when extreme events occur. Among risk factors known to increase
vulnerability to summer heat stress are cardiovascular diseases, a health condition noticeable
in contexts of demographic and health transitions.
The use of climate models to project the impact of global warming on heat-related
mortality provides alarming data such as an increase in summer heat-related deaths in Lisbon,
Portugal, by up to six times by the 2050s (Dessai, 2003). In another continent, a 75% increase
in annual heat-related mortality among people 65 years and older was projected by 2050 in
six temperate cities of Australia (McMichael, 2002).
As part of a pattern of increased climate variability due to climate change, natural
hazards have differing impacts on human health. Responses to disasters can make significant
differences in morbidity and mortality and are the reflection of how the protection of the most
vulnerable members of a population is ensured. Climate protection efforts represent a
translation of countries’ policy regarding the mitigation of the effects of climate change.
China’s climate policy has been considered positive and praised for its willingness to
cutting energy consumption (Zhang, 2006). In its first national climate change plan, it is
clearly expressed that the need for development must be reconciled with the need for
environmental protection (Watts, 2007).
However, taking action to curb the high levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions was
eluded. Therefore, the progressive perceived policy appears less interesting without a
commitment to lower targeted emissions. Also, it appears less impressive in light of external
data.
As a matter of fact, data recently provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA)
on CO2 emissions indicate that in 2009, China will become the world’s biggest emitter with a
release of 5.8 billion tons of the greenhouse gases. As such, China would leave the United
States of America behind (Zhang, 2006). Although this estimate could be less high, there is
mounting evidence on China moving backward.
According to the climate change performance index (CCPI), a measure linked to a
mechanism for transparency and comparability into international climate policy, China did
not achieve any progress. If in 2006 the country ranked 29 out of 53 countries, in 2007 it
dropped to 54 out of 56 countries. This is attributed to its rising CO2 emissions (World
Watch, 2006)
Carbon dioxide and other emissions of greenhouse gases such as sulphur dioxide
(SO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) have increasingly displayed atmospheric
concentrations. Most are recurrently said to be of critical importance to climate change.
China as one of the main sources of emissions of carbon and other greenhouse gases
contributes to global warming. Besides the United States of America (USA), other countries
from Europe and the Third World (India, Brazil, etc) are involved. So, China is not the only
major country emitter.
However, the concern is about the unwillingness of the Chinese government to join
biding international commitments in order to reduce its share of gas emissions. It does so by
shifting the blame and responsibility for a long-time atmospheric pollution and global
warming on wealthier nations. Therefore, the question of how to reconcile it with china’s
growing greenhouse gas emissions is relevant and worthy of being addressed from various
perspectives after the Kyoto protocol adopted in 1997 in Japan.
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Reluctance toward the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, whilst efforts at
reaching a related consensus are underway, not only may leave China in a situation of
marginalization, but also raises an issue of values. Bearing in mind that societies are judged
on how they treat their weakest elements, China has to face its responsibility for the health
and well-being of the elderly as a component of the population more vulnerable to extreme
weather events and heat waves in particular.
The objective of this paper is to address the extent of China’s obligation toward the
elderly as susceptible to heat waves and vulnerable to such kind of abnormal weather,
especially in urban areas. In doing so, it handles secondary data derived from a nonexhaustive review of a specialized scientific literature. The search for relevant publications
was performed from a multidisciplinary perspective, using relevant keywords. Engines were
used to locate and retrieve articles from specialized databases.
Information available from websites of organizations dedicated to global change,
environmental, energy and public health issues, and the press were also taken into account.
The results presented here are discussed simultaneously to highlight sound evidence needed
to properly inform policy making and thus, support mitigating actions relevant to the health
and well-being of the elderly in an aging world.
Results
Heatwaves: A Window to Climate Relationships to Human Health Conceptual Aspects
There is no absolute specific definition of heat waves which are described as periods of
abnormally hot, and often humid, weather (EPA, 2009). There is also a tendency to consider
maxima temperatures above 35 degrees Celsius (35°C) during several days. Despite the lack
of unanimous definition of heat waves, a common ground is that they cause discomfort and
are health damaging.
However, there is a definition of a heat wave considered the most adopted (Souch &
Grimmond, 2004). It is the one provided by Robinson (2001), describing a heat wave as an
extended period of unusually high atmosphere-related heat stress, causing temporary
modification of lifestyles and likely to have adverse consequences on the health of the
affected population.
It has been suggested that the notion of a heat wave is relative on an interregional
scale, and is dependent upon the frequency of a given maximum temperature (Kalkstein &
Davis, 1989). In two Asian cities, Tokyo, Japan and Nanjing, China, a threshold of daily
maximum temperatures was established at 32°C and 36°C degrees Celsius respectively.
Above this threshold, a direct impact of heat on human health could be observed (Ando et al.,
1997).
When China was hit by unprecedented heat waves in 2003, temperatures ranging from
39 to 41 degrees Celsius were the highest daily ones registered in the south of the Yangtze
River (Tong, 2003). Actually, human thresholds to heat are heterogeneous, but the negative
impact of heat waves on humans, especially on their health is notable.
Heat-Related Mortality
Conflicting data over the decline versus increase of heat waves do not elude the magnitude of
heat-related mortality. Its toll of more than 8,000 premature deaths over two decades (19791999) in the USA for instance, is estimated to exceed the number of mortalities resulting
from hurricanes, lightning, tornadoes, floods, and earthquakes combined (CDC, 2004).
In Europe, France was heavily affected by the heat waves that hit many countries in
2003 and kill mostly elderly people. An unusual increase of deaths in the capital city Paris by
140% and an excess death of 14, 800 solely in the month of August, challenged the protection
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of public health in an industrialized country (Vandentorren et al., 2004; Institut de Veille
Sanitaire, 2003).
If the association of hot weather extremes with mortality among humans is commonly
taken for granted, it is also noteworthy to mention documented discordant situations in the
scientific literature. In southern USA, the cities of Dallas, Atlanta, New Orleans, Oklahoma
City, and Phoenix offer examples of little change in mortality during the hottest weather in
summer.
In China, a comparison of day-to-day variation in mortality between the city of
Guangzhou with a warm summer climate similar to New Orleans (USA), and Shanghai
located at a higher latitude (Tan, 1991), shows a lesser trend in the former. As such, it raises
the difficulty of defining threshold temperatures.
However, most findings on heat-related mortality demonstrated that many cities in the
northeastern and Midwestern United States show a sharp rise in total mortality during
unusually hot weather conditions. In some cases, daily mortality can be more than double
baseline levels when the weather is oppressive (Kalkstein, 1989).
In a recent European study on heat waves by Fouillet et al., (2008), a consistent link
between temperature and mortality was found and can be observed in figure 1 below.
Six years ago, approximately 35,000 people were killed by a heat wave that occurred
during summer 2003 and has been said to probably be the hottest summer since 1500 in
Europe (Schar et al., 2004; Luterbacher et al., 2004).
Figure 1. Observed daily mortality rate (deaths per 100,000 subjects; black line), maximum (red) and
minimum (blue) temperatures (°C) in France in June–September, 2006.

Source: Fouillet et al., 2006

Heatwaves and the Elderly
The elderly vulnerability to heat-related mortality is more accepted than contentious among
researchers. There is considerable research work indicating age and socioeconomic status as
more significant factors than gender and race (Huynen et al. 2001; O'Neill, Zanobetti &
Schwartz, 2005). Although heat waves are not exclusive to urban areas, highest heat-related
mortality is often associated with relatively high levels of urbanization (Smoyer et al., 2000).
According to Kalkstein (1992), the fact that mortality rates during heat waves increase
with age, has been documented since the 70’s and is still supported. It has been explained by
505

impaired physiological responses, insufficient cardiac output during extremely hot weather,
decreases in sweating efficiency, and an increased sensitivity to the heat under the effect of
many medications (Oechsli & Buechley, 1970; Jones et al., 1982).
In a recent state-of –the-art, the elderly vulnerability to heat is attributed to a range of
factors such as: intrinsic changes in the regulatory system; interference of some medications
with normal homeostasis; a relatively high percentage of people with illnesses, disabilities,
and a lower socioeconomic status among them (Tan, 2008).
Heatwaves and Hospitalization
In Italy, data have been collected on heat waves and hospitalizations among people age 75
and older during two consecutive years (2002 and 2003) in the Veneto Region. They show
that dehydration, heat stroke and kidney failure were the heat-related conditions for which
hospitalisation among elders duplicated (Mastrangelo, 2007).
Under the occurrence of five heat waves, researchers could observe associations
between their duration (at least four days) and the even effects of a combination of high
temperatures and humidity as the summer progressed. A study on the effects of heat waves on
the health of the elderly in Seville, Spain, concluded that low relative humidity enhances the
effects of high temperatures, particularly through the effects of ozone (Diaz et al., 2002).
Such findings in the context of Europe (Italy and Spain) do not support previous ones
derived from studies conducted in the USA in the 70’s. Humidity and wind were found
insignificant in contrast to high temperature as a single factor having a very dramatic effect
on mortality (Kalkstein, 1992).
The effects of the duration of heat waves were also observed in China. A study
conducted on the impacts of heat waves mortality in Shanghai, found that for heat waves in
both summers (1998 and 2003), mortality was strongly associated with the duration of the
heat waves (Tan et al., 2006).
In the Italian study by Mastrangelo et al., (2007) which examined hospital discharge
records, and a similar one carried out in Australia with a focus on extreme heat and the health
of the mentally ill (Hansen et al., 2008), the link to hospitalization is clearly established. In
the context of China, such link does not seem to obviously reflect the real situation of the
elderly.
Data on hospital admissions in Adelaide, Australia, revealed that deaths attributed to
mental and behavioural disorders increased during heat waves in the 65- to 74- year age
group and in persons with schizophrenia, schizotypal, and delusional disorders. Dementia
deaths increased in those up to 65 years of age (Hansen et al., 2008). Rather, in many
developing countries, dementias are overlooked while age is a risk factor for Alzheimer
disease for example.
Accuracy on heat-related mortalities may not be applicable to the Chinese elderly in
the same extent. As a matter of fact, in the context of China, some data highlight the greater
disadvantage of the elderly, in the sense of their lower hospital admission rate. This is
attributable to socioeconomic factors.
In their study of the trend of hospitalization among the elderly in urban China, Gao et
al., (2007) found that financial difficulties were the most common reasons for not accessing
inpatient care and affected the low-income elderly, without health insurance and women in
particular. Worthy of being mentioned, is the dramatic increased in 1993 from 12% to 134%
in 2003 among the low-income elderly not using inpatient services.
Other analyses performed by Chinese experts revealed that the high cost of medical
treatment has become a biggest barrier to proper medical care for the population. The state
sponsored health care systems in the cities have been confronted with cuts in spending.
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Therefore, the cost of medical services increased from 1993 to 1998 at rate two to three times
higher than the rate of the increase of the average wage (CASS ketizu, 2000).
Heat Acclimatization: Scope and Limitations
People's vulnerability to heat depends on climatic factors (eg. the frequency of heat waves),
poorer-quality housing, and lack of air-conditioning among many others (Tan, 2009;
Semenza et al., 1996). Comparing the levels of human mortality during two heat waves in
Shanghai, China, for the years 1998 and 2003, led researchers to conclude that some actions
interplayed in the differences they observed.
They stated the following:
“Finally, since the meteorological conditions and pollution levels for the two heat
waves were alike, we conclude that improvements in living conditions in Shanghai,
such as increased use of air conditioning, larger living areas, and increased urban
green space, along with higher levels of heat awareness and the implementation of a
heat warning system, were responsible for the lower levels of human mortality in
2003 compared to 1998.” (Tan et al., 2006)
On the other side of the medal, the use of air conditioner may have negative health
repercussions in addition to soaring demands for electricity. In the city of Shanghai, China,
where a heat wave was experienced in the summer of the year 2004, and the number of days
with high-temperature outnumbered officials' predictions, the following was reported:
“Most of the illnesses are caused because these little babies cannot adapt to airconditioners or take improper food….In addition, people who suffered fever,
heatstroke, and related acute diseases caused by frequent air-conditioner use have
doubled, especially for senior citizens… The heat has also worsened the serious
power shortage in the city…. Electric generators have been kept running near
maximum load so as to meet the surging power demand of households while 5,000
industrial producers have been co-ordinated to shift their working hours to reduce the
pressure.” (Xiuzhen & Xiaoyi, 2004)
In the USA, a study seeking to anticipate the future effects of climate change on ambient
temperatures and associated mortality, the positive impacts of acclimatization through
modelling (eg. increased use of air conditioning, gradual physiological adaptation) on
summer heat-related premature deaths indicated a reduction of about 25% in New York and
its outskirts (Knowlton et al., 2007).
Also, these authors acknowledged in their conclusions the uncertainty which
surrounds climate forecasts and future health vulnerability, and raised the limitations of
acclimatization in completely mitigating the effects of climate change by mid-century.
Accordingly, their projections suggest an overall net increase in heat-related premature
mortality in the New York City metropolitan region.
If acclimatization has its own limitations, increased use of air conditioning and refrigeration - one of its aspects – is also involved in global warming during summers and contributes to a
vicious circle likely to affect human health in a context of urban heat islands.
The Urban Heat Islands and Their Ramifications
In their typology, scientists distinguish between atmospheric and surface urban heat islands.
According to them, urban heat islands are the results of the combination of many forces
leading to the replacement of natural land covers in cities with human-made surfaces
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(pavement and building made of concrete, asphalt, metal) that absorb incident sunlight during
the day and re-radiated it at night as heat (EPA, 2009; Knowlton et al., 2007; West, 2009).
Consequently, urban areas tend to have higher surface and near-surface air
temperatures than surrounding suburban and rural areas. According to experts (EPA, 2009),
night time temperatures are oppressive and may be more significant than high maximum
daytime temperatures. They found a strong correlation between the lack of night time relief in
air temperatures and increased mortality during heat waves (Kalkstein, 1991).
The effects of urban heat islands are exacerbated by an urban design consisting of tall
buildings, narrow streets where the air trapped is heated by waste derived from air
conditioners, cars and factories (West, 2009). Urban heat islands also exacerbate the impact
of heat waves and in some densely populated urban centers, vulnerability to heat increases
(EPA, 2009; O'Neill, Zanobetti & Schwartz, 2003; CDC, 2002).
In addition to altering local weather (e.g. wind patterns, clouds and fog, lightning
strikes, rates of precipitation), urban heat islands contribute to global warming and affect
human health due to the increased use of air conditioning and refrigeration needed to cool
indoor spaces, which in turn results in the release of more of the heat-trapping greenhouses
gases known to cause global warming (West, 2009).
In the United Kingdom, a 250% increase in annual heat-related deaths is projected by
the 2050s across four greenhouse gas scenarios according to a global climate model
(Donaldson et al., 2006). In the vein of their modeled impacts on global climate, emissions
along with warming trends are not expected to cease (Solomon et al., 2007). Since it has been
found that the urban heat island exacerbates regional temperature increases (Solecki et al.,
2005), a related prediction is that a city like New York may be at particular risk for climate
change (Knowlton et al., 2007).
In China, the study of historic trends in climate change detection show what happened
in the past half century. The mean summertime temperature has increased, with warmer
nights than days. The number of extremely hot and humid days has increased, as well as heat
waves lasting several days (Wang & Gaffen, 2001).
In their study using a regional climate model focused on California, Bell, Sloan &
Snyder (2004) found that increases in daily temperature lead to increases in prolonged heat
waves. Besides, they demonstrated that statistically significant increases in daily minimum
and maximum temperatures occur with a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide
concentration. China ranks high as far as greenhouse gas emissions which contribute to
global climate change are concerned. It is important to mention its willingness to tackle the
adverse health effects of heat waves.
Good Intentions Against the Adverse Health Effects of Heatwaves in China
China announced its project on Climate Change Adaptation to Protect Human Health in
collaboration with international health, development and environmental agencies
(WHO/UNDP-GEF Global Project, 2009). The World Health Organization is in favour of the
implementation of effective mitigation policies relating to the consequences of climate
change on health (Bertolini, 2008).
China specified the objective of the project and described what will be established
accordingly. The expected outcomes encompass a series of initiatives to be implemented at
both national and international levels.
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Objective of the project
To strengthen the national capacity to respond to the increased health risks due to
heat waves to in China.
Summary of the expected outcomes
-. Enhanced capacity of emergency medical services and establishing emergency
medical plans drafted at each locality based on information on high risk population
in the community for increased cases during heat wave periods.
-. Early warning system linked to weather and ambient temperature forecast, in
order to inform the public of potential health risks. At-risk people will be warned
about heat waves in a timely fashion.
-. Enhanced ability of public self-protection by providing health advisory and
education.
-. Availability of community health consulting services. Therefore, a regular health
examination and surveillance of people at risk.
-. Enhanced community awareness of individual actions and also among decisionmakers.
-. Effective local and national inter-sectoral collaboration (environmental protection,
health and meteorological services), and international cooperation as well.
(Own adaptation)
The People’s Republic of China
Project on Climate Change Adaptation to Protect Human Health

Such a national plan not only acknowledges the increased threat to human health that
heat waves represent, but also gives an idea of the preparedness needed to empower the atrisk population for heat-related stress. Adaptation is paramount for those who do not count
with the conditions that may play a protective role.
Social Conditions and Health Status in Old Age
Social conditions and health status that put the elderly and the poor at risk for heat-related
illnesses and deaths encompass the characteristics of their homes, social isolation and
physical health according to the EPA (2009). Besides the reduced ability of their bodies to
handle heat stress, the profile appears as follows: a low income elderly, living on the upper
floor of a typical row home, made of brick construction, with extreme temperatures, a dark
roof, and windows on only two sides, often lacking air conditioning and/or available, but not
in use for fear of high utility bills.
According to the same source, social isolation contributes to their vulnerability to
extreme heat events in situations where: a) they live by themselves and are unemployed; b)
neither family members nor friends live nearby; c) they do not have neighbours to rely upon
and d) they fail to hear news or other warnings and recommendations regarding heat waves.
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In China, the old dependency ratio is predicted to rise according to several scenarios
by experts. As it can be appreciated in the figure provided below, the value of the total
dependency ratio will be pulled up by the value of the old component (Stranges, 2008).
Disproportions in the composition of the population will likely also be reflected in a
shrinking social network versus an extended one.
Figure 2: Demographic forecasts of the percentage of population aged 65 and more in China under four
different scenarios

Source: own elaborations on United Nations, 2006 by Stranges, 2008

The issue of social isolation at an advanced age needs to be examined and
apprehended in relation to the structural imbalances in China’s population. This is the result
of family policies implemented decades ago, especially the restrictive one-child policy, in
order to achieve a decline in population growth.
Demographers have well described one of the effects of the demographic transition
for the Chinese social system in terms of burden of care of the elderly. The “4-2-1- model” is
used to explain a reversed system with a family strain, where only one child will be available
to care for two adults (parents) and four elderly (grandparents) (Booth, 2008).
Such a responsibility becomes challenging in a context where the social and welfare
system is different from the existing ones in more industrialized countries. In the latter, the
elderly may benefit from a rise in transfers derived from retirement pension schemes and
social insurance programs with a wider coverage.
In China, less than 30% of the aged have any pension, and their access to medical
insurance is limited. The pension and health care systems are conducive to further reliance on
intergenerational support provided by children and grandchildren (Banister, 2009). Actually,
it is estimated that two-thirds of people aged over 65 live with their children and one per
cent of those over 80 are in nursing homes (Willett, 2005). Therefore, a failure to provide
for the older relatives and house them like in a “feedback family model”, contributes to their
exposure to social isolation.
The would-be elderly are likely to be faced with more demand for a less available
family support. In addition to the living arrangements issues, poverty still persists and wealth
is said to lag behind old age: “wei-fu-xian-lao” meaning in Mandarin getting old before
getting rich (Yang, 2009). So, addressing climate change in relation to health and well-being
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in later life puts in presence a constellation of factors with an unfinished agenda on poverty
reduction at the national level, into which the rate for the elderly has been slower.
Conclusion
As already stated in the present article, China, an important contributor to CO2 emissions and
other greenhouse gases, is undergoing demographic changes (lower birth rate and a greater
increase in life expectancy). Its population will age very fast and it is known that older adults,
and among them persons with existing health conditions, are at particular risk for extreme
events and vulnerable to heat waves, while not necessarily being among the better-off.
Humans’ vulnerability to heat depends on climatic factors (such as the frequency of
heat waves) among many others ranging from individual, medical, behavioural to
environmental factors. Adaptation measures exist along with findings about the difference
acclimatization could make in heat-related mortality. In addressing global climate change and
protecting human health, national heat waves response systems are as important as other
strategies to mitigate the effects of urban heat islands.
It is true that human societies have the potential to provide mitigating responses to the
negative effects of climate change and global warming. In China for example, rain is
artificially created and high temperatures are cooled through the manipulation of clouds to
ease the oppressive action of heat on humans and pressure on the cities’ power generators as
well.
Also true is that members of human societies belong to differing social strata and age
groups, and do not have the same coping capacity. Although praised, access to
acclimatization cannot be taken for granted among the elderly due to a number of factors.
On the other hand, authoritative researchers pointed out the limitations of
acclimatization in terms of its sustainability. Also, by releasing more heat-trapping
greenhouse gases responsible for global warning, increased indoor use of air conditioning and
refrigeration in summer time, may appear to act as a double sided ally.
It cannot be eluded that heat-related stress has variable thresholds on the one hand. On
the other hand, all extreme temperatures do not necessarily lead to higher morbidity and
mortality. Social isolation per se does not appear to have potential adverse effects, as long as
the elderly people who live alone are able to take care of themselves properly.
Also, global change models are not exempt from criticism regarding their limitations
in simulating heat waves. However, a thorough review of the scientific literature does not
provide support for inaction or delayed actions.
China has significantly reduced poverty along with illiteracy since the end of a central
planning era. Nonetheless, consistent data on unemployment and a diminished purchase
power at an older age, the burden of care of the elderly, mounting unmet needs among the
have-not, a growing power demand and the consequences of an over consumption must be
taken seriously.
The emphasis put on individual responsibility as far as the prevention of heat-related
illnesses and deaths is concerned, is reflected in what is usually recommended by experts.
They are focused on the home environment and lifestyle and convey behaviours such as
staying indoors in an air-conditioned space and drinking plenty of fluids. Although useful to
some extent, and a luxury for some, such preventative measures appear to be insufficient.
As already clearly stated by an international health authority such as the World Health
Organization, responsibility must be directly taken by the health sector since adaptation to
climate change and the protection of public health go hand in hand. So, in terms of policy
implications, public health interventions need to be implemented. How to implement them is
important as well. It should be done in a pro-active rather than reactive manner.
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A way of doing so should involve a real commitment to minimizing (with concrete
reduction targets) the sources of global warming and investing in renewable energy sources.
It implies a strong political will and a huge responsibility not only toward a growing segment
of the population sensitive to the health impacts of global climate change, but also further
awareness of the burden of their family caretakers.
Going completely carbon neutral would be unrealistic during the process of protecting
public health. However, the potential to restore international fairness and a genuine protection
of the atmospheric commons exists.
We should bear in mind that demographic aging in China and other countries is
accompanied by a shrinking support received from the state and social networks. Therefore,
further emphasis on a holistic environmental protection rather than on individual
responsibility for ill-health and lifestyle, would help in properly addressing the threats to
human health posed by climate change and global warming.
Adhering to the legally binding commitments for greenhouse gases reduction as
established by the Kyoto Protocol, would surely contribute to make environmental
friendliness inevitable and beneficial for all. This would be fair and is pressing in a connected
world with aging populations.
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Land Use and Climate Change: Effects and Solutions at The Local Level
Mark Henderson, Ph.D.1
Introduction
China is likely already seeing the effects of climate change. Further effects in the form of
increased temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, and rising sea levels could be
catastrophic, making action at all levels an urgent priority. While much attention is rightfully
paid to reducing carbon emissions from fossil fuels, land management practices account for
as much as a quarter of the net increase in greenhouse gasses. In China, urbanization is the
most important and tractable phenomenon affecting the landscape, reducing carbon
sequestration, as well as locking in transportation patterns that assume increasing fossil fuel
use into the future. Developing systems for carbon-negative land management will have
benefits at the local and global scales, serving as an insurance policy against the increasingly
negative consequences of climate change.
In this paper, I review the linkage between land use patterns and climate change. In
China, central government policies aimed at curbing urban expansion and preserving
agricultural land have faced difficulties in implementation, as local officials respond to other
policy signals and economic incentives. A review of the local effects of climate change on
some of China’s most prosperous regions suggests that, if these were properly accounted for,
many local leaders could see net benefits from investing in carbon-negative land
management. I conclude by considering some policy reforms that can be taken by local and
central governments to promote beneficial practices at multiple levels.
Land Use and Climate Change
Anthropogenic climate change has emerged as the foremost environmental challenge of our
time. The increase of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2, the dominant greenhouse gas) has
been linked directly to the rise in fossil fuel use as the Industrial Revolution has spread
around the world. As such, the greatest amount of attention has been given to efforts to limit
new carbon emissions through political, economic, and technical means (Fleming 1998;
Houghton, Jenkins, and Ephraums 1990; Watson 2001; Depledge and Lamb 2003). But the
absorption of carbon from the atmosphere by vegetation—completing the “carbon cycle”—is
attracting increasing attention, with proposals that land use management practices may be key
to meeting the challenge posed by global warming.
Land resources can act as either sources or “sinks” of carbon. Forests are one oftgiven example: growing trees take in carbon from the atmosphere, sequestering it until they
are burned or decomposed. Agricultural crops also sequester carbon during the growing
season (see Figure 1). Changes in land use can affect the flow of carbon: forests cleared by
burning release their carbon back into the atmosphere, while land taken out of agricultural
production is no longer able to play its role in the cycle. As climatic variation affects
vegetation growth patterns, climate change and land use change are intertwined in a feedback
loop, each affecting and being affected by the carbon cycle (Adger and Brown 1994: 5-9;
Matthews et al. 2000).
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Carbon Storage Capaticty (t C / ha)

Figure1. Carbon Storage Capacity of Land Cover Types. After Matthews et al. 2000.
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Governments and international organizations are already considering how land
management practices that sequester carbon can be encouraged, and perhaps credited against
a country’s share of global carbon emissions. The Kyoto Protocol included provisions to
account for afforestation efforts, although it should be pointed out that new forests do not
always enhance carbon sequestration if they replace other well adapted land cover types, such
as grasslands or peat bogs (Watson et al. 2000: 16; Adger and Brown 1994: 49-54). True
carbon-negative land management systems in any environmental setting would be designed
to enhance cyclical and secular carbon sequestration, as well as incorporating urban design
features that minimize transportation-related carbon emissions.
In China, with its recent history of rapid development and its billion-plus population
seeing living standards rise, emissions from industry and a booming transport sector have
risen sharply to surpass those of the United States (Energy Information Administration 2009).
Meanwhile, land use change in China is also expected to reduce carbon sequestration, further
contributing to atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations. Researchers of the Harvard
University Committee on the Environment’s China project have estimated that the growth of
net carbon emissions from China could offset the reductions proposed by all of the other
countries in the world, combined (McElroy 1997; McElroy and Nielsen 1997).
The greatest effects of China’s land use change on the global carbon cycle may have
already happened. Reconstructing a three hundred-year history of forest cover, Woods Hole
Research Center scientists estimated that 180 million hectares of forest land have been lost
since 1700, releasing 17 to 33 Pg (billion metric tons) of carbon into the atmosphere. The
annual average emissions of up to 110 million tons over three centuries was far exceeded in
the Maoist era, when mass campaigns promoted accelerated clearing, with emissions perhaps
reaching 500 million metric tons in peak years. But expanded afforestation drives since the
1990s suggest a reversal of China’s net carbon flux, making China’s remaining forest lands
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an important sink for atmospheric carbon (Houghton and Hackler 2003; see also Shapiro
2001, chapter 2).
China’s agricultural lands, which sequester only one-third to one-fourth as much
carbon per hectare as growing forests, have come to occupy a greater share of China’s
landscape. And agricultural lands are under greater threat from urban expansion. An
analysis of night time satellite imagery found that China’s city lights had increased in area by
over half, from 4.40% of the country’s land area in 1992-93 to 7.03% in 2000. Seen by day,
those same areas were nearly twice as likely to see declines in vegetation (Henderson 2004:
9-12, see Figure 2). In terms of carbon storage, the conversion of that much cropland to
urban areas could result in a reduction of 300 million tons annually—around twice the carbon
sequestration capacity of the forests of the United States (Adger and Brown 1994: 49;
Myneni et al. 2001: 14788).
Figure2. Land Cover Change: Urban (DMSP) and Vegetation (NDVI) dimensions, 1992-93 to 2000.
Source: Henderson 2004.

Nearly one-fifth of China’s agricultural lands fall within 8 km of expanding urban
areas. Though the total land area affected by urban expansion is a relatively small share of
China’s territory, such areas have a disproportionate effect on the overall trend of decreasing
vegetation. Typically, labor and fertilizer inputs have made farmland close to urban
settlements the most productive, and these are the lands most likely to have seen both urban
expansion and decline in vegetation.
Land use change must be considered not only for its immediate effects on the carbon
cycle, but also for the long-term patterns of future emissions that are locked in place by
choices about land development and, especially, transportation. The development of urban
forms that emphasize reliance on the automobile, energy-intensive buildings, and external
resources will produce greater carbon emissions. The energy and resources required to
maintain complex urban systems must be drawn from an even wider swath of the landscape,
what some have called the “ecological footprint” (Lin 2001; Qi et al. 2004). Together, the
expanding physical and ecological footprints of cities have become the most significant
forces reshaping China’s landscape (Watson et al. 1997: n.p.).
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Climate Change and Land Policy: Tension between Central and Local Goals
There are signs that the Chinese central government recognizes the importance of combating
climate change in order to live up to its aspirations as a leader in the international community
as well as to avoid further domestic consequences. Top leaders have begun to attach greater
importance to “environmental security” (huánjìng ānquán), listing global climate change
among their major concerns (Guojia Huanjing Baohu Zongju 2002). While the Chinese
negotiating posture leading up to the 2009 Copenhagen climate talks calls for highly
aggressive cuts in carbon emissions by developed nations in advance of any mandatory limits
for China and other developing countries, within its borders the government has taken
significant steps to promote more environmentally friendly technologies and public works
projects—far surpassing the “green” stimulus spending of any other country (Yang and Oster
2009; Qi 2009; Jacobs 2009).
Still, there are limits to the central government’s capacity to carry out “green” reforms
even if there were a political consensus to do so. Although conservation of agricultural lands
has returned as a key issue in national policy (Rozelle and Rosegrant 1997), the central
government cannot act alone to control land use in the thousands of towns and villages across
China. It must rely on agents at the local level to monitor land uses and enforce conservation
policies. Under China’s system of collective land ownership, most rural households’ rights to
use land is subject to the control of local officials, who retain the authority to allocate and
reallocate land (Christiansen 1986: 21-3). These officials, situated at the nexus of state power
and local interests, often have divided interests—their responsibilities to higher authorities
may conflict with community pressures and incentives for personal gain (Brown 1995: 922).
At the village level, almost all economic and political motivations favor industrial
development over the preservation of agricultural land. Every peasant farmer knows that
factories, not farms, are the key to rapid wealth. Besides filling the pockets of their
constituents, village leaders have another incentive to divert land to industrial development:
factory profits are subject to a different taxation system than agriculture, leaving more in
local coffers and sending less to the central government (Oi 1992; Whiting 2000). Not
surprisingly in this context, compliance with land conservation policies has historically been
low.
Another major challenge to the central government’s attempt to regulate land
conversion has been the lack of reliable, detailed statistics on local land management. Land
use statistics, produced unreliably at the township level, were filtered and aggregated as they
were reported up the bureaucratic hierarchy, resulting in an undercount of at least 40 percent
(Smil 1995: 805; Crook 1993; Ash and Edmonds 1998: 845; Smil 1999; Cartier 2001; U.S.
Embassy Beijing 1997a, 1998; Lin and Ho 2003). Without private property rights to land,
government officials at the township level or above did not systematically track who held and
exercised land use rights; a national land registration system only went into effect in 2008
(Shandong interview 2001, Asia Pulse 2008).
Turning to satellite surveys of land use and urban growth as an independent source of
data, in the late 1990s China’s State Council launched a nationwide campaign to protect land
resources. Directives called on “the whole nation to pay more attention to the protection of
arable lands” and banned unauthorized conversions of forest and agricultural land (Xinhua
1997b, 1997a, 1998; Zhang et al. 2000; Xu, Qi, and Gong 2000). A mounting sense of crisis
prompted central officials to invoke a “broad-brush” policy that left little room for adaptation
to local conditions.
Meanwhile, the desire to jump-start local economies stalled by the Asian financial
slowdown prompted a resurgence in the creation of local economic development zones, with
some six thousand such zones opened from 2000 to 2003 (Cartier 2001; Zhang 2004). These
zones made use of a loophole in the 1998 Land Administration Law that allowed cities to
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requisition surrounding farmland for planned urban expansion (Skinner, Kuhn, and Joseph
2001). In the past decade, such land requisitions have become a common source of friction
between local officials and displaced farmers, resulting in protests and thousands of lawsuits
nationwide.
Faced with discontented farmers, reports of profiteering by local officials, and
renewed concern about food security, top leaders again confronted the question of
agricultural land conservation with two important policy changes. First, the State Council’s
Document Number 1 in early 2004 reiterated the policy of “strictly protecting farmland,”
requiring provincial or higher-level approval for conversions (Associated Press 2004).
Secondly, the principle of compensation for land appropriation was formalized as part of a set
of amendments to the national constitution (Xinhua 2004). Accompanying regulations
specified how compensation could be assessed for displaced farmers, their village collectives,
and local governments; these costs can amount to RMB ¥160,000 per hectare (Zhang 2004).
By 2008, satellite imagery indicated that the pace of unauthorized land conversions had
slowed, but some 31,000 suspected violations remained under investigation (Xinhua 2008a,
2008b)
While the policy of requiring no net loss of farmland continues, regulations are vague
about where compensatory land may be reclaimed. Fresh vegetables for the city of Beijing
are now being shipped in from farmland hundreds of kilometers away, rather than being
produced locally as was true just a decade or two ago (Skinner 1985; Qi et al. 2004). Perhaps
influenced by the ongoing xībù dà kāifā (Great Development of the West) campaign,
developers in Dalian have invested in land reclamation in Xinjiang, some three thousand
kilometers to the west (Zhang 2004). Indeed, Xinjiang, Ningxia, and the Tibetan
Autonomous Region in the far west of the country accounted for most of the reclaimed
farmland reported in recent years (Wang 2000: 652-3; 2001: 706-7). Such remote land
reclamation projects do nothing to achieve the stated goal of balanced land use within
provinces, to say nothing of the increased carbon emissions from transporting food from
more distant sources.
Localized Effects of Climate Change
A growing understanding among national leaders of the potential consequences to
China of global climate change may have contributed to the decision to sign the Kyoto
Protocol, as well as to take other measures on this issue (U.S. Embassy Beijing 1997b; Chen
2002). Several analysts have shown how interactions among Chinese and international
scientists have helped develop this understanding within the Chinese bureaucracy, along with
the technical capacity to predict potential consequences and implement beneficial policies
(Henderson 1994; Ross 1998; Economy 1999).
Given the importance of local enforcement to ensure the success of any policies to
combat climate change, especially policies related to land use, consideration needs to be
made of the motivations of local officials. While normative exhortations and bureaucratic
enforcement will both have their place (Skinner and Winckler 1969; Ross 1988), I suggest
that attention to the incentive structures under which these officials operate will have the
most immediate and long-lasting results.
Appeals to localities’ own self-interests—producing “win-win” situations—should be
made wherever possible. Co-benefits to the local economy and environmental conditions
must be emphasized. While this is difficult in the case of global climate change, where
effects are often far displaced from the sources of the problem, some local effects of carbon
emissions can be pointed out. As it happens, some of the most prosperous localities in China
(and those with the highest carbon emissions) also face some of the greatest risks under
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future climate scenarios; as such, these regions have both the wherewithal and the incentive
to invest in emissions-reducing land management practices.
According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “three
subregions in north China appear to be especially sensitive to climate change because of
potential increases in the soil moisture deficit.” Climate models indicate that areas of the
North China Plain can expect “more frequent and severe spring droughts” and changes in
seasonal temperature patterns that will “make it difficult to maintain current crop patterns …
limiting the present practice of double-cropping in succession” (Watson et al. 1997, chapter
10)
Such climate changes have already begun to appear, revealed in weather station data
collected by Chinese authorities over the past half-century.
Liu et al. (2003) found
statistically significant warming trends across China, especially in the north (see figure 3).
As night time low temperatures have increased faster than daytime highs, the daily
temperature range has decreased—a fact of importance to cropping patterns. To give one
example, rising temperatures trimmed 2.4 percent from growth in wheat yields between 1979
and 2000 (Fang and Yang 2008: 272). For the 300 million residents of the region, warmer
nights bring less relief in heat waves, linked to increased mortality. For those who can afford
it, this climate trend spurs the demand for air conditioning—and for electric power from coalfired power plants, further contributing to anthropogenic climate change.
Figure 3. Daily Temperature Range: Trends, 1955-2000. Source: Liu et al. 2004.

Total precipitation in all seasons, especially the summer rainy season, has also
decreased across northern China while increasing in the flood-prone Yangzi River basin (see
figure 4). Of even greater concern, the frequency of precipitation events has decreased at a
greater rate in all regions and seasons, meaning that even if there is less total precipitation, it
comes in more intense storms, with implications for soil erosion and flooding (Liu et al.
2005). Many other climatic variables show similar spatial and temporal trends, with turning
points toward less favorable conditions from around 1978–1990.
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Figure 4. Summer Precipitation: Trends, 1960-2000. Source: Liu et al. 2005.

Of all of the projected effects of global climate change, rising sea levels are among
the most alarming and contentious. A minimum increase of around 1 meter is expected in the
coming century due to the expansion of ocean water under warmer global temperatures, with
some substantial variations around the world’s coastlines (IPCC Working Group 2007).
Substantial additional increases—to 10, 20 meters or more in the long term—are expected as
the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets recede. Recent reports indicate this may be happening
faster than previously acknowledged by the IPCC (Hansen 2007; Kerr 2008).
Figure 5. Population Centers in Relation to Elevation above Current Sea Level. Source: Township
Population Census of China, 2000; GTOPO30 Digital Elevation Model.
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In China, where large areas of land has been reclaimed from the sea over centuries
(Elvin 1993; Marks 1997) and where an increasing population has been drawn to new
economic opportunities in coastal cities, sea level rise could have catastrophic consequences.
While a 1-meter rise in sea levels may sound minor, coupled with increasing storm surges it
would require a major engineering effort to protect heavily developed coastlines (Revkin
2009). As shown in Figure 5, large tracks of Jiangsu province and much of the North China
Plain are very close to sea level; the Pearl River Delta around Guangzhou and Hong Kong is
similarly situated. Nationwide, up to 16 million people live within 2 meters of sea level and,
with gradually rising sea levels, will require increasingly expensive protective measures, or
decisions to relocate.
Even as seas rise, low-lying areas in the North China Plain are experiencing land
subsidence related to groundwater depletion. Considering areas currently up to 5 meters
above sea level, there are 45 million more people potentially affected by seawater incursions,
including most of the major metropolises of Tianjin and Shanghai.
Should the Greenland or West Antarctic Ice Sheets collapse, as some fear, either
could add up to 10 meters to current sea levels worldwide; in China, another 90 million
people would be affected—including nearly all of Jiangsu province. While the collapse of
the East Antarctic Ice Sheet is considered the least likely, it could raise sea levels 25 meters
or more, with another 138 million people affected in China. Under such a scenario, presently
landlocked Shenyang and Ji’nan would face typhoon storm surges, and tidal flows would
reach up the Changjiang to Wuhan.
In short, depending on which level of risk you want to consider, sea level rise could
affect the homes and livelihoods of around 300 million people in China—approximately
equal to the entire population of the United States (see figure 6). Because the regions at risk
include some of the most developed in China, the value of the infrastructural investments
potentially in harm’s way—water control structures, ports, highways and railroads, urban
developments, and improved agricultural lands—could exceed more than one-third of the
country’s total.
Figure 6. Population by Elevation above Current Sea Level. Source: Township Population Census of
China, 2000; GTOPO30 Digital Elevation Model.

Engineering solutions to protect against these risks would require enormous
expenditures. Attempted on a piecemeal basis under crisis conditions, construction of new
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water control structures could only defend the most valuable urban centers. With sufficient
advance planning more land could saved behind seawalls, levees, and locks, but displacement
of many people and industries would be unavoidable. Estimation of these costs, even under
conservative estimates of possible harm, are needed so that they can be weighed against
proposed measures to mitigate these consequences of global climate change.
A “win-win” alternative to these dire projections would involve adapting land
management practices in these areas to promote carbon sequestration and reduce
transportation-related carbon emissions. Local jurisdictions at risk of negative consequences
from climate change, whether in terms of rising temperatures, water shortages, or flooding,
can view investments in carbon-negative land management systems as an insurance policy
that will have benefits whether or not the worst predictions come to pass.
There is some evidence that communities that are more prosperous are more willing
to make expenditures or forego some economic growth in order to achieve environmental
aims. The hypothesized “Environmental Kuznets Curve” suggests that “smokestack”
industries and loss of biodiversity are seen as the necessary price of progress as societies
industrialize, but that beyond a certain point societies place an increasing value on
environmental amenities like clean air and open space. A recent study suggests that China’s
coastal provinces may have passed that point, showing declines in sulfur dioxide, an air
pollutant of local and regional concern (Fang and Yang 2008: 237; see also Auffhammer and
Carson 2007). If true, and if local leaders can be provided with sufficient information to
assess the current and prospective costs of climate change, we may look to these more
developed communities to lead progress on carbon-negative land management systems.
Policies for Carbon-Negative Land Management at The Local Level
Some of the most promising political developments on global climate change since the 1997
Kyoto Protocol have come from local governments and communities worldwide. Even in the
United States, where the Federal government failed to ratify the protocol, numerous localities
adopted their own “climate action plans” to reduce carbon emissions. Localities on Taiwan,
too, have been successful in making progress on climate issues without being a Kyoto
signatory. In these cases, local officials were often swayed by members of civic
environmental organizations. China too has seen a notable rise in environmental NGOs,
often focused on protecting local natural resources. If given the political space to become
informed about the effects of global climate change on local environments, these domestic
environmentalists may help shape and implement carbon-negative land management
practices in key areas of China.
There is no time to lose in setting China’s urbanization and land conservation policies
on a more sustainable footing. Land conservation policies must be carried out at the local
level by officials who are faced with other conflicting political and economic signals. While
the central government is increasingly stressing the importance of agricultural land
conservation, most local officials will still be swayed—short of a campaign on the order of
the One Child policy—by other signals in the political and economic environment. These
include policies of the central government itself that have countervailing effects, as well as
issues that have been a source of recurring tension between central and local interests.
Development of the Transportation Infrastructure
From the Grand Canal to railroads and most recently superhighways, the construction of
transportation infrastructure has always hastened urbanization. New roads literally pave the
way for more labor intensive and higher value industries. The mode of transportation access
may have long-lasting effects on the form of urbanization that takes place. Railroads have
the benefit of requiring relatively little land; their effect on land use is concentrated around
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stations and spurs through industrial districts, and, especially if electrified, they are relatively
benign in terms of energy efficiency and pollution. Since 1990, the North China rail network
has grown from three long-distance lines to more of a grid, linking every regional city and a
growing number of lower-order settlements. With the anticipated addition of high-speed
links between metropolises, this network can be the basis of a sustainable transportation
system for passengers and freight.
The new long-distance superhighways, though, promote another source of urban
expansion altogether. They require significantly more land for the roadways and
interchanges, not to mention the accompanying infrastructure of feeder routes, gas stations,
parking lots, and the other accoutrements of the automobile society. The Chinese
government’s stated goal of producing 10 million cars annually, much of which are to be sold
domestically (People's Daily 2003) is indirectly a land use policy, because it promotes a
vision of automobile-oriented development as China’s future. With China now the world’s
third largest oil importer (Xinhua 2003), concerns about national security may join air
pollution and land management as reasons to shift course. Putting greater priority on
developing local roads—building connections within regional city systems—while favoring
rail for long-distance connections would be an improvement.
Reform of Economic Development Zones
As noted above, development zones have been promoted by locales eager to attract outside
investment—and to skirt rules for converting agricultural land within zone boundaries. Much
has been written on the proliferation of these zones and the central government’s periodic
campaigns to revoke thousands of zone designations made by local authorities (Chung 1997:
148; Cartier 2001). In the present economic environment, the proliferation of development
zones across the landscape makes little sense from the national perspective, especially when
such zones are concentrated in areas that already have the economic advantages of
convenient transport and bureaucratic infrastructure.
To break the cycle of establishing and abolishing development zones, one approach
would be to overhaul the complex land permitting and taxation system, with infinite local
variations, that has evolved over the past quarter-century. With a more uniform system,
locales would compete for investment on the basis of the structural advantages, rather than
with creative loopholes. With the shift back from “letting some regions get rich first” to the
promotion of more spatially balanced development, subsidies should be available for regions
falling behind the national average.
Priority Farmland Zones and Ecological Services
Another kind of zone designation that has spread rapidly across the landscape putatively
reserves highly productive land for agricultural use in perpetuity, or at least requires greater
scrutiny at higher levels (and higher costs for would-be developers) before conversion can
take place. Surveys to identify and post signs around these zones have been seen in
prefectures from Dalian to Lhasa. At a higher scale, entire counties have been labeled
“national grain bases.” Clear signals from authorities about the permitted future uses of land
are to be welcomed, as contrasted with the “give it today, take it back tomorrow” approach to
land use rights that has been seen too often over the past half-century (Grinspoon 2002: 27).
But there remains the implication that communities consigned to the agricultural sector will
be excluded from the benefits of economic development and urbanization.
In these circumstances, transfer payments for “ecological services” provided by these
communities should be considered. International economic incentives for tree-planting and
other beneficial land management practices are already being tested as part of the
international negotiations on climate change. If widely adopted, these could provide a legal
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framework for transferring funds to regions that continue to provide important ecological
services (Daily 1997; Prugh, Costanza, and Daly 2000). Farmers and foresters would receive
a greater share of the economic benefits that they provide to society at large from
participating in carbon-negative land management systems.
Conclusion
Some of these policy recommendations echo directives that are already being put into effect
in China; others will require greater coordination between central and local officials or
structural changes to be effective. All will depend on more widespread understanding of the
likely local consequences of failure to act on global climate change. While any local actions
on this global issue are subject to fears about free-riding by communities that would reap
benefits without sharing the costs, China’s local leaders have, in aggregate, the resources to
affect a phenomenon of planetary scale. In the words attributed to Benjamin Franklin, “we
must all hang together, or we will assuredly hang separately.”
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Sustainable Consumption and Production as Climate Change Mitigation Strategy for
China
Patrick Schroeder1
Abstract
China’s greenhouse gas emissions currently stem mainly from sources related to industrial
production and electricity generation. With accelerating speed of urbanisation and economic
policies which aim to increase domestic consumption, over the next decade a major share of
China’s emissions will be resulting from consumption related activities. This paper will
discuss the current status of consumption in China and options of the integrated approach of
sustainable consumption and production (SCP) for reducing emissions from the three
consumption demand areas housing, mobility and food. In this context it discusses
consumption trends and the growth of the global consumer class in China, the circular
economy approach, and the potential of current government stimulus spending and policies to
create sustainable urban infrastructures and consumption patterns from the outset.
Introducing Sustainable Consumption and Production (SCP)
The approach of sustainable consumption and production (SCP) can be distinguished
according to three aspects: First, it is an integrative analytical perspective which helps to
understand the complex interrelationship between economic activity, human well-being and
environmental degradation. Secondly, it is a set of practical solutions or ‘tools’ to address
social, economic and environmental problems arising from unsustainable production and
consumption patterns. Finally, it is a political agenda to promote and support policies
necessary for the systemic transition towards sustainable consumption and production
patterns.
SCP as an integrative analytical perspective is based on the realisation that
consumption and production are not separated from each other, but are inextricably
connected and need to be considered as a coupled system (Lebel and Lorek, 2008). However,
the SCP perspective is, for conceptual simplification, still often separated into the production
side and the consumption side, with consumption and production referred to as ‘two sides of
the same sustainability coin’ (UNEP-DTIE, 2009; De Ruyt, 2008). Some related concepts
which are relevant and supportive of the SCP perspective are, amongst others, Factor 4 and
‘dematerialisation’ (v. Weizsäcker, Lovins & Lovins, 1997) and ecological footprint analysis
(Wackernagel and Rees, 1996). The most important analytical tool of the SCP perspective is
life-cycle thinking through which it is possible to consider all stages of the life-cycle of goods
and services from resource extraction to end-of-life phase, thereby making the ‘world behind
the product’ visible. Conceptually, life cycle thinking offers huge untapped potential for
providing comprehensive information and data about products and the associated
environmental impacts. There is currently still a gap between the life-cycle information
already generated and comprehensive practical applications which address environmental
issues based on life cycle thinking (Mont & Bleischwitz, 2007).
Similarly, the SCP concept has been discussed since the early 1990s, however, tools
and methodologies for practical implementation are still evolving. SCP as a practical
approach developed out of the Cleaner Production approach which, according to the formal
definition by UNEP and UNIDO (UNEP-DTIE website), “is the continuous application of an
1
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integrated, preventive environmental strategy towards processes, products and services in
order to increase overall efficiency and reduce damage and risks for humans and the
environment.” Born out of the realisation that Cleaner Production alone will not be sufficient
to achieve the necessary reduction in environmental impacts (Mont & Plepys, 2008), and that
overall increases in consumption can offset efficiency improvements on the production side
through so-called rebound effects (Sorrell, 2007), the cleaner production approach was
extended by adding the ‘consumption side’ - thereby creating the integrated SCP approach.
SCP offers a ‘toolbox’ containing range of practices and solutions which are being used to
address unsustainable consumption and production patterns. Some of these SCP practices are
technical and managerial, seeking to improve product properties and manufacturing processes,
i.e. make them more energy and resource efficient, reduce the content of toxic substances and
the output of industrial waste products. Examples of this type are the above mentioned
cleaner production practices, technological innovation and green supply chain management.
Other practices are used to effectively communicate relevant information about
products or companies’ performance to stakeholders, such as policymakers and consumers.
Such information sharing and communication practices include among others eco-labelling,
sustainability reporting, product information disclosure and consumer awareness raising.
Further practices can be classified as demand side management approaches which go beyond
simply providing better information, but actively influencing consumption behaviour towards
becoming more sustainable. Examples here include product choice editing by retailers and
regulators, or green public procurement undertaken by local and national government bodies.
All these different practices described above are often closely related and mutually supportive,
thereby can be combined as a package for a more comprehensive strategy to deal with the
environmental, social and economic impacts of consumption and production systems,
including climate change (Tuncer and Schroeder, 2009).
In addition to being a conceptual perspective and practical approach, SCP is also a
global political agenda and process. The political SCP agenda first gained momentum at the
World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002 where it was stated that “…all
countries should promote sustainable consumption and production patterns, with the
developed countries taking the lead and with all countries benefiting from the process…”
(WSSD Plan of Implementation, 2002).
Responding to the call of the WSSD Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, UNEP and
UN DESA initiated a global action plan to promote sustainable consumption and production
in June 2003, the so-called Marrakech Process. It is a global multi-stakeholder process
(including national governments, private sector and civil society) to promote SCP and to
work towards a 'Global Framework for Action on SCP', a 10-year framework of programmes
on SCP to support regional and national initiatives promoting the shift towards SCP patterns.
The Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) will review the theme of SCP during its
2010/11 two-year cycle (UNEP DTIE/UN DESA, 2007; UNEP, 2009). One of the main goals
of the Marrakech Process is the development of non-prescriptive guidelines to support the
implementation of national SCP programmes and action plans which requires the active
participation of national governments (Clark, 2007). One example of such a national action
plan is the Sustainable Consumption and Production and Sustainable Industrial Policy
Action Plan by the European Union which was adopted on 4 December 2008 (Council of the
European Union, 2008). While this action plan is currently the most elaborate plan globally
available, it has been criticised by different stakeholders for its lack of proposed action and
measures. An alternative ‘blueprint’ has been launched as recently as May 2009 and proposes
how the current EU action plan should be improved to make significant progress towards
realising SCP in Europe (EEB, 2009).
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SCP and Climate Change
How does the pressing issue of climate change relate to the SCP perspective, SCP approaches
and related political processes? From the SCP perspective climate change can be said to be
the result of currently unsustainable consumption and production patterns. Whilst climate
change is often perceived as mainly an energy issue, through the SCP perspective it becomes
clear that many more economic sectors and activities need to be considered, including among
others forestry, agriculture, and waste management.
The application of life-cycle thinking and detailed analysis of a wide range of products shows
that current efforts to reduce greenhouse gases do not focus on the ‘hot-spots’ responsible for
the main share of emissions. Huge potentials for reduction exist ‘upstream’ in the value chain,
the resource extraction phase and early stages of raw material processing, as well as
‘downstream’ in the value chain, during the use phases of goods and services (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Opportunities for emission reductions along the value chain (Source: Tuncer and Schroeder,
2009).

Currently, the main global, bi-lateral and local initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, such as the Kyoto Protocol under the UNFCCC, or the Asia Pacific Partnership,
focus mostly on the production side, i.e. technical improvements in electricity generation
infrastructures and industrial manufacturing equipment. While acknowledging the importance
of these actions, the SCP perspective also shows that a variety of social issues need to be
considered to understand the underlying causes of climate change and find possible solutions
to climate change. The most crucial contribution of the SCP approach to climate change is the
realisation that in addition to technical solutions other non-technical issues and options for
change on the consumption side need to be considered and supported, particularly for the
reduction of emissions through behaviour and lifestyle changes.
This proposition by the SCP approach is supported by growing scientific evidence
that not only technological and industrial transformation towards renewable energy
technologies such as wind or solar, energy efficient manufacturing processes and new
technological innovations are required to successfully mitigate climate change, but issues
relating to consumer behavior and life styles are keys in finding a solution. For instance, in
the Synthesis Report of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report it is stated that “there is also
high agreement and medium evidence that changes in lifestyle and behaviour patterns can
contribute to climate change mitigation across all sectors. Management practices can also
have a positive role.“ (IPCC, 2007: 59).
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Looking more specifically at which type of consumption patterns and lifestyles have
climate change impacts, a comprehensive study about end-consumption related activities in
the EU-25 has shown that there are currently three consumption sectors, also called demand
areas, responsible for about 70-80% of the overall environmental impact of human
consumption and production systems (EIPRO Study, 2006). These demand areas are housing,
mobility and food and they are also thought to be the causes for about 70% of the global
warming potential in the European Union (ETC/RWM NAMEA data base). Applying life
cycle thinking shows that by addressing these three demand areas significant reductions in
environmental impacts, including greenhouse gas emissions and climate change mitigation,
can be achieved. For instance, more than 80% of greenhouse gas emissions over the life cycle
of a private passenger vehicle occur during the consumption phase, i.e. while driving the car
(WWF-UK, 2008). Similarly, the use phase of a computer is responsible for three times more
greenhouse gas emissions than the emissions resulting from the manufacturing of the
computer (UNEP, 2008).
Examples of SCP practices which are currently trying to address climate change issues
in these three consumption demand areas are, for example, energy labeling for buildings and
electric appliances, carbon labeling for food products or emission standards for private
vehicles. Most of the SCP practices simultaneously address other environmental, social and
economic issues also. Labeling for buildings encourages better insulation for energy
efficiency in housing, which not only reduces energy consumption for heating or cooling, it
also helps households save money in the long run. Using low-carbon or even zero-carbon
transportation contributes to improving air quality in cities and has significant health benefits
for inhabitants. Finally, in the demand area of food, consumer awareness raising can support
efforts to reduce the intake of red meat, particularly beef, which can not only significantly
lessen greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture and deforestation, but also has positive
health effects reducing the risk of cancer (Cross et al., 2007).
SCP in Asia and China
The adoption of the SCP perspective in Asia for the analysis of environmental issues has so
far not been without complications. While the awareness about ‘production side’ issues and
the need to reduce industrial pollution is widely acknowledged, the sustainable consumption
part of SCP has at times been an almost controversial topic for Asian developing countries,
including China. The reason behind this controversy are considerations of global equity and
historic responsibility of the industrialised economies of Europe, North America and Japan,
which house only 20% of the world population, but are currently responsible for almost 80%
of the life-cycle impacts of consumption, therefore are still the ‘prime culprits’ of modern
consumption patterns (Tukker et al. 2008: 1219; Schor, 2005).
Current trends in global consumption patterns, including Asia and in China, pose a
dilemma because of two seemingly contradictory traits: patterns of over-consumption and
under-consumption existing side by side. Consumption levels in Asia, and particularly in
China, have increased dramatically over the last three decades since the opening-up economic
reforms under Deng Xiaoping. At the same time, millions of people are still not consuming
enough to meet their basic needs for water, food, shelter or energy services and, increasingly,
suffer from the environmental problems associated with industrial pollution. Why should
China and other Asian developing countries, which often are still struggling with issues of
poverty reduction, should restrict or change their consumption levels when western
industrialised countries are responsible for the largest share of current and historical levels of
resource consumption and associated industrial pollution and resource depletion? Why
should Asian developing countries realise sustainable consumption while western
consumption patterns are still highly unsustainable? The SCP debate shows close parallels to
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the international discussions on climate change, per capita emissions and commitments for
emission reductions by developing countries, above all China. The sensitivities about
historical responsibility and global equity are important issues to be resolved, not only for
climate change, and the concept of sustainable consumption being a key issue in the debate.
Another barrier to the acceptance of the sustainable consumption concept, in Asia as
much as in Europe, is the perception that sustainable consumption is automatically a
restriction in consumption and of reduction in quality of life. In this respect, the challenges of
promoting sustainable consumption in Asia’s newly industrialising economies are similar to
those in Europe and North America. The first test is to make stakeholders such as
policymakers, consumers, business and researchers understand that the concept of sustainable
consumption is not necessarily about less consumption, but about efficient consumption.
While it might entail a reduction in the quantity of resources consumed, it also means
improving the quality of consumption, thereby contributing to increases in quality of life.
Regarding SCP as a practical approach, it is important to recognise that economies of
different countries have significant differences in their consumption and production patterns
due to their different stages of economic development. Hence, a one size fits all SCP
approach is not feasible. Practices that have been successful in Europe, the US or Japan might
only be to some extend replicable in China and other Asian countries. In practice, the
‘production side’ practices such as cleaner production for industrial resource efficiency,
phase-out of outdated industrial equipment or technological innovation approaches have been
taken up relatively quickly by policy and business in Asia and China and show first success.
In contrast, the SCP practices addressing the ‘consumption side’ for consumption
behaviour and life-styles have so far received little attention, and require possibly more
complex and integrative practices involving a larger range of stakeholders than conventional
production side practices. The reason is that consumption is not only an activity to fulfill
basic needs for food, clothing and shelter, but increasingly driven by a complex set of forces
rooted in different psychological, social, cultural and institutional settings (Mont and Plepys,
2008:536), which can be quite different within the Asian context. Therefore, understanding
and addressing consumption issues in Asia and China possibly requires different approaches
than those applied in Europe.
Several international initiatives are currently underway trying to promote the SCP
agenda in the Asia Pacific region. The main new message of these initiatives is that pollution
control alone is not enough to reduce environmental damage and mitigate climate change,
and that demand side management approaches to control consumption will become
increasingly critical in the future.
The 3R (reduce, reuse, recycle) concept and initiative from Japan can be seen as an
early SCP approach as it is also based on life-cycle thinking. Currently, the Japanese
government and the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) are working
towards bringing the two concepts and approaches of 3Rs and SCP together. The Green
Growth Initiative, funded by the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), is a
policy focus for Asia that emphasizes ecologically sustainable economic progress. Next to
initiatives for promotion of green taxation and sustainable infrastructure, Green Growth also
includes a component on demand side management through SCP. Several project-based
initiatives have also been funded by the European Commission, such as under AsiaProEco
and most recently under the SWTICH Asia Programme. These projects involve small and
medium sized enterprises and are carried out by a range of different organisations. In addition
to greening industries these programmes have the strategic goal and make attempts to give
the concept and approach of SCP more prominence in Asian policymaking.
In China, the national action plan for SCP is currently being promoted and realised
through the ‘circular economy’ concept – promoting closed-loop industrial processes where
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waste products are reused and recycled as opposed to a linear one-way cradle to grave
straight-out production and consumption processes. On a theoretical level, the circular
economy concept is closely related to ecological modernisation concepts and aims for
simultaneous positive outcomes for the Chinese economy, society, and the environment. On a
practical level, the circular economy model is mainly a cleaner production approach that aims
to ensure that industrial facilities’ waste product outputs (including heat, water, materials) are
other facilities’ resource inputs. By preventing waste at the source as well as turning waste
into a resource, the circular economy concept aims to reduce both waste to be treated and
levels of resource consumption of the industry (NRDC, 2006). Despite these efforts by
Chinese government agencies and industries, the knowledge of existing circular economy
best practices in China is still somewhat inadequate, especially with regard to the
effectiveness, efficiency and appropriateness of best practices for the differing contexts of
Chinese economy (Geng et al, 2008). The law is extremely important in terms of announcing
China’s intent to pursue a more sustainable model of industrial development, but to move
from only being a comprehensive policy statement to implementation requires further
specification. Efforts to implement circular economy currently focus mainly of large state
owned enterprises. To make the circular economy a common industrial practice, more
attention is required to improve the environmental performance of small and medium sized
enterprises which constitute about 99% of all companies in China and generate about 60% of
the industrial output value (Ho, 2005). From the SCP perspective, the circular economy
approach is still too much focused on the production side and not sufficiently considers
consumption side issues.
Consumption Trends and Climate Change in China
As mentioned above, fast developing emerging economies display a wide range of different
consumption and production patterns. In countries like China, India and Brazil stark
differences exist between regions and social classes where poverty and western high-impact
life-styles often exist side by side. As the societies in emerging economies are in flux and the
momentum of rapid economic development will continue despite global financial crises and
economic downturn, over the next two to three decades 80% or more of their future
infrastructures will still be built. This is as much a worrying trend as much as it is an
opportunity! Decisive action towards setting up sustainable consumption and production
systems in the early stages of development can be realised before the societies are locked-in
though unsustainable infrastructures, institutions and behaviour.
This is exemplified through Asian urbanisation trends which are major drivers for
economic development and social change, resulting in massive changes of consumption and
production patterns. In Asia, by around 2035 the urban population will have grown by 70% to
more than 2.6 billion people (ADB, 2006). More than half the construction going on in the
world is currently taking place in China and by 2030 this one country is expected to have
more than 200 cities with populations of over one million people each (McKinsey Global
Institute, 2008). Urbanisation is not only driving construction, but further a driver for new
mobility patterns. At present, with only about 2% of the population in China owning a motor
vehicle, private car ownership is still low compared with 40-50% in Europe and North
America, but this level is expected to rise steeply, and estimates put the number of private
passenger cars in China at 190 million by 2035 (ADB, 2006).
Finally, it is particularly urban consumers that belong to the emerging so-called
“global consumer class” which totaled about 1.7 billion people in 2004 – of which almost
40% are in Asia (Worldwatch Institute, 2004). Global consumers share certain elements of a
lifestyle of conspicuous consumption regardless of their cultural background or nationality –
they are likely to live in modern apartments equipped with electronic appliances and gadgets,
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have access to information technologies and global luxury brands, own their own cars, travel
by air, etc. This consumer class in Asia is now estimated at around 600 million people,
already more than the total populations of Europe and North America combined. In China,
rapid growth in economic activity and incomes has revolutionised access to modern
consumer goods and services. The country has in the last three decades not only become a
global manufacturing hub, but it is now home to an emerging consumer class. It is estimated
that by 2020 about 700 million Chinese will be part of this global consumer class, compared
with less than 100 million today. In terms of spending, this increase in consumer numbers
equals a five-fold increase in urban consumer spending over the next 20 years to $2.3 trillion
per year (McKinsey Global Institute, 2006:17)
While the consumption patterns of millions of urban consumers in the newly
industrialised countries of the Asia-Pacific region are converging with those of western
industrialised countries – especially within the younger generations – there are still stark
differences between rural and urban consumption patterns in many of these countries. One
commonly used tool to measure and compare the environmental impact of consumption
patterns is the environmental footprint analysis. In China ecological footprint analysis shows
that there are large differences between rural and urban footprints. The rural ecological
footprint is between 0.8 to1.2 ha per inhabitant, while the urban footprint can be as high as 3
to 6 ha per inhabitant (Salat, 2008), the latter being comparable to the average urban
European footprint. Looking only at China’s mean ecological footprint of 1.6 ha per
inhabitant, which is still below the global average of 2.2 (CCICED & WWF, 2008), is
therefore not giving the complete picture of the situation. Furthermore, the comparison of
different Chinese and global cities’ footprints shows that Beijing and Tokyo have similar
ecological footprints (about 4 ha per inhabitant), and Shanghai and London’s inhabitants have
a footprint of about 5.5 ha per person (Salat, 2008). This shows that urban consumer lifestyles
of people living in Chinese metropolis are equal in terms of environmental impact to those in
industrialised countries of Europe and Japan.
The high urban ecological footprint is closely related to per capita emissions and
carbon footprints which are becoming relevant in the global climate change debate. While
China’s average per capita emissions are currently still below 6 tonnes per year, it can be
expected that there is a significant different between rural per capita emissions and urban per
capita emissions in China. For example, Beijing has annual per capita greenhouse gas
emissions of 6.9 tonnes and Shanghai 8.2 tonnes (Vaughn, 2009) while the per capita
emissions of rural Chinese are significantly lower than the national average. This stands in
contrast to industrialised countries where the highest share of carbon emissions can be
attributed to people living in sub-urban and rural areas and urban consumers often have up to
50% lower carbon footprints. Comparing the per capita emissions of different global cities,
the inhabitants of Beijing and Shanghai have significantly higher footprints than their
counterparts living in Tokyo (4.8 tonnes), Seoul (3.8 tonnes) or Barcelona (3.4 tonnes)
(Vaughn, 2009). This difference is mainly due to public transport infrastructure and building
densities reducing the need for motorized personal transport in those cities (see figure 2).
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Figure 2: GHG emissions per capita (tonnes of CO2 equivalent). (Source: Vaughn/IIED 2009)

Realising Low-Carbon Lifestyles Through Sustainable Consumption in China
The hot-spots identified above show that urban consumption patterns in China’s mega cities
need to be addressed first to reduce increases in emissions from consumption. In the area of
personal mobility, often regarded as the main problem area for many Chinese cities, positive
developments towards sustainable consumption patterns can be observed in the uptake of
electric scooters and bicycles. Over the last decade these electric two-wheelers have made
strong advances in quality, and the diffusion and commercialization has accelerated
dramatically since the early 2000s. Electric two-wheelers emerged from virtual non-existence
in the 1990s. Then, in 2000 about 300,000 electric bikes were sold and the number of bikes
sold increased to 10 million in 2005 and 20 million in 2006 (Weinert et al., 2008).
Electric two-wheelers have significantly reduced environmental impacts compared to
other personal urban travel options. The average electric bicycle uses only 1.5 kWh
electricity per 100 km. Compared to the average of 3 litres petrol used by a motorcycle and
10 litres petrol by a passenger car in urban city traffic, the environmental impact reduction is
considerable, even if electricity is generated through coal. It also is also a more cost effective
mobility option. Given 10,000 km travelled per year, the total electricity cost would amount
to about 90 to 100 Yuan, which is about 15 times lower than that of a motorcycle and more
than 40 times lower than of a car. (Feng, Jiang and Chen, 2007)
How can Chinese urban consumers make progress towards realising low-carbon
lifestyles in other consumption related demand areas? While on the one hand Chinese urban
consumption patterns and life-styles are converging with those in Europe, Japan and North
America, on the other hand personal consumption in China is a socially, culturally and
politically embedded and idiosyncratic activity affected by society and institutions, which can
be quite different than those in western industrialised countries. A number of relationships
shape values of Chinese consumers, including notions of utility and need. Currently, material
consumption in China increasingly is perceived to contribute to self-satisfaction, social
position and serves as an indicator of a good, successful und modern life. Initiatives that aim
to enable SCP and emission reductions in China must therefore deal with both ‘hard’
technical details of industrial production processes, as is currently the main focus, as well as
‘soft’ issues such as how consumption is practiced, perceived and circumscribed by Chinese
society.
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One the one hand, wealthy urban consumers have significantly larger environmental
footprints and higher carbon emissions than their less well-off fellow citizens. This is true for
western industrialised countries as much as for China. Therefore, wealthy consumers with
high-impact lifestyles carry a larger share of the responsibility for contributing to global
environmental changes such as climate change. On the other hand, wealthy consumers can be
agents of change supporting the transition towards sustainable consumption and production
patterns. Through their buying power they can take up their responsibility and support ‘green’
and low-carbon products, such as organic food and natural cosmetics, living in modern lowcarbon buildings that use environmental technologies and sustainable building materials,
organic fashion made from natural fibres and dyes, and make use of low-carbon vehicles such
as hybrid cars. While often perceived as such, these green products are in fact not bottom-end
products of low-quality and low-price, but luxury products for the wealthy that the average
consumer in many cases cannot afford.
As for China's nouveau riche, consumption is not any longer about meeting basic
daily needs, but has entered a stage of conspicuous consumption, an "Enjoy Now" phase
where higher-end purchases are no longer out of reach. According to Merrill Lynch’s Asia
Pacific Wealth Report, an estimated 415,000 Chinese had more than $1 million in disposable
assets in 2007, more than any other country (Merrill Lynch and Capgemini, 2008). Up to 170
million people, or 13 percent of the population, can afford luxury brands and the number is
predicted to reach 250 million by 2010. They are mostly aged between 25 and 40 and live in
urban developed coastal regions of China. They are fashionable and passionate about lifestyle
and quality. With a growth of 20 to 35 percent in the next five years the Chinese Ministry of
Commerce predicts the country will become the world's largest luxury market by 2014,
accounting for 23 percent of global business (Battered luxury brands eye Chinese market,
2009).
As Chinese consumers increasingly spend their money on luxury goods, there should
be no apparent contradiction between a luxury life-style and sustainable consumption of high
quality green products. However, at this stage green and sustainable products are not
particularly considered to be luxury goods and product quality is often not satisfactory. An
additional issue is that eco-labels, important tool for the identification of green and
sustainable products, have low credibility and are not trusted by Chinese consumers. A shift
in consumer thinking, together with increased awareness about environmental and health
issues, and quality improvements can give green products a new face and image. With these
barriers overcome, green sustainable products have the potential to become new status
symbols and a creative means of displaying wealth and success. Furthermore, it can be a way
of generating positive emotions and satisfaction from consumption that cannot be gained
through unsustainable wasteful or unethical consumption practices which can often even be
accompanied by feelings of guilt.
This trend towards green high-end lifestyles can already be observed in the lifestyle
concept of LOHAS (Lifestyle Of Health And Sustainability) which is becoming an ever more
important high-end market segment in North America, Europe and Japan. Even in China the
LOHAS concept (lehuo) is beginning to become known and is used as marketing strategy by
forward-looking, innovative businesses. Through buying green luxury products such as
organic food or cosmetics, the market share of such niche products can be increased and be
made available for mainstream consumers. However, green consumerism is probably not the
final answer, the greening of markets and improving the quality of green products has rather
to be seen as a step into the direction of sustainable consumption.
In addition to making green products ‘cool’ and trendy, traditional Chinese culture
and values have the potential to positively influence consumption behaviour. All three
Chinese cultural traditions, Buddhism, Daoism and Confucianism, are currently experiencing
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a renaissance in China. Long before current discussions about unsustainable consumption
behaviour these traditions have dealt with issues relating to conspicuous consumption. With
their emphasis on simplicity, contentment, moderation, frugality and harmony between
humans and nature they are still relevant today and influence personal consumption
behaviour. Furthermore, these traditions emphasise the relationship between the individual,
society, the Earth and Universe as one, therefore appropriate personal behaviour is crucial for
global well-being. While ‘back to nature’ in the proper sense of the phrase is not possible,
these traditional cultural values can support awareness about the need of balancing economic
growth through industrialisation and environmental protection, including the global
atmosphere (Angsuvat, 2006).
Addressing unsustainable individual and institutional consumption behaviour is also
increasingly becoming an area of activity for Chinese NGOs and civil society. Environmental
awareness of Chinese consumers’ is increasing, often through the efforts of NGO
environmental activism and campaigns. In the area of climate change the “26-degree
campaign”, which was initiated during 2004 and 2005 jointly by several NGOs including
Global Village of Beijing, World Wide Foundation for Nature in China, China Association
for NGO Cooperation, Friends of Nature, Institute of Environment and Development and
Green Earth Volunteers, has been very successful. Following this campaign, in 2007 the State
Council officially announced that all governmental agencies and state enterprises are obliged
to set air conditioner to a minimum of 26 degrees, which shows that civil society is beginning
to have an impact on national environmental policy making (Xie, 2009).
Furthermore, consumption of sustainable products are not only options for wealthy
urban consumers, but can also be made available for China’s poor in rural areas of Western
China. Examples are solar PV home systems for renewable energy generation. China’s solar
water heater market is already the largest in the world. Through the adoption of solar PV
home systems, many people in rural areas who have never been connected to the electricity
grid can leapfrog towards a sustainable energy future without going through the process of
grid connected unsustainable energy supply through coal fired power generation. Over the
last decade, through a range of government sponsored programmes, several million people in
Western rural China have been supplied with solar home systems, local industries have been
built up contributing to social and economic development in the region. Electricity provision
further is the basis for other economic activities and social development.
In addition to greening markets other efforts are likely to be necessary to achieve
systemic solutions. Examples are the development of product-service systems that can be
realised through increasingly closer partnerships and collaboration between stakeholders
(Morelli, 2007). The SCP approaches developed and practiced in western industrialised
countries can be replicated and offer potential solutions also for addressing challenges arising
from Chinese consumption patterns and lifestyles. In addition, particular SCP practices and
strategies based on the native cultural as well as political contexts need to be considered for
realisation of SCP in China (Leong, 2008).
Particularly China’s policies for demand side management and changing consumer
behaviour based on a tradition of central planning can show very different approaches and
results compared to those implemented in Western countries, where market-based
mechanisms are preferred over top-down command and control mechanisms. A case in point
are the Beijing measures to reduce traffic congestions and improve air quality during and
after the Olympics. The effects on traffic reduction can be to some degree compared with the
effects of congestion charges in the London inner city. Which approach is better or more
effective is difficult to assess and should be considered according to the socio-political
situation and local conditions. While an imposed Beijing-style “five-day regulations” would
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very likely be met with resistance in most European cities, implementation of congestion
charges would be likely to face other difficulties in Chinese cities.
In the context of global financial crisis and economic downturn, China’s policymakers
face both challenges and opportunities. China has in the last three decades largely been a
production-focused economy, with most products destined for overseas export markets and
consumption in the countries of Europe and North America. As the recent financial crisis has
shown, this model was unsustainable not only from an environmental perspective, but also
from financial and economic perspectives. China’s economic policy is now stimulating the
increase of national domestic consumption to prevent large-scale unemployment in the
manufacturing sector. The government’s stimulus package with more than US$200 billion
allocated for green spending (HSBC, 2009), in comparison to other countries’ spending the
highest amount allocated for green industries, is an example how government can stimulate
economic development towards sustainability. In times of economic and financial crisis
China now has also the opportunity to change its economic structure from one that only
produced low-value-added products and relied on external markets to an economy based on
sustainable consumption and production systems.
Conclusion
Emissions from coal-fired power stations for electricity generation are generally still being
perceived as the main contribution to climate change from China. While in the past China’s
environmental problems and greenhouse gas emissions can indeed be largely contributed to
electricity generation and resource and emission intensive industrial production, within the
next decade the focus will very likely shift towards more consumption related impacts. As a
result of increasing incomes and urbanisation the share of emissions from the consumption
areas of private mobility, housing and food are going to increase and will account for one of
the largest shares of China’s emissions in the future.
The conceptual and practical approaches of SCP offer a good opportunity for China to
address the issues of rising urban per capita ecological footprints and greenhouse gas
emissions simultaneously, and contribute to the creation of a resource efficient and lowcarbon economy and society. Currently in China, SCP is mainly being promoted through the
circular economy approach, which has a strong focus on cleaner and leaner production
processes, waste minimization and recycling. It does, however, not explicitly include the
issue of sustainable consumption. While the circular economy is an important legislation to
improve environmental performance of industry sectors, a comprehensive SCP approach will
also need to consider the growing impact associated with new consumption patterns,
particularly in respect to growing greenhouse gas emissions.
Addressing unsustainable consumption patterns in China requires the active
participation of China’s wealthy consumers who have the power to support a market shift
towards greening products and markets. Increasing awareness among Chinese consumers
about environmental and health related issues is an important first step in any transition to
sustainable consumption patterns. However, as increased awareness does not automatically
lead to behavioural changes, further SCP practices and measures addressing consumer
behaviour are required. These SCP practices can to some degree be taken from Europe and
other countries, but for replication in China will have to be tailored according to the specific
Chinese cultural, political and social conditions.
Finally, the Chinese government has included the expansion of domestic consumption
as a key goal to overcome the financial crisis and global economic downturn. The
government is allocating large amounts for financial stimulus spending towards important
sectors such as railway systems, public transportation and energy efficient buildings. While
there are doubts how ‘green’ China’s stimulus package actually will be, this type of green
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spending offers opportunities to establish sustainable urban infrastructures, including lowenergy housing and sophisticated public transport systems from the outset. This effort has the
potential to support medium-sized second-tier cities, where most future construction will take
place, to avoid becoming locked into unsustainable infrastructure, making the transition for
Chinese citizens towards sustainable consumption and production patterns significantly easier,
thereby pre-emptying high-carbon urban lifestyles.
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Public Initiatives and Local Practices in China’s Response to Climate Change
Lei Xie1
Abstract
China is facing increasing environmental pressure, among which climate change is the most
serious one. As many areas are still under development, the country’s vulnerability to the
adverse impacts of climate change lies not only in its ecological aspect but also its social
aspect. In particular, the country’s increasing energy demand has posed serious problem, as
the country strongly relies on fossil-fuels. Dilemmas exist between development and
increasing level of pollution. Local government, to realize its political credibility often
permits environmental pollution happen and has been ineffective in local environmental
governance.
Chinese environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGO), led by journalists,
scientists and key environmentalists, have emerged since early 1990s. They begin to play an
increasingly significant role in China’s dealing climate change. Although still in its early
stage of development, domestic ENGOs are greatly influenced by International ENGOs in
their strategies, organizational development and accessing scientific knowledge. Chinese
ENGOs have become successful in assisting local communities dealing with key issues of
climate change, including energy, agriculture pattern and changes of lifestyles in
cosmopolitans.
Illustrated by case studies, this paper discusses the role that Chinese environmentalists
play in local communities’ dealing with climate change issues. It examines ENGOs’ the
characteristics, strategies, knowledge and technology transfer in their organizational
development and promotion of social changes. In particular, this paper explores the
interaction between ENGOs, INGOs, local governments and local communities in looking for
solutions of climate change.
This paper contributes to the understanding of China’s growing civil society and local
practices in mitigating climate change’s impact, which have significant influence to local and
national environmental governance. It also deepens our understanding of the impact of
globalization to the country.
Introduction
China, a country whose role on the global stage has changed profoundly, has received
significant attention from the world. Although the country has experienced fast economic
growth, a high price has been paid by the environment, which has been seriously degraded.
Climate change has posed serious environmental problems including accelerated
deforestation, threats to human health, increasing levels of outdoor and indoor air pollution
and negative effects to coastal zones and freshwater ecosystems and so on.
China is faced with mounting pressure in dealing with climate-related issues.
Domestically, owing to its ecological and geographical conditions, China is highly vulnerable
to climate change. This factor, along with China’s growing regional inequality pose serious
problems to sustainable economic and political development. Driven by extreme weather
events, health and pollution crises, social unrests surge in China.2 Growing protests emerge
against forced relocation by energy development and unequal exposition to environmental
risks. Therefore, the impact of climate and environmental change is one issue that has strong
implications to political stability (Wiener, 2008).
1
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China is also being challenged to bear climate-related issues with greater responsibility
from various stakeholders in international community. External pressures generated by
international negotiations on climate change have placed the issue of global warming on
China’s domestic agenda and forced the country to respond. Climate negotiations have
become an important element in its foreign dialogues with countries that have strong
commitment in global climate governance, such as the European Union. Equally important,
concerns have been raised toward China’s overseas investment and the country’s
environmental footprints abroad. In Africa, China’s resource security centred approach has
been criticised for neglecting the environmental impacts and damaging natural resources in
the continent (see Taylor, 2007; Bosshard, 2008).
Under this background, certain space is found available for the Chinese public to get
involved and respond to climate change with individual actions. Since early 1990s, Chinese
citizens have shown an increasing level of environmental awareness, which is evident in the
development of environmental activism and symbolized by the organization of environmental
non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) and voluntary groups. During the globalization
process, the international environmental events, organizations and NGOs (INGOs) have had a
strong impact on the country. The Chinese NGOs’ perspectives are broadened and intensified
understandings of global climate change are achieved after participating international events,
such as the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change Conference since 2005. They have successfully built public
consensus on local and regional environmental issues. In recent years, many ENGOs have
began to be involved in mitigating the impact of climate change in China, assisting local
communities adaptation capacity, promoting energy efficiency and energy saving and so on.
This article examines the development of public initiatives in China’s response to
climate change. The following questions will be addressed: what are the main forms of
actions, on what issues the public’s climate actions are, how are public’s interests articulated
and what impact has been produced? The second part provides a literature review on the role
of NGOs in global environmental governance. The third part explores political opportunities
that are found in China’s political structure. Through case studies, the fourth part illustrates
the main domains of NGOs’ initiatives and the significance of such activities. The last section
concludes the role that the non-state actors play in China and discusses the implications of
public participation to China’s climate capacities.
Literature Review
Increasing scholarly interests have been shown on the significance of nongovernmental
actors’ in global environmental governance. Literature includes the development of
international environmental activism, forms of action and the nature and extent of its
influence globally.
International environmental organizations are the largest transnational social
organizations in number (Bandy and Smith, 2005). Its population has almost doubled as a
percentage of all transnational social movement organizations (Johnson and McCarthy, 2005;
Frank et al. 2000). Two factors contribute to such development in environmental movement,
one the globalization of environmental problems and solution strategies) (van der Heijden,
2006). Second, the characteristics of global environmental governance also require the
incorporation of NGOs, who act as potential force to provide arrangements beyond state (see
Arts, 2006).
One of the key areas of debate is developed on the role of NGOs in international
environmental politics (Bestill and Corell, 2001; 2007). Two categories can be found: a small
group of scholars puts strong emphasis on the national and subnational context of ENGOs
(Dalton, 1994; Pickvance, 1998; Szasz, 1994); while a larger group takes on a transnational
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focus and emphasizes the emergence of transnational advocacy network (O’Neill, 2009;
Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005). Both agree that although environmental NGOs are rooted in
national context (Bandy and Smith, 2005; Faber, 2005; Rootes, 2005), they have broader
policy impact at the state, national and international levels (Faber and McCarthy, 2001).
Heated debate is developed on the significance of transnational environmental activities.
Such activities are characterized by two natures: networking and cooperation. Transnational
advocacy networks are found to be linked by horizontal or vertical connections (Khagram et
al. 2002) or loose and informal networks that have spread across borders (see Adamson,
2005). Environmental NGOs cooperate by sharing common purposes, values, environmental
information and resources (Wapner, 1996; Dalton et al., 2003; Della Porta and Tarrow,
2005). However, issues are raised on the coalition efforts. Murphy’s work suggests that
coalition presence is a double-edged sword. While greater numbers of coalitions suggest
movement expansion, empirical evidence suggests that this rise makes the foundings of new
organizations less likely (Murphy, 2005). Additionally, no universal frame exists for global
environmentalism (Mol, 2003), therefore conflicting ideologies and goals exist among
environmental networks and can cause tensions and affect the patterns of international
cooperation (Keck and Sikking, 1998).
Regarding the influence of transnational networks and their activities, they are found to
be of significance in global environmental politics. Dryzek (2003) suggests it as part of the
“transnational public spheres”. At global level, advocacy networks are suggested to be
functional in the following two aspects.
First, ENGOs participate in the process of international environmental negotiations
(Arts, 1998; O’Neill, 2009). They serve as the “conscience-keepers”, highlighting the moral
and ethical imperatives to solve global environmental problems (Yamin, 2001), and in some
occasions have successfully brought problems to the attention of the international community
(Wapner, 1996). However, ENGOs’ role in international environmental negotiations is found
to be constrained by domestic politics. In climate politics, governments may assume that new
international rules to impose policy changes upon them and therefore not want NGOs to codetermine the outcome of international negotiations (Arts, 1998). Certain states are found to
have had tried to reduce, or even marginalize altogether the degree of NGO input into policy
debates, for instance, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Argentina and Mexico (Newell, 2000). The
significance of ENGO’s political influence is also suspected. By closely examining NGOs’
political influence on the Climate Change and Biological Diversity conventions, Arts argued
that NGOs have only some or indirect effects on both of the provisions, which were far less
than representatives claim they could have (Arts, 1998).
Another main role of NGOs is their involvement in advancing the creation of formal
accountability mechanisms for global governance (Scholte, 2004; O’Neill, 2009). In
environmental governance, NGOs, as one distinct form of non-state actors (NSAs), have been
noted for imposing substantial regulatory power (Arts, 2006). They offer the strongest
regulation and potential to socially embed global markets ‘an array of voluntary, selfregulatory, shared governance, and private arrangements’, which are beginning to fill the
policy void (Howlett, 2000; Haufler 2001; Gunningham et al. 2003; Ruggie 2004; Hay et al.
2005). In the climate arena, self-regulation proposed by civic-business partnerships,
certification programs, labeling and standards for climate neutrality are regarded as ‘new’
modes of governance that is transformed from conventional hierarchical governance.
(Bäckstrand, 2008).
However, turning to green activism in newly industrializing countries, where the
capacities and resources to articulate environmentalism are relatively low, the environmental
movement is often found weak at national level and is only poorly integrated in global
networks (Mol, 2003). Current literature suggests that organizational development has been
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one major reason that attributes to the lacking of significance in environmental movements.
Securing funds to survive is of priority to ENGOs in developing countries, where finance
mostly comes from foreign donors. Lacking resources proves to be an important factor to
explain why the Mexican NGOs put priority on local environmental issues and not engage in
climate issues (Pulver, 2006). Additionally, distinct environmental identities are another
important factor that affects ENGOs’ influence when interacting with foreign donors in
developing countries. Lacking connection with local communities, Russian’s ENGOs are
found to be inefficient in promoting civil society and influencing environmental policy,
despite the fact that Russian ENGOs’ increasingly developed into professional bodies (Henry,
2001). Furthermore, with relatively weak organizational development, ENGOs in newly
industrializing countries are found to remain in an unequal position within global
environmental networks (see Rohrschneider and Dalton, 2008). Northern ENGOs provide aid
to groups from the South and may frame environmental campaigns using their own goals
instead of the indigenous groups (Rohrschneider and Dalton, 2008). Therefore, grassroots
organizations’ own strategies and resources available at the local level influence the
relationships that emerge between local and transnational environmental organizations and
compose key variables in determining movement outcomes (Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005;
Rodrigues,2004).
China’s Climate Governance and Political Opportunities for Public Participation
In general, the Chinese authorities are not keen on encouraging organized efforts from the
public, which is often associated with political dissent. However, it seems that political
regulations is less repressive in the field of environmental protection, which has been one of
the fields that certain space is provided by the state for NGOs to establish (Saich, 2000). This
can be explained by several factors, the evolution of Chinese environmental governance
structure, improved legal regulations on public participation and the challenge of the
complexity of climate policy implementation in local level.
China’s climate-relevant policies are found to be rather limited, domestically as well
as internationally (Richerzhagen and Scholz, 2007; Koehn, 2008). They can be broadly
divided into three policy fields: energy, transport, and environment. Energy policy is central
for economic growth, and at the same time, energy generation is the main source of Chinese
GHG emissions. Transport sector is one of the sectors that have the fastest growing
greenhouse gas emissions. However, these two sectors have been weakly incorporated to
climate policies. Only environmental policy has connections with the other two sectors’
policies and holds strong potential for synergies between mitigation policies and specific
environmental programmes (Richerzhagen and Scholz, 2007). Hence, mechanisms and
measurements utilized in environmental policies may have strong implications to the design
and implementation of comprehensive climate policies. Evidence has been shown that in
environmental policies the Chinese political authority is experiencing transformation (Mol
and Carter, 2006). In industrial pollution control, NGOs have been involved in industrial
pollution control (Han and Zhang, 2006). Such facilitative attitude may lead political elites to
integrate civil society in other climate-relevant policies.
Recognizing that demands exist for public environmental participation, the state has
established several legal frameworks and regulatory measurements to allow the public to be
involved in policymaking processes and decisions. The Environmental Impact Assessment
Act promulgated in 2003 confirms the right of public participation in environmental policies,
but in practice the law is seldom followed. This legal framework is complemented by
‘Environmental Protection Administrative Licensing Hearings Provisional Measures’ (2004)
and ‘Provisional Measures for Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment’
(2006). Both legal documents delineated the measures for citizens’ participation in
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environmental impact assessment. These legal documents provide institutional arrangement
for public participation, for NGOs to act as an independent monitoring force in controlling
environmental pollution, the completion of environmental impact assessment that many
large-scaled energy skipped under protection of local government.
China is in great need of climate efforts at local level. As suggested by Wilbanks and
Kates (1999), ‘the human activities that can lead to climate change are very local’, there is
growing awareness that any global response to climate change must involve local action.
Despite enormous efforts to improve the state of the environment, implementation on the
local level of the actions proposed is weak due to lack of incentives and conflicting interests,
which result in neglect of environmental activities. Lacking of financial resources in
environmental protection lead to weak administration, and produces an obstacle that restrains
the Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB)’s capabilities (Xie, 2009a). Human resources
also are not sufficient to undertake climate-specific actions, in climate-relevant sectors such
as energy, transport, agriculture, forestry, industry and research and Development. Therefore,
the design and implementation of climate policies and measures are largely constrained. This
factor provides strong incentive for NGOs’ participation in climate-related activities. Those
whose interests are at risk are very likely to participate in environmental movement and have
their interests articulated by ENGOs (Xie and van der Heijden, forthcoming). When the
political output structure is found weak in adapting to climate change, the public is likely to
initiate such activities themselves.
Main Actors in the Third Sector
Among the efforts of public organized activities, INGOs, ENGOs, and GONGOs are the
important forces. Each has its own advantages, which lead them to adopt different strategies
to conduct activities responding to climate change.
International Actors
China sees an increasing number of international actors actively involved in mitigating
effects of climate change in China. During the globalization process, international
environmental events, organizations and NGOs (INGOs) have had a strong impact on the
country. After the UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, an increasing number
of international NGOs arrived in China. These groups account for a majority of INGOs that
have entered China since 1978.3
A vast number of international environmental NGOs are currently working in China on
climate and environmental change. Some of the areas they are working include: climate
change (WWF), biodiversity protection (Conservation International, Wildlife Conservation
Society); Watershed management (Oxfam America) and ecotourism, promotion of clean
energy (Natural Resources Defense Council; The Nature Conservancy).
INGOs have proven to be a strong force in fostering the development of Chinese
ENGOs, especially when the latter were just established in the early stages of NGO
development (Xie, 2009a). They bring significant funding to help Chinese groups, which
constitute the major source of revenue to Chinese ENGOs (Fu, 2004; Yang, 2005). Although
enjoying certain degree of freedom, it should be noted that INGOs are very cautious in
working with and joining domestic advocacy activities, because of the repressive political
conditions in China.4 Collaboration between domestic ENGOs and International NGOs are
built mainly through their chapters in China. Large international environmental NGOs - such
3
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as Greenpeace and WWF China - have their own staff and offices in China and operate
relatively independently from their headquarters. They have more chances to cooperate with
Chinese partners. After two decades of presence in China, WWF has built good working
relationship with state government. It has been committed to seeking solutions for China’s
low carbon development and is carrying out a “low carbon city” project with 2 pilot cities.
Some others prefer to work alone, for instance Greenpeace. Smaller organizations can hardly
establish an office and choose to build partnerships with local environmental groups, thus
relying mainly on the latter in their collaborative projects and the collaboration lasts only for
a short period of time (see Xie, 2009a).
In recent years, foreign NGOs and social groups have also been brought in the country
by its climate cooperation with Northern countries including those from EU, the US, Canada
and Japan and so on. NGOs can apply for financial sources provided by official development
assistance grants and act as implementing partners in multilateral environmental agreements
(MEA) from China’s partner countries.
Domestic Environmental NGOs
The past few years have seen rapid growth of ENGOs. By October 2008, 3,539
environmental groups had been registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs or its local
bureaus.5 However, unregistered environmental NGOs are not included in this number and
neither are web-based organizations or ENGOs registered as business organizations 6 .
According to estimates the total number of unregistered environmental organizations is over
2,000.7
The Chinese ENGOs participation in climate related issues is, contrastingly, relatively
new. In late 1990s and early few years after 2000, most Chinese ENGOs engage in rising
environmental awareness among citizens and officials, in disseminating information to the
wider public and in clean-up actions in streets and parks (Xie, 2009a). The past several years
have seen an increasing amount of ENGOs engaging themselves in climate change issues,
including providing education on climate change, promoting energy saving and efficiency
and helping farming communities to shift to renewable energy sources. It is estimated that
almost 60% are involved in energy saving and emissions reductions. This excludes those that
promote other issues on deforestation, sustainable agriculture development and consumers’
behavior change.
Regarding the professionalization, the Chinese social organizations and voluntary
groups have also been more capable to secure funds through domestic charity and
foundations, with legal document that provides higher incentive to private donations.8 With
their fund secured, NGOs can focus on global environmental issues instead of local or
regional ones that have immediate effects to their lives. However, China’s ENGOs have seen
a low level of institutionalization and formalization, which is identified by a weak
membership system, informal internal institutions and very few systematic mechanisms that
have been developed for decision-making. Individual key members or leaders dominate
organizational life, and determine these organizations’ agendas. Despite this, indigenous
environmental identities have been developed in different localities, which are supported by
5
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the country’s cultural heritage and traditional moral education. It strongly strengthens the
mobilization of masses and resources, and helps to preserve the movement’s autonomy from
international NGOs as their funding organizations (Xie, 2009b).
GONGO
One special type of NGOs that is of increasing importance in China is government organized
NGOs (GONGOs). They were initiated by government agencies or institutions. Examples of
GONGOs that are committed to energy saving and renewable energies include Chinese
Renewable Energy Industries Association (CREIA) (established in 2000), the All-China
Environmental Federation (ACEF) (established in 2005), China Energy Conservation
Association (CECA) (established in 1984).
GONGOs’ involvement in climate activities is boosted by international climate
cooperation between China and the world. The multiple structure of global climate
increasingly requires the participation of NGOs and industrial associations as partners in
collective global climate efforts (see O’Neill, 2009). As non-state actors, they are regarded as
important representative of the industries and community interests. Additionally, the Chinese
government partner is often concerned for lacking transparency in project implementation
(see Wu, 2002). For example in German government’s cooperation with China on energy
saving and the promotion of renewable energies, industrial associations become partners for
implementation as well as state agencies. Moreover, GONGOs have acquired certain level of
independence and began to play leading role in setting professional standards and norms and
decision making process. Empirical case study on CREIA indicates that it has expanded its
activities as merely implementing project and has become an influential actor in national and
provincial renewable energy policy making (Wu, 2002).
Additionally, GONGOs also foster coalitions and networks among NGOs and groups
that work on climate change issue. Established in 2007, China Civil Climate Action Network
(CCAN) is a network that is co-organized by China Association for NGO Cooperation
(CANGO). Major members include Chinese ENGOs, industrial associations and international
NGOs, such as WWF Beijing Office, Environment Defense China. Aside from strengthening
Chinese NGOs’ knowledge and capacity working on climate change issues, CCAN also
bridges Chinese NGO actors with international NGOs’ activities on climate change, including
2007 UNFCCC in Bali.
Raise Individuals’ Awareness
Educating the public and affecting consumers’ behaviour have been the main focuses of
NGOs’ involvement in reducing China’s greenhouse gas emission. Based on their rich
experiences in conducting environmental education, a coalition of ENGOs mobilised a
national campaign to promote energy saving.
Seeing the urgency to keep the climate change in check and the potential to save more
energy in the summer months when air conditioners run full power to cool hotels, offices and
private homes, Beijing’s 6 ENGOs collectively initiated the “26 Degree Campaign” during
the summers of 2004 and 20059. Their goal was to raise consumers’ awareness of climate
change and change their behaviors when consuming energy. Public and private enterprises as
well as individuals were asked to set their air conditioners to a minimum of 26 degrees. Led
by Global Village Beijing and WWF China, systematic campaigns were organized including
a variety of promotional activities. Experts were organized to provide profound knowledge
9
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and data on Beijing’s energy crisis and scientific investigation was conducted to affirm the
possibilities of saving energy by controlling the use of air conditioners.
This initiative was also welcomed by local ENGOs through their connections with major
ENGOs in Beijing. Across the country in 16 provinces, various promotional activities
including exhibitions, participatory education and lectures were organized to disseminate
methods of energy saving and to educate the public on global warming. Target audiences
were composed of communities, schools and universities. Newspapers as well as the Internet
were also used to generate social influence. Innovative methods were utilized to educate the
youth through a music concert.10 This campaign also saw new groups join: prestige GONGOs
such as All-China Environmental Foundation (ACEF) and CANGO. Their presence boosted
the influence of the campaign and smoothed the implementation in cities where the size of
ENGO community is small.
The public’s efforts have had significant results. Within the first year of the campaign
starting, according to the calculation of NGOs, about 350,000 to 550,000 tons of carbon
dioxide emissions were avoided. After two years of advocacy activities, the campaigns had
also successfully influenced state agencies located in Beijing, as they began to take actions to
set minimum requirements for public buildings. In June 2007, the State council issued a
document formally regulating all governmental agencies and state enterprises to set their air
conditioners to a minimum of 26 degrees. Such efforts have also indirectly led to the state
government adopting strict quantified targets in reducing environmental and climate
pressures in the 11th Five-Year Plan. This calls for a 20 percent nationwide improvement in
energy intensity by 2010, and is one of the few strict quantified targets that were adopted to
preserve the environment.
Greening the Media and Better Inform the Public on Climate Change
The Chinese news media has been enjoying increasing freedom in environmental reporting.
Although most newspapers and their regional offices are still owned by Communist Party
Committees at various levels, the decline of financial subsidies from the state means that the
mass media have to survive in the developing market economy. Even the Communist Party’s
newspapers and publications are transforming, by establishing supplements that increase their
freedom to discuss news and public affairs.
Mass media is often used deliberately by environmental movements to mobilize
resources, support as well as to alert political figures on environmental issues (Dalton et al.,
2003) In China, the media has been found to work closely with Chinese environmental
movement, the two actors often cooperating in building public consensus and generating
social impact (Xie, 2009a; Yang, 2005). In fact, many NGO leaders are journalists
themselves, making them very familiar in utilizing media campaigns to promote
environmental concerns. Faced with the country’s growing demand for energy, ENGOs and
the media have raised strong concerns on the construction of dams and development of hydro
power in Southwest China, where water resources are rich. Media discourse was built on the
ecological perspective as well as rights of the local inhabitants (Xie and Mol, 2006), therefore
raising the issue of social costs that is associated with dam construction.
Regarding climate change-related issues, the public has not been well informed in many
places of the world. According to study, in both Germany and US, important disparities have
been found between the media’s reporting and communications in the fields of science and
politics (Weingart and Pansegrau, 2000); even the prestige press have produced biased
coverage of global warming and resultant actions (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004). This may
have affected the public’s understanding regarding the causes of global warming, and hence
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might have attributed to the finding that the American citizens’ knowledge about global
warming was ranked middle among fifteen countries (including developing countries)
surveyed in 2001, even lower than Cuba (Brechin, 2003).
As for Chinese reporters, they are faced with challenges in producing accurate and
effective climate reporting. For a developing country like China, the public’s levels of
activism is relatively low (Xie, 2009a). The public’s perception of specific environmental
problems is rather limited, evident in the knowledge they have on specific environmental
issues (Minsheng Bank, 2005; Hong, 2005). The most distressing environmental issues
include noise pollution, and air and water quality (Minsheng Bank, 2005), probably as they
concern day-to-day living. In comparison, the public’s concern on regional and global
environmental issues is relatively low. According to a survey conducted among 20, 000 urban
youth between 16-35 years old, only 25% are certain that they have clear idea of how to deal
with the impact of climate change, although 75% feel that it is a threat and already underway.
Among them, 92% have received university education. Media and NGOs are thus obliged to
develop close links to assist with the gathering and dissemination of environmental and
climate-related information and improve public awareness.
In addition, the green reporters have also been active in raising their capacity to produce
effective climate reports. Assisted by ENGOs, contacts and networks are built between
reporters, scientists and experts. Workshops and seminars have been organized to train
reporters in effectively reporting on climate change, and guidance has been written to direct
reporting. Such activities are especially prominent in Beijing, which hosts a majority of
national newspapers. A climate change journalist club has been formed, funded by British
Council, on a “Climate Cool” project. State-owned media groups, particularly at the national
level, are the most influential in the industry, and are the main source to which local
newspapers and news agencies refer when determining what approaches and attitudes to
adopt when reporting local stories. It is therefore essential that reporters from prestige
national newspapers communicate with relevant experts to ensure scientifically accurate
reporting.
Promote Shift to Clean Energy Sources and Eco-Economic Sustainability in Rural Areas
Using biogas presents an opportunity to address many of the problems plaguing the
countryside, among which the most serious is energy supply in rural areas. People
traditionally forage for fuel wood in forests, which also serves as safe fertilizer supplier.
Currently, China relies heavily on nitrogen-based fertilizers, which are produced from
petroleum. These fertilizers deplete the quality of soil over years of reuse in a way that
organic fertilizer does not. Additionally, over-applied nitrogen-based fertilizers are a major
contributor to eutrophication and algae blooms in China. Biogas digesters also stand as a
solution to increasing production of methane emissions, which accounted for an estimated 3
percent in total methane emissions in the country in 2005.
Biogas technology is not new to China and is mainly used for cooking, lighting and
heating by individual farm households. However, difficulties exist in the shift to biogas as an
energy source in rural areas, primarily in financing the installation of biogas digesters. 11
Additionally, the income level of households proves an important factor in determining fuel
usage, and the consumption of firewood declines as incomes reach relatively high levels
(Zetriffi and Pan, 2008). Poverty therefore proves a constraint lies is therefore often
synonymous with pollution levels that impede rural areas’ ability to mitigate climate impact.

11

Difficulties with distribution drive up marginal coast. Since consumption is lower, the fixed costs end up
being divided between fewer units of energy sold.
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ENGOs have succeeded in introducing this efficient energy source to rural areas and
in two cases have received active support and participation from local communities. In
Hubei, through preliminary investigation, Beijing-based ENGO Green Cross (GC) discovered
that villages in Wushan County could very easily be transformed into an ecological village.
They initiated an experimental project that aimed to reconstruct the village in an ecological
way, establishing clean energy (biogas), improving the local living environment, recycling
rubbish, recycling telluric water and promoting ecological food and ecological tourism.
Working directly with local ENGO Green Han River, GC successfully gained trust from three
levels of local governments (city government, county government and Villagers’ Committee).
In particular, the leader of the group built good personal connections with county government
officials. This proved an important factor, as the county government provided half of the
funding to build a digester in pilot villages.
The biogas system provides methane gas that farmers can use as a fuel source for
cooking, heating and electricity. Farmers use the slurry left over from the fermentation
process as an organic fertilizer in local agriculture to plant tea or greenhouses. Local tourism
is developed because the recycling rubbish and recycling telluric water greatly improves the
villages’ hygiene conditions and attracts city dwellers to stay at village homes. Villagers’
ecological economy was raised by 15% on per capita basis. The successful pilot has now
been expanded: another 15,000 households (15.2% of total households in the county) and 167
villages (62.5% of the total number of villages) have set up biogas digesters and a number of
them have also established wastewater treatment plants—using the energy generated by
biogas.
In Tibet, the Global Environmental Institute (GEI)-a Beijing based NGO, also
implemented a biogas program in Wujinmai village, Tibet. Based on its rich project
experiences in Yunnan, GEI educated and trained farmers to manage and maintain biogas
systems that employ simple technology to provide one or two households with heating and
cooking fuel year-round. Animal manure, a potential groundwater pollutant, is composted
into biogas for energy and fertilizer for growing organic crops. Realising Tibet’s temperature
and sunshine compose ideal conditions for organic agriculture production. GEI helped the
villages to establish greenhouses that are greatly facilitated by the biogas tanks. The clean,
renewable and free source of energy solves Tibetans’ animal waste problems and reliance on
wood for fuel. Impressed by the pilot village’s success, the Tibetan political authority who
initially suspected the plausibility of GEI’s project began to promote extensive usage of
biogas systems in combination with greenhouses. Tibet's Development and Reform
Commission evaluated the villagers' understanding and use of the biogas system and have
replicated the project in 12 counties since 2007, with more than 2,000 biogas systems built.
To make the programme profitable and financially sustainable, GEI also assisted
villagers to establish a local company as a vehicle to connect the farmers to outside markets.
Capacity building and skills training are provided to help the farmers learn to better manage
their new businesses selling surplus organic vegetables. The organic product can be sold for
profits that allow them to engage competitively in the market economy.
Both cases illustrated that ENGOs have played an active and innovative role in
promoting rural energy shift and contributing to greenhouse gases reduction. Two factors
greatly contributed to the success of these innovational experiments: First, NGOs can easily
gain trust from local communities, which facilitated their work; second and most important,
they incorporated poverty relieving as an important goal in projects and assisted the local
communities’ sustainability economically as well as ecologically. The latter reason also
explains why the initial successes were expanded to more communities.
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Watchdog on industrial behavior
Being a main driver of economic growth, Chinese industries are also a principal source of
greenhouse gas emission. They also cause serious environmental deterioration in China; more
than half of the river pollution and 90% of air pollution come from industries.
NGOs play a crucial role in improving pollution regulation and controlling severe
pollution. Monitoring and curbing domestic enterprises’ pollutions has been one of the main
focuses of Chinese ENGOs. At subnational level, local governments face a conflict between
economic and environmental aims and usually give priority to the economic development of
their region, postponing environmental recovery. When polluting industries compose an
important part of the local economy, they are often protected by local governments. As an
independent force, NGOs thus play an active role in disseminating information to the public
through mass media and the Internet. One polluting factory’s discharge caused cancer to
villagers from Zhaiwan, a Hubei village that borders to Henan province. Green Han River, a
local NGO from Xiangfan (located in Hubei province) mobilized public consensus and
collaborated with an influential group, Green Volunteer Beijing, to publish the news on
national and provincial newspapers. Henan provincial officials were alerted and ordered the
polluting factories closed. Aside from building the media campaign, NGOs also helped
citizens launch civil lawsuits against polluting enterprises to seek legal redress through the
courts. The Center for Legal Assistance for Pollution Victims (CLAPV) helped citizens sue
enterprises. However, the citizens are likely to disagree about how to manage the
compensation received, as happened in one case in which 1721 litigants were involved.12
In recent years, the Chinese ENGOs have also become watchdogs on international
enterprises for their environmental behaviours. Advocacy networks have been built between
Chinese local and national ENGOs and international ENGOs, such as Greenpeace and WWF
through their local offices. One such campaign was initiated by Greenpeace toward Yunnan’s
illegal logging operations of Asia Pulp & Paper (APP), a subsidiary of Sinar Mas Group, the
largest Indonesian pulp producer. From Green Watershed, a Yunnan-based NGO that
commits to protection of natural resources, Greenpeace learned that APP’s illegal operation
in Yunnan had been secretly permitted by Yunnan government. It then gathered evidence of
the company cutting trees in natural forests and planting non-native eucalyptus trees, which
are then used by to produce paper and pulp. Greenpeace, collaborating with another 5
influential Chinese ENGOs, sent a letter to the Department of Pollution Control, Ministry of
Environmental Protection.13 Such collaborative actions have caught the media’s attention and
have affected APP’s public image, as the company was suspected to have breached the law
by demolishing natural forest in China and was under investigation by central government.
Another important role of NGOs is their involvement in facilitating the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) and its potential in China. The mechanism, developed
under the Kyoto Protocol, has been an impetus to reduce greenhouse gases and promote the
green technology market in China, where huge potential for CDM projects exist. However,
the implementation of this mechanism has posed difficulties to Chinese private business, as
knowledge, capacity and the understanding of CDM markets are rather low. The Chinese
research institute GEI, collaborating with partners from Europe, organized “CDM Capacity
Building”. Through training and editing a handbook on CDM practice in China, it improved
12

See Benjamin van Rooij, 2008, The People vs. Pollution: Understanding Citizen Action against Pollution in
China, discussion paper, Colloquium, “Environmental politics in China”, University of Manchester, 3 Dec,
2008.
13
Among the 5 ENGOs, except Greenwatershed, which is a local ENGO from Yunnan, another 4 are all
national ones, including Green Village Beijing, Friends of Nature, Green Environmental Volunteers and
Shouwang Jiayuan.
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enterprises’ understanding of CDM project activities and related carbon trading concepts and
indirectly contributed to the mobilization of increasing resources through market mechanisms
to support energy efficiency.
Discussion and Remarks
Illustrated by the cases of ENGOs’ role in the four areas, it is found that the public has been
participating to China’s response to climate change. The success is mostly based on their
previous experiences in environmental education, campaigning and monitoring activities. The
shift on climate-related issues at a crucial time when such efforts are mostly needed should be
regarded as one progress Chinese ENGOs have made. In comparison to new industrializing
countries, the Chinese proves to be one of the few countries that see public involvement in
climate policies.14 This is based on increasing public awareness about climate-related issues
as well as the organizational development of green groups and NGOs in China.
Environmental groups are capable to secure funds and can focus on global environmental
issues such as climate change, instead of local or regional ones that have immediate effects to
their lives. In this regard, it has to be noted that Beijing’s environmental activism has been at
the forefront of the country’s environmental movements, probably because it is the origin of
the Chinese environmentalism and in comparison to other regions in China, closer
interactions have been made between local environmental groups and branches of
international NGOs that conduct the large amount of climate-related campaigns in the
country.
Additionally, the cases illustrate that existing connections and networks between these
nonprofit actors proves to be useful to facilitate cooperation. Each brings own advantages in
collaborations: international NGOs provide NGOs and GONGOs with the updated global
climate efforts and linkages to relevant international actors; GONGOs can provide access to
policy-makers and state and economic institutions; they also facilitate project implementation
through administrative structures that GONGOs can use (Zhao, 2004). ENGOs act quickly
and are representatives of local communities because they know their needs best. They are
also efficient in mobilizing volunteers and expertise in environmental education. Through
cooperation, the three actors complement each other and can succeed in improving
environmental capacity of the state and local authorities.
Viewing from NGOs’ activities in responding to climate change, it is found that
initiatives and operations are taken mostly on energy, environmental protection including
deforestation and pollution control. Sporadic initiatives are implemented in the adaptation of
climate change. This indicates that NGOs’ involvement in climate policies is still in an early
stage. They have yet to develop sufficient knowledge and expertise in providing specific
actions on strengthening local climate capacities.
Although ENGOs’ work in climate-related activities has just begun, innovative ways to
adapt to different communities have been brought out, based on ENGOs’ past experiences
and rich understanding of China’s current socio-economic development. Take the example of
energy saving promotions, different focuses are developed in urban and rural areas, where
environmental awareness levels differ. In cities where consumption is higher, energy saving
is educated with the perception of low-carbon life style raised. In rural areas, the primary goal
is to ensure that local communities’ sustainability in economically as well as ecologically.
Regarding the fact that China is in great need of local climate efforts, the joining of nonprofit
organizations provides a potential solution to the strengthening of the Chinese state’s climate
capacity and mitigating adverse impact of climate change.

14

In country such as Brazil
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Climate Change, The Traditional Chinese Calendar and Modernity
Dr. Rey Tiquia PhD1
Abstract
This era of unpredictable and at times colossal global climactic weather changes place
tremendous pressure upon the human internal environment to adapt to these dire changes in
the external environment. It places tremendous pressure upon our inner Guardian Qi wei qi as
well as the air or atmosphere da qi (which the Chinese Martial artist Lu Ji Tang refers to
metaphorically as similar to our inner Guardian Qi).
In premodern China, climate change is always contingent upon time and the seasons
i.e. the twelve two-hour periods, lunar month, seventy two pentads, twenty four solar periods,
the four seasons, the year and the sixty temporal units Jia Zi.
The cosmic yin and yang energies of heaven and earth ascend and descend and
climate weather conditions during the four seasons resonate with these changes. Humanity
must harmonize and adapt to these changes as well.
However, the current dominance of modernistic temporal systems by way of the
Gregorian calendar and the Greenwich Mean Time has led to the effacement of local and
traditional temporal systems such as the Chinese astrocalendrical system. This has led to the
spatio-temporal desynchronisation of humanity with the natural flow of the seasons/time shi.
This is clearly demonstrated in the practice of Chinese medicine in the southern
hemispherical region of Australia and New Zealand where the flow and movement of our Qi
is out of synchronization with the occurrence and flow of the seasons/time.
To help harmonize our Qi and our health with the nature’s temporal order I have
constructed a north-south hemispherical lunisolar calendar, which may contribute towards the
synchronization of our respective spatial locales with nature’s motion of temporality.
氣候 Qi hou Climate/Weather
A modern definition of the English word ‘climate’ refers to “ the weather conditions
prevailing in an area in general or over a long period”. 2Please note the absence of the role of
‘seasons’ in the definition. Having this definition in mind, can we use the word ‘climate’ to
translate into English the ancient Chinese word 氣候 qi hou? As an example, the ABC
Chinese-English Dictionary compiled by John DeFrancis translates qi hou into ‘climate’
(Defrancis, 1996, p. 477). Other similar dictionaries have done similar things. To clarify the
matter, I investigated the etymology of the Chinese word qi hou.
The Etymology of the Chinese Word 辭源 defines qi hou as “changes in the qi xiang
氣象 or jie ling 節令. [Commercial Press Editorial Board, Ci Yuan, Vol. II, p.1705]. Jie ling
節令 is defined as “Climate and other natural phenomena of a season” by the electronic
dictionary “Learning is so Easy” 快譯通, Chinese to English, English To Chinese Dictionary,
Taiwan, 2004. It also defines qi xiang 氣 象 ， as the “natural landscape, the natural
phenomenon” 自然界的景色，現象。[Ci Yuan, Vol II, p.1706]. Hence, we can say that Qi
hou, is similar in meaning to Qi xiang in the sense that both refer to changes involving the jie
ling. We can say that Qi hou is Qi xiang. Both mean changes and transformation in the
climate and in other natural phenomenon of a season. Hence, I do not think we can simply
translate the Chinese word qi hou into the English word ‘climate. It is more appropriate to
define Qi Hou as the “constantly changing state of the climate and other natural phenomenon
of a season/sub-seasonal phase.” Subseasonal phase or ‘subseasonal Qi is my English
1
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translation of the Chinese ancient terminology jie qi 節氣. Other Chinese language scholars
translate this Chinese word into English as ‘solar qi’ or ‘solar periods’.
變易 Bian Yi ‘Change’
DeFrancis translates 變易 Bian Yi into English as to ‘change’ or to ‘alter’ (Defrancis, 1996, p.
33). Yi 易 is the second Chinese word of the title of one of the oldest book in human history:
The Book of Changes 易經 Yi Jing.
In his introduction to the use of the Book of Changes, the late German Sinologist
Richard Wilhelm views the eight triagrams 八掛 as symbols 3 which stands for changing
transitional states. They are images, which are constantly undergoing change. The system of
the eight triagrams centres not on things in their state of beings as it is chiefly used in the
West, but rather upon the movement of things in their changes. Wilhelm sees the eight
triagrams not as representation of things as such but rather of their tendencies in movements
[Yi Ching, Wilhelm (Trans.), 2003, p. 25], that is in their re-presentation.
In early antiquity, China used the eight triagrams 八卦 Zhen 震，Li 離, Dui 兑 and
Kan 坎 to represent spring, autumn, summer and the winter seasons respectively. Since every
hexagram has six Yao 爻, hence these four Gua 卦 would have twenty-four yaos which
represent the twenty-four ‘solar Qi’ 二十四個節氣. The east and the spring season are
categorized under triagram zhen 震 and the element ‘wood’ 木. The south and summer
season is categorized under the triagram Li 離 and the element ‘fire’ 火. The west and
autumn season are categorized under the triagram dui 兑 and the element ‘metal’ 金. The
north and the winter season are categorized under the triagram Kan 坎 and the element
‘water’ 水. The triagrams zhen, Li, Dui and Dui correlates with the ‘four seasons' 四季. Every
hexagram has six yaos; and every yao 爻’manages’ 管 fifteen days. Hence, every hexagram
(which has 6 yaos 爻 ) altogether ‘manages’ ninety days. And the four hexagrams in total
manages 360 days (China Nurturing Life, 2004, p. 11]
The Structure of the Hexagram Tai 泰
Upper Outer
Triagram __________________ __________________
上卦；外卦 __________________ __________________
__________________

__________________

Upper Yao
5th Yao
4th Yao

Lower Inner
Triagram ______________________________________

3rd Yao

下卦；內卦 _______________________________________

2nd Yao

_______________________________________

1st Yao

(China Nurturing Life, 2004, p. 146]
3

“…a word or picture is symbolic if it contains more than can be grasped at first glance” (C.G. Jung Man and
his Symbols , London, 1964) [ Eberhard, 2003, p. 8].
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In this way, subtracting the four triagrams (Zhen, Li, Dui and Kan) from the sixty four
hexagrams we are left with sixty hexagrams left with 360 yaos 爻. Every yao 爻 represents a
day. However, each year has 365.25 days. Hence, there are 5.25 days, which have no Yi jing
gua to pair with. Hence, 5.25 days are equally distributed to the 60 hexagrams. If each day is
apportioned 80 points each, then 5.25 days will come to 420 points. Then distribute 420
points equally to the 60 hexagrams. Every hexagram will then get 7 points. Because one yao
爻 generates one day and one hexagrams ‘manages’ 主 6 days, and then add to this the
average 6 points, hence one hexagram is paired with 6 days and 7 points. This is what is
referred to as the ‘6 days 7 points’ 六日七分法 methodology developed by the famous Yi
Jing scholar Meng Xi. Because the ancient Chinese consider 5 days in each solar Qi
(subseasonal Qi or phase) constitute one hou 候 (pentad), hence in one year there are 12
months, 24 solar Qi 节气 and 72 pentads.七十二候 [China Nurturing Life Culture Research
Centre, Chun, ershisi jie Qi yang sheng jing (China Nurturing Life, 2004, p. 11].
Seasons, Subseasonal Phases and the Seventy-Two Pentads
The premodern Chinese lunisolar calendar 農曆 is a very complex but very reliable spatiotemporal map, which aids us to “calculate our position in time, space and the universe”
(Dalby, 2007, p. xix). It affords one the opportunity to experience the universe (that is the
continua of space-time) in both the Northern and Southern hemispheres of the globe. It is a
time tested reference tool in “comprehending the rhythms of the earth and the seasons”
(Dalby, 2007, p. xix).
In premodern Chinese medicine, being mindful of the correct season means
‘determining or diagnosing the disease correctly’ 決病法. The ‘Fourth Exemplar’ of the
Treatise on Febrile Diseases Caused by Cold Meteorological Influence ’ 傷 寒 例 第 四
outlines the ‘ temporality-related methodologies for diagnosing seasonal diseases’ jue bing fa
These methods are ‘the four seasons’ 四時, ‘eight solar nodes’ 八節, ‘the twenty four Qi’ 二
十四氣and ‘the seventy-two pentads’ 七十二候.
The ‘four seasons’ are spring, summer, autumn and winter seasons. The ‘eight solar
nodes’ ba jie are the eight time-segments into which the four seasons are further subdivided
into eight subseasonal phases, which are
1. Spring Begins 立春
2. Spring Equinox 春分
3. Summer Begins 立夏
4. Summer Solstice 夏至
5. Autumn Begins 立秋
6. Autumn Equinox 秋分
7. Winter Begins 立冬
8. Winter Solstice 冬至
The ‘eight solar nodes’ ba jie above are differentiated on the basis of the ascension,
descent, separation and coming together of the Yin and Yang (Qi).
The twenty-four subseasonal Qi (subseasonal phases) is further subdivided into the
twelve (lunar) monthly nodes 十二月節 and ‘twelve middle of the month Qi’ 十二中氣
(Please refer to table). The ‘monthly nodes’ are the ‘starting Qi’ 起始之氣 in every month,
while the ‘middle of the month Qi’ 中氣 is the Qi in the middle of the month. For example,
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the subseasonal phase Spring Begins is a ‘node’ of the first month 立春為正月節; while
‘Rain Water’ 雨水 is the ‘Qi (subseasonal phase) of the middle of the first lunar month
month’ 正月氣 of the Chinese calendar.
Let us further subdivide hou 候. Five days constitute one hou. In one year, there are
seventy-two hous, which make up three hundred sixty days in one year. The very meticulous
differentiation made here is the result of the combination of traditional Chinese astronomy 天
文 and the calendar 曆法 by the ancient sages who observed the influence of weather changes
天候衍變 upon the natural world, animals, plants, and humans. This paper is exploring the
effects of weather changes upon humans.
Month
Node

1
Spring
Begins

Qi

Rain
Water

2
Waking
little
critters
Spring
Equinox

3
Clear &
Bright

4
Summer
Begins

5
Grain
Ears

Grain
Rain

Little
Fullness

Summer
Solstice

in

6
Little
Heat

7
Autumn
Begins

8
White
Dew

9
Cold
Dew

10
Winter
Begins

11
Great
Snow

12
Little
Cold

Great
Heat

End of
Heat

Autumn
Equinox

Frost
Descends

Little
Snow

Winter
Solstice

Great
Cold

Table 1 Twenty-four Subseasonal Qi in one Year

Among the twenty-four subseasonal phases, the ‘four beginnings’ 四 立 (Spring
Begins, Summer Begins, Autumn Begins and Winter Begins) are the starting points of the
four seasons si shi. The ‘two solstices’ er zhi and ‘two equinoxes’ er fen represent the process
of the rise and fall shuai wang of the two Yin Qi and Yang Qi between heaven and earth tian
di. The rest represent the ‘phenological signs’4 徵候, which all-living things in the universe
generate. Each of the names of these two sets of subseasonal phases comes from marked
changes being performed by these living things. For example, ‘Rain Water’ is the
subseasonal phase when ‘the spring wind melts the ice’ chun feng jie dong. Waking little
Critters’ represents the subseasonal phases when ‘critters’ (tiny creatures) 蟄蟲 begin to be
active. (Lai Peng Ju et. al. (2003. Pp. 15-16)
The Subseasonal Phases 節氣 jie Qi5
Jie Qi generally refers to jie ling or seasonal changes. From the subseasonal phase of Spring
Begins li chun up to the subseasonal phase of the ‘Severely Cold ’ da han there are all in all
twenty four jie Qi or subseasonal phases. These subseasonal phases represent the
interrelationships between astronomy 天文, the seasons’ 季節, climate 氣候 and agricultural
production 農業生產. It is a cultural legacy from ancient China. As an integrated agricultural
climate/weather calendar, it has played a major role in agricultural production in China and
still in use up to the present time.

4

The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary Vol 2 (l993) defines phenology as “The field of study that deals
with the cyclic and seasonal natural phenomena, especially in relation to climate and plant and animal life.”
(Brown, 1993, p. 2184).
“Vegetation dynamics like growth, reproduction, winter rest, competition for nutrients, water, and light are
strongly influenced and determined by climate variables. A change in climate will result in a change of these
dynamics. A scientific discipline , which is able to link vegetation dynamics with climate variable is
PHENOLOGY. Phenology is the study of the timing of recurrent biological processes such as flowering,
budburst, insect hatching, birdnesting, fruit ripening and leaf fall (so called PHENOPHASES).”
[International Society of Biometeorology, 2009].
5
The following segment is a linguistic translation of the theme on ‘The Twenty Four Jie Qi’ from the on-line
version
of
the
Complete
Chinese
Encyclopaedia
中 國 大 百 科 全 書
http://wordpedia,pidc.org.tw/content.asp?ID=14057&query=1
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During the early history of civilization in China, the notion of spring sowing 春種, the
growth of crops during summer 夏長, the harvesting of crops during autumn 秋收 and the
storing of crops in winter 冬藏 evolved in response to the needs of seasonality patterns in
agricultural production.
At the time of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States period, with the emergence
of iron agricultural implements, seasonality requirements in agricultural production has
become much higher resulting to the gradual evolution of the concept of jie Qi. During this
time, the ancient Chinese sundials 土圭 was put into use to ‘measure the sun’s shadow’ and
thus fix the subseasonal phases. In the beginning, there were only the subseasonal phases of
the ‘Winter solstice’ 冬至 and ‘Summer Solstice’ 夏至. Subsequently the subseasonal phases
of the ‘Spring Equinox’ 春分; ‘Autumn Equinox’ 秋分; ‘ Spring Begins’ 立春; ‘Summer
Begins’ 立夏; ‘Beginning of Autumn’ 立秋 and ‘Beginning of Winter’ 立冬 were added.
During the Western Han Dynasty, the whole twenty-four subseasonal phases were recorded
in the Chinese philosophical text Huainanzi (ca.180-122 B.C.E.). The direction where the
handle of the Big Dipper is pointing was used to fix the temporal beginning of each of the
twenty-four subseasonal phases. The ‘Beginning of Spring’ was fixed on the first subseasonal
phase of the First month of the lunar calendar 正月節 （節氣）; while the start of the
subseasonal phase of ‘Rain Water’ 雨水 was fixed at the middle of the first lunar month. In
one year, there were twelve jie Qi and twelve zhong Qi ‘middle of the month Qi’. Later in
history, the two were collectively referred to as jie Qi. Astronomically speaking 天文上, the
twenty-four subseasonal phases represent the twenty-four (apparent) positions of the sun
along the ecliptic 視太陽在黃道上的位置 as the earth rotates around the former. When the
sun is on 0 degrees on the ecliptic, it is the ‘Spring Begins’ 立春. From this position, the
succeeding subseasonal phases follows in 15° intervals until the whole cycle of 360 degrees
of the ecliptic is covered. In each month of the Gregorian calendar 公曆上, the two days are
set for the two of the subseasonal phases.
The twenty-four subseasonal phases evolved in the regions surrounding the lower
reaches of the Yellow River basin in China. Hence the designated names and their meanings
of these reflect the specific, local characteristics hour 侯 corresponds with specific
phenological phenomena of agricultural production there, its seasons as well as the local
climate of the region.
The Seventy Two Pentads 七十二候
The content of the temporal system of the seventy two pentads was recorded in the classical
Chinese book The Complete Classical Text on Leisurely Living,” Chapter on Instructions on
the Flow of the Seasons” 《逸周書．時訓解》which was compiled in 2 BC. Each pentad 候
corresponds to a phenological phenomena 物候现象, which is referred to as a ‘resonating
pentad’ 候应. The sequential changes in each of the seventy-two resonating pentads reflect
the changes in the qi hou (constantly changing state of the climate and other natural
phenomenon of a season/sub-seasonal phase) each year. In the case of botanical resonating
pentads 植物候应, we have first the sprouting of the buds 萌芽萌动; then the flower blooms
开花; and then the bearing of fruits 结实. While in the case of the zoological resonating
pentads 动物候应 we have firstly, the ‘ first vibration’ 始振, the first cry 始鸣, and the
mating 交配；mobility 迁徙. As for examples of resonating pentads of inanimate things 非
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生物, we can point to phenomena of ‘beginning to freeze’ 始冻； ‘melts the ice’ 解冻;
‘thunder sings’ 雷始发生 etc. [<http://www.wiki.cn/wiki 七十二候>
The Four Seasons, 24 Subseasonal Phases and The Seventy-Two
Pentads
I SPRING

III AUTUMN

Spring Begin
Autumn Begins
37. Cool wind arrives
February 3 through 8th
1. East wind melts the ice
August 7 through 12th, 2009
th
th
2. Dormant creatures start to twitch August 12 through 17
38. White dew descends
February 8 through 13th
39. The cold cicada chirps
February 13 through 18th
3. Fish swim upstream break ice
August 17th through 23rd
Rain Water 雨水
Limit of Heat 處
40. The raptor sacrifices birds February 18 through 23rd
4. River otters sacrifice fish
August 23rd throughAugust 27th
5. Wild geese head north
August 27th through September 1st 41. Heaven & earth turn strict
February 23 through 28
6. Grasses & trees sprout
September 1st throughSeptember 7t 42. Millet ripens
February 28 through March 5th
Waking little critters 驚螫
White dew 白露
7. Peach blossoms open
September 7th through 12th
43. Wild geese come
March 5 through 10th
th
th
8. Golden orioles sing
September 12 through 17
44. Swallows leave
March 10 through 15th
th
rd
45. Flocksof births gather grain
March 15 through 20th
9. Hawks become doves
September 17 through 23
Spring Equinox 春分
Autumn Equinox 秋分
10. Swallows return
September 23 through 28th
46. Thunder pipes down
March. 20 through 25tt
th
11. Thunder sings
September 28 through October 2 47. Beetles wall up their burrows
March20 through
12. First lightning
October 2 through 8th
48. Waters dry up
March 30 through Apr. 4th
Clear & Bright 清明
Cold Dew 寒露
13. Paulownia blooms
October 8 through13th
49. Wild geese come as guests
April .4 through 9th
14. Moles become quails
October 13 through 18th
50. Sparrows enter water and
turn into clams
April . 9 through 14th
15. Rainbows appear
October 18 through 23rd
Grain Rain 穀雨
51. Chrysanthemums are tinged yellow April 14 through 20th
th
16. Floating weeds appear
October 23 through 28
Frost Descends 霜降
17. Pigeons flap their wings
October 28 throughNovember 2nd 52 The wolf sacrifices the beasts April 20 through 25th
18. The hoopoe alights in
53. Leaves turn yellow and fall
April 25 through 30th
th
the mulberry
November 2 through 7
54. Insects tuck themselves away April 25 through May 5th

II SUMMER

IV WINTER

Summer begins 立夏
19. Little frog peeps
November 7 through 12th
20. Worms come forth
November 12 trough 17th
21. Cucurbit flourishes
November 17 through 22nd
Grain full 小滿
22. Bitter herbs grow tall
November 22 through 27th
23. Waving grasses wither
November 27 through Dec. 2nd
24. Autumn wheat ripens
Dec. 2 through Dec. 6th
Grain in ear 芒種
25. Mantids hatch
December 6 through 11th
26. The shrike begins to shriek
December 11 through 16th
27. The mockingbird loses its voice December 16 through 21st
Summer Solstice 夏至
28. Deer break antlers
December 21 through 26th
29. Cicadas sing
December 26 through 31st
30. Crowdipper plant flourishes
December 31 through Jan. 5th
Slightly hot 小暑
31. Hot winds arrive
January 5 through 10th
32. Crickets comes into the walls
January10 through16th
33. The hawk studies and learn
January 16 through 20th
Severely hot 大暑
34. Rotted weeds turn into fireflies January 20 through 26th
35. The earth is steaming wet
January 26 through 31s

Winter Begins 立冬
55. Water begins to freeze
May 5 through 10th
56. Earth begins to freeze
May 10 through 15th
57. Pheasants enter the water and turn
into monster clams
May 15 through 21st
Slight Snow 小雪
58.Rainbows hide
May 21 through 26th
59. Heaven’s Qi rises Earth’s Qi sinks May2 through31st
60. Walled up and closed, winter
takes hold
May 31 through June 5th
Heavy Snow 大雪
61. The copper pheasant is silent
June 5 through 10th
62. Tigers begin to mate
June 10 through 15th
63. The Iris Pallassii sprouts
June 15 through 21st
Winter Solstice 冬至
64. Earthworms twist
June 21 through 26th
65. Elk sheds antlers
June 26 through July 1st
66. Spring waters move
July 1 through 7th
Slightly Cold 小寒
67. Wild geese return to their
northern home
July 7 through 12th
68. Magpies nest
July 12 through 17th
69. The pheasant cock calls its mate
July 17 through 22nd

36. Great rain sweeps through

January 31 through February 3rd

Severely Cold 大寒
70. Pheasant hens brook
July 22 through 27th
71. The vulture flies stern and swift July 27 through Aug. 1st
72. Streams and marshes are frozen solid Aug.1 through 5th

English entries of 72 pentads are from Lisa Dalby’s book: East Wind Melts the Ice: A Memoir through the Seasons,
2007.
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The Cyclical Flow of the Sixty-Gan zhi 干支 Temporal Units
“Time for the (premodern) Chinese is forever flowing without beginning or end, ” noted
Thome’ H. Fang. And “ it is customary for the Chinese people to use the kan-Chih (gan zhi)
干支” [Shu-Hsien Liu, 1974, 145-153] to mark the passage of time. There are ten heavenly
stems (gan) and twelve Earthly Branches (zhi), an alternating and sequential combination of
the two makes a cycle of sixty ” years, months, days and two-hour periods shi Chen 时辰 in a
day.
Each lunar year is represented by a pair of one celestial stem and one earthly branch.
The celestial stem is at the top while the earthly branch is below (please see table below). In
accordance with the succession and order 順序依次 of the each (celestial) stem 干 and
(earthly) branch 支, the pair of temporal symbols are arrayed with the first of the stem like jia
甲 being paired with the first branch Zi 子 which forms jia-zi 甲子. Jia Zi is the first among
the cycle of temporal units, while Gui Hai 癸亥 is the last of the 60-temporal units.
With regards the tracking down of the 60-year temporal units, please refer to the table
below. Beginning from jia-zi 甲子, one stem and branch are paired in sequential succession.
Every year ends up with a different stem and branch combination. For example, the year
2039, is the ji-wei year 己未. The succeeding year is the Geng-Shen year 庚申, which falls on
the year 2040. The following year is the year 2041, which is the xin-you year 辛酉. 2042 is
the ren-xu year 壬戌. etc. Because there are 10 celestial stems and 12 earthly branches,
hence, the celestial stems are arrayed back and forth six times. 10X6=60. On the other hand,
the earthly branches are arrayed back and forth 5 times. 12X5=60. After pairing the stems
and branches in this way, the 60th year is reached and the temporal cycle then goes back to
the first jia-zi 甲子 year with one stem and one branch combination. Hence 60 years is
referred to as one cycle or as one stem-branch or gan zhi cycle. However, the stem-branch
gan zhi 60-units cycle can also be used to track down diurnal time (two-hour period 时辰),
days in a lunar month as well as the twelve lunar months in a year [Yang Yi Ya 扬医亚,
1985, pp. 182-183].
The sixty gan zhi temporal cycle is very important in the practice of Chinese medicine.
More specifically, it is an important temporal tool in the acupuncture practice of zi wu liu zhu
子午流注 which is a method of choosing and using acupuncture points in dealing with a
specific clinical pattern 症候 in accordance with the patient’s temporal clotting and flow of
his/her Qi and blood .
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The Cyclical 60-Year, Months, Days, Two-Hour Periods
Jia 甲

Yi乙

Bing丙

Ding丁

Wu 戊

Ji 己

Geng庚

Xin 辛

Ren壬

Gui癸

Zi 子
1984
1.Rat

Chou丑
1985
2.Ox

Yin 寅
1986
3Tiger

Mao卯
1987
4.Rabbit

Chen 辰
1988
5.Dragon

Si 巳
1989
6.Snake

Wu 午
1990
7.Horse

Wei 未
1991
8.Sheep

Shen 申
1992
9.Monkey

You酉
1993
10.Rooster

Stem
Branch
Year
Zodiac

Jia甲

Yi 乙Hai

Bing丙

Ding丁

Wu 戊

Ji

己

Geng 庚

Xin 辛

Ren 壬

Gui 癸

Xu戌
1994
11.Dog

亥
1995
12.Boar

Zi 子
1996
13.Rat

Chou丑
1997
14.Ox

Yin 寅
1998
15.Tiger

Mao 卯
1999
16.Rabbit

Chen 辰
2000
17Dragon

Si 巳
2001
18.Snake

Wu 午
2002
19 Horse

Wei 未
2003
20.Sheep

Stem
Branch
Year
Zodiac

Jia 甲

Yi 乙

Bing丙

Ding 丁

Wu 戊

Ji

己

Geng 庚

Xin 辛

Ren 壬

Gui 癸

Shen申
2004
21Monkey

You 酉
2005
22Rooster

Xu 戌
2006
23 Dog

Hai 亥
2007
24.Boar

Zi 子
2008
25. Rat

Chou丑
2009
26. Ox

Yin 寅
2010
27 Tiger

Mao 卯
2011
28Rabbit

Chen 辰
2012
29Dragon

Si 巳
2013
30 Snake

Stem
Branch
Year
Zodiac

Jia 甲

Yi

乙

Bing丙

Ding 丁

Wu 戊

Ji 己

Geng 庚

Xin 辛

Ren 壬

Gui 癸

Wu 午
2014
31Horse

Wei 未
2015
32Sheep

Shen申
2016
Monkey

You 酉
2017
34Rooster

Xu 戌
2018
35. Dog

Hai 亥
2019
36.Boar

Zi
子
2020
37. Rat

Chou丑
2021
38。Ox

Yin 寅
2022
39 Tiger

Mao 卯
2023
40Rabbit

Stem
Branch
Year
Zodiac

Jia

Yi 乙

Bing丙

Ding 丁

Wu 戊

Ji

己

Geng庚

Xin 辛

Ren 壬

Gui 癸

Chen辰
2024
41Dragon

Si 巳
2025
42Snake

Wu 午
2026
43Horse

Wei 未
2027
44 Sheep

Shen申
2028
45Monkey

You 酉
2029
46Rooster

Xu 戌
2030
47.Dog

Hai 亥
2031
48.Boar

Zi 子
2032
49.Rat

Chou 丑
2033
50. Ox

Srem
Branch
Year
Zodiac

Jia 甲

Yi

Bing丙

Ding 丁

Wu 戊

Ji

己

Geng 庚

Xin 辛

Ren 壬

Gui 癸

Yin 寅
2034
51 Tiger

Mao 卯
2035
52 Rabbit

Chen辰
2036
53Dragon

Si
巳
2037
54 Snake

Wu 午
2038
55 Horse

Wei 未
2039
56 Sheep

Shen 申
2040
57Monkey

You 酉
2041
Rooster

Xu 戌
2042
59. Dog

Hai 亥
2043
60 Boar

Stem
Branch
Year
Zodiac

甲

乙

Modernity, Climate Change and the Time/Seasons
Modernity is a historical epoch characterize by the emergence of capitalism, industrialism,
ratio-legal bureaucracies, and state control of military power and surveillance. Its cultural
dimensions include discourses of rationality, scientism, and progress through economic
development [Connor & Geoffrey, 2000, p. 7]. In his book Cosmopolis the Hidden Agenda of
Modernity, Stephen Toulmin aptly describes the cosmology of ‘High Modernity’ as one
“which saw nature and humanity as distinct and separate”6, and pointed out as early as a
decade before the end of the last millennium the sure signs of the dismantling of this ‘modern
scaffolding’ and saw modern society moving towards the current unfolding epoch of ‘humanist
modernity’ which “reintegrates nature and humanity, and puts the local, circumstantial
arguments of ecology 7on a scientific footing with universal arguments of electromagnetism
and other physical theories.” and where “scientists no longer separate nature from society” .
We are at currently at the threshold of a humanist, modern and globalised era which is
characterized by a growing “disbelief in the meta-narratives of science, rationality and
objectivity, in which lived lives, the diverse, the complex, the unique” [Chan, Jonathan &.
Chan, Julienne E, 2000, p. 332-33] are favoured. More importantly there is a trend towards
the local, which also “acknowledges individuality, complexity and the subjectivity of
6

Stephen Toulmin described ‘High Modernity’ as an age “which saw nature and humanity as distinct and
separate’ giving way to an epoch of ‘humanized Modernity’ or postmodernity “which reintegrates nature and
humanity” [ Toulmin, 1990 ,pp. 182-183].
7
‘By now, people understand that ‘nature’ is not a source of neutral resources to be exploited for our benefit;
quite as much, it is our terrestrial home. In political and social debate, therefore, questions about “ecology” –
the Greek rots of this word mean “the science of household management” –have irreversibly moved to the
center of the practical stage.” (Toulmin, 1990, p. 182).
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personal experience” [Chan, Jonathan &. Chan, Julienne E, 2000, p. 332-33], as well as the
organic unity of man (humanity) and heaven (nature)8 [Liu. & Wei, 1970, p. 8]; that is, as
expressed by Chen Dingsan, the fact that the nature world and the human world are
organically “of one Qi” tian ren tong Qi 天人同氣 [Chen Dingsan, 1986, p. 16].
Climate Change Qihou Bianyi -The Constantly Changing State of The Climate and
Other Natural Phenomenon of a Season/ Subseasonal Phase
Hence, at this present postmodern era, climate change qi hou bian yi 气候变易 is seen as
contingent upon shi 時 (time and season)9, shi chen (twelve two-hour period), ri (day), yue
(month), qi shi er hou (seventy two climactic weather pentads), er shi si ge jie Qi (twenty
four subseasonal phases), si shi (four seasons), liu Qi or liu jing (the Six Ecological Seasonal
Qi or Six Divisions), nian (year), and jia zi (sixty temporal units). As the premodern TCM
scholar/practitioner Yang Ru Hou (1861-1928) stated (paraphrasing and further developing
this concept from the Yellow Emperor’s Manual of Corporeal Medicine, ‘Chapter on the
Regulation and Nurturing of the four Qi’ 內經素問。四氣調攝 ):
The cosmic yin and yang energies of heaven and earth ascend and descend and
climactic/weather changes 氣候 during the course of the four seasons resonate with these
changes. And humanity must conform and resonate (harmonize) with it 順應 with it as well.
During spring and summer, one must nurture the cosmic Yang energy. While during autumn
and winter one must nurture the cosmic Yin energy 春夏養陽；秋冬養陰. In this way,
unusual diseases will never afflict one. Those who dare goes against it will certainly be
afflicted with severe illness. Whichever acutract the fierce and toxic Qi decides to ‘remain’,
one will get that illness 毒烈之氣 ，留在何經，則發何病.
When one is ‘injured’ by the cold meteorological influence 傷於寒 in winter one will
certainly get the warm factor disease 溫病 in spring. When one is damaged by the wind
meteorological influence in spring, one will certainly get dinnertime ‘leak’ 飧泄 in summer.
When one is ‘injured’ by the heat meteorological influence in summer 暑, one will certainly
be afflicted with a condition known as 痎瘧 (a type of malaria). When one is injured’ by
humidity meteorological influence during autumn one will be afflicted by a coughing disease
咳唆.
The above are cases of illnesses one gets when one is ‘injured’ by the changing qi hou
i.e. changes in the climate and other natural phenomenon of a season/ subseasonal phases
unfolding between heaven and earth. However, there are times when the qi hou do not occur
in synchronicity with nature’s temporal order (seasons) 亦有與時不應者. Hence, in the

8

In discussing the history of Chinese thought, James T.C. Liu and Wei Ming Tu quoted the contemporary
Chinese philosopher Wing Tsit Chan as stating that:
If one word could characterize the entire history of Chinese philosophy, that word
Would be humanism—not the humanism that denies or slights a Supreme power,
But one that professes the unity of man and Heaven. In this sense, humanism has
Dominated Chinese thought from the dawn of its history. [Liu, James T. C. & Wei
Ming Tu , 1970, p. 8]
9
The Chinese character 時 shi is written with the radical ri 日 ( the sun) and the phonetic component si 寺
which stands for a temple where the ‘temporal’ law is applied constantly’. A more ancient form of writing the
script conveys the meaning of the time when plants sprout under the influence of the sun or the continuity of the
flow of the subseasonal phases.[G.D. Wilder ,1974, p. 47-48].
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classics 經 there is this discussion on whether or not people gets afflicted by an illness when
the qi hou has arrived or not 未至至而至者病論. When nature’s temporal order has arrived
有至 and is in harmony with the cycle of the changing qi hou then there will be tranquility 而
和則平. However, when nature’s temporal order has arrived and the qi hou is quite severe,
then people gets ill 至而甚則病. Or, it has arrived but the qi hou is the reverse to what it
should be 反, then, people also fall ill. If the temporal order should have arrived and it turns
out that it has not, then people falls ill. When the temporal order should not have not arrived
and it turns out that it has arrived, and then people also fall ill.
These are situations wherein a specific qi hou is ‘occurring wrongly’ at a specific
subseasonal phase 非節之氣候. This will certainly generate illnesses 必生病也. An example
is when it should be warm in winter but instead it is ‘ragingly warm’ 暴暖. Hence, winter
warm factor diseases occurs 冬溫. When it should be warm during spring and summer but
instead it is ‘ragingly cold’ 暴寒. Hence, winter pestilence 寒疫之纇 of sorts will emerge.
Above are the correlations between the principles of illnesses 病理 and the qi hou 氣候. This
is to show that the study of the astrocalendar 曆學 and medicine 醫學 is mutually related.
Although Western medicine 西醫 does not talk about the methodology of the study of the
astrocalendar, however they observe the prevalence of infectious diseases and intestinal and
stomach diseases during the summer season; the prevalence of respiratory diseases during the
winter seasons and thus are reluctant to abandon the qihou factors 氣候 in discussing about
pathology 病理. As to accounting for qi hou changes 夫氣候之變遷, there is the difference
between the direct and slanting way the light of the sun reaches us. The sun and the moon
passes through in heaven which has not changed even since the beginning of antiquity
…Humanity is in the midst of this Qi between heaven and earth and is closely and
interactively connected with the Qi transformation unfolding between heaven and earth 天的
之 氣 化 息 息 相 通 . As medical practitioners harmonizing with the temporal order and
surveying Qi 候時測氣, how can we ignore these things? [Yang Ruhou, 1985, pp. 293-295]
Practicing the Tradition of Chinese Medicine As Local Knowledge In a Globalised
World
The practice of bian zheng lun zhi 辨证论治 i.e. the practice of proposing treatment
principles in accordance with the pattern of clinical phenomena (Tiquia, 1996) is a body of
knowledge that is anchored on local conditions. It is an ancient traditional medical practice,
which emerged and became systematized from the local health contingencies in ancient
China and then extended in time and space to other locales in China, Japan, Korea, Asia,
Europe, America and Australia. It is a set of medical practices that “adapt to different local
circumstances, to meet the heterogeneity 混雜性 of the local requirements of the system...
(plasticity 可塑性) and the capacity… to incorporate many local circumstances and still
retain a recognizable identity (coherence 條理性)” , as the contemporary American feminist
philosopher of science Susan Leigh Star would put it. Plasticity and coherence are the two
factors, which make a system of knowledge ‘robust’ 健狀的 according to Star [Star, 1989,
pp. 15-16].
On this question of the transmission of knowledge from one locale to another, the
Chinese has an equivalent set of phrases which goes: yin di zhi yi 因地制宜; yin ren zhi yi 因
人製宜; yin shi zhi yi 因時製宜 which I translate into English as ‘doing things which are
appropriate to the locality; the culture of the local people and local temporality (local time
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and seasons).’ With the practice of bian zheng lun zhi i.e. differentiating clinical patterns and
associating yao [Tiquia, 2004, p. 101] not only can emergent clinical phenomena 症候 be
holistically differentiated in detail, but at the same time they can also be dealt with
dynamically in their various stages of development.” [Zu Xing, 2007, p. 44]. In this way,
illnesses can be simultaneously dealt with spatially 在空间上 as well as temporally 在时间
上。
Practising TCM in the northern hemispherical region of China follows local
temporality 时, spatiality 空间 and human culture 人文 (humanities) . Historically, the
practice of bian zheng lun zhi 辨证论治 followed and continues to follow the circularity 圆
of time (continuous cycle of the past, present and future cycle of the seasons) as well as the
quadratic 方 nature of space (the sky above, the earth below and the directional locale of the
east, south, west and north) with humanity occupying the central spatio-temporal position.
In the Southern Hemispherical region of Australia and New Zealand, deploying a
syncretic ‘double insider’ methodology of standing outside both the analytic tradition of
contemporary science studies and inside contemporary TCM practice and analysis, I connect
with the theory of local knowledge developed by contemporary philosophers of science such
as Susan Leigh Star, Joseph Rouse, Bruno Latour, Helen Verran and David Turnbull, who
have been at the forefront of de-colonizing traditional and indigenous knowledge systems
from
the
Trojan
horse
of
scientific
theories.
[Tiquia,2009
http://arts.monash.edu.au/mai/asaa/proceedings.php]. From this stance, I have reconstituted
the practice of TCM as bian zheng lun yao 辨證論藥 i.e. differentiating clinical patterns and
associating yao. I see ‘yao’ as routine therapeutic practices that move the patient’s Qi which
includes acupuncture, traditional Chinese massage, food therapy, prescribing materia medica,
emotional counter therapy, Qi exercises, Tai ji quan etc. In TCM clinical encounters, Qi is
performed as differentiating clinical patterns and associating yao [Tiquia, 2004, p. 101].
Living in our contemporary world dominated by abstract, universalizing and
modernistic temporal systems such as the Gregorian calendar (with its northern hemispherical
bias) and Greenwich Mean time (with its de-localizing bias of universal time) presents huge
challenges for those of us living in the southern hemisphere, who wish to follow health
practices according to the principles of living in harmony with local space, local time and
local culture.
Furthermore, for those of us living in the southern hemisphere, there is the added
challenge of practicing TCM according to the foundation principle of bian zheng lun yao
(differentiating clinical patterns and associating yao). This is a practice based on highly
specific prescribed health practices and treatment principles dispensed in accordance with
clearly defined complex temporal phases and periods set on the basis of the ancient northern
Hemispherical Chinese lunisolar calendar. In the absence of such an adaptation of this
calendar for the southern hemisphere, it is almost an impossibility to practice bian zheng lun
yao.
To address this problem, I researched the ancient traditional Chinese calendar and
adapted its core principles to produce a Chinese Medical & Agricultural Lunisolar Calendar
(Northern & Southern Hemispheres) relevant to Australia’s southern hemispherical local
conditions. This will now make it possible to follow best practice in TCM by utilizing such a
calendar to harmonize the flow of our Qi with the flow of the seasons here in the southern
hemisphere. In addition, with this calendrical tool, we can ‘reverse’ the clinical activities of
‘differentiating clinical patterns and associating yao in accordance with the flow of the
seasons here. For example, by using this calendar, it is now possible to forecast, prevent and
clinically manage ‘seasonal diseases’ shi bing 时病 brought about by external factors wai gan
bing (influenza type conditions like the ‘ severe warm factor epidemics 大溫病 [Lai Peng Ju,
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2003]) as the calendar will indicate the likely spatio-temporality of this condition’s genesis,
its prevention, and specific, effective diurnal time periods in which to treat this condition.
Examination of the Characteristics of the Traditional Chinese Calendar
The traditional Chinese calendar with its northern hemispherical bias is ironically found and
used in many TCM practices, Chinese restaurants and homes in Australia. On examining a
copy of such a calendar for the year 2007 (the Year of the Pig ding hai nian 丁亥年
published by the Chinois for Living), for one who cannot read Chinese characters, it is just
like any ordinary Gregorian calendar with the twelve months of January, February, and
March etc. complete with the Arabic numerals from 1- 31. However, for one literate in the
Chinese language, one can see that aspects of the traditional Chinese Farmer calendar nong li
農曆 or yin li 阴历 blended with the days and months of the Western Gregorian calendar.
Thus we have the ‘Chinese lunisolar calendar’, which evolved after the adoption
of the Gregorian calendar in 1911and syncretised with aspects of the traditional Chinese
calendar.
As we are all aware, we celebrated the arrival of the ‘Ox Year’ Ji Chou nian 己丑年
last January 26, 2009 of the Gregorian calendar, which falls on the ‘first day of the first
month of the traditional calendar’ i.e. Ji Chou nian 己丑年, zheng yue chu yi ri 正月初一日.
The first day of the traditional Chinese calendar month is the day on which the astronomical
new moon (i.e. conjunction) is calculated to occur” [ Doggett, L.E. Calendars, 2004
<http://astro.nmsu.edu/~lhuber/leaphist.html>]. However, the 26th of January in the northern
hemisphere (in China) is just nine days before the subseasonal phase 节气 of the “Beginning
of Spring” li chun 立春 [< http://www.nongli.com/item3/index.asp>]. However, here in the
southern hemisphere, the 26th of January 2009 is just the end of the summer season and the
start of autumn. From these, we can see that the flow of the seasons in the southern
hemispherical region of Australia runs in the opposite direction to that of China and regions
in the northern hemisphere.
Locating the Year and First Days of the First Lunar Month in the Southern Hemisphere
According to the rules followed by Purple Mountain Observatory (1984) in Nanjing, China,
in constructing the Chinese traditional calendar, ‘the first day of the month is the day on
which
the
New
Moon
occurs
[
Doggett,
L.E.
Calendars,
2004
<http://astro.nmsu.edu/~lhuber/leaphist.html>]. On this basis, I calculated the first days of the
lunar month in the Australia/New Zealand, from a table of the various phases of the moon in
the southern hemisphere for the years 2006-2010, in Easy Organic Gardening 2006 by Lyn
Bagnall. I then proceeded to set the first day chu yi 初一 of the first month zheng yue 正月 of
the year of the of the Ox Year, Ji Chou Nian 己丑年on the 2009 Gregorian calendar. In
order to do this, I first located and then superimposed the exact dates of the twenty-four
subseasonal phases 节气 onto each month of Gregorian calendar (2008- 2009). I then aligned
them with the seventy-two pentads qi shi er hou 七十二候. Using a Chinese language
calendrical table, which converts the 60-temporal gan-zhi units of years, months, days and 2hour periods into the Gregorian calendarical years, months and days [Ou Yang Shan Ren,
2007] , I tallied the days and months for the years 2008-2009. I then superimposed the
Chinese gan-zhi (combination of the celestial stems and earthly branches) onto the days and
months of the 2008-2009 Gregorian calendar.
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August 20th 2009 -The ‘ Chinese Spring Festival’ of the Year of the Tiger in the
Southern Hemispherical Region of Australia
After executing the above, I was able to establish the first day of the first month of the
Southern Hemispherical Chinese Medical & Agricultural Lunisolar Calendar: August 20,
2009. In doing so, I also discovered that our ‘spring festival’ or chun jie or Lunar New Year’s
Day fell on the New Moon of August 20th 2009, some six months ahead of the Chinese New
Year Date in the Northern hemisphere. Hence, on the 20th of August 2009, we will begin the
‘Year of the Tiger’ Geng Yin nian 庚 寅 年 . The first Chinese Medical & Agricultural
Lunisolar Calendar (for both northern and southern hemispheres) was thus constructed.
Enclosed (fig. 1) is a copy of the Chinese Medical & Agricultural Lunisolar Calendar
(Southern Hemisphere) for August 2009 (the beginning of the Tiger year) which features the
reversed flow of the twenty four subseasonal phases 节气, seventy two pentads 七十二侯 as
well as the days of the months both in the Gregorian calendar and the traditional Chinese
calendar. It also features the specific dates of the sixty gan zhi 干支 temporal units for the
year 年, month 月 and days 日 of the Chinese lunar calendar.
This calendrical tool, a practical critique of modernity which restores and breathes
new life into an ancient Chinese spatio-temporal tradition will hopefully bring human life
into close rhythm with the organic flow of all forms of natural life in this universe 宇宙. It
will help us align the performance of our Qi with the occurrence and flow of the seasons in
the Southern hemisphere. More specifically, it will facilitate the choice of acupuncture points
and acutracts in accordance with the flow and clotting of our patient Qi and blood 子午流注.
In this way, we can properly execute seasonally appropriate ‘nurturing life’ exercises 养生
and adopt lifestyles that promote health, longevity and prevent diseases. At the same time,
this Chinese Medical & Agricultural Lunisolar Calendar (Southern Hemisphere) can facilitate
the ‘translation’ of the ancient Chinese northern hemispherical concept of ‘the circulating five
phases and six climactic influences [Qi]’ 五 运 六 气 into the Australian southern
hemispherical locale. In doing so, the occurrence of exogenous seasonal diseases 时病 like
epidemic influenza 流感 can be traditionally and properly diagnosed and their future health
risks may be ascertained and managed.
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Climate Protection in The People’s Republic of China
Bartosz Rakoczy1

Abstract
Climate protection is one of the basic problems in the modern world. It is also a problem
which should be solved in an all-world scale and not by each state separately. It does not
mean, however, that individual states could not regulate issues concerning climate protection
in their own legislation. Constitutional regulations play an important role in climate
protection.
Climate protection in the constitution of the People’s Republic Of China is carried out
on several plains. First, climate is protected as an environmental element to the use of which
all citizens have the right. Public authorities ensure climate protection. Second, climate
protection occurs within the protection of rights and freedoms of an individual. An individual
/ citizen has the right to use environment, and also climate. Third, climate is protected as an
element of environment on the basis of the regulations concerning environment as the good
of the whole nation.
In the first place it should be noticed which duties public authorities have when it
comes to climate protection. It is about presenting their duties concerning this notion. Climate
is protected first due to the fact that it is an element of environment which public authorities
should protect and, second, climate as an environmental element is the common good of a
nation.
Later constitutional position of an individual concerning climate protection will be
presented. In particular, the duty of an individual to protect climate will be characterized as
well as the rights of an individual to use environment.
The summary will contain proposed solutions which could be accepted in the
Constitution in the future in order to protect climate in a better way by the People’s Republic
Of China.
The environmental protection, in particular climate protection, is a challenge for the
modern world. As W. Skrzydło points out “the environmental protection has been one of the
principal issues of the modern society and state” 2 . In consequence, the modern legislator
faces the challenge connected with legal regulations concerning the environmental protection.
Among notions referring to the environmental protection one should also take into account
intensity with which one should protect particular environmental components without
forgetting about the fact that we should protect the environment (as a whole) despite
everything.
At present the most important challenge connected with the environmental protection
of the contemporary state is the climate protection. It is connected with the scale of climate
violation as well as the scale of the results of such violations. The climate protection is a
challenge not only for biologists, economists, ecologists but also for legislators. That
protection should be carried out both on the level of international public law, regional law
(eg. the European Union law) and the national law3.
1
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From the point of view of national law one should recognize as the most important the
regulations concerning the environmental protection including the climate protection in the
constitutional regulations. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China has the highest
authority in the legal system so it plays the role of the most important and superior legal act.4
At the same time the People’s Republic of China is considered as the state where dictatorship
of the proletariat lies at the basis5.
The report covers discussing legal regulations concerning the climate protection n the
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China dated 4 December 19826. The aforementioned
report stresses above all tasks of the state, issued connected with international aspects of the
climate protection as well as the legal situation of individuals concerning the climate and its
protection.
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, as well as other constitutions of
the world, does not contain the definition of climate. Such an important act should not
contain definitions since it is the act of a general and abstract character. Moreover one should
notice that generally in legal sciences it is difficult to define such a not legal notion as
climate. It may be assumed that in legal sciences “the notion of climate has not been precisely
defined in accordance with legal regulations. […] The climate is defined as the characteristic
system of phenomena and atmospheric processes occurring on a particular area which
develops under the influence of physical and geographical properties of that area. The climate
is also defined as an average state of weather on a given area, characterized on the basis of
measurements carried out in the period of at least 30 years since measurement of climate
components is necessary7.
The analysis of the regulation concerning the climate protection in the Constitution of
the People’s Republic of China one should start from the preamble. J. Rowiński and W.
Jakubiec claim that “the bases of the constitutional system of the state [i.e. China – author’s
note] are regulated by the preamble and regulations contained in the first chapter. 8 ” The
preamble to the Constitution of China contains a sentence saying “ The future of China is
closely linked to the future of the World”
That sentence from the last part of preamble has a very important meaning since it
expresses the connection between the world’s history and its future. It means that the
People’s Republic of China undertakes international cooperation also regarding the climate
protection for that is one of the most important challenges for the modern world.
International cooperation, as it arises from the preamble, is to be connected with the
future of the world. It means that the People’s Republic of China not only undertakes such a
cooperation but also does that by taking the world’s future into account. It seems that the
climate protection is the best example of the kind of actions taken into considerations. Not
only does it require international cooperation but also it is future-oriented because global
actions undertaken today are going to produce effects only in the future. Climate is protected
not only for contemporary generations but first of all for the future ones.
Notions connected with the environmental protection including the climate protection
appear also in the next parts of the Constitution of China. Art. 9 may be treated as the
constitutional basis of the climate protection „All mineral resources, waters, forests,
mountains, grassland, unreclaimed land, beaches, and other natural resources are owned by
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the state, that is by the whole people, with the exception of the forest, mountains, grassland,
unreclaimed land and beaches that are owned by collective in accordance with the law.
The state ensures the rational use of natural resources and protects rare animal and
plants. Appropriation or damaging of natural resources by any organization or individual by
whatever means is prohibited”.
The aforementioned regulation is contained in the first chapter of the Constitution of
the People’s Republic of China called „General Principles”. That chapter covers the basic
constitutional and political principles of the People’s Republic of China. Within the general
principles the constitutional legislator shall regulate the basic values that the constitution
should protect.
Natural resources should be treated as such without any doubt but their protection is
connected first of all with the role that the aforementioned resources play in the functioning
of the state and society. They are to serve the common good and all the people what arises
from the art 9 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. „The state is responsible
for assuring the national use of these natural resources and for protecting the same resources
against exploitation”9
From the analyzed point of view, important is the fact that the components
enumerated in the art. 9 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China make up the
notion of the environment. They are also the environmental components. Their rational
acquiring, use and management is supposed to aim at the environmental protection. It is
worthy noticing that the art. 9 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China mentions
plants as environmental components deserving protection. Flora protection, regardless of the
fact if the plants are rare, protected or common has the great significance in the climate
protection. The state of flora serves the stability of climate and in consequence leads to its
protection.
The art. 20 of the Constitution of China that states „The state promotes the
development of the natural and social sciences, disseminates knowledge of science and
technology, and commends and rewards achievements In scientific research as well as
technological innovation and invention” is also counted among the constitutional bases of the
climate protection.
The aforementioned regulation has a general meaning and refers not only to issues
concerning the environmental protection. Yet this article may also be used for issues
connected with the environment and its protection since it imposes the duty on the state to
promote and develop natural and social sciences, deepening knowledge and supporting the
development of technical and technological innovations.
It is interesting that the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China imposes the
duty to promote and develop natural and social sciences. The development of these sciences
is naturally connected with aiming at obtaining funds necessary for the environmental
protection including the climate protection. In case of the environmental protection, including
the climate protection, one can clearly notice how nature and social sciences may serve a
common goal since the climate protection is not possible without involving both natural and
social sciences. Natural sciences allow to understand the mechanisms that rule the nature and
climate. They also allow to gain proper means for the climate protection10.
Social sciences also play an important role in the climate protection. Economics is
important as well for it allows to figure out the costs of climatic changes as well as the law
which allows to assure the best efficient means and instruments for the climate protection
9
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including sanctions and sociology describing social consequences of climatic changes and
allowing to forecast future effects.
The national authorities have the duty to support and develop new techniques and
technologies. Such a situation is in favour of gaining new ways of development and as a
consequence the climate protection because such technical and technological solutions taking
the need to protect the climate into account may be consciously suggested.
Another provision of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China that is
connected with the climate protection is the art. 26 which stipulates that. The state protects
and improves the environment in which people live and the ecological environment. It
prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards. The state organizes and encourages
afforestation and the protection of forests.
The aforementioned provision should be treated as the basic one when it comes to the
climate protection. Similarly as in the case of former provisions the legislator does not clearly
point out that they mean only climate. The legislator refers to the notion of the environment
and not the climate.
Yet it stems from that provision that it says also about the climate which is an
important environmental component. The contents of that provision is wide.
The aforementioned provision imposes on the state the obligation to protect the
environment, including the climate. That duty should be understood widely. It can be
assumed that the state is obliged to undertake all the actions aiming at preserving and
improving the state of the environment. The duties connected with the environmental
protection may be realized on four planes – constituting laws, organizing activities connected
with the environmental protection, assuring funds and carrying out ecological education. The
constitutional obligation of the state concerning the environmental protection is set out on
these four planes.
When it comes to the first of the aforementioned planes it should be pointed out that
the state has duties concerning constituting the law favourable to the environment what can
be done both directly and indirectly. Direct method consists in constituting legal acts aiming
directly at the environmental protection, while indirect method consists in constituting other
standards (eg. tax standards) that are to aim at different purposes but at the same time it is
possible to reach a fiscal goal11.
The state also has the duty to organize the environmental protection. It occurs first by
indicating which organs are competent for the issues concerning the environmental protection
and what are their competences. The state may constitute specialized bodies, entrust already
working bodies with performing the tasks or accept a mixed model consisting in part of the
competences being performed by specialized bodies and another part by not specialized12.
The next task of the state is assuring financial means for the environmental protection.
The state is obligated to finance the environmental protection either through the national
budget or specialized funds. The lack of sufficient funds for the environmental protection is
the basic reason of ineffectiveness of protective measures.
The last task should be ecological education on all the stages beginning from
kindergartens to adult education. The state should assure proper educational content in school
curricula, including studies.
The aforementioned solutions will also refer to issues concerning the climate
protection.
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First, the state should constitute the regulations that either directly or indirectly are
favourable to the climate protection. Thereby it is forbidden to constitute regulations that may
lead to violating the climate.
The state should also organize the climate protection by designating competent organs
which might deal in climatic issues under their own tasks. Then the state could entrust these
bodies with specific competences.
The state should also assure financial means for the environmental protection and
directly bear the costs of the climate protection (financing technologies favourable to the
climate protection).
The state’s duty consists also in carrying out education concerning the climate
protection both for children and adults. The education is first of all connected with making
the society aware of the importance of the climate and indicating the need of its protection.
It results from the art. 26 of the Constitution of China that the state has an obligation
to protect the environment, including the climate, on account of people. The Chinese
legislator indicates clearly that it concerns the environment in which people live. One can
clearly see the connection between the environmental protection and individual’s legal
situation, including the connection with its laws. The Chinese legislator also proves that the
protection of human life and health is the basic motive of the environmental protection in the
Chinese legislation. The following question occurs - can the right of humans to live in the
favourable environment be deduced from the art. 26 of the Chinese Constitution?
In spite of the fact that the regulation refers to human life and health as the basic
values, it is hard to deduce that every human being has the right to live in the favourable
environment and the state is obliged to assure that.
First of all, the regulation is not to be found in the second chapter of the Constitution
of China – the basic rights and duties of citizens, so the legislator’s intention was not to refer
to the rights and freedoms and even duties of citizens but only indicating one of the basic
duties of the state.
Secondly, human life and the environment favourable to humans are only indicated as
a standard in that regulation at achieving of which the state should aim, and not the value
itself.
One should also make the demand de lege ferenda that such a right of an individual to
live in the favourable environment should be expressed in the future.13
From the analyzed point of view one should also treat duties of the state concerning
protecting the environment against pollutions as very important. It is a very important and at
the same time a very courageous declaration of the state taking the form of an obligation. The
danger of pollution is now treated as one of the most dangerous challenges for the
environment in China.14
The state committed itself to preventing pollutions and the risk of such pollutions. It
seems that the obligation refers to the very climate protection. Modern problems concerning
the environmental pollution first of all refer to the air, and as a consequence to the climate. So
the state is obliged to prevent air pollution, including the pollution which may result in
climate violation. It does not only concern the fact that the state alone refrains itself from
polluting the air but also leads to such a situation when other subjects also refrain themselves
from such an activity.
The state has an obligation to prevent the risk of pollution as well which means
referring to the universally accepted prevention principle in the modern environmental
13

The same problem refers also to many other constitutions, eg. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland
dated 2 April 1997
14
E. Chien, Working towards environmental quality in the 21st century, Pekin 1991, p. 19.
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protection law. The mentioned principle first of all assumes refraining from unlawful
violation of the environment at the same time accepting the fact that the environmental
impact is necessary. That principle constitutes the basis of the European environmental
protection law.
Prevention requires from the state creating proper legal instruments aimed at its
realization, in particular by specifying the limits, standards and indicating in which situations
it is necessary to obtain the environmental permit.
The state has an obligation not only to prevent pollution but also to control it. It
means that the state must constitute proper procedures of control and register the results
under the monitoring system.
Another important regulation is forest protection stemming from the art. 26 of the
Constitution of China. As it has been pointed out above, the People’s Republic of China
protects the forests and prevents their violation. The forest protection occurs again in the
regulation. The following question occurs – to what purpose the Chinese legislator referred
twice to the forest protection? In the first case mentioned before forest protection concerned
natural environmental reserves, while the art. 26 of the Constitution of China refers to the
forest protection in the context of preventing the environment violation. Also protection
against pollution is important which forests are able to assure. Also solutions accepted in the
art. 26 should be treated as important from the point of view of the environment in that
context. The constitutional legislator draws our attention to the forests as a natural means of
protecting the environment against pollution. On the other hand however, the legislator seems
to be aware of the significance of forests for the environmental protection, in particular the
climate.
Solutions concerning the environmental protection, in particular the ones referring to
the climate protection in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China should be
accepted with satisfaction. The most important drawback, apart from the lack of clear
reference to the rights of an individual to live in favourable conditions, is the lack of
reference to the sustainable development principle on any grounds. The Chinese legislator
never refers to that principle in the Constitution of China. It seems that it is difficult to protect
the environment without referring to the sustainable development principle in the modern
state. Reference to that principle strengthens the constitutional bases of the environmental
protection. It also makes them more universal and connected with global means of the
environmental protection which has the fundamental significance in case of the climate
protection.
The art. 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland may be cited as an example. It
says that “The Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence and integrity of its
territory and ensure the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens, the security of the
citizens, safeguard the national heritage and shall ensure the protection of the natural
environment pursuant to the principles of sustainable development.”
Reference to that clause could strengthen the climate protection in the Constitution of
China all the more so because the legislator realizes the necessity to cooperate with other
countries to the extent of challenges that the modern world poses. Therefore the sustainable
development principle should be made de lege ferenda the basic principle of the Chinese
environmental protection law. Also direct reference to the concept of sustainable
development would be legitimate.
Summing up, the solutions adopted in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of
China referring directly to the climate protection are good ones. The legislator treats the
environmental protection, including the climate protection as the constitutional value which is
important in itself. Also wide regulation of notions concerning the environmental protection,
including the climate protection, is justified. The basic duties concerning the climate
580

protection are imposed on the state by the constitutional legislator. The very state is
responsible for the environmental state and its protection. Therefore the state should
constitute regulations favourable to the environmental protection both aiming at that directly
or indirectly. The state should also assure financial means for organizing the environmental
protection and ecological education.
The state should assure the proper level of the environment due to the protection of
health or life of an individual and prevent the environmental pollution, including the risk of
its violation.
The lack of direct regulation of individuals’ right to the life in favourable environment
as well as the lack of reference to the sustainable development principle are drawbacks of the
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. In the future constitutional regulations should
be supplemented with these elements.
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Embedding Climate Change in The Curriculum
John Willott1

Abstract
Climate change presents significant scientific, technical, ethical and political challenges.
Attitudes to climate change are a function of tradition and culture, and the prevailing
discourses in society and the media. Educators have a key role in understanding these
attitudes and promoting behavioural changes. However, the transdisciplinary nature of the
issues can present a problem for staff and students alike. While it is relevant to many, or
most, areas of the curriculum, traditional discipline and organisational boundaries, and the
knowledge, skills and educational history of both staff and students, can prevent engagement.
Examples include teaching the concepts in non-science courses, engaging science disciplines
with the political and ethical issues, and developing the understanding of responsibility and
its relevance in vocational, business-related courses.
In this paper I describe a review of courses across a higher education institution to
understand how climate change is incorporated into the curriculum, and the development of
teaching and materials for use across disciplines. Examples and discussion will be
contextualised to China and its role and position in global climate change issues.

Introduction
Climate change is the greatest environmental challenge facing the world today. To meet this
challenge, the world needs minds capable of creating new possibilities for meeting our basic
needs such as energy, water, shelter and food; minds that can transform our daily
experiences into ones that allow a sustainable development, safeguarding our opportunities
and the environment for future generations.
The higher education sector is where these minds are trained and developed. Therefore, it is
crucial that the sector contributes strongly to sustainable development. It can do so by
training and expanding these young minds; researching answers to challenges and informing
public policy; showing its own understanding and commitment through careful campus
management; and by being a responsible employer and active member of the business and
local community. Professor Lord Stern of Brentford, Foreword in HEFCE (2009)
These words illustrate the growing concern at policy level in the UK of the impacts of
climate change, and the role of universities, both as organisations and teaching institutions, in
responding to the threats. The role identified for universities here, way beyond that of
researching the problems, poses a significant challenge to our understanding of higher
education – what it is for, how it operates, and how curricula can be developed across the
different disciplines which encompass the range of issues implicit in the statement. I shall
show there are difficulties and tensions, but significant opportunities to respond to the
challenge which can no longer be avoided.
Role of Higher Education
Views on the purpose and role of higher education vary across the world (Gough & Scott
2007), but the discourse and policy in the UK has been largely shaped in recent years by what
1
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has become known as the Dearing Report (Dearing 1997). In this, four main purposes are
identified:
•

•
•
•

to inspire and enable individuals to develop their capabilities to the highest potential
levels throughout life, so that they grow intellectually, are well equipped for work,
can contribute effectively to society and achieve personal fulfilment;
to increase knowledge and understanding for their own sake and to foster their
application to the benefit of the economy and society;
to serve the needs of an adaptable, sustainable, knowledge-based economy at local,
regional and national levels;
to play a major role in shaping a democratic, civilised, inclusive society.
(Dearing 1997, Chapter 5)

These ideas have recently been explored and expanded in the context of sustainable
development by Gough & Scott (2007). These authors discuss the tensions between the roles
of higher education producing the skills base to serve society and the economy, and its
contribution to personal development and the intellectual and moral improvement of the
human condition - the so-called “real world” or “ivory tower” views. Added to contested
notions of how sustainable development is actually defined, these tensions have perhaps held
back the incorporation of sustainability principles within higher education.
Ward (2007a, b) has critiqued the role of higher education in the UK and its (lack of)
engagement with climate change problems. He sees the fundamental problem being due to
the influence of capitalism and consumerism, mediated through government policy, on
education generally, and on universities in particular. He argues that universities may be
compromised by their pursuit of research funding, including that of major corporations and
the petroleum and energy industries. With particular reference to the curriculum, he
concludes:
Our current education system at all levels, with its discrete, economically justified curricula,
designed for the knowledge based economy, lacks any element for holistic approaches to
global problems such as environmental degradation (Ward 2007b, p.15).
Contribution of Higher Education to Climate Change
In the UK, the Climate Change Act (2008) established a legally binding target of at least an
80% cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, and a reduction in CO2 emissions of at least
26% by 2020, both targets against a 1990 baseline. This imposes a Carbon Reduction
Commitment (CRC) (Defra 2009) on large organisations which consume more than 6,000
MWh of energy per year. This includes many universities. At present this only includes
energy consumed on site, but in future is likely to incorporate emissions related to travel and
waste. The CRC is a cap and trade system, so organisations purchase carbon credits, with a
price currently set at £12 per tonne of CO2 for the first year of the scheme (2010 – 2011).
Companies receive a rebate the following year, based on the cost of the credits ± 10% in the
first year, with this rising to ± 50% in the fifth year. The variation is based on the company’s
position in a league table of environmental performance. Initially this will be determined by
actions such as the number of sub-meters installed and certification to the Carbon Trust
Standard2, but will eventually be judged mainly on emissions reductions. So there are now
strong financial incentives and penalties for universities to address their carbon emissions,
and any actions will need engagement with staff and students.
2

See www.carbontruststandard.co.uk/
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This wider legislative framework also informs the policy of the Higher Education
Funding Council for England (HEFCE) and its counterparts in Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland. HEFCE distributes core funding for students, learning, teaching and research, and
provides capital funding for universities. Earlier policies and actions of HEFCE (e.g. HEFCE
2005) were criticised by Ward (2007a) for failing to address climate change at all, despite the
rhetoric around sustainability. However, its more recent publications are now more explicit.
The policy on sustainable development in higher education (HEFCE 2009) notes that English
universities have energy bills totalling £250 million a year, resulting in around 1.6 million
tonnes of CO2 emissions. The same report also notes (p.18) that the sector spends over £8
billion per year in non-pay costs, so how and where that money is spent can have a significant
social and environmental impact. Although there is wide variation across institutions in their
consumption of resources and emissions, there does seem to be some evidence of
improvement (Table 1).
Table 1 Energy and water consumption and waste indicators for English HEIs, 2006-07 (source, HEFCE
2009)

Energy consumption per student FTE*
Percentage change 2004-05 to 2006-07

Lower quartile
2,288 kWh
-7%
7.6 m3
4%

Water consumption per student FTE*
Percentage change 2004-05 to 2006-07
CO2 emissions per student FTE*
Percentage change 2004-05 to 2006-07
* FTE: full-time equivalent

643 kg
-4%

Median
3,201 kWh
-7%
11.5 m3
1%
863 kg
-12%

Upper quartile
6,449 kWh
-11%
25.0 m3
2%
1,593 kg
-15%

While the precise details of calculations are not explicit in either publication, these
figures for UK universities would appear to be lower than for many in the USA. In a sample
of 13 institutions, Rappaport & Creighton (2007, Table 2.2, p.24) record per capita emissions
of between 360 – 9950 kg CO2. For an individual institution, Rappaport & Creighton (2007)
provide a detailed case study of approaches to reduce the climate change impact of Tufts
University in the USA which could be used as a template for other institutions. It is
interesting to note in their analysis that the wealthiest universities (as measured by their
endowment funds) tend to have the greatest per capita emissions (Chapter 2, p.22), mirroring
the relationship between wealth and emissions of countries. They suggest that less well-off
institutions may have been quicker to embrace routine energy saving measures than their
wealthier counterparts.
A voluntary scheme exists in the USA for universities and colleges to monitor and
report actions to combat climate change. Recent data are summarised in Table 2. While
recognising that the sector in the USA is larger, more diverse and does not have the
centralised policy and control of that in the UK, it is nevertheless disappointing to see that as
many as 20 – 30% (of those who reported) do not even have policies to reduce energy
consumption through more efficient buildings or purchasing – two areas that would seem to
make economic sense even if responsible development was not the key driver.
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Table 2. Measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at some universities and colleges in the USA. Data
accessed from http://acupcc.aashe.org/statistics-tangible.php on 5 June 2009.

Schools
Committed
(Total = 514)

Action
1. Establish a policy that all new campus construction will be built to
at least the U.S. Green Building Council's LEED Silver standard or
equivalent.

368 (72%)

2. Adopt an energy-efficient appliance purchasing policy requiring
purchase of ENERGY STAR certified products in all areas for which
such ratings exist.

412 (80%)

3. Establish a policy of offsetting all greenhouse gas emissions
generated by air travel paid for by our institution.

46 (9%)

4. Encourage use of and provide access to public transportation for all
faculty, staff, students and visitors at our institution.

323 (63%)

5. Within one year of signing this document, begin purchasing or
producing at least 15% of our institution's electricity consumption
from renewable sources.

181 (35%)

6. Establish a policy or a committee that supports climate and
sustainability shareholder proposals at companies where our
institution's endowment is invested.

45 (9%)

7. Participate in the Waste Minimization component of the national
RecycleMania competition, and adopt 3 or more associated measures
to reduce waste.

297 (58%)

It is perhaps not surprising to see that air travel and investment policies are the least
well developed, as the former would be an additional cost, even if travel were restricted
(which would itself raise questions about how the institution operates), and the latter would
raise fears that the institution might see lower returns on investments. Both of these measures
which carry immediate cost implications may be further affected because as has been widely
reported, for example in The New York Times (2009), the value of university endowments
has fallen significantly since the onset of the current global financial crisis. The actions of
UK universities are being discussed in June 2009 at a roundtable debate organised by Times
Higher Education and the Carbon Trust entitled ‘UK HEIs are home to some of the world’s
experts on climate change and sustainability but are they putting their own house in order?’.
We shall see.
Education for Sustainable Development (ESD)
Climate change could be considered as a topic under the broader heading of education for
sustainable development. There is a considerable literature on this, from compulsory schoolage education through to universities. A consistent theme is that sustainable development
education, as distinct from environmental education, is highly complex and interdisciplinary,
and consequently requires the development of high level skills in both teachers and students
(e.g. Dale & Newman 2005). This has had implications for its incorporation into school
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educational programmes across the world, for example in Australia (Tilbury 2004) and the
USA (Fortner 2001). Some authors have argued that the school education system actively
mitigates against incorporating such a subject which is holistic, co-operative and
interdisciplinary (Stevenson 2007). Comparable concerns exist in higher education, with staff
largely supportive of its inclusion in the curriculum, but voicing concerns about the
complexity, fit with subject areas, and how it could be taught (Cotton et al 2007), although
there are examples of highly creative ways of engaging students, albeit those on a geography
programme who might be expected to be motivated, skilled and engaged with the issue
(Rebich & Gautier 2005). Nevertheless, policy drivers, in the UK at least as evidenced in my
introduction, are pointing towards its inclusion across the curriculum, perhaps catching up
with those who have been advocating it for some time:
What is particularly missing is the study of global warming in the curricula. It should,
without doubt, be present across almost the entire spectrum of university teaching. No other
educational opportunity like this presents itself. Before these students depart to their careers
in whichever field they have chosen, it is fundamental that they realise what that role that
field plays in humankind’s contribution towards the changing of the planet’s climate. Ward
(2007a, p.178).
Case Study: Leeds Metropolitan University
Leeds Metropolitan University arose through the amalgamation of several smaller specialist
colleges during the 20th century. It became Leeds Polytechnic in 1970, and Leeds
Metropolitan University in 1992, and currently has around 52,000 students. Buildings are
divided between the city centre and a campus approximately 5 km away. The city buildings
were mainly 1960s tower blocks, which are gradually being replaced by modern, more
energy-efficient units. The separate campus largely comprises older, listed buildings; that is
they are protected by law because of their historical and architectural significance. The nature
of the estate, and the fact that having two separate campuses means significant inter-campus
travel, poses significant challenges to sustainability strategies. Nevertheless, in 2003, it
became the first university in England to achieve the ISO 14001 international standard for
environmental management. In 2008 it ranked in the top 50 Sunday Times Best Green
Companies League, being the highest placed university. Contributory factors included the
fact that 85% of energy comes from renewable sources, the university employs full-time
environmental co-ordinators and regularly consults and informs staff on green issues, and
there are travel, recycling & purchasing policies in place. The University has also been
awarded Fairtrade status.
The project on ‘Embedding Climate Change in the Curriculum’ was conceived in late
2007 in response to the feeling that there was no knowledge of the extent to which climate
change and related issues of sustainability were addressed in teaching and learning across the
institution, and since they cut across the curriculum a university perspective was necessary.
Our impression from colleagues was that climate change (and related issues) was not always
incorporated into the curriculum where it could be, and colleagues may have been working in
isolation or duplicating effort. As the subject is so wide-ranging and interdisciplinary, and
requires both technical knowledge and high level skills in systems analysis (Dale & Newman
2005) we were concerned that individuals working in relative isolation would not be dealing
with the subject in a holistic manner (if at all). With no obvious focus for broad climate
change research and teaching within the institution (i.e. no earth or environmental sciences)
our goal was to create a network of individuals across faculties and disciplines to help embed
this subject across the curriculum, share the expertise and good practice of staff, develop
shared teaching materials and enhance the student learning experience as a result. Given that
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the university has been recognised as having taken a lead on environmental issues, it was also
fundamental to the project that the Sustainability Manager and team were involved. Case
study materials will have immediate relevance to students, and will illustrate the framework
within which the university operates, and tensions between some of its areas of operation.
Being so close to home we predict that this kind of case study is likely to have a greater
impact in changing student behaviour (e.g. switching off electrical appliances) or
expectations.
Thinking of the nature of the institution and subjects taught within it, these were some of our
a priori ideas of how climate change could relate to curricular areas:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Politics, social sciences – political and social policy
Business, economics, law – corporate social responsibility; consumer behaviour;
costs of mitigation and adaptation; economic models of development and growth;
notions of discount rates; legislation to reduce emissions
Ethics and development – spatial and temporal components of responsibility and
justice; water resources; population movements; millennium development goals
Tourism, hospitality, events – impact the industries have, e.g. carbon emissions of
flights, and the consequences of climate change for destinations and related
businesses; responsible tourism, event and hospitality management
Health – changing patterns of disease and vectors; mortality from heat stress
Built environment, architecture & landscape design – energy efficient buildings;
planning issues; urban design; consequences for the landscape
Arts – cultural consequences; artists’ responses
Education – education for sustainable development agenda; curriculum & pedagogy
IT/Computing – resource use, recycling, green computing, role of ICT in sustainable
development and lowering emissions

The survey of actual practice gave the overall impression that although there were
some centres of activity and good practice, and many staff were interested at a personal level,
there was no evidence of broader inclusion across the curriculum, even in areas where it
might be expected. It is not my intention here to highlight the gaps, but to briefly illustrate
some activities across diverse areas.
Two research and teaching centres have climate change issues explicitly at their core.
The Centre for the Built Environment3 works on emissions and energy efficient buildings,
and produces a range of teaching materials, including online and virtual simulations. The
International Centre for Responsible Tourism 4 works extensively on areas of pro-poor
tourism, sustainability, conservation and protected areas, with Masters courses for
professionals in the sector. Elsewhere, recent curriculum developments have included an
MSc Green Computing5 which identifies that ‘green’ issues are a major concern in terms of
their business, social and environmental impact in the 21st century. With the almost universal
adoption of ICT, this industry has a significant carbon footprint and students investigate
green ICT technologies, assess the environmental impact of ICT and look at how companies
can streamline their systems, increase sustainability and save energy costs.
Sector-specific reports and initiatives on climate change can influence curriculum
content within highly vocational degrees. The course team of the BSc Entertainment
3

See www.leedsmet.ac.uk/as/cebe/build.htm
See www.icrtourism.org/
5
See www.leedsmet.ac.uk/inn/courses_msc_green_computing.htm
4

587

Management have developed a new module on Responsible Entertainment, and updated the
curriculum within a module entitled Contemporary Issues, partly in response to a report on
carbon emissions by the London theatre industry. This is currently estimated at 50,000 tonnes
CO2 per year, with an additional 35,000 tonnes due to audience travel, and strategies are
suggested for reducing them (Greater London Authority 2008). Such a clear drive from the
sector for more sustainable practice is clearly a strong driver for the incorporation of
materials on climate change, emissions and sustainability into the curricula of degree
schemes for which it might, on the face of it, appear to have little relevance. This notion of
tailoring information to make it directly relevant to peoples’ concerns (in this case their
chosen profession) is one of the suggestions for breaking down barriers to engagement
suggested by Lorenzoni et al (2007).
Other opportunities for engaging with the sustainability agenda in courses that have
not traditionally been involved can come through shared teaching sessions. In one example,
students on the MA Peace and Development course were taught together with those on the
BA Managing International Hospitality. Though a simplistic exaggeration, these courses
could be considered to be in different places along the spectrum of vocational and academic
courses, or the ‘real world’ and ‘ivory tower’ dichotomy of Gough and Scott (2007).
Together they studied a module entitled ‘Working as a Global Citizen’, which covers ideas of
responsibility and ethics in the workplace, including sustainability and climate change. The
dynamics of two groups of students who would not normally interact (indeed, would
normally be on different campuses) allowed the development of understanding of others’
positions; education where learners are challenged by the experiences and perceptions of
others, rather than direct personal experience (Gough & Scott 2007, Chapter 15).
These few examples illustrate pockets of activity and expertise across a wide range of
disciplines and faculties, and that given individual and institutional will to develop and share
resources, the lack of an obvious centre is no barrier to climate change being incorporated
across different curriculum areas. Our next challenge is to roll out materials for wider use.
Tensions Within Academia
I am not suggesting it will be straightforward to embed climate change and sustainability
across a university’s operations. There are a number of structural and attitudinal barriers to
greater engagement, not least of which are the behavioural norms of academics themselves
(Feltham 2007), and a hands-off approach is entrenched in policy:
We have not yet revised the action plan in the light of the strong concerns that HEFCE
should do more to support the educator role. This is a challenging and sensitive area and we
do not wish to do anything that might infringe, or be perceived as infringing, institutional
autonomy. HEFCE (2009, p.6)
An illustration of an area displaying an apparent mismatch between institutional
policy to reduce emissions and its educational mission is provided by international students.
These are a significant source of income for many universities worldwide, they add to the
cultural diversity of campuses and enhance the educational experience of fellow students.
Internationalisation is a key agenda for many universities, and even though an important
component of this is greater internationalisation of the curriculum through materials and
examples from other countries and cultures, there is still considerable emphasis placed on
international students and student mobility through educational exchange schemes. An
unavoidable consequence of this are the associated greenhouse gas emissions. For example,
consider the approximately 49,000 Chinese students studying in the UK in 2007/2008 (Table
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3). Let us assume for the sake of illustration an average of one return air fare per year from
Hong Kong to London for each individual, producing approximately 4.5 tonnes CO26. On this
basis, emissions from these journeys alone exceed 220,000 tonnes CO2 per year, and this
crude averaging does not include in-country travel. This tension between the benefits and
costs of internationalisation is likely to become a key issue for higher education institutions
worldwide, both in terms of the ethics of increased air travel in an age of climate change, and
particularly if these emissions are included in any future calculations of an institutions’ total
output of greenhouse gases. Of course, if air travel becomes prohibitively expensive for
students owing to peak oil or carbon taxes or other disincentives (or a combination of both),
then the financial model and student experience of many universities will have to be reappraised.

Table 3. Subject of study and country of origin of students studying in UK universities in 2007 – 2008.
Source: UK Higher Education Statistics Agency (www.hesa.ac.uk)

UK
Medicine & dentistry
Subjects allied to medicine
Biological sciences
Veterinary science
Agriculture & related subjects
Physical sciences
Mathematical sciences
Computer science
Engineering & technology
Architecture, building &
planning
Social studies
Law
Business & administrative
studies
Mass communications &
documentation
Languages
Historical & philosophical
studies
Creative arts & design
Education
Combined
Total

6

Other EU

Rest
world

China

of

52875
267280
146205
4200
15385
71765
27975
76080
96920

%
2.7
13.6
7.4
0.2
0.8
3.7
1.4
3.9
4.9

2420
7560
7375
175
930
4110
1805
5140
11550

%
2.2
6.7
6.6
0.2
0.8
3.7
1.6
4.6
10.3

255
620
905
0
235
1095
1890
2655
6645

%
0.5
1.3
1.8
0.0
0.5
2.2
3.9
5.4
13.5

6260
11665
7110
475
1125
5160
2450
11700
24320

%
3.5
6.5
3.9
0.3
0.6
2.9
1.4
6.5
13.5

53870
169645
72740

2.7
8.6
3.7

3380
10285
4955

3.0
9.2
4.4

1260
3755
990

2.6
7.6
2.0

4575
15190
10560

2.5
8.4
5.8

219690

11.2 22730

20.3 21015 42.8 47020

26.0

40860
115210

2.1
5.9

2960
9050

2.6
8.1

1110
3710

2.3
7.6

3040
8085

1.7
4.5

88520
140340
191020
113735
1964315

4.5
7.1
9.7
5.8

3260
8250
4360
1860
112150

2.9
7.4
3.9
1.7

210
1360
980
400
49090

0.4
2.8
2.0
0.8

4635
8935
5945
2310
180550

2.6
4.9
3.3
1.3

Emissions calculated using www.carbonbalanced.org/calculator/flights.asp
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The importance of academics engaging with the problems of climate change across all
disciplines, including arts, humanities and social sciences has been stressed by Sir David
King, the former Chief Scientific Adviser to the UK Government:
“[climate change] is also a problem that needs to be looked at from the social science point
of view, economic point of view and political point of view, and universities need to address
these problems in an interdisciplinary mode” (Times Higher Education, 24 January 2008)
The comments of Sir David were made in the context of interdisciplinary research,
but the data in Table 3 emphasise the need the need to extend this argument to teaching.
Table 3 shows the numbers of students in the UK studying different disciplines and their
country of origin. Climate change research is likely to be concentrated in the disciplines of
physical and biological sciences, and perhaps engineering and technology. (There will of
course be individuals or small groups of academics with these interests in other areas, but my
contention is that they are likely to be in the minority). Assuming patterns of teaching and
curriculum content follow these research foci, it is clear that there are potentially large
numbers of students passing through university without engaging with the issues as part of
their curriculum. This is unintentionally reinforced by some of the professional associations
in UK academia. The Higher Education Academy 7 supports good practice and sharing
resources in teaching and learning across UK universities, and is arranged in Subject Groups.
Resources related to climate change tend to be within the Geography, Earth & Environmental
Sciences (GEES8) Subject Group, but many of these are technical and could only be readily
understood by others within the discipline. It is also evident that some websites of faculties or
departments engaged in climate change science have resources and activities available for
schools and children. While this is laudable and should be encouraged further as part of
universities’ responsibility to engage with society, what of resources for non-specialist
academics and students within their own institution?
For many of the more vocational undergraduate and postgraduate courses, curriculum
content is strongly determined by the associated professional body. Examples at Leeds Met
include nursing, physiotherapy, law, accountancy and architecture among others. In order to
retain the accreditation of the professional body, and so attract fee-paying students, course
designers need to meet the professional standards. In what may already be a full curriculum,
negotiating where issues like climate change and sustainability fit in (and, crucially, dealing
with real or perceived fears of what may therefore need to be left out) is a significant issue.
Aside from courses with professional bodies, there are strong traditions of autonomy within
higher education when it comes to designing and delivering a curriculum, and this continues
to be articulated by the responsible public body:
HEFCE recognises that it is not within its role to influence the curriculum. However, we can
support universities and colleges in producing graduates with the values, skills and
knowledge to address sustainable development. This is important for all graduates, not just
those engaged in fields directly connected to sustainability. Many will, for example, be
managing or leading businesses or services where they will need to make decisions that
impact on social justice or the environment.
Equally, we recognise the danger of bolting what some might see as the latest fad onto
courses; doing so is more likely to create resentment than real change. So we will support
7
8

See www.heacademy.ac.uk/
See www.gees.ac.uk/index.htm
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shared curriculum ideas, content and assessment methods that help to develop teaching and
learning. Different institutions will have different approaches. We want to encourage and
incentivise engagement (including through our Strategic Development Fund) but recognise
that there will be those who find it hard to engage because of their discipline base, the focus
of their mission or the size or level of student interest. Our approach is therefore one of
encouragement and support. HEFCE (2009, p.13)
While the newer policy on sustainable development is undoubtedly a step forward, the
above extracts do not entirely remove some of the frustrations with earlier documents
discussed by Ward (2007a). If the principal body responsible for policy and funding of higher
education in England regards sustainable development as ‘important for all graduates’ (my
emphasis), why do they not feel they can influence curriculum, and can only offer ‘support’
for those institutions? The curriculum is already influenced in that there are strong drivers to
incorporate employability, enterprise and personal development planning into all courses.
Discipline base, mission, size and (perceived) level of student interest are no excuse for lack
of action. As I showed earlier in the example of Leeds Metropolitan University, there are few,
if any, disciplines to which it is not relevant, and it is certainly now relevant to every
individual and organisation across the globe. It is the case though that many academics will
not see the relevance to their subject or will be concerned about unbalanced or politicised
teaching (e.g. see Cotton et al 2007). Nor would I argue that climate change should be
developed in the curriculum uncritically. There are debates (however well- or ill-informed)
about the nature of the evidence, the veracity and reliability of predictions, the extent to
which any changes are human-induced, what, if anything, our response should be, and
responsibility for and nature of actions to mitigate and adapt to changes. So aside from the
subject of climate change per se, it is a highly valuable and topical tool for students to
develop skills in critical analysis and balancing arguments, risks and uncertainties. This fits
with universities’ responsibility to prepare students to face the challenges of the twenty-first
century world in their professional lives and as citizens. Broader concepts of ethics, justice
and fairness can readily be addressed through climate change (e.g. Adger et al 2007; Garvey
2008).
It would be naïve to assume that incorporation of materials across the curriculum
would instantly produce results. Education is a necessary but on its own insufficient condition
to promote the necessary changes in behaviour – the gap between knowledge and proenvironmental behaviour is well known (see Kollmuss & Agyeman 2002). But without it no
change is likely.
China
The capacity of the environment in China to cope with the growing pressures of population,
development and economic growth is being stretched (Kitzes et al 2008). Unsurprisingly,
there is wide regional variation in the causes and consequences of the issues. For a densely
populated and highly developed area such as Hong Kong, its ecological footprint is largely a
consequence of its importing of natural resources from other regions and the global
commons, and carbon emissions released into the atmosphere as a consequence of power
generation and transport (Niazi et al 2008). Summarising China’s environmental problems,
MacBean (2007) argues that while there are a range of policies and laws in place aimed at
addressing them, their impact is limited owing to lack of compliance and conflicting
pressures for economic growth and employment.
In 2007, the National Development and Reform Commission produced China’s
National Climate Change Programme (Anonymous 2007). As with any such document, there
are issues with the scenarios and targets because of the time lag in collecting, publishing or
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reviewing data in such rapidly changing circumstances (e.g. see Anderson & Bows 2008).
There is also China’s stance, contested by some, that developed countries should take the lead
in reducing emissions because of past activities. Liu (2009) offers a recent and succinct
critique on climate and energy issues in China, encompassing the National Climate Change
Programme. While noting some considerable achievements, like MacBean (2007) she
comments on the disjunction between state policy and local buy-in:
Unfortunately, the state-led efforts have not sparked much enthusiasm from local
governments and industries because of a lack of incentives. And the annual energy efficiency
targets are rather arbitrary, with few considerations of the time frame needed by industries
for such changes. As a result, the targets were not reached in 2006 or 2007. The policies and
regulations do, however, indicate the central government’s political will, and they have
cleared many obstacles for optimal market functioning. (Liu 2009, p.86)
For the purposes of this paper, I do not intend to comment further on general climate
change issues or policies within China, but will focus on those aspects of the policy which
relate to higher education. Key sections of the document are:
Strengthening Education, Training and Public Awareness on Climate Change
The Government of China always attaches importance to education, training and public
awareness on climate change. The Program of Action for Sustainable Development in China
in the Early 21st Century states that China will vigorously develop all forms of education at
all levels, to enhance the public awareness on sustainable development and enhance their
scientific and cultural capacity for their participation in the sustainable development by
reinforcing personnel training. In recent years, China has intensified its efforts to promote
education, training and public awareness on climate change by organizing various kinds of
lectures on climate change basic knowledge, conducting climate change training courses for
policy makers at central and provincial levels, and organizing conferences such as Climate
Change and Ecological Environment, as well as setting up an official bilingual website on
climate change (China Climate Change Info-Net http://www.ccchina.gov.cn) in Chinese and
English to provide comprehensive information on climate change. Commendable results have
been achieved accordingly.(p.13)
Reinforcing the publicity, education and training on climate change. Measures in this
regard include: making full use of mass media such as books, newspapers, periodicals, audio
and video products to disseminate knowledge of climate change to stakeholders in all walks
of life; advocating sustainable life style including electricity-saving, water-saving, garbage
classification, reduction, recycling and reuse; incorporating climate change publicity and
education into the framework of basic education, adult education and higher education as an
important component of China’s overall quality education; holding various thematic training
seminars targeting at different audiences and organizing different workshops on both
popular and professional climate change science; (p.55)
Public awareness. Capacity building needs for public awareness include developing
medium-and-long term program and policy to enhance public awareness of climate change,
establishing professional publicity and education network and institutions in line with
international standards, training people working in media and climate change education,
launching public campaigns for stakeholders from different regions and groups to
disseminate the knowledge of climate change, and guiding the public consumption patterns in
favor of the protection of global climate system. (p.62)
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While many of these goals are laudable, there is a lack of indication of who is to take
responsibility for the actions and how they are to achieve them. Higher education in China
has changed rapidly in recent years, and this process is continuing (Ma 2003). There is still a
strong rhetoric of centralised control and a proscriptive curriculum (e.g. Ministry of
Education of PRC 2008a), and this approach can take away the flexibility and incorporation
of locality-specific materials with which to engage students. These can include case studies of
their own university as I have indicated earlier, and include specific examples of impacts if
localised scenarios are available (e.g. Tracy et al 2006). In common with other countries,
many of the specialist higher education institutions might not regard climate change as
relevant to them. The latest data I have seen show that by 2002, 15% of young people were
progressing to higher education in China, equating to 16 million people in over 2000
institutions (Ministry of Education of PRC 2008b). These are likely to be the future managers
and leaders of society, and as Ma (2003) notes:
What specific missions and roles will higher education play in independent judgment,
development of cultural and ethical values of society, besides economic development?
Conclusions
Universities have a key role to play in responding to the challenges of global climate change.
They are the site of much research into our understanding of the science behind climate
change, and are working with businesses, governments and non-government organisations on
projects to develop technologies and actions for mitigation and adaptation. However, there is
evidence that teaching in these areas is not always extending beyond the core areas of
geography, earth and environmental sciences and some engineering. This lack of
interdisciplinary working is hampering wider engagement and means that many students are
passing through university without any critical engagement with climate change issues within
their curriculum. This need not be the case. Universities also tend to be large organisations,
playing a significant role in the city or region they are located. Through better management of
their estate and energy use, and initiatives aimed at staff and students, such as transport,
purchasing and recycling policies, they can demonstrate leadership to their communities and
stakeholders, both internally and externally, and these can generate valuable teaching tools
with which to engage students.
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